9ZN\G 


UT 


in  the  ®ttu  cf  ^^nr  ^ovh 


|[>* 


LIFE 


or  THB 


EMPEROR     NAPOLEON 


>OTK   nv  Tui:  E.\GUAVj:r.. 

The  likeness  is  taken  from  tin;  original  print  r'ngraved  in  the  yt-jr  1797,  \>y  J.  (jouE- 
tKoy,   •v*hich  print  was  drawn  by  Cukvunr,  from   David's  original  ski-tch  after  life. 

Towards  tlie  cod  of  the  year  1797.  about  the  time  of  general  Bonaparte's  return 
being  expected  from  his  victorious  campaign  in  Italy,  a  gcntlema/i  in  order  to  pay  his 
court  to  Joscpiiine  (madam  IJoaapartcj,  wished  to  present  her  with  a  fan  illustrative  of 
the  general's  victories  in  Italy,  lie  .ipp'icd  to  Cbaldet,  the  celebrated  draughtsman 
and  sculptor,  and  member  of  the  institute,  who  made  an  allegorical  and  emblematical 
design,  in  the  centre  of  which  is  a  medallion  portrait  of  general  lionaparte.  i'.uwuEi- 
drew  the  likeness  from  the  sketch  which  IJavid  had  made  fro:n  nature,  when  ibc  gene- 
ral had  sal  to  him  about  the  year  1796,  before  be  left  Paris  for  the  Italian  frontier. 
CiiAUDET  completed  his  design  with  the  assistance  of  Fostaimb  an.l  I'ercieb,  arcliiti.'cts, 
who  drew  the  other  medallions  and  ornaments  with  their  accustomed  ability,  and  I  was 
ccinmLssioned  tt>  engrave  this  drawing,  which  I  did  Ijy  the  end  of  17^7. 

J.  Goi>KFR«ir,  Julv,    i8j4. 


i 


y 


I 


J 


GE  f^'  K  RAIL  'OSV        I^OI^  AFARTE 


THE    LIFB-^^^^^^^_^^^^^^^^^ 


S 


OF    THE 


\    EMPEROR     NAPOLEON. 


WITH  AN  APPENDIX, 


CONTAINING    AN    EXAMINATION 


OF 


SIR  W.  SCOTT'S  "  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE ; " 


AND 


A  NOTICE  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  ERRORS  OF  OTHER  WRITERS, 
RESPECTLNG  HIS  CHARACTER  AND  CONDUCT. 


BY 


H.    LEE. 


VOL.  I. 


NEW-YO  RK  : 

CHARLES      DE      BEHR, 

No.   102,  Broadway. 

1835. 


[Entered  according  to  the  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1835,  by  Crahles  db 
Behr,  in  the  Cleric's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
Southern  District  of  New- York.] 


PREFACE. 


The  general  impression,  that  an  impartial 
and  accurate  biography  of  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  does  not  exist,  and  that  Sir  Wal- 
ter Scott,  in  his  "  Life  of  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte,'  did  injustice  to  his  subject,  autho- 
rises an  endeavour  to  supply  that  defect  and 
repair  that  injustice.  In  the  body  and  ap- 
pendix of  the  work,  the  first  volume  of 
which  is  now  submitted  to  the  public,  this 
double  object  is  attempted. 

The  fame  and  amiableness  of  the  author 
of  Waverley,  since  they  give  importance  to 
his  errors  and  effect  to  his  detraction,  are 
far  from  alleviating  his  faults  as  an  bisto- 
rt 


VI  PREFACE, 

rian.  His  name  is  less  glorious  than  tliat 
of  Napoleon ;  his  memory  less  sacred  than 
truth. 

It  may  be  that  the  causes  of  his  failure  in 
one  walk  of  literature,  were  the  sources  of  his 
success  in  another.  But  a  bigoted  and  fantas- 
tic zeal  for  the  hereditary  privileges  of  rank 
and  royalty,  when  displayed  ostentatiously 
in  the  light  of  reason,  and  mischievously  ob- 
truded on  the  business  of  nations,  is  not  the 
less  absurd  and  offensive,  that,  transmitted 
through  the  twilight  of  romance,  it  has  con- 
duced to  the  creation  or  embellishment  of 
unreal  characters  and  fictitious  scenes.  Their 
music  and  innocence,  although  they  qualify 
the  choristers  of  Rome  to  fill  with  harmony 
the  domes  of  temples,  and  to  touch  with 
ecstacy  the  forms  of  devotion,  would  not 
exempt  them  from  pity  and  aversion,  should 
they  go  forth  into  the  world  and  meddle 
Avith  the  affairs  of  bearded  men. 

The  propriety  of  annexing  lo  a  life  of  the 


PREFACE.  VII 

Emperor  Napoleon,  an  examination  of  the 
work  of  Sir  Walter  Scott,  is  enforced  by 
several  considerations.  In  the  first  place, 
that  work  controverts  the  assertions  of  Na- 
poleon respecting  matters  of  his  personal 
experience,  in  the  sketches  which  he  dic- 
tated of  his  own  life ;  and  so  far  raises  a 
question,  the  decision  of  which  is  essential 
to  a  just  estimation  of  his  moral  character. 
In  the  next  place  ;  for  an  unknow  n  writer 
to  demand  of  the  public  the  acceptance  of 
his  own  narrative  and  the  rejection  of  that 
of  the  most  eloquent  and  popular  author 
of  his  aoe,  without  demonstratino  the  fal- 
lacy  of  one  and  the  faithfulness  of  the 
other,  would  be  a  proceeding  as  presump- 
tuous as  the  example  of  Norvins  has  proved 
it  to  be  vain.* 

*  Norvins  announced  (see  his  preface)  his  woik  as 
expressly  designed  to  refute  and  discredit  that  of  Sir 
Walter  Scott — an  effect  ^\hich,  notwithstanding  his  zeal 
and  opportunities,  lie  does  not  appear  to  have  had  the 
slightest  agency  in  producing. 


VIM  PREFACE. 

An  engineer,  rather  than  see  his  fortress 
overcrowed  and  commanded,  will  not  hesi- 
tate to  demolish  a  neighbouring  edifice, 
however  costly  its  materials  or  curious  its 
workmanship;  however  pompously  its 
foundations  may  be  laid  in  the  earth,  or 
gracefully  its  spires  may  spring  into  the  air. 

Again;  if  it  shall  be  found  that  the  scheme 
of  the  great  novelist  embraced  such  misre- 
presentations as  he  covild  decently  repeat  or 
plausibly  imagine,  their  correction  will 
counteract,  in  its  most  imposing  form,  and 
by  a  single  operation,  a  diversified  mass  of 
historical  falsehood,  and  establish  in  the 
reader's  mind,  various  and  important  truths. 
It  is  observed  by  Lord  Bacon,  that  '•^  the 
enquiry  of  truth,  which  is  the  wooing  of 
it^  the  knowledge  of  truth,  which  is  the 
presence  of  it^  and  the  belief  of  truth, 
which  is  the  enjoying  of  it;  is  the  sovereign 
good  of  human  nature.' 

Within  tlic  compass  of  the  design  here 


PREFACE.  IX 

indicated  the  task  of  noticing  kindred  and, 
conflicting  errors  of  lesser  writers,  naturally 
falls.  The  author,  removed  from  the  in- 
fluence of  national  or  personal  feelings  in 
relation  to  his  suhject,  is  sensible  of  as  little 
disposition  to  respect  the  follies  of  French, 
as  the  unfairness  of  British,  historians,  while 
he  records  the  actions  of  a  man,  whose  cha- 
racter, in  rising  to  a  level  with  the  noblest 
examples  of  any  former  age,  provoked  and 
encountered  the  vilest  prejudices  and  pas- 
sions of  his  own. 


i 


COiSTENTS. 


<^sSS^&Q)^S^Samm 


CHAPTER  I. 

From   1769    lo    178 


V 


Corsica  —  Birth  of  Napoleon — His  familv —  Circumstances 
attending  his  birlh  —  Anecdotes  of  his  infancy  —  His 
father,  a  deputy  of  the  nobles  to  Versailles  in  1^79 — 
Places  him  at  the  military  school  of  Brienne — Anecdotes 
respecting  him  while  at  Brienne — Pichegru  his  comrade 
and  tutor — His  admiration  for  Turenne — His  early  trans- 
fer to  the  school  of  Paris — The  Chevalier  Keralio's  opi- 
nion and  report  of  him — Admiration  of  his  instructors  at 
Paris — His  favourite  authors — Anecdotes  in  regard  to  hiai 
while  at  the  school  of  Paris  —  Noticed  bv  the  abbe 
Raynal — Death  of  his  father  — His  comrades  at  Paris — 
Examined  by  La  Place — Receives  his  first  commission  as 
second  lieutenant  of  artillery — Joins  his  regiment  at  Va- 
lence, in  Dauphine — His  character  at  the  time. 


CHAPTER  H. 

From  1785  to   1793. 

Napoleon  in  garrison  at  Valence  in  Dauphine — Madam  Co- 
lombier's  kindness  and  esteem  for  him — In  love  with  her 
daughter — His  success  in  society  —  His  comrades  in  the 
regiment — His  prize  essay  successful  in  the  academy  of 
Lyons — His  history  of  Corsica — Commended  bv  the  Abbe 
Raynal — In  garrison  at  Auxonne — Near  being  drowned 
in  the  Saone — Prince  of  Conde — Bonaparte's  public  letter 
lo  the  Corsican  deputy  Buttafoco—  Kindness  to  his  brother 
Louis — Promoted  to  a  first  lieutenancy  in  the  regiment  of 
Grenoble  —  Pieturns  to  Valence  —  Anecdote —  General 
Dutheil — Bonaparte's  liberal  political  opinions — Rescues 
a  brother  officer — Visits  Corsica — Death  of  his  father's 


XII  IM)tX. 


uncle — AiiPcdole — Proniolcd  to  a  caplaiucy — Conimaucfs 
a  Corsican  ballalion,  and  siij)ressesa  riot  at  Ajac(;io — Tlic 
first  siand;'!'  against  hin) — Goes  to  l\iris — llcmarks  on  the 
liorrors  of  the  uolli  or,hMir,and  lolli  of  August — Jleilcc- 
tion — Interest  al)Oiil  liissistcjs — lleturns  to  ( ioislca — Tlxr 
<'\j)edltion  af;ainst  Sai'dinla — Paoll — Anecdote — Refuses 
to  join  l^ioli — Paoli's  cruelly  to  tin;  Bonaparte  finnily — 
Clixil^varin  Corsica — J}on;<j)art{;  active  on  tlie  side  of 
l*'rance — Paoli  calls  in  tin;  English — Corsica  subdued  by 
England — JMadani  ]>onaj)art(;  lakes  n  fuge  on  the  conti- 
nent, and  sellles  at  Marseilles — ]{ona])artc  joins  the  army 
of  Italv  —  Writes  and  publishes  *'  Le  Souper  de  i»cau- 
caire." 

CHAPTER  ill. 

From  Aiujuai,  1795,  to  March,  1794. 

Siege  of  Toulon — That  place  betrayed  to  EordlTood — Sen- 
siilion  produced  bj  it — Situation  ofToidon — Strength  of 
the  allied  garrison — j^hasurcsof  the  coniniittee  of  public 
safety — Their  jilan  for  the  siege — 13onaj)arle  chief  of  bat- 
talion— Ap|)oinledto  command  the  artillery  of  the  siege 
— General  Carlaux. — ignorance  at  heatl-cpiarters — Dilli- 
cidties  to  contend  a\  iih — Boniij)arte's  ])lan  — Rejected  by 
Carlaux  — Foliy  of  that  general — Vigour  and  activity  of 
Roniiparte — Council  of  uar — Ronaparle's  plan  adopted 
— Jls  execution  commenced — Little.  Gibraltar  — J>all(;ry 
of  the  convention — Mischievous  interference  of  the  de- 
puties— Sally  and  capture  of  General  O'llara — Repulse 
of  the  sallying  party — General  Doppet  —  His  cowardice 
and  incapacity — General  Dugommier — His  coura^rp  and 
experience  —  Discoin-agement  of  the  besiegers — Confi- 
tlence  of  IJonaparle — His  batteries  play  on  JiiliicGii)raltar 
— Advises  the  storming  that  place — Little  Gibraltar  car- 
ried by  assault — Brav(M-v  of  the  garrison — Swaggering  of 
ihe  deputies — Tin;  allied  squadrons  weigh  anchor — 'Ihe 
town,  forts  and  harbour  plundered  and  evacuated  — The 
French  fleet,  arsenal,  and  magazines  set  on  hre — Dreadful 
conflagration — Distress  of  the  Toulonese — Anecdotes — 
.lunot — Humanity  of  Bonaparte — Duroc — Afi'ection  and 
admiration  of  Dugommier  lor  Jjonaparte — Bonaparte  bri- 
g;)di(>r  general  —  Is  ordered  to  join  the  army  of  Italy  — 
Prcsciibes  a  system  of  fortifications  for  the  coast — His 
horror  of  the  cruelty  of  a  mob — His  respect  for  the  me- 
mory of  Gasparin,  and  of  Dugommier. 


iM»i;x.  \m 


CHAPTER  IV. 

From  March,  1794,  to  October,  1795. 

Uonapai  te  joins  the  army  of  Italy  as  general  of  artillery — 
llis  first  aides-de-camp — General  Dunierbion — Position 
of  the  two  armies — Strong  camp  of  the  Sardinians — Bo- 
naparte's plan  for  dislodging  them — Adopted  by  a  coun- 
cil of  ^vn^ — Massena — Bonaparte's  active    operations — 
Their  rapidity  and  success — Beats  the  Austrians — Takes 
Oneille,Ormea,and  Garessio — The  Sardinians  dislodged 
and  Saorgio  taken  by  Massena,  who  drives  them  from  the 
Col  deTende — Positions  occupied  by  the  French  army — 
Their  sufferings — Bonaparte's  plan  for  uniting  the  armies 
of  Italy  and  the  Alps — Prevented  In  the  events  of  the  Qth 
Tliermidor — Preparations  of  the   allies — Plan  proposed 
by  Bonaparte   for  counteracting  them — Carries   it   inlo 
executifjn — Its  effects — End  of  the  campaign — His  chief 
occupations  in  autumn  and  Avinter — Madam  1  liurreau — 
Bonaparte's  infatuation — Its  proboblc  effect  on  his  fortune 
— Iiobespierre   the  younger — Anecdote — Bonaparte  put 
under  arrest — lleleased  without  trial — Zeal  and  fidelity 
of  Junot — Bonaparte  summoned  to  the  bar  of  the  conven- 
tion, on  a  charge  which  is  withdrawji — Allaehed  to  the 
armament  prepared  for  an  attack  upon  Rome — By  his  ad- 
vice that  project  abandoned — Mob  at  Toulon — Saves  two 
deptities  of  the  assembly  —  Rescues  the  Chabrillants  — 
Rejoins  the  army  of  Italy — Ordered  to  take  a  command  in 
the  infantrv — Is  dissatisfied  and  proceeds  to  Paris — Visits 
his  mother  on  his  way  and  stops  at  Chatillon-sur-Seine — 
Anecdote — His  interview  with  Au])ry,  the   minister  of 
war — His  retoit — Tenders  his  resignation — It  is  not  ac- 
cepted— Appointed  to  command  the  artilleiT  of  the  army 
of  the  West — Kellerman's  disasters — Dangeiof  the  Italian 
frontier — The  committee  of  public  saf  ty  consult  Bona- 
parte— He  draws  up  instructions  which  are  sent  to  Keller- 
mann  —  Is  employed  in  the  war  oihee   in  directing  the 
operations  of  the  armies — His  reputed  idea  of  obtaining 
orders  to  seek  a  command  in  the  army  of  the  Grand  Sig- 
liior — Independent  in  his  circumstances,  though  not  rich 
— His  disposal  of  his  time  while  at  Paris — His  impres- 
sion in  society. 


MV  lM)IiM, 


CHAPTER  V. 

From  October,  1795^  to  March,  1796. 

The  convention  adopt  the  constitution  of  the  year  5 — Its 
principal  provisions — Likely  to  be  acceptable  to  the  na- 
tion— The  additional  acts  engrafted  on  it  excite  dissatis- 
faction— Wisdom  of  those  acts — Combined  opposition  of 
the  royalists  and  jacobins — The  people  of  Paris  stirred 
up  to  opposition — They  vote  for  accepting  the  constitu- 
tion and  for  rejecting  the  acts — A  majority  of  the  nation 
and  the  armies  ^\\e  their  suffrages  for  both — Resistance 
and  insurrection  of  the  sections  of  Paris — Violence  of  the 
section  Lepellelier — Measures  of  the  convention — Ge- 
neral Menou  commander  in  chief  of  the  army  of  the  inte- 
rior— He  attempts  to  disperse  an  armed  body  of  insur- 
gents— Hesitates  and  fails — Danger  of  the  crisis — Bona- 
parte an  accidental  witness  of  Menou's  miscarriage  — 
Repairs  to  the  gallery  of  the  convention  —  Agitation  of 
that  assembly — His  conference  with  the  executive  com- 
mitee — Protests  against  being  fettered  by  commissaries 
of  the  convention — Is  appointed  by  the  committee  to 
command  the  troops — Barras  made  nominal  commander 
in  chief — Bonaparte's  prompt  and  judicious  measures — 
Gets  possession  of  the  cannon  and  occupies  the  bridges — 
Danican,  commander  in  chief  of  the  insurgents,  summons 
the  convention  to  dismis  their  troops  —  Bonaparte  fur- 
nishes the  members  with  arms — Movement  of  the  insur- 
gent leader  Lafonde,  upon  Pont  Neuf — Cartaux  abandons 
that  post,  and  falls  back  to  the  Louvre — The  insurgents 
close  in  and  fire  upon  the  Tuileries — Bonaparte  orders  his 
troops  to  act — Spirit  and  success  of  his  operations — Cou- 
rage and  repulse  of  Lafonde — The  insurgents  defeated  on 
all  points — Humanity  of  Bonaparte — The  insurrection 
quelled — Exultation  of  the  convention — Meanness  of  Bar- 
rass — The  appointment  of  Bonaparte,  as  commander  of 
the  army  of  the  interior,  confirmed  by  the  convention — 
Their  moderation — Trial  and  danger  of  Menou — Saved 
hy  the  influence  of  Bonaparte — Bonaparte  disarms  the 
national  guard,  and  executes  other  unwelcome  but  salu- 
tary measures — Scarcity  in  Paris — Discontent  of  the  po- 
pulace— Anecdote — llecomposes  the  legislative  guard  for 
the  new  government — Organises  a  legion  of  police,  and 
a  guard  for  the  directory — Becomes  acquainted  with  Ma- 


INDEX .  \v 


tlam  Beauharnais  and  her  son — Interesting  interview — 
The  ItaHan  frontier  again  in  danger — Bonaparte  consuU- 
ed  by  the  directory  —  Furnishes  apian  of  campaign — ■ 
Appointed  commander  in  chief  of  the  army  of  Italy — 
Marries  Madam  Beauharnais — State  of  his  fortune  and 
his  probaljle  reflections — Leaves  Paris  and  takes  com- 
mand of  his  army. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

From  March,  4790,  to  May,  1796. 

Italy — The  valley  of  the  Po — The  states  and  forces  hv 
which  it  was  defended — The  instructions  of  the  di- 
rectory to  Bonaparte — The  folly  of  those  instructions — 
Comparative  numhers  and  condition  of  the  hostile  armies 
— Sufferings  of  the  French — Their  want  of  food,  mo- 
ney, horses,  and  artillery — Bonaparte  relieves  general 
Scherer — His  appointment  acceptable  to  the  troops — 
Not  so  altogether  to  Massena  and  Augereau — The  force 
and  ascendancy  of  his  character — Anecdote — Orders  the 
head  quarters  to  be  advanced  to  Albenga — Mutiny  of 
the  29th  regiment — Royalist  emissary — The  mutineers 
punished,  and  the  emissary  arrested — Efficacious  at- 
tention of  Bonaparte  to  the  subsistence  of  his  troops — 
His  march  to  Albenga — Disdains  to  return  the  cannonade 
of  Nelson — Address  to  his  army — Its  character  and  effect 
— His  generals  and  aides-de-camp — The  high  spirit  of  the 
army — Bonaparte's  plan  of  invasion — His  object  frus- 
trated by  the  advance  of  general  Laharpe — Stations  of 
the  several  divisions  of  his  army — Beaulieu  opens  the 
campaign — His  activity  and  plan  of  operations — He  ad- 
vances upon  Yoltri — Directs  Argenteau  upon  Savon  a — 
Bonaparte  resolves  to  detain  Beaulieu  at  Voltri,  and  to 
attack  Argenteau — Combat  of  Voltri — Of  Monteligino 
— Good  conduct  of  Cervoni — Heroism  of  Rampon — 
Battle  of  Montenotte — Defeat  of  Argenteau — Advance  of 
the  French — Beaulieu  and  Nelson  disconcerted — Battle 
of  Milessimo — Gallantry  of  Joubert — Surrender  of  Pro- 
vera — Passage  of  the  Bormida  and  storming  of  Dego — 
Defeat  of  Beaulieu  and  further  advance  of  the  French — 
Surprise  of  Dego — Retaken  by  the  Austrians — Counter- 
march of  Bonaparte — Battle  of  Dego — Heroic  conduct 
and  death  of  general  Causse — Promptness  and  activity 
of  Bonaparte — Gallantry  of  Lannusse  and  of  Lannes — 


XVI  INDEX. 

Sanguinary  defeat  of  the  Austrians — Recapture  of  Dego 
— Bonaparte  prudent  after  his  surprise^Sends  to  re- 
connoitre Voltri — The  Austrians  and  Sardinians  com- 
pletely separated — Laharpe's  division  posted  on  the  Belbo 
— Serrurier's  division  advanced  against  the  Sardinians — 
The  action  of  the  army  reversed — March  of  the  French 
upon  Ccva  —  They  reach  the  commanding  heiglit  of 
Montezemoto — The  plains  of  Italy  in  view — Feelings  of 
the  troops — Emotion  and  remark  of  Bonaparte — Attack 
upon  Ceva — The  Sardinians  driven  with  loss  from  their 
intrenched  camp — Alarm  of  the  court  of  Turin — The 
French  pass  the  Tanaro — Their  active  pursuit — General 
Colli  retreats  behind  the  Corsaglio — Serrurier  passes 
that  river — Driven  l)ack — Bonaparte's  dispositions  for  ad- 
vancing— Directs  Augereau  to  march  down  the  right 
hank  of  the  Tanaro — With  Serrurier  and  Massena  passes 
the  Corsaglio — Battle  of  Mondovi — Defeat  of  the  Sar- 
dinians— Pursued  by  general  Stengel  with  the  French 
cavalry — His  death  and  character — Gallantry  of  Murat 
— Rapid  advance  of  the  French  army  towards  Turin — 
— Serrurier  enters  Fossano,  Massena  Cherasco,  and  Au- 
gereau Alba — Bonaparte  fortifies  Cherasco — His  prepa- 
rations for  strengthening  his  army — The  king  of  Sardinia 
sues  for  peace — His  general  proposes  a  suspension  of 
arms — Answer  and  conditions  of  Bonaparte — His  frank- 
ness and  moderation — Armistice  of  Cherasco — Suffering 
of  the  French  troops  for  food — Their  plundering — Dis- 
content of  the  officers — General  Laharpe  tenders  his  re- 
signation— Firmness  and  equity  of  Bonaparte — His  mea- 
sures to  supplv  food  to  his  troops,  to  repair  his  losses,  and 
to  strengthen  his  position — He  equips  his  cavalry  and 
prepares  a  park  of  artillery — His  victories  celebrated  by 
the  French  legislature — His  conduct  approved  by  the 
directory — He  resolves  to  invade  the  Italian  possessions 
of  the  house  of  Austria. 


THE  LIFE 


OP  THE 


EMPEROR  NAPOLEON. 


CHAPTER  I. 

From  I  769  to  1785. 

Corsica — Birth  of  Napoleon — His  family- — Circum- 
stances attending  his  birth — Anecdotes  of  his 
infancy — His  father,  a  deputy  of  the  nobles  to  Ver- 
sailles in  1779 — Places  him  at  the  military 
school  of  Brienne — Anecdotes  respecting  him  while 
at  Brienne — Pichegru  his  comrade  and  tutor —  His 
admiration  for  Turenne  —  His  early  transfer  to 
the  school  of  Paris- — The  Chevalier  Keralio's  opi- 
nion and  report  of  him — Admiration  of  his  in- 
structors at  Paris* — His  favourite  authors — Anec- 
dotes in  regard  to  him  while  at  the  school  of 
Paris — Noticed  by  the  Abbe  Raynal — Death  of  his 
father  —  His  comrades  at  school  —  Examined  by 
La  Place — Pxeceives  his  first  commission  as  second 
lieutenant  of  artillery — Joins  his  regiment  at  Va- 
lence, in  Dauphine — His  character  at  the  time. 

The  island  of  Corsica,  though  known  from 
the  earUest  ages,  of  considerable  extent,  and 

I 


CHAP.  I. 


2  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  I.  adjacent  to  the  coasts  of  Italy  and  France, 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  the  scene  of 
any  memorable  event ,  until  it  became  the 
birth  place  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  He 
was  born  at  Ajaccio,  on  the  i5th  of  August, 
1 769.  (i)  His  father  w^as  distinguished  for 
eloquence  and  liberality;  his  mother  re- 
spected for  the  pride  of  virtue,  and  the  pru- 
dence of  an  independent  spirit. 

As  the  exertion  of  power  awakens  our 
wonder_,  its  origin  excites  our  curiosity. 
After  contemplating  the  actions  of  great 
men,  we  are  pleased  to  trace  the  course  of 
their  parentage ;  as  travellers  leave  the  cur-, 
rents  of  rivers  to  explore  their  sources,  in 
untrodden  wilds,  in  the  clefts  of  rocks,  and 
in  barren  mountains.  In  compliance  with 
this  general  inclination,  the  follow^ing  parti- 
culars respecting  the  Bonaparte  family  have, 
with  more  or  less  detail,  been  before  re- 
lated. 

During  the  wars  of  the  Guelph  and  Ghi- 
belline  factions  in  Italy,  the  Bonapartes 
were  among  the  adherents  of  the  latter, 
which  was  the  liberal  and  defeated  party. 
Expelled  from  Florence,  the  city  from  which 
Dante  had  been  banished;  a  younger  brother 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  6 

of  the  family  found  a  refuge  and  a  home  in  J^rom  1769 
Lorsica.  rrom  this  adventurous  exile  was  ^ 
descended  Charles  Bonaparte;  who,  though 
unprosperous  and  shortlived,  was  the  sire 
of  sovereigns,  and  among  them  of  a  mo- 
narch, to  whom  Emperors  were  supphants, 
and  who  prostrated,  pardoned,  and  created 
kings. 

The  great  grandfather  of  Napoleon  had 
three  sons — Joseph,  Napoleon,  and  Lucien. 
The  first  of  these  had  an  only  son,  Charles; 
the  second  an  only  daughter,  EUsabeth ;  the 
third  who  was  a  priest,  long  survived  his 
brothers,  and  died  in  1791  archdeacon  of 
Ajaccio.  The  father  of  Napoleon  was  thus 
the  eldest  in  descent,  and  the  sole  represen- 
tative of  his  name  in  Corsica.  From  these 
circumstances,  as  well  as  from  the  ancient 
distinction  of  the  family,  which  had  been 
eminent  in  the  church,  had  figured  in  the 
politics  and  literature  of  Italy,  and  which, 
besides  minghng  its  blood  with  the  Orsini^ 
the  Lomellini,  and  the  Medici^  claimed  de- 
scent from  the  imperial  house  of  the  Com- 
neni,  (2)  great  care  was  bestowed  on  his  edu- 
cation. He  studied  at  Pisa  and  Rome,  and 
took  the  degree  of  doctor  of  laws. 


THE    LIFE    OF 


^^^^-  ^  Returning  home,  handsome,  intelligent, 
and  accomplished,  he  won  the  affections  of 
Letitia  Ramolino,  a  young  lady  of  the  is- 
land, descended  from  a  noble  family  of  Na- 
ples, and  remarkable  for  personal  beauty 
and  strength  of  character.  They  were  mar- 
ried so  young,  that  a  connection  which 
was  deemed  eligible  in  other  respects, 
their  friends  disapproved  as  premature. 
The  fruits  of- iiris-jnarriage  were,  besides 
five  children  who  died  in  infancy,  Joseph, 
king  of  Spain  j  Napoleon ;  Lucien,  princeof 
Canino ;  (3)  Louis,  king  of  Holland;  Jerome, 
king  of  Westphalia  •  Eliza,  grand  duchess 
of  Tuscany;  Pauline,  princess  Borghese; 
and  Caroline,  queen  of  Naples. 

The  war  of  1 768,  in  which  the  Corsicans 
contended  against  the  power  of  France  in 
vain,  found  Charles  Bonaparte  at  the  head 
of  his  island  clan  (or  piet^e)^  and  a  friend 
and  follower  of  Paoli.  His  wife,  prompted 
by  congenial  spirit  and  the  fervour  of 
youthful  love,  resolved  to  share,  if  not  his 
dangers ,  at  least  his  hardships.  In  the 
disastrous  campaign  of  1769,  accordingly, 
she  followed  the  head  quarters  of  the  Corsi- 
can  arrnvj  throughout  that  series  of  mountain 


THE    EJVlPErxOR   ^'APOLEON. 


marches,  which  terminated  in  the  battle  oF   ^^^^  ^^^^ 

'  ,  to  1785. 

Ponte  Novo,  and  the  final  defeat  of  Paoli. 

Charles  Bonaparte  at  first  resolved  to  ac- 
company Paoli  in  his  voluntary  exile,  being 
like  him  indignant  at  the  subjugation  of  his 
country.  But  the  situation  of  his  wife  re- 
quiring his  immediate  care  and  her  longer 
residence  in  the  island, he  deferred  his  de- 
parture until  a  safe  conduct  was  obtained 
for  her  from  the  French  commander  in 
chief.  Then,  while  the  father  of  Napoleon 
repaired  to  Porto  Vecchio  with  intention  to 
seek  an  asylum  in  England,  his  mother  re- 
gained her  solitary  residence  in  Ajaccio, 
there  to  bring  into  the  world,  the  future 
Emperor  of  France, 

The  period  of  her  pregnancy  was  ap- 
proaching, when  influenced  by  distress  and 
apprehension,  rather  than  by  the  spirit 
of  youth  or  beauty,  Madam  Bonaparte  at- 
tended the  celebration  of  mass  on  the  day 
of  the  feast  of  the  assumption.  (4)  The 
solemn  ceremony  was  not  concluded^  when 
the  first  pangs  of  childbirth  surprised  her. 
Hastening  home,  she  was  met  by  a  gentleman 
who,  observing  an  uncommon  glow  in  her 
countenance  and  lustre  in   her  eyes^  witJi 


CHAP.  I. 


O  THE    LIFE    OF 

a  gallantry  more  natural  than  seasonable^ 
made  these  effects  of  pain  and  agitationj  sub- 
jects of  compliment  and  praise.  She  was 
just  able  to  reach  her  house  and  throw 
herself  on  a  sofa  in  the  parlour.  When 
discovered  by  her  domestics,  the  child  was 
born  and  the  mother  had  swooned.  He 
came  into  the  world  as  he  rose  to  greatness, 
without  assistance.  (5) 

About  this  timCj  Charles  Bonaparte,  over- 
come by  tenderness  for  his  family,  and  the 
expostulations  of  his  uncle  the  archdeacon, 
declined  his  purposed  emigration,  and  re- 
turned home. 

In  conformity  with  a  custom  of  the  fa- 
mily, the  second  son  was  christened  Napo- 
leon. Of  his  infancy  little  is  known,  as 
probably  little  was  remarkable.  He  was 
healthy,  sprightly,  inquisitive  and  wilful; 
mastered  his  elder  brother  who  was  of  a 
gentle  disposition ;  disobeyed  his  father  who 
was  indulgent;  but  was  submissive  to  his 
mother,  who  being  of  a  firm  and  discreet 
character,  united  discipline  with  affection. 
He  said  of  her,  that  she  never  overlooked  a 
good  or  a  bad  action  of  her  children ;  she 
said  of  him,  that  though    wild  and  head- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  7 

stronff,  he  Avas  a  kind  brother  and  a  cood    From  1769 

^'  ,  .        ,  ^  to  178d. 

son.  He  was  the  favourite  of  his  father, 
who  by  averting  sometimes,  and  sometimes 
inviting  the  mother's  authority,  curbed  or 
hcensed  the  frolics  of  his  darhng  boy  (6). 
Thus  hghtly  swayed  were  the  impulses  of 
a  mind,  which  Avas  soon  to  dazzle  and  to 
awe  the  world. 

When  he  was  between  five  and  six  years 
of  age,  he  was  placed  at  a  day  school  w^ith 
some  little  girls  who  were  older  than  him- 
self. Caressed  bv  them  all,  he  was  most 
attached  to  the  little  Giacominetta.  Her 
companions,  jealous  of  this  preference,  re- 
sented it  as  graver  persons  sometimes  resent 
more  serious  slights,  by  ridicule  and  rhyme. 
When  they  walked  out,  he  always  held 
her  hand,  while  his  stockings  often  fell 
about  his  heels.  His  arch  tormentors  fol- 
lowed them  singing.  "  Napoleone  di  mezza 
calzetta,  fal'amore  a  Giacominetta."  (Napo- 
leon with  his  stockings  half  off,  is  making 
love  to  Giacominetta. J  This  was  the  signal 
for  instant  battle.  With  sticks,  stones,  or 
whatever  came  in  his  way,  he  invaded  the 
little  throng;  then,  as  afterwards,  prompt 
in  his  attacks,  and  fearless  of  numbers. 


8  THE    LIFE    or 

^j^^j_^'  ^       When  he  was  somewhat  older,  his  mo- 
ther forbad  the  children  chmbing  the  fig 
trees  in    the  vineyard.      At    length  Napo- 
leon took  it  into  his  head  to  long  for  some 
of  the    figs.     They  were  ripe  and  tempt- 
ing, the  opportunity  seemed  good,  and  he 
embraced  it.     Having  satisfied  his  appetite 
he  was  filling  his  pockets,  Avhen  the  keeper 
of  the  vineyard  came  upon  him.     Petrified 
with  terror  he  clung  helpless  to  a  branch  of 
the  tree.     The  keeper  threatened  to  tie  him 
and  conduct  him  to  his  mother.     He  beg- 
ged  for  mercy,  fear  made   him  eloquent, 
and  the  keeper  appeared  to  relent.     The 
next  day  however  his  mother  expressed  an 
ominous  wish  to  gather  some  of  these  figs. 
They  were  all  gone ;  and  the  keeper  being 
summoned,   the  culprit  was  exposed  and 
chastised.     How  difficult  to    conceive    the 
twice-crowned    conqueror,    whose    frown 
darkened  the  face  of  Europe,  trembling  in  a 
fig  tree  at  the  threat  of  a  peasant! 

It  was  observed  by  his  mother,  that 
when  he  first  went  to  school,  he  was  not 
remarkable  for  quickness  of  apprehension; 
but  that  having  once  surpassed  his  comrades, 
he  was  greatly  delighted,  and  never  after- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEO>'.  9 

wards  lost  his  superiority.  (7)  It  would  seem    ^^^^Jll^^ 

^  ^^     vy  /  ^  to  17o5. 

that^  while  his  mind  refused  the  influence  of 
ordinary  incitements,  it  was  highly  stimu- 
lated by  the  consciousness  of  merit,  exer- 
cising a  degree  of  free  will,  and  requiring  a 
certain  dignity  of  motive^  even  in  its  infan- 
tile eflforts. 

It  is  said  that  his  favourite  plaything  was  a 
small  cannon,  and  his  chosen  retreat,  a 
grotto,  formed  by  an  arching  rock,  and  over- 
looking the  sea.  The  first  circumstance  is 
too  common  to  be  characteristic;  fondness 
for  handhng  arms  betrayed  the  sex,  not  the 
disposition  of  Achilles.  The  second,  if  true, 
probably  expanded  his  mind  with  some  of 
its  earliest  visions ;  for  grand  must  have 
been  the  impression  of  the  sea,  even  on  the 
infant  energies,  of  a  soul  as  boundless  and 
subhme  as  itself.  In  manhood,  the  sight  of 
the  desert,  which  he  called  a  solid  Ocean^ 
affected  him  strongly,  elevating  his  imagina- 
tion with  a  sense  of  immensity. 

It  having  been  the  object  of  the  French 
government  to  incorporate  Corsica  with 
France,  their  policy  was  of  consequence 
conciliating.  They  established  a  provincial 
parliament,  thus  placing  the  new  conquest 


10  THE    LIFE    OF 


^j^^-^  on  a  footing  with  the  old  provinces ;  and  as 
an  additional  favour,  continued  the  existing 
magistracy  of  the  tAvelve  nobles,  in  whom 
ihelocal  executive  authority  resided.  Charles 
Bonaparte  Avas  a  member  of  this  magis- 
tracy; and  although  he  had  resisted  to  the 
last,  both  in  the  army  and  in  a  convention 
which  was  held  after  the  battle  of  Ponte 
Novo,  the  domination  of  France,  (8)  he  was 
induced  to  acquiesce  in  the  new  order  of 
things,  by  these  and  other  favourable  mea- 
sures. He  was  soon  gratified  by  the  ap- 
pointment of  assessor  to  the  Royal  Court  of 
Ajaccio;  a  situation  which,  besides  increasing 
his  influence,  augmented  his  income^  scarce 
adequate,  in  consequence  of  sacrifices  and 
losses  in  the  war,  to  his  liberal  habits  and 
growing  family. 

In  1779,  the  parliament  of  Corsica  sent  a 
deputation  to  Versailles.  Charles  Bonaparte, 
who  besides  liis  other  qualifications  for  such 
a  mission,  was  an  eloquent  and  enlightened 
advocate,  was  chosen  deputy  for  the  nobles, 
as  w^as  the  bishop  of  Nebbio  for  the  clergy, 
and  one  of  the  Casa  Biancas  for  the  com- 
mons. It  was  time  to  provide  for  the  educa- 
tion of  his  two  sons,  Joseph  and  Napoleon, 


THE    E3IPER0R    NAPOLEON.  I  I 

the  first  being  eleven  and  the  second  near    ^^om  1769 

/  ,  ...         to  1785. 

ten   years  oi    age ;  and  as   a  situation  in 

France  was  now  preferable  to  one  in  Italy, 
for  that  purpose,  he  determined  to  take 
them  with  him  to  Paris.  He  passed 
through  Florence,  where  his  name  and  the 
rank  of  his  family,  were  remembered.  The 
Grand  Duke  Leopold^  gave  hirn  a  letter  of 
recommendation  to  his  sister,  the  queen  of 
France.  He  was  graciously  received  by 
that  unfortunate  princess,  and  was  a  guest  at 
the  banquets  of  Versailles.  Having  dis- 
charged his  public  duty,  he  proceeded  to 
dispose  of  his  sons.  Their  inclinations  pro- 
bably determined  their  destination .  Joseph 
was  placed  in  a  classical  seminary  at  Autun  ; 
and  the  policy  of  the  government  facilitat- 
ing it,  admittance  was  obtained  for  Napo- 
leon, in  the  month  of  April,  asa  king's  scholar, 
at  the  royal  military  school  of  Brienne.  (9) 

At  this  period  there  were  two  French 
generals  in  authority  in  Corsica^  whose 
conflicting  pretensions  created  two  parties. 
M.  de  Narbonne  Pellet,  was  haughty  and 
violent ;  M.  de  idarbeuf,  was  mild  and 
affable.  The  former ,  being  of  high  birth 
and  superior  interest,  was  likely  to  prevail 


CHAP.  I. 


12  THE    LIFE    OF 

over  his  rival.  Fortunately  for  M.  de  Mar- 
beuf,  the  deputation,  with  Charles  Bonaparte 
at  its  head,  arrived  at  the  moment  when 
this  competition  was  under  consideration. 
He  was  consulted  by  the  minister,  and  made 
representations  which  effectually  sustained 
M.deMarbeuf. 

The  nephew  of  Marbeuf,  who  was  arch- 
bishop of  Lyons,  and  minister  of  ecclesiasti- 
cal affairs,  acknowledged  this  act  of  well- 
timed  justice;  and,    learning    that  M.   de 
Bonaparte  was  conducting  his  son  to  the 
school  of  Brienne,  introduced  him  by  letter 
to  a  noble  family  of  that  name,  residing  there. 
This  was  the  commencement  of  that  kind- 
ness which  the  families  of  de  Brienne  and  de 
Marbeuf  extended  to  young  Bonaparte,  and 
which,  from  sportive  malice  or  disappointed 
emulation,  was  ascribed  by  his  school-fel- 
lows to  a  different  cause.     The  aspersion 
being  nourished  by  the  press,  and  the  policy 
of  England,  outlived  the  usual  date  of  such 
ephemer(3e.    The  manly  beauty  and  graceful 
accomplishments    of    Charles    Bonaparte, 
the  advanced  age  of  M.  de  Marbeuf,  and  the 
character  of  Madam  Bonaparte,  were  cir* 
cumstances  which  rendered    the  story  ri- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  1 3 

diculous,  wbile  they  proved  it  to  be  un-    FromiT69 

to  17o5. 

true.  [10 J 

At  the  school  of  Brienne,  the  young  Gor- 
sican  was  not  long  in  showing  a  disposition 
and  ability  to  excel.     He  seemed  to  abound 
in  sensibility  and  genius.   If  the  last  obtained 
him  triumphs,  the  first  exposed  him  to  mor- 
tifications.    His  preceptors  praised,  but  his 
comrades  persecuted  him.     They  ridiculed 
his  Italian  accent,    mocked    his  imperfect 
French,  and  derided  his   comparative   po- 
verty ;  they  called  him  a  foreigner,  the  brat  of 
a  Corsican  attorney,  the  bastard  of  the  Count 
Marbeuf.     As  love  for  his  parents,  and  affec- 
tion for  his  home,  were  heightened  by  recent 
separation  from  both,  he  keenly  resented 
these  insults ;   and  his  spirit  in  combating 
boys  his  superiors  in  age  and  in  size,  associa- 
ted in  a  cabal  against  him,  soon  secured  him 
friends.     It  was  observed,  that  even  when 
worsted,  he  never   succumbed   nor    com- 
plained ;  and,  though  provoked  and  injured, 
could  not  be  induced,  when  in  the  routine 
of  duty  he  became  superintendant  of  the 
class,  to  report  the  misconduct  of  the  boys 
by  whose  annoyance  he  himself  had  suf- 
fered.   Rather  than  swerve  from  this  point 


CHAP.  I. 


1 4  THE    LIFE    OF 

of  honour,  he  preferred  enduring  imprison- 
ment,  which  he  submitted  to  on  one  occa- 
sion, for  the  space  of  three  days,  (i  i) 

These  injuries  and  mortifications,  though 
manfully  supported,  as  they  were  felt  to  be 
unjust  and  found  to  be  unavoidable,  sunk 
deep  into  his  youthful  heart,  which  was 
disposed  to  overflows  of  feeling  and  ardent 
attachments.  Their  influence  on  his  tem- 
per soon  discovered  itself  by  a  change  in  his 
habits.  From  being  sprightly,  confident, 
and  joyous,  he  became  quiet,  sensitive,  and 
solitary;  fonder  of  his  books  than  of  his 
schoolfellows.  ( 1 2 j  He  naturally  associated, 
in  the  same  resentment,  the  wrongs  inflicted 
on  his  native  island  with  the  sneers  aimed  at 
himself,  and  unconsciously  infused  the 
merit  of  public  grief  into  his  own  puerile 
vexations.  Thus  was  kindled  that  intense 
patriotism  which  animated  his  whole  life; 
which  warmed  his  boyish  indignation ;  di- 
rected his  youthful  studies  ;  inspired  his 
greatest  actions;  and  sanctified  the  dignity 
of  his  last  request. 

He  was  too  capable  of  acquiring  know- 
ledge to  be  long  insensible  of  its  value.  His 
application  accordingly  seemed  less  a  matter 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  l5 

olduLy  than  of  choice;  and  his  attention  to    From  1769 
...,,.  .  to  1785. 

discipline  to  be  directed  more  by  a  sentiment 

of  order  than  by  the  force  of  rules.   Studious 

and  reserved^  he  was  rather  respected  than 

popular  in   the  school ;   but  when  he  did 

engage  in   the  sports  or  enterprises  of  the 

little    republic,    his  strength  and  fertility 

of  character  made  him  at  once  its  dictator. 

The  following  anecdotes,  relating  to  this 
period  of  his  life,  are  accounted  authentic. 

Soon  after  his  arrival  at  Brienne,  with  all 
his  natural  vivacity  about  him,  he  was 
shown  into  a  hall  in  which  was  a  portrait  of 
the  Duke  of  Choiseul.  The  sight  of  this 
minister,  who  had  defrauded  Corsica  of 
independence,  excited  his  indignation  so 
strongly,  that  he  indulged  it  in  epithets  of 
abuse,  in  defiance  of  the  rank  and  power  of 
its  object,  and  in  spite  of  the  reprehension 
and  menaces  of  the  professors. 

The  first  time  he  dined  at  the  table  of  the 
principal,  that  person,  with  a  view  of  trying 
the  spirit  of  his  guest,  spoke  ill  of  Paoli. 
The  young  Corsican  interrupted  him  in- 
stantly, stoutly  exclaiming  — "  Paoli  is  a 
great  man^  he  loved  his  country,  and  I  shall 
never  forgive  my  father  for  consenting  to 


1 6  THE    LIFE    OF 

ciiAP^i.  xhe  union  of  Corsica  with  France.  He 
ought  to  have  followed  the  fortunes  of 
PaoH." 

When  some  of  the  boys  were  reproaching 
him  with  his  Corsican  birth  and  accent,  he 
expressed  warmly  to  a  friend  this  compre- 
hensive menace.— -"I  will  do  these  French 
of  vours  all  the  harm  I  can  :*'  a  sense  of 
powder  thus  early  quickening  within  him. 
His  threat  expired  with  the  flash  of  temper 
which  prompted  it ;  for  he  befriended  with 
unequalled  liberality  the  companions  of  his 
early  days :  his  only  revenge  consisted  in 
excelling  them. 

In  the  severe  winter  of  1780,  he  per- 
suaded his  comrades  to  construct  a  fortress 
of  snow ;  and  applying  rules  drawn  from 
the  science  of  their  common  study,  pro- 
tected the  Avork  by  regular  fortifications. 
Passing  from  the  duties  of  an  engineer  to 
the  functions  of  a  general,  he  divided  the 
stripling  band  into  two  parties,  and  had 
the  fortress  attacked  and  defended  with  a 
degree  of  vigour  and  skill,  which  besides 
evincing  his  proficiency,  was  thought  to 
exhibit  a  remarkable  power  of  rousing  and 
directing  the  energy  of  others. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  1 7 

On  the  days  of  the  fetes  of  Brienne,  for    From  1769 

,  V  .  -    n  r  to  1785. 

the  purpose  ot  preventing  an  iniiux  oi  stran- 
gers into  the  school,  guards  were  mounted, 
with  orders  to  admit  no  person  without  a 
pass.  It  happened  once  when  Bonaparte 
was  the  officer  on  duty,  the  portress^  who 
was  in  the  habit  of  selhng  milk,  fruit,  eggs, 
cakes,  etc.,  to  the  students,  counting  on  her 
personal  consideration  among  them,  presen- 
ted herself  without  a  pass;  and,  upon  being 
stopped  by  the  sentinel,  loudly  insisted  on 
admittance.  The  sergeant  of  the  guard  re- 
ported the  fact  to  Bonaparte,  who,  though 
only  thirteen  years  of  age,  did  not  hesitate 
between  the  inclinations  of  the  boy,  and  the 
duties  of  the  officer  ;  but,  with  that  firmness 
of  character,  and  aversion  to  disorder,  for 
which  he  was  always  remarkable,  called  out 
in  a  tone  of  command, — ''Remove  instantly 
that  woman,  who  is  bringing  here  the  license 
of  a  camp."  This  woman,  who  was  named 
Haute,  he  afterwards  established  with  her 
husband  comfortably  at  Malmaison. 

A  fair  was  to  be  held  in  the  vicinity  of 
Brienne,  and  the  students  were  desirous  of 
attending  it ;  but.  as  they  had  quarrelled  with 

2 


8 


THE    LIFE    OF 


CHAP^i.  the  country  people  on  a  previous  occaoion^ 
the  professors  issued  an  order  confining  them 
on  the  day  of  the  approaching  fair,  within 
the  gates  of  the  college.  This  painful  re- 
striction excited  the  enterprise  and  invention 
of  young  Bonaparte.  Under  his  direction 
the  students  undermined  a  segment  of  the 
wall,  conducting  the  operation  so  secretly, 
and  adjusting  it  so  nicely,  that  the  sapped 
space  tumbled  down  on  the  morning  of  the 
fair  ^  which,  by  this  stratagem  they  were 
enabled  to  visit  without  violating  the  order. 
His  superiority  of  genius  and  efficiency  of 
character,  while  they  secured  his  ascendancy 
in  the  school,  and,  generally,  the  respect  of 
the  faculty^  seem  to  have  been  considered  as 
reprehensible  forwardness  by  illiberal  ob- 
servers. Accordingly  one  of  the  teachers,  tak- 
ing advantage  of  some  slight  irregularity, 
condemned  him  to  wear  a  penitential  dress, 
and  to  dine  on  his  knees  at  the  door  of  the  re- 
fectory. He  uttered  neither  complaint  nor 
suppHcation,  yet  felt  the  indignity  so  acutely, 
that,  at  the  moment  it  was  about  to  be  in- 
flicted, he  fell  into  convulsions ;  distress  over- 
coming the  strength  of  his  body,  but  not  the 


THE    EMPEROR    NA.P@LEON.  1 9 

fortitude  of  his  mind.     The  principal  of  the    From  1769 

to  1T85. 

school  happening  to  pass  by,  and  father 
Patrault,  professor  of  mathematics,  warmly 
interposing  in  behalf  of  his  favourite  pupil, 
he  was  rescued  from  the  undeserved  punish- 
ment, and  the  brutal  pedagogue. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  Pichegru,  who 
was  a  charity  scholar  at  Brienne,  was  his 
tutor  in  the  mathematical  class^  and  that 
France  was  rearing  together  in  one  of  her 
schools,  the  conqueror  of  Holland,  and  the 
dictator  of  Europe — the  patriot  who  was  the 
terror  of  Bourbons  and  foreigners,  and  the 
traitor  who  was  a  tool  in  their  hands. 

In  matters  of  principle  he  manifested,  even 
at  Brienne,  an  inflexibility  so  striking  that  it 
made  a  lasting  impression  on  Pichegru.  In 
1796,  when  this  last  was  conspiring  to  be- 
tray his  country^  being  consulted  by  a  royal- 
ist agent  upon  the  expediency  of  attempting 
to  gain  over  the  commander  of  the  army  of 
Italy,  he  bore  unwilling  testimony  to  his  for- 
mer comrade's  integrity  and  firmness.  ^''  It 
would  be  a  waste  of  time;  I  knew  him  at 
school ;  his  character  is  inflexible ;  he  has 
taken  his  side  and  will  never  change  it.'' 


20  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  I.  Tliestudiesinwhichlieexcelledwerethose 
chiefly  pursued  in  the  school,  and  directly 
embraced  in  the  profession  of  arms — mathe- 
matics, history,  and  geography.  But  as  the 
instinct  of  power  is  the  early  consciousness 
of  a  vigorous  mind,  a  desire  of  influence 
was  probably  one  of  his  primary  motives; 
and  it  is  therefore  reasonable  to  infer,  with- 
out reference  to  his  subsequent  career,  that 
he  might  have  been  at  Brienne,  as  ardent 
and  successful  in  the  study  of  eloquence 
and  politics,  as  he  was  in  acquiring  the  rudi- 
ments of  war.  ( 1 3) 

A  lady  who  was  conversing  with  him  on 
the  subject  of  his  studies,  mentioned  the 
name  of  Turenne,  reproaching  the  memory 
of  that  great  general  with  having  laid  Waste 
the  Palatinate.  '^  And  why  not,  madam," 
eagerly  demanded  the  future  victor,  "if 
it  was  necessary  to  the  success  of  his  de- 
signs?'* This  anecdote,  in  the  spirit  of  which 
inay  be  discovered  the  embryo  of  that  gigan- 
tic decision  which  was  exemplified  in  his 
raising  the  siege  of  Mantua,  as  well  as  his 
ardent  admiration  of  Turenne,  shows  how 
soon  his  understanding  was  capable  of  com- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  21 

bining  the  extended  reasoning  of  military    From  1769 
policy,  with  the  technical  conclusions  of  the 
art  of  war.  (i4) 

From  observations  which  dropped  from 
him  at  St.  Helena,  it  appears  his  powers  of 
reflection  were  so  active  and  strong  in  the 
season  of  early  youth,  that  the  sentiments 
of  religious  faith  which  the  affection  of  his 
mother,  and  the  piety  of  his  uncle,  had  in- 
stilled into  his  childhood,  became  disturbed 
in  the  course  of  his  fourteenth  year^  by  those 
doubts  of  reason,  from  which  ordinary 
minds  are  free,  until  they  are  infested  by  the 
pride  of  manhood. 

In  1784,  the  Chevalier  Keralio,  who,  as 
inspector-general  of  the  military  schools,  was 
charged  with  the  selection  of  pupils  for  pro- 
motion to  the  school  of  Paris_,  selected  Bo- 
naparte, though  he  was  rather  under  the 
proper  age,  as  one  of  the  number  to  be  sent 
from  Brienne.  As  he  was  better  acquainted 
with  the  sciences  than  the  languages,  the 
masters  of  the  school  proposed  detaining  him 
a  year  longer,  in  order  that  he  might  improve 
his  knowledge  of  the  classics^  alleging  that 
he  was  not  yet  fifteen.     "  No,"  replied  M.  de 


21  THE  LIFE    OF 

^^J^^^^J;^  Keralio  ;  "1  know  what  I  am  doing  ;  if  I 
transgress  the  rule  respecting  age,  it  is  not 
from  favour  to  any  particular  family,  for  I 
am  not  acquainted  with  that  of  this  lad;  it 
is  solely  from  regard  to  his  merit.  I  dis- 
cover in  him  a  spark  of  genius  which  cannot 
])e  too  carefully  cherished."  (i5)  The  cheva- 
lier, Avho  was  an  author  on  tactics,  had  con- 
ceived a  great  affection  for  the  young  Corsi- 
can.  Soon  after  the  examination^,  this  in- 
spector of  the  school  Avas  advanced  to  other 
employment ;  but  his  successor  adopted  his 
decision,  and  Bonaparte,  with  four  other 
students,  w^as  transfered  in  October,  1784^ 
from  the  Royal  school  of  Brienne,  to  that  of 
Paris.  (16) 

Marshal  Segur,  was  then  minister  of  war. 
Among  his  official  papers,  there  exists  a 
minute  under  the  head  of  t/ie  school  q/* 
Tirienne  (a  transcri|>t  of  the  report  of 
M.  de  Reralio  to  the  king),  which  shews 
that  scientific  acquirements  were  much  less 
esteemed  in  the  French  army,  when  Bo- 
naparte commenced,  than  when  he  ended 
his  military  life.  For  after  noting  his  age, 
size,  and  assiduity,  and  remarking  that  he 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  23 

was  tractable^  honesty  and  grateful^  the  ^^^'^^^J?^ 
writer  of  the  minute  adds — ''would  make 
an  excellent  seaman."  It  is  remarkable  that 
when  Washington  was  about  the  same  age^  a 
midshipman's  warrant  in  the  British  navy 
was  obtained  for  him ;  and  he  was  prevented 
from  becoming  ''an  excellent  seaman/'  solely 
by  the  timid  objections  of  his  mother. (lyj 
Had  both  or  either  of  these  suggestions  been 
effectuated,  how  different  from  what  it  now 
is,  might  have  been  the  state  of  the  civilized 
world  ! 

His  faculties  being  developed  by  growth 
and  strengthened  by  exercise,  Bonaparte's  su- 
periority was  more  marked  and  impressive 
at  the  school  of  Paris  even  than  it  was  at  that 
of  Brienne.  The  celebrated  Monge,  who 
was  his  instructor  in  geometry,  formed  a  high 
opinion  of  his  capacity.  M.  de  I'Eguille,  the 
professor  of  history,  declared  he  would  be- 
come a  great  man,  and  to  his  name  in  the  class- 
book  affixed  this  note,  "  A  Corsican  by  birth 
arid  character;  he  will  distinguish  himself  if 
favoured  by  circumstances,"— alluding  pro- 
bably to  his  vivacity  of  genitis,  ardent  sensibi- 
lity, and  passionate  application,  which  gave 
an  unsocial  cast  to  his  character,  and  an  orien- 


24  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  I.  ^  tal  warmth  and  splendour  to  his  elocution. 
The  professor  of  belles-lettres  was  so  forcibly 
struck  by  this  property  of  his  style,  that  he 
at  once  imitated  and  described  it,  by  calling 
his  original  and  vivid  amplifications,  "blocks 
of  granite  issuing  hot  from  a  volcano."  As 
Bonaparte  discovered  no  aptitude  for  the 
German  language,  the  German  teacher  was 
no  believer  in  his  extraordinary  intelligence^ 
affirming,  when  told  that  he  was  already 
undergoing  his  examination  for  the  artillery, 
that  he  '^always  thought  mathematicians 
blockheads." 

Study,  the  labour  of  most  young  minds, 
was,  to  his,  recreation,  and  seemed  now  to 
engross  his  faculties  with  the  absorbing 
force  of  a  passion.  His  preference  for  his- 
tory continuing  to  prevail,  Polybius  and 
Arrien,  but  more  especially  Tacitus  andPlu- 
tarch,  were  his  favourite  authors;  one  pre- 
senting to  his  mind  admirable  portraits  of 
heroes  and  legislators ;  the  other  enriching 
his  judgment  with  profound  maxims  of 
political  wisdom — both  inculcating  lessons 
of  patriotism  and  virtue,  contempt  for  weak- 
ness, and  abhorence  of  vice.  His  applica- 
tion was  as  fruitful  as  strenuous,  for  though 


THE   EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  25 

his  succeeding  years  were  too  active  to  ad-  From  1769 
mit  of  much  reading,  he  displayed  through 
Hfe,  a  famihar  and  accurate  acquaintance 
with  ancient  history.  There  are  probably 
few  exercises  in  which  mental  vigour  is  more 
readily  discovered,  than  in  imbibing  and 
assimilating  historical  knowledge. 

Macpherson's  Ossian,  which  was  then 
sanctioned  by  the  Scotch  critics  as  a  collec- 
tion of  genuine  translations,  and  had  been  re- 
cently rendered  into  Itahan,  he  read  like 
most  youths  of  his  time  with  curiosity  and 
admiration;  and  as  it  was  really  an  inge- 
nious compound  of  the  finest  thoughts,  ex- 
pressions, incidents,  and  characters  to  be 
found  in  Homer,  Virgil,  Milton,  and  Tasso, 
andwas  recommended  to  his  taste  by  the 
beautyofCesarolti's  version,  it  was  one  of  the 
poetical  works  in  which  he  most  delighted. 

The  boast  and  glory  of  his  native  tongue 
also  shared  his  youthful  admiration.  In  the 
dreadful  campaign  of  i8i4,  he  observed  a 
tree  near  Brienne,  under  the  shade  of  which, 
in  the  days  of  peace  and  boyhood,  he  had 
read  the  Jerusalem  Delivered,  and  admired 
deeds  and  battles  less  heroic  than  his  own. 

During  his  stay  at  the  school  of  Paris,  two 


26  THE    LIFE    OF 

^^  — ^'  ^  occurrences  have  been  mentioned  which  ap- 
pear characteristic,  one  of  the  reach  of  his 
mind,  and  one  of  its  readiness.  The  arch- 
bishop of  Paris  held  a  confirmation  at  the 
military  school.  At  the  name  Napoleon^ 
he  expressed  surprise,  and  said  there  was  no 
saint  of  that  name  in  the  calendar,  '^  That 
is  no  objection  to  him,"  promptly  observed 
the  youth,  '*^since  there  are  a  host  of  saints, 
and  but  three  hundred  and  sixty-five  days  lo 
dispose  of  among  them." 

The  expense  of  education  and  living  main-« 
tained  in  the  royal  school  he  found  very 
great;  proportioned  rather  to  the  habits  of 
the  rich  and  the  luxuries  of  the  capital, 
than  to  the  expectations  of  the  students, 
or  the  value  of  the  instruction  imparted  to 
them.  He  prepared  a  memoir  on  the 
subject,  pointing  out  the  disadvantages  of 
sumptuousuess,  as  well  to  those  who  could, 
as  to  those  who  could  not  afford  to  continue 
it.  In  this  remarkable  paper,  after  insisting 
that  this  expensive  living  tended  to  render 
the  students  frivolous  and  self-sufficient,  he 
recommended  that  they  should  be  made  to 
eat  coarse  bread,  to  brush  their  own  clothes, 
and  clean  their  own  boots,  adding  that  fru- 


THE    EMPEROPx    :NAP0LE0N.  27 

gal  allowances  and  simple  fare  would  make  ^J^^rr^^^ 
them  "robust,  able  to  support  the  inclemen- 
cies of  weather  and  the  toils  of  war,  and  fit 
them  to  inspire  the  soldiers  with  respect  and 
attachment/'  Remarks  like  these,  while  they 
must  be  allowed  to  show  a  surprising  range 
of  observation  and  maturity  of  judgment, 
in  a  youth  of  fifteen,  discover  also  how  soon 
the  self-exalting  spring  of  his  genius  was  be- 
ginning to  act,  elevating  him  above  his  own 
situation,  and  enabling  him  to  look  down  on 
that  of  others. 

About  this  period  also  he  is  said  to  have 
formed  liberal  political  opinions,  which  he 
indulged  so  far  as  to  express  himself  in  a  let- 
ter to  his  parents,  disrespectfully  of  the 
kingly  office.  The  letter  being  submitted, 
according  to  the  regulations  of  the  school,  to 
the  professor  of  belles  leltres,  this  sentiment 
was  of  course  reprobated,  the  letter  was  de- 
stroyed and  the  writer  rebuked.  Afterwards 
when  he  was  first  consul,  having  occasion  to 
employ  a  preceptor  for  his  brother  Jerome, 
he  sent  for  his  old  instructor  in  belles  lettres, 
and  reverting  kindly  to  their  former  acquain- 
tance, reminded  him  of  the  fate  to  which  he 
had  doomed  his  unlucky  epistle. 


28  THE    LIFE    OF 

^^^1^-  ^  In  the  course  of  one  of  his  lectures,  the 
professor  of  history  at  Paris  introduced  the 
revolt  of  the  Constable  of  Bourbon,  and  en- 
larged, with  loyal  emphasis^  on  the  enormity 
of  his  fighting  against  his  king.  This  view 
of  the  subject  did  not  satisfy  the  mind  of 
Bonaparte,  whose  finer  feeling  and  nicer 
judgment,  discriminated  at  once  between 
patriotism  and  loyalty.  The  Constable's 
crime  he  justly  apprehended,  consisted  not 
in  fighting  against  his  Mng^  but  in  uniting 
with  foreigners  to  make  war  on  his  own 
country,  A  mind  like  this,  it  was  not  in 
the  power  of  temptation  or  adversity,  to 
degrade  to  the  part  of  Bernadotte  or  Mo- 
reau. 

His  reputation  soon  reached  beyond  the 
limits  of  his  school,  and  attracted  the  notice 
of  the  Abbe  Raynal,  who  paid  him  flatter- 
ing attentions. 

While  he  was  thus  enlarging  the  circle  of 
his  knowledge,  and  unfolding  the  rich  pro- 
mise of  his  character,  his  father  died  of  a  can- 
cer of  the  stomach,  at  Montpellier.  (i8)  In 
this  son  were  centered  his  hopes  and  affec- 
tions— so  strongly,  that  although  Joseph  was 
the  attendant  of  his  sick  bed,    his    dying 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  2g 

thoughts  were  fixed  on  Napoleon.     On  his    From  1769 
name  he  was  heard  frequently  to  call^  and  in  >^  *^ 
moments  of  delirious  agony,  to  invoke  the 
succour    of  his  mighty  sword.     As  if  the 
clouds  which  darkened  the  death-bed  of  the 
parent,  Avere  tinged  with  prospects  of  the 
greatness   and  glory  that  were  to  descend 
upon  his  son.   As  it  does  not  appear  that  Na- 
poleon had  visited  Corsica  from  the  time  of 
his  entering  the  school  of  Brienne,  his  last 
interview  with  his  father  most  probably  took 
place  when  the  latter  came  to  Paris  for  medi- 
cal advice,  on  the  first  access  of  his  disorder. 
Of  course  he  knew  very  little  of  this  parent. 
Among  his  fellow  students^    two  indivi- 
duals arementionedj  whose  names  are  event- 
fully  connected  with  his  own.    Philippeaux, 
who,  at  Acre,  under  hostile  banners,  con- 
tributed to  arrest  the  course  of  his  Syrian 
conquests ;  and  Lauriston,  his  favourite  aide- 
de-camp,  whose  protracted  and  ineffectual 
negotiations    with    KutusofT,    contributed 
not  to  shorten  his  delay  at  Moscow. 

In  September,  1785^,  his  dihgence  and 
aptitude  having  again  accelerated  his  exami- 
nation, he  received  his  first  appointment  in 
the  army  ;  a  second  lieutenancy  in  the  regi- 


vio  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  I.  j^^gnt  of  y^a  F^re,  or  the  ist  artillery.  (19} 
His  success  on  this  occasion  Avas  the  more 
creditable,  as  his  examination  in  the  impor- 
tant branch  of  mathematics,  was  conducted 
by  the  great  La  Place.  He  is  said  to  have 
been  transported  with  joy  at  finding  him- 
self an  oflicer ;  an  emotion  proportioned  less 
to  the  inconsiderable  event  itself,  than  to  the 
vast  career  which  it  opened.  He  joined  his 
regiment  forthwith  at  Valence  in  Dauphine, 
and  there  first  did  duty  as  an  officer. 

Pausing  to  contemplate  him,  when  thus 
emerging  from  the  restraints  of  adolescence, 
it  will  appear  that  he  was  a  youth  fit  to  be 
loved  with  devotion  by  a  friend,  and  with 
pride  by  a  parent;  that  he  was  sensitive 
yet  ingenuous,  grateful  but  not  vindictive, 
and  though  obstinate  against  injury,  tract- 
able to  kindness ;  capacious  of  kjiowledge, 
and  ardent  in  pursuing  it,  not  as  a  badge  of 
boyish  superiority,  but  as  an  instrument  for 
intellectual  purposes.  The  progress  of  his 
understanding  though  rapid  was  steady,  pro- 
portioned, not  only  to  the  strength  of  genius 
in  which  its  impulse  originated,  but  to  the 
extent  of  advancement  which  its  maturity 
was  to  reach.     It  was  natural  that  his  pre-  . 


THE    EMPErvOR    NAPOLEON.  3 1 

ceptors  should  have  entertained,  with  afTec-    ^^^^JZ^^ 

.  ....  *^  1785. 

tion  for  his  person,  anticipations  of  his  great- 
ness ;  and  it  is  probable  they  were  not  more 
gratified  at  seeing  their  predictions  fulfilled, 
than  surprised  at  the  degree  to  which  they 
were  surpassed  by  his  exploits. 


(     32     ) 


CHAPTER  II. 


s. 


From  1785  to  1793. 

CHAP.  ir.  Napoleon  in  garrison  at  Valence  in  Daupliine  —  Ma- 
dam Colombier  s  kindness  and  esteem  for  him- — 
In  love  "willi  lier  daughter — His  success  in  society 
—  His  comrades  in  the  regiment — His  prize  essay 
successful  in  the  academy  of  Lyons — His  history  of 
Corsica. —  Commended  by  the  Abbe  Raynal  —  In 
garrison  at  Auxonne- — Near  being  drowed  in  the 
Saone  ■ —  Prince  of  Condt^ — Bonaparte's  public  letter 
to  the  Corsican  deputy  ButtafocO' — Kindness  to  his 
brother  Louis — Promoted  to  a  first  lieutenancy  in 
the  regiment  of  Grenoble  —  Returns  to  Valence  — 
Anecdote  —  General  Dutheil  —  Bonaparte's  liberal 
political  opinions — Rescues  a  brother  officer  —  Vi- 
sits Corsica- —  Death  of  his  father's  uncle -^^  Anec- 
dote —  Promoted  to  a  captaincy  —  Commands  a 
Corsican  battalion,  and  suppresses  a  riot  at  Ajaccio — 
The  first  slander  against  him — -Goes  to  Paris  —  Re- 
marks on  the  horrors  of  the  20th  of  June,  and  loth 
of  August — Reflection — Interest  about  his  sisters — 
Pveturns  to  Corsica  —  The  expedition  against  Sardi- 
nia —  Paoli  —  Anecdote — P^efuses  to  join  Paoli  ■ — 
Paoli^s  cruelty  to  the  Bonaparte  family — Civil  war 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.  '     33 

in  Corsica  —  Bonaparte  active  on  the  side  of  France    From  1785 
^  Paoli  calls  in  the  English  —Corsica  subdued  by  .    ^^  ^'^^^• 
England  —  Madam  Bonaparte  takes  refuge  on  the 
continent,   and   settles  at    Marseilles  —  Bonaparte 
joins  the  army  of  Italy  —  Writes  and  publishes  **  Le 
Souper  de  Beaucaire/' 

Attheheadof  the  society  of  Valence,  when 
Lieutenant  Bonaparte  joined  his  regiment, 
was  Madam  Colombier^  a  lady  of  amiable 
character  and  penetrating  mind.  The  offi- 
cers of  the  garrison  were  invited  to  her  par- 
ties, where  she  soon  noticed  and  liberally 
encouraged,  the  strong  and  brilliant  facul- 
ties of  young  Bonaparte.  She  introduced 
him  to  her  acquaintances  and  recommended 
him  to  her  friends,  especially  to  the  Abbe  de 
St.  Rufe,  by  whose  hospitality  he  was  associ- 
ated with  the  most  distinguished  persons  of 
the  province.  His  mother  supplied  him  with 
an  allowance  which,  added  to  his  pay,  placed 
him  above  the  inconveniences  of  a  narrow 
income.  He  became  a  favourite  Avith  his 
commanding  officer,  was  of  an  age  to  feel  the 
allurements  of  society  as  well  as  the  attrac- 
tions of  knowledge^  and  entered  its  circles 
with  pleasure  and  success.  His  slight  ele- 
gant form,  classical  expressive  face,  original 

3 


34  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  II.  conversation,inwhich  flashes  of  genius  inces- 
santly appeared, excited. general  admiration; 
and  being  new  to  life  and  its  fashions,  he 
pleased  without  the  rules  of  pleasing,  and 
therefore  pleased  the  more,  (i) 

Mademoiselle  Colombier  was  about  his 
own  age.  It  was  natural  that  he  should  see 
the  graces  of  his  friend's  daughter,  that  she 
should  perceive  the  merits  of  her  mother's 
favourite ;  and  a  sentiment  of  tenderness 
arose  between  them.  Having  established 
the  usual  intelligence  of  lovers,  they  met  one 
moi  ning  by  day  break  in  an  orchard^  where 
their  passionate  indulgence  consisted  in  eat- 
ing cherries  together.  This  was  his  £rst 
love;  pure  as  the  dew  on  the  cherries,  it  prov- 
ed to  be  as  transient,  and  appears  to  have 
been  as  cool. 

It  was  not  without  incurring  the  envy  of 
his  comrades,  that  he  led  this  life  of  privilege 
and  pleasure  in  the  kind  and  happy  society 
of  Valence.  This  feeling  does  not  appear 
to  have  disturbed  his  enjoyment  at  the  time, 
nor  to  have  stood  in  the  way  of  their  fu- 
ture good  fortune ;  for,  of  his  messmates 
at  Valence,  six  lived  to  receive  marks 
of  his  particular  favour  j  viz.,  Lariboissiere, 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  35 

Sorbier,  Desmazzis.  d'Hedouville.  Pioland,    FromiT85 

to  1795 

and  Mabille.  (2) 

Madam  Colombier  died  soon  after  the 
commencement  of  the  revolution,  in  the 
success  of  which  she  is  said  to  have  taken  a 
warm  interest.  Her  enthusiastic  esteem  for 
young  Bonaparte  continued  to  the  last. 
Though  he  had  left  Valence,  she  mentioned 
him  on  her  death  bed,  and  told  those  around 
her,  that  if  he  was  not  prematurely  cut  off, 
his  career  in  life  would  certainly  be  glorious. 
He  always  spoke  of  her  as  his  benefactress, 
and  when  he  had  more  than  verified  her  pre- 
dictions, testified  his  respect  for  her  memory 
by  making  a  munificent  provision  for  her 
daughter.  If  Madam  Colombier  deserved  his 
gratitude,  she  demands  the  notice  of  his  bio- 
grapher, as  being  the  only  person  to  whom 
his  infant  fortune  was  indebted. 

Society,  its  charms  and  flatteries,  the 
envy  of  young  men  and  the  favour  of  young 
ladies,  did  not  allay  his  thirst  for  knowledge 
or  for  fame.  He  chanced  to  be  quartered  at 
the  house  of  a  bookseller  who  allowed  him 
the  free  use  of  his  miscellaneous  assortment 
of  volumes.  Most  of  those  during  his  stay 
at  Valence,  he  read  over  and  over,  pushing  his 


36  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^n.  studies  beyond  the  limits  of  bis  profession 
and  tbe  taste  of  his  class,  into  ihe  distant  re- 
gions of  ecclesiastical  history  and  papal  go- 
vernment. Even  from  this  irregular  read- 
ing be  appears  to  have  gleaned  a  fund  of 
sound  and  appbcable  knowledge.  At  the  age 
of  eighteen  be  became  a  competitor  for 
literary  honours.  The  academy  of  Lyons 
offered  a  prize  for  the  best  essay  on  the  fol- 
lowing question,  proposed  by  the  AbbeRay- 
nal. — ''  What  are  the  principles  and  institu- 
tions, the  application  of  which  is  most  con- 
ducive to  the  happiness  of  society  ?"  A  sub- 
ject so  abstract  and  comprehensive, it  required 
boldness  to  undertake,  and  ability  to  manage. 
Bonaparte  it  seems^  though  but  a  stripling, 
was  deficient  in  neither  prerequisite,  and  his 
anonymous  essay  not  only  gained  the  acade- 
mical prize,  but  general  applause.  Cast  in 
a  liberal  political  mould,  it  coincided  with 
the  literary  spirit  and  popular  feeling  of  the 
time,  and  to  that  circumstance  doubtless, 
owed  in  some  degree  its  success.  But  there 
was  a  force  of  logic,  and  an  energy  of  feehng 
and  expression  in  the  essay,  which  under  any 
circumstances  must  have  been  admired .  The 
upward  progress  of  its  author,  soon  left  this 


THE    EMPEROR   NAPOLEON.  87 

small  title  to  credit  beneath  him.  When  FromiT85 
however  he  had  risen  high  in  the  firmament 
of  powerand  glory,  it  was  retrieved  by  the  of- 
ficious flattery  of  Talleyrand.  The  Emperor, 
with  a  fastidiousness  23roper  to  his  elevation, 
and  common  to  men  of  great  genius,  saw,  in 
his  juvenile  essay,  nothing  but  its  imperfec- 
tions, and  threw  it  into  the  fire.  A  copy,  it 
seems^  had  been  taken  by  his  brother  Louis, 
and  the  essay  is  now  in  print. 

About  this  time  too,  actuated  by  a  noble 
veneration  for  the  place  of  his  birth^  and  the 
land  of  his  fathers,  he  undertook  to  compose 
a  history  of  Corsica.  He  made  some  pro- 
gress in  the  work,  which,  with  a  proper 
feeling  of  respect,  he  dedicated  to  the  Abbe 
Raynal.  But  though  thus  early  and  strongly 
inclined  to  authorship,  the  disposition  ap- 
pears to  have  proceeded  more  from  the  abun- 
dance of  his  resources,  and  the  creative  ar- 
dour of  his  mind,  than  from  a  predilection 
for  pursuits  so  meditative.  His  essay  toward 
a  history  of  Corsica  was  read  and  commen- 
ded by  the  Abbe  Raynal,  who  in  vain  ad- 
vised its  pubUcation.  The  production  itself 
is  lost,  but  the  familiarity  which  its  prepara- 
tion had  given  its  author  with  the  subject, 


38  THE   LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  ir.  no  doubt  furnished  his  retentive  memory 
with  the  materials,  out  of  which  was  con- 
structed the  clear  and  succinct  account  of 
Corsica,  which  he  dictated  at  St.  Helena. 

In  consequence  of  popular  disturbances  at 
Lyons,  in  the  year  1788,  his  regiment  was 
ordered  to  that  city.  From  Lyons  it  was 
transferred  to  Auxonne^  and  it  was  while 
there  that  he  was  near  being  drowned  in  the 
Saone.  In  swimming,  he  w^as  seized  with  the 
cramp,  and  sunk  so  suddenly,  that  his  com- 
panions thought  he  was  diving.  After  strug- 
ghng  some  time  he  lost  his  recollection,  and 
drifted  to  a  distance  by  the  current,  was 
lodged  on  a  sand  bank.  Here  his  comrades, 
after  giving  him  up  as  lost,  recovered  him 
before  it  was  too  late. 

In  1790,  while  he  was  stationed  at  Aux- 
onne,  thePrince  of  Conde  announced  his  in- 
tention of  inspecting  the  school  of  artillery 
at  that  place.  The  name,  as  well  as  the  rank 
of  this  personage,  rendered  his  visit  an  im- 
portant occasion  for  the  garrison.  The  Com- 
mandant therefore,  determined  to  place  the 
most  accomplished,  instead  of  the  oldest, 
officer,  at  the  head  of  the  battery,  and  Bona- 
parte was  of  course  the  officer  selected.    His 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  3g 

comrades,  to  revenge  iheir  being  postponed  From  1785 
to  him,  secretly  spiked  his  guns  the  night 
before  the  review.  But  the  mihtary  glance 
of  the  future  conqueror,  was  already  too 
quick  and  pervasive  to  be  surprised.  Be- 
fore the  prince  came  upon  the  ground,  he 
had  detected  and  frustrated  the  scheme, 
and  at  the  appointed  hour,  was  in  full  readi- 
ness to  receive  him. 

Little  could  the  prince  have  foreseen 
that  in  the  youth  before  him  stood  the  chief, 
who  was  to  eclipse  the  renown  of  his  name, 
and  to  shorten  its  succession. 

The  young  oflicers  of  the  garrison,  who 
were  eleves  of  the  royal  seminaries,  were 
associated  in  the  exercises  of  the  school  at 
Auxonne.  A  mathematical  problem  of  great 
difficulty  having  been  proposed  for  their 
study,  Bonaparte,  in  order  to  accomplish  its 
solution,  confined  himself  to  his  chamber 
seventy-two  hours  without  intermission. 
His  power  of  application,  in  truth,  seems  to 
have  been  as  remarkable  as  his  genius. 

It  was  during  his  residence  at  Auxonne^ 
that  he  wrote  and  pubhshed  his  letter  to 
Buttafoco,  the  Corsican  deputy  of  the  nobles 
in  the  national  assembly.     Besides  force  of 


40  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^ii.  ^  invective,  and   reasoning,    this  letter  exhi- 
bits a  patriotic  spirit^,  and  a  sense  of  popu- 
lar rights,  vs^hich  must  have    removed   all 
doubt  as  to  the  political  inclination  of  the 
author,  with  regard  to  the  revolution.     It 
concludes  with  an  apostrophe  to  the  great 
patriots  and  orators  of  the  assembly,  which 
would  alone  be  sufficient  to  show  that,  like 
Caesar^  had  Bonaparte  cultivated  rhetoric,  he 
would  have  rivalled  the  greatest  masters  of 
eloquence.     The  effect  of  this  letter  was 
equal  to  its  intrinsic  excellence,  and  greater 
than  any  expectation  which  the  age  or  sta- 
tion of  its  author  could  have  excited.    It  was 
adopted  and  republished  by  the  patriotic  so- 
ciety of  Ajaccio,  who,  under  its  influence, 
passed  a  resolution,  attaching  the  epithet  in- 
famous^  to  the  name  of  their  noble  deputy. 
About  this  period,  he  was  in  treaty  with  M. 
Joly,  a  bookseller  of  the  neighbouring  town 
of  Dole,  for  the  publication  of  his  history  of 
Corsica.     But  partly  from  diffidence,  and 
partly  from  the  indecision  occasioned  by  his 
approaching  transfer  to  another  regiment, 
he  seems  to  have  dropped  the  project,  with- 
out putting  the  last  hand  to  his  work,  or 
completing  the  agreement. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  4^ 

The  office  of  chaplain  having  been  abo-  From  1785 
lished  by  the  government,  the  clerical  orna- 
ments and  sacred  implements  of  the  regi- 
ment, were  deposited  in  Bonaparte's  care  at 
Auxonne.  He  showed  them  to  M.  Joly,  and 
expressing  himself  respectfully  with  regard 
to  religious  observances^  said :  "If  you  have 
never  heard  Mass  I  can  repeat  it  to  you." 
The  functions  of  his  uncle  and  his  mother's  ex- 
ample had  made  him  from  his  childhood,  fa- 
miliar with  the  forms  of  the  Catholic  church. 

That  course  of  protection,  which  he  ex- 
tended so  liberally  and  so  constantly,  to  the 
members  of  his  familv,  he  seems  to  have 
commenced  when  a  simple  lieutenant.  At 
Auxonne,  his  brother  Louis,  then  but  ten 
years  of  age,  was  under  his  care  and  instruc- 
tion, shared  his  meals,  and  occupied  a  room 
in  his  quarters.  (3)  It  was  by  his  care  that 
Louis  received  the  religious  information  ne- 
cessary for  a  communicant,  and  by  his  ex- 
hortations, that  he  took  the  sacrament  of  the 
Lord's  Supper — conduct  on  the  part  of  Na- 
poleon, which  was  not  only  kind  and  consi- 
derate as  a  brother,  but  affectionate  and  re- 
spectful as  a  son. 
'     In  consequence  of  his  promotion  to  a  first 


/p  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  n.  lieutenancy  in  the  regiment  of  Grenoble, 
or  the  4tli  artillery,  he  left  Auxonnein  1790 
and  returned  to  his  old  station  of  Valence, 
where  the  regiment  of  Grenoble  was  quar* 
tered.  Here  he  became  acquainted  with 
young  d'Hedouville  who  was  an  officer  in 
that  regiment.  They  were  in  the  same  mess, 
and  sat  beside  each  other  at  table.  Among 
the  rules  of  the  mess  was  one  imposing  a  fine 
on  any  member,  who  at  meals,  should  intro- 
duce a  professional  subject.  Bonaparte's 
fondness  for  his  profession  made  him,  it  was 
observed,  the  most  frequent  infractor,  and  a 
constant  victim  of  this  rule.  (4) 

Attended  by  his  friend  and  comrade  Des- 
mazzis  he  made  an  excursion  from  Valence 
into  Burgundy  as  far  as  Mont  Cenis,  a  town, 
famous  for  its  manufacture  of  chrystal.  On 
his  way  he  stopped  at  Nuits  and  was  invited 
to  sup  with  Gassendi,  a  captain  of  his  regi- 
ment,  who  had  married  the  daughter  of  a 
physician  residing  there.  Gassendi  was  a 
royalist,  his  father-in-law  a  patriot.  Their 
opposition  Avas  displayed  by  a  warm  discus- 
sion at  supper,  in  which  Bonaparte's  superior 
intelligence  and  logic,  were  so  efficient  on  the 
side  of  the  doctor,  that  he  visited  his  guest 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  4^ 

next  mornine;  in  his  chamber,  and  thanked    From  1785 

.  .     .  .  .  to  1793. 

him  in  flattering  terms  for  his  interposition. 
The  eloquence  and  patriotism  of  the  young 
officer,  became  the  subject  of  conversation  in 
the  town.  It  was  Snndav,  and  when  he 
walked  out,  the  people  in  the  streets  pulled 
off  their  hats  to  him  as  the  champion  of  their 
cause.  But  the  triumph  of  the  morning 
was  overcast  at  night.  He  was  invited  to 
pass  the  evening  at  the  house  of  Madam 
Mery,  a  lady  of  wealth  and  fashion,  who  en- 
tertained all  the  aristocracv  of  the  district. 
Here  having  expressed  some  of  his  opinions^ 
they  were  assailed  and  reprobated  with  the 
utmost  violence.  He  attempted  a  war  of 
words,  but  overpowered  by  noise  and  num- 
bers, was  able  to  extricate  himself  only  by 
the  assistance  of  his  hostess,  who  gracefully 
parried  the  blows  which  he  could  not  resist. 
This  incident,  though  it  mortified  him  for 
the  moment,  contributed  still  farther  to  con- 
nect his  name  and  feelings  with  the  cause  of 
the  people.  Of  this  trip,  in  which  his  curio- 
sity andfriendshipw^ere  both  gratified,  and 
which  appears  to  have  been  the  last  as  well 
as  the  first,  he  ever  performed  from  mere 
motives  of  pleasure,  his  recollection  was  so 
agreeable,  that  he  conceived  for  the  moment 


44  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  II.  an  idea  of  writing  a  description  of  it  after  the 
manner  of  Sterne,  and  spoke  of  it  in  afterlife 
with  pecuHar  complacency,  calling  it  his  sen^ 
iimental  journey. 

Though  reflective  in  the  general  bent  of 
his  mindj  it  Avould  seem  that  when  under  the 
influence  of  professional  duties  and  pleasing 
recreations,  the  shade  of  early  mortification 
having  passed  away  from  his  temper,  he 
was  become  companionable  and  cheerful. 
His  success  in  society  at  Valence,  has  been 
mentioned  already^  and  at  St.  Helena  he  him- 
self recorded  various  little  anecdotes,  indica- 
tive of  the  sportive  disposition  of  his  youth. 
As  a  sample  of  these  anecdotes^  this  may  be 
repeated.  An  octogenary  general  undertook 
to  exercise  the  young  officers  in  gunnery,  and 
was  very  intent  on  tracing  the  balls  with  his 
spy-glass.  Bonaparte  persuaded  the  young 
men  to  fire  blank  cartridges.  The  veteran 
could  not  of  course  discover  where  the  balls 
struck,  and  reproached  the  wags  with  taking 
very  wide  aim.  Their  amusement  consisted 
more  in  fun  than  in  wit;  in  witnessing  the 
general's  eagerness  in  looking  out  for  balls 
which  were  not  fired,  and  asking  the  by- 
standers where  they  struck.  After  five  or  six 
rounds^  he  suspected  the  trick  and  ordered 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  4^ 

the  balls  to  be  counted.     He  laughed  heartily    F«>i»  ^^85 

to  1793. 

at  the  joke,  but  notwithstanding,  had  its  pre- 
petrators  put  under  a  momentary  arrest. 
This  veteran  was  General  Duthiel,  for  whose 
memory,  evidence  of  respect  and  a  title  to 
honour,  are  found  in  Napoleon's  will. 

The  revolution  was  npw  decisively  in  pro- 
gress, and  the  political  disunions  by  which  it 
eventually  distracted  the  nation,  were  mak- 
ing their  way  into  the  army.  The  soldiers, 
having  the  soundest  feelings,  were  first  affect- 
ed by  thepatriotic  spirit.  Gradually  it  spread 
from  them  to  the  officers,  and  after  the  famous 
and  comprehensive  oath  of  allegiance  "  to 
the  nation,  the  law,  and  the  king,"  was  pre- 
scribed by  the  national  assembly,  officers  of 
superior  rank  and  aristocratic  conuectionsj 
espoused  the  popular  side  of  the  question. 
Bonaparte  who  had  given  early  and  frequent 
evidence  of  this  disposition,  and  who  was 
confirmed  in  it  by  the  promulgation  of  the 
oath,  acquired  in  addition  to  the  authority 
conferred  by  professional  talent,  the  in- 
fluence arising  from  political  sympathy  with 
the  men.  In  consequence,  he  and  his  adhe- 
rents were  able  to  manage  the  corps,  although 
a  preponderance  of  officers  in  rank  if  not  in 


46  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  II.  number  was  against  them.  This  control 
he  exercised  with  generosity,  and  rescued 
from  a  military  mob  an  officer  who  had  ex- 
cited the  fury  of  the  soldiers,  by  singing,  at 
the  window  of  the  mess-room,  the  famous 
royalist  song,  "Oh  Richard,  Oh  my  King,'' 
a  song,  which  was  one  day  to  be  proscribed 
on  his  account.  Thus,  though  deeply  imbued 
with  the  liberal  principles  by  which  the  re- 
volutionary party  was  actuated,  he  was  not 
tainted  by  their  cruelty,  nor  even  their  into- 
lerance. Indeed  in  reference  to  the  motives 
of  the  opposite  parties,  he  made  subsequently 
this  sound  and  just  remark;  "  Had  I  been 
a  general  officer  I  might  have  adhered  to  the 
king  ;  a  young  heutenant,  I  sided-  with  the 
revolution."  (5) 

It  appears  that  about  this  time  he  was  in 
,  correspondence  with  the  celebrated  Paoh,  on 
the  subject  of  his  history  of  Corsica,  and  on 
the  prospect  of  a  more  liberal  state  of  things, 
which  by  the  enlightened  labours  of  the  na- 
tional assembly,  was  dawning  on  the  nation. 
Paoli,  in  consequence  of  the  success  of  Mira- 
beau's  motion  for  the  recal  of  the  Corsican 
exiles,  left  England  in  1790,  and  after  being 
received  with  signal  honour  at  Paris,  was 


THE    E>IPEROR  NAPOLEON.  47 

hailed  on  his  arrival  in  Corsica  with  lovful  From  1785 
demonstrations  or  general  respect.  1  he  L.or- 
sicaus  placed  in  his  hands  whatever  power 
they  had  to  confer ;  the  confidence  of  the 
Government  was  not  inferior  to  the  attach- 
ment of  the  people  ;  and  PaoH  wasappomted 
Lieutenant  General  in  the  army,  and  Com- 
mander in  chief  of  themilitary  division  which 
comprehended  the  island. 

This  was  the  state  of  things  in  Corsica 
when  in  September,  1 79 1 ,  Bonaparte,  after  an 
absence  of  more  than  twelve  years  visited  his 
native  town  on  furlough.  He  had  left  it  a  wild, 
sprightly  boy,  he  returned  to  it  an  accom- 
plished officer,  with  powers  of  conception 
and  expression  singularly  strong,  and  with 
a  name  already  known  in  politics  and  letters. 
He  joined  his  family  in  time  to  witness  the 
last  days  of  its  second  father,  the  good  arch- 
deacon,-  who  had  bestowed  on  it  a  parent's 
care.  This  venerable  relative  was  so  firmly 
persuaded  of  Napoleon's  worth  and  ge- 
nius, that  on  his  death-bed  he  called  the  chil- 
dren around  him,  and  accompanied  his  last 
blessing  with  this  advice :"  Joseph,  you  are 
the  eldest  of  the  sons,  but  remember  what  I 
say.  Napoleon  is  the  head  of  the  house." 


48  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  II.  As  Joseph  was  by  no  means  deficient  in 
promise,  the  spirit  of  the  injunction  could 
not  be  misapprehended.  It  seems  to  have 
made  a  deep  impression  on  the  mind  of  Na- 
poleon, and  to  have  influenced  his  conduct 
as  well  as  the  expectations  of  his  family, 
through  life. 

His  power  in  the  circle  of  his  brethren,  was 
the  same  which  he  exerted  in  the  world  at 
large,  and  the  judgment  of  the  secluded  and 
expiring  prelate,  was  confirmed  by  the  devo- 
ted obedience  of  armies,  and  the  deliberate 
confidence  of  a  great  nation.  The  feeling  of 
the  relative  was  directed  by  sagacity,  the 
judgment  of  the.  people  was  actuated  by  af- 
fection, so  that  the  ascendancy  of  Napoleon, 
whether  viewed  in  its  domestic  or  public  cha- 
racter, may  be  said  to  have  arisen  from  those 
legitimatesources,  which  nature  implants  and 
reason  consecrates — the  light  of  man's  un- 
derstanding, and  the  warmth  of  his  heart.  (6J 
Her  protecting  son  being  in  the  army. 
Madam  Bonaparte  was  compelled  to  assume 
the  personal  superintendence  of  the  family 
affairs.  These  were  by  no  means  prosper- 
ous; for  although  the  archdeacon  left  some 
ready  money    his   ecclesiastical  income  of 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  49 

course  ceased  with  his  life,  and  the  costly  From  1785 
and  unsuccessful  experiments  of  Charles  Bo- 
naparte in  reclaiming  an  extensive  salt  marshy 
had  seriously  impaired  his  estate.  (7)  In  these 
circumstances^  however,  the  fortitude  and 
good  sense  of  his  widow  effected  much.  She 
managed  her  properly  with  care  and  econo- 
my, and  her  children  with  that  prudence 
and  affection,  which  have  evinced  through  a 
long  and  eventful  life,  the  excellence  of  her 
character. 

In  February,  1792,  a  general  promotion, 
which  was  accelerated  by  the  emigration  of 
many  officers^  raised  Bonaparte  to  the  rank  of 
captain.  The  divisions  generated  by  the 
revolution  had  extended  themselves  to  Cor- 
sica, where,  modified  by  circumstances  pe- 
cuhar  to  the  history  of  that  island,  they  ap- 
peared in  the  shape  of  a  party  in  favour  of 
maintaining  the  union  with  France,  and  a 
party  opposed  to  it.  For  the  purpose  of  pre- 
serving the  public  peace,  and  supporting  the 
legal  authorities,  a  corps  of  local  troops  was 
raised  in  Corsica,  and  the  provisional  com- 
mand of  one  of  the  battalions  was  intrusted 
to  Bonaparte.  The  insurgents,  or  anti- 
union party,  had  at  first  the  sympathy,  and 

4 


5o  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^i.^  finally  the  countenance,  of  Paoll  ;  and 
Ajaccio  was  the  focus  of  its  proceedings. 
Hence  it  happened  that  Bonaparte's  first  act 
of  war,  was  exerted  in  opposition  to  the  sen- 
timents of  his  father's  commander  j  and  in  the 
suppression  of  a  tumult  in  his  native  town. 
Peraldi,  a  popular  leader  of  a  rival  clan  and 
the  opposite  party,  who  breathed  hereditary 
enmity  to  the  Bonaparte  family,  was  at  the 
head  of  the  discomfited  rioters ;  a  circum- 
stance which  Avas  not  likely  to  soften  the  in- 
veteracy of  a  clannish  feud.  Accordingly^ 
he  denounced  Bonaparte  to  the  government, 
as  the  secret  instigator  of  the  disorder  which 
he  had  openly  quelled.  This  accusation, 
prompted  by  vengeance,  was  unsupported  by 
truth.  But  it  rendered  a  journey  to  Paris 
advisable,  where,  though  the  sanguinary 
temper  of  power  was  beginning  to  encourage 
delation,  Bonaparte  found  no  difficulty  in 
vindicating  his  conduct. 

This  slander  of  Peraldi  is  memorable  as 
being  coeval  with  the  earliest  of  Napoleon's 
public  services,  and  as  the  first  in  that  long 
succession  of  falsehoods,  which  under  the 
warmth  and  lustre  of  his  merit,  Avere  exhal- 
ed from  the  disorder,  malicCj  and  corruption 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEO'.  5 1 

of  his  a£[e.     Though  frustrated  in  its  aim,  it    From  1785 

.  ...  .to  1793. 

was  not  without  effect  in  his  history,  as  it 
was  the  occasion  of  his  witnessing  the  outra- 
ges of  the  populace  on  the  20th  of  June  and 
the  I  oth  of  August.  On  the  first  occasion,  it  is 
said,  that  upon  seeing  from  the  river  terrace 
of  the  garden  of  the  Tuileries  the  King  pre- 
sent himself  at  a  balcony  of  the  palace,  wear- 
ing the  red  cap  of  liberty,  which,  intimida- 
ted by  the  rabble,  he  had  clapped  upon  his 
head,  Bonaparte  expressed  indignation  at 
the  monarch's  weakness,  and  exclaimed:-— 
"How  could  they  suffer  the  mob  to  enter  the 
palace  ?  It  was  only  necessary  to  sweep  off 
a  few  hundreds  of  them  with  cannon,  and 
the  rest  would  have  been  running  now.'^ 
His  contempt  for  a  rout  of  this  kind,  origin- 
ating in  his  love  of  order  and  pride  of  dis- 
cipline^ and  his  confidence  in  the  application 
of  military  force ,  were  both  strengthened 
doubtless  by  his  recent  experience  in  Cor- 
sica. (8) 

He  was  still  more  shocked  by  the  sangui- 
nary excesses  of  the  loth  of  August.  The 
brave  and  immolated  Swiss  guards,  their 
bodies  lying  in  heaps  on  the  pavement  of 
the  court,  and  their  heads  paraded  about  on 


52  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  II.  pikes  by  demons  in  human  shape,  struck 
him  with  horror,  and  presented  a  spectacle 
which  he  remembered  as  "hideous  and  re- 
volting." Instinct  with  heroic  fire,  his  soul 
shuddered  at  scenes  of  cruelty  and  murder, 
and  his  just  understanding  regarded  the  vio- 
lence of'a  mob  as  the  ferocity  of  a  monster. 
But  he  was  not  in  a  position  to  reflect, 
that  the  fault,  instead  of  being  in  the  infu- 
riated populace,  was  in  the  oppression  which 
had  maddened  them.  They  were  born  with 
natures  askind,  with  sensibilities  as  gener- 
ous as  the  rest  of  mankind,  but  a  bigoted  and 
dissolute  priesthood,  a  privileged  and  rapa- 
cious aristocracy,  and  a  line  of  cruel  and  vo- 
luptuous kings,  had  ch^iven  them  through 
all  the  extremities  of  persecution  and  shift- 
ings  of  servitude,  to  the  rage  of  despair.  The 
great  body  of  the  French  people  had  been 
treated  like  brutes  until  they  were  become 
brutal.  Their  mental  vision  had  been  so 
long  obscured  in  depths  of  degradation,  that 
the  light  of  liberty  affected  them  with  bhnd- 
ness,  the  air  of  relief  with  convulsions.  Ex- 
hausted by  ages  of  oppression,  a  nation,  re- 
nowned for  generous  devotion  to  ungrate- 
ful monarrhs,  was  excited  to  paroxysms  of 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  3a 

frenzy  by  the  first  sensations  of  freedom.  But   From  1785 

.  ...  to  1795. 

is  this  an  argument  in  favour  of  divine  right 
and  legitimate  monarchy,  or  a  motive  for  dis- 
trusting the  capacity  of  the  people  for  self- 
government.-^  The  people  of  France  were  no 
more  to  blame  than  is  the  solitary  maniac, 

■J  7 

who  escaping  from  unrighteous  chains^  kills 
a  stranger  under  the  belief  that  in  that  stran- 
ger he  is  destroying  the  oppressor,  whose 
cruelty  tortured  his  limbs  and  distracted  his 
brain.  The  objects  of  their  fury  were  not 
the  victims  of  popular  rage,  but  of  the  royal 
vices  which  engendered  it  5  and  the  axe 
which  beheaded  Louis  XVI  was  raised,  not 
by  his  subjects,  but  his  ancestors. 

Through  all  the  violence  of  the  revolu- 
tionary struggles,  the  people  had  but  one  ob- 
ject of  desire,  freedom,  but  one  subject  of 
dread,  tyranny;  and  their  great  leaders,  the 
patriots  of  the  revolution,  pursued  the  no- 
blest aims  of  human  ambition,  the  liberty  of 
their  fellow  citizens,  and  the  independence 
of  their  country.  That  the  good  which  was 
desired  and  proposed  was  not  all  effected, 
and  that  unforeseen  misery  and  crime  could 
not  be  avoided,  was  their  mutual  misfortune, 
not  their  common  fault.  He  therefore,  who 


CHAP.  II. 


54  THE  LIFE    OF 

stigmatizes  the  revolution  because  of  its  in- 
cidental atrocities  or  unexpected  catastrophe, 
might  consistently  reproach  a  miner,  whose 
enterprise  and  labour  afford  comfort  to  mil- 
lions, because  the  fire-damps  of  the  earth 
explode^  when  touched  by  the  flame  of  his 
useful  torch.     And  he  who  can  lament  over 
the  downfall  of  a  throne,  and  the  suffering  of 
the  individuals  connected  with  it,  without 
execrating  the  tyranny  of  which  it  was  the 
seat,  might  he  expected  to  sympathise  with 
the  murderer^  against  whom  the  blood  of 
his  victim  rises  in  judgment,  without  feeling 
indignation  for  the  crueUy  with  which  that 
blood  had  been  shed,  or  pity  for  the  pangs, 
which  sent  forth  life  in  its  current.  The  truth 
of  these  observations  is  too  plain  to  be  con- 
tested.  They  shew  that  as  the  excesses  of  the 
French  revolution  were  the  natural  conse- 
quences of  hereditary  rule,  the  votaries  of 
that  system  have  no  right  to  complain,  when 
the  vices  of  one  king,  descend  in  vengeance 
on  his  successor.  They  also  shew,  that  if  long 
continued  submission  strengthens  the  hands 
of  the  oppressor,  it  makes  his  ultimate  ac- 
countabiUty  the  more  perilous,  by  perverting 
the  nature  and  the  energies  of  the  oppressed. 


THE    E>IPEROR    NAPOLEON.  55 

Of  no  great  political  event  have  all  the 
consequences  been  beneficial.  The  struggle 
which  emancipated  the  United  States,  was 
not  unattended  by  the  sorrows  of  innocence, 
and  the  sufferings  of  virtue.  Unminglcd  ad- 
vantages were  not  to  be  expected  from  the 
French  revolution,  of  whichj  however,  while 
the  horrors  were  confined  to  France,  the 
advantages  redounded  to  mankind.  That 
these  were  important,  may  be  conceived  by 
reflecting  on  the  probable  condition  of  Eu- 
rope, had  the  first  coalition  against  France 
been  successful.  Those  who  rail  against  the 
French  revolution,  and  describe  its  excesses  as 
effects  of  the  natural  propensity  of  the  people 
and  the  press,  would  do  well  to  compa  re  them 
with  the  massacre  of  St.  Bartholomew,  the 
acknowledged  offspring  of  the  altar  and  the 
throne,  since  it  was  perpetrated  by  the  order 
of  Charles  IX,  and  eulogised  by  the  thanks- 
giving of  Gregory  II.  The  virtuous  Sully  re- 
cords some  of  the  horrors  of  ([\\s  legitimate 
reign  of  terror  ^'\n  which  seventy  thousand 
French  protestants  were  massacred  in  the 
course  of  eight  days. 

While  Bonaparte  was  on  this  occasion  at 
Paris,  he  seems  to  have  felt  the  weight  of 


From  1 785 
to  1795. 


56  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  II.  the  inheritance  which  his  dying  uncle  had 
turned  aside  from  Joseph,  and  devolved  upon 
him.  His  mother,  though  not  in  affluence, 
was  in  possession  of  comfort  and  indepen- 
dence, and  for  his  own  wants,  his  pay  as 
Captain  of  artillery,  constituted  adequate, 
though  not  ample  provision.  But  his  younger 
brothers  and  his  sisters  were  to  be  educated, 
and  the  latter  provided  for.  About  these 
last  he  felt  most  anxiety,  for  in  writing  at 
this  time  to  his  uncle  Paravicini  he  observed: 
^'Allow  yourself  to  feel  no  uneasiness  con- 
cerning your  nephews;  they  will  be  able  to 
take  care  of  themselves."  Accompanied  by 
Bourrienne,  he  went  from  Paris  to  St.  Cyr, 
to  visit  his  sister  Eliza,  who  was  then  at 
school  there;  and  it  is  said,  in  speculating 
upon  the  means  of  making  money,  formed  the 
momentary  project,  of  renting  a  number  of 
houses  in  Paris,  and  subletting  them  at  pro- 
fitable prices.  (9) 

Beturning  to  Corsica;  and  resuming  the 
command  of  a  local  battalion,  he  wais  direct- 
ed in  January,  1793,  to  join  the  expedition 
of  Admiral  Truguet,  against  the  neighbour- 
ing island  of  Sardinia.  A  second  battalion 
was  added  to  his  corps,  which  constituted  a 


THE   EMPEROPi    NAPOLEON.  5"] 

part  of  the  land  force  of  the  armament.    The    From  1785 

...  .  to  1795. 

expedition  sailed,  the  main  body  under  the 
admiral  to  attack  Cagliari ;  and  the  Corsi- 
can  detachment  to  make  a  diversion  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  island.  Bonaparte 
with  his  militia  force,  executed  his  part 
of  the  enterprise  so  far  as  to  get  possession  of 
several  islets  and  forts,  in  the  straits  of  Boni- 
facio. But  the  principal  attempt  under  Tru- 
guet  having  failed,  in  consequence,  as  was  al- 
leged of  Paoli's  machinations,  Bonaparte's 
subordinate  success  was  unavailing.  Conse- 
quently, he  abandoned  the  positions  he  had 
taken,  and  re-embarking  his  men,  returned  to 
Ajaccio;  where  the  spirit  and  ability  which 
he  had  displayed  were  applauded,  in  spite 
of  the  inefficacy  of  his  exertions,  and  the 
failure  of  the  expedition. 

PaolijWho  had  for  some  time  given  reason 
to  suspect  that  his  former  enmity  to  France 
was  reviving  in  his  mind^  was  completely 
alienated  by  the  outrages  of  the  loth  of  Au- 
gust and  the  3d  of  September.  He  had  been 
much  caressed  in  England  during  his  exile, 
and  had  conceived  admiration  for  the  lead- 
ing men  and  principal  institutions  of  that 
country.     His  discontent  with  the  state  of 


58  THE    LIFE    OF 

^3^^^J1l-  things  in  France,  exaggerated  by  these  inch- 
nations  towards  her  enemy^  induced  him  to 
form  a  design,  and  finally  to  take  measures 
for  separating  Corsica  from  France,  and 
annexing  it  to  the  possessions  of  the  crown 
of  England.  At  length  being  denounced 
to  the  French  Government  by  the  populaff 
societies  of  Provence,  he  was  summoned  to 
the  bar  of  the  convention  to  justify  himself, 
under  the  penalty  of  being  punished  as  a  trai^ 
tor.  Whatever  had  been  his  motives^  his 
conduct  he  was  conscious,  had  placed  him  in 
a  position  in  which  success  could  alone  justify 
or  protect  him,  even  before  a  temperate  tri- 
bunal. He  declined  compliance  with  the 
fearful  summons,  under  the  pretext  of  age 
and  infirmity,  and  then  throwing  off  the  mask 
with  which  he  had  hitherto  veiled  his  pro- 
ceedings, invited  the  assistance  of  England, 
and  raised  the  standard  of  revolt.  (lo) 

Before  taking  this  final  step  he  communi- 
cated his  intention  to  Bonaparte,  who  was 
already  a  person  of  influence  in  the  island, 
and  commanded  as  we  have  seen  a  corps  of 
Corsican  miHtia.  As  he  had  engaged  the 
personal  regard  of  Paoli,  his  co-operation  was 
desirable  from  the  double  motive  of  policy 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  5g 

and  friendship.     The  Corsican  chief  was  a   From1T85 

to  1795. 

man  of  venerable  age,  imposing  appearance, 
and  elegant  conversation ;  skilful  in  war,  and 
sagacious  in  government.  He  discoursed  much 
with  his  young  friend  on  the  distracted  state 
of  affairs  in  France,  enlarged  on  the  advanta- 
ges of  Corsican  independence,  referred  to  the 
united  efforts  of  himself  and  Charles  Bona- 
parte in  support  of  it ;  and  riding  over  the 
ground  of  their  campaigns,  pointed  out  its 
memorable  spots,  and  explained  its  military 
positions.  Bonaparte  though  pleased  with 
his  anecdotes,  and  probably  instructed  by  his 
experience,  was  far  from  agreeing  in  his  poli- 
tical conclusions.  He  admitted  that  the  con- 
dition of  public  affairs  in  France  was  fright- 
ful, but  with  his  characteristic  judgment 
argued  that  whatever  is  violent  in  degree  is 
short  in  duration,  and  urged  that  as  Paoli 
was  possessed  of  extensive  authority  and 
great  influence  in  the  island,  it  was  his  pro- 
vince to  maintain  the  laws,  and  preserve  tran- 
quillity, until  the  fury  of  the  convulsions  in 
France  should  subside.  He  added  that  Cor- 
sica belonged  geographically  to  Italy  or 
France ;  that  religion,  language,  and  position, 
rendered  its  cordial  union  with  England  im- 


6o  THE    LIFE    OF 

CH  AP.  II,  praclicablejaiidtliat  as  Italy  was  insignificant, 
by  reason  of  its  subdivisions,  the  most  natu- 
ral and  advantageous  connection  for  Corsica 
was  with  France;  a  connection  which  in  good 
policy  no  temporary  inconvenience  should 
be  allowed  to  disturb,  and  in  sound  patriot- 
ism, not  even  great  calamities  should  be 
permitted  to  sever.  It  was  during  one  of 
these  conversations,  that  Paoli,  struck  by  the 
force  of  Bonaparte's  logic,  and  the  dignity  of 
his  sentiments,  exclaimed  "  Oh,  Napoleon, 
vou  are  not  a  man  of  modern  times^,  your 
opinions  belong  to  the  men  of  Plutarch. 
You  will  rise  to  greatness."  These  expres- 
sions it  appears,  Paoli  often  repeated,  (i  i) 

Their  last  and  decisive  conference  took 
place  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Corte,  a  town 
in  the  interior,  and  the  ancient  capital  of  the 
island,  the  date  and  tone  of  which  rendered 
it  evident  that  they  must  part  either  as  con- 
federates or  enemies.  Paoli  persisted  in  his 
shortsighted  designs  in  favour  of  the  English 
connection  J  Bonaparte  adhered  to  the  coun- 
try of  his  father's  adoption,  and  his  own  birth 
and  allegiance.  Their  separation  shows  a 
remarkable  diversity  of  conductin  twogreat 
men  disposed  to  act  from  honourable  mo- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  6l 

lives,  and  placed  on  the  same  staee  of  affairs.    From  1785 

.  .  .  to  1795. 

BulPaoli  had  recollections  of  pride  and  power 
tolookback  upon,  which  though  definite,  and 
converged  to  the  microscopic  scene  of  Corsi- 
can  history,  were  magnificent  and  endearing 
to  the  memory  of  age.  His  original  hostility 
to  France,  though  soothed  and  tranquilised 
by  the  homage  and  confidence  of  the  leading 
men  in  Paris,  had  not  been  converted  into 
hearty  attachment.  Bonaparte  on  the  con- 
trary, was  born  a  Frenchman  and  educated 
in  France,  was  young,  passionate  for  glory, 
vivid  with  hope  and  talent,  and  naturally 
looked  forward  to  the  undefined  future,  and 
the  ample  theatre  of  France,  for  opportunity 
and  distinction.  His  professional  pride  and 
instinctive  feeling  were  affected  as  he  says 
with  antipathy  for  the  treasonable  project 
of  Paoli,  and  as  vigorous  plants  shoot  upward 
to  the  sun,  his  genius,  which  would  have 
been  imprisoned  in  the  contracted  circuit  of 
his  native  isle^  gravitated  towards  the  im- 
portant events  of  France,  and  the  powerful 
emotions  which  produced  them. 

PaoH,  persevering  in  his  unjustifiable  pro- 
ject of  delivering  up  Corsica  to  England,  tem- 
porised with  Bonaparte  not  a  moment  after 


62  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^ii,^  this  last  interview;  and  accordingly,  the  latter 
in  retracing  his  steps  toward  Ajaccio,  found 
himself  surrounded  and  made  prisoner  by 
the  partisans  of  Paoli  at  a  place  called  Bocog- 
nano  situated  in  a  pass  of  the  mountains. 
Escaping  by  a  singular  stratagem^  he  reach- 
ed  Ajaccio,  whence  with  the  assistance  of  a 
friend,  hesucceededin  joining  the  force  which 
the  committee  of  public  safety  had  by  this 
time  assembled  at  Calvi,  under  the  direction 
of  the  representatives  of  the  people,  Salicetti 
and  La  Combe  St.  Michael. 

A  civil  war  noAV  broke  out  in  the  island. 
Paoli  having  failed  in  the  attempt,  first  to 
mislead  Bonaparte's  judgment  by  pursuasion, 
and  next  to  secure  his  person  by  force,  now 
resorted  to  threats,  and  warned  him  by  letter 
that,  if  he  continued  to  support  the  French 
authorities,  he  would  treat  him  andhis  family 
as  public  enemies.  This  menace  being  disre- 
garded or  defied,  the  exasperated  veteran  pro- 
ceeded to  execute  it  with  vengeful  severity. 
The  French  party  was  driven  from  Ajaccio  ; 
the  house  in  Avhich  Bonaparte  was  born  was 
given  up  to  pillage,  and  converted  into  a  bar- 
rack for  British  troops  ;  the  farm  laid  waste, 
and  in  the  blind  impotence  of  rage  and 


THE    EMPEROR    ^APOLEON.  63 

wron2[,  a  decree  of  banishment  was  issued    From  1785 

to  1793. 

against  Napoleon  and  his  brother  Joseph,  (i  2) 
Sahcetti  and  St.  Michael  made  several  ineffec- 
tual descents,  in  which  Bonaparte  either  com- 
manded or  engaged  ;  but  the  Enghsh  forces 
having  interposed,  and  the  mountaineers  of 
Paoli  joining  them  in  numbers,  the  French 
cause  was  lost  in  the  island. 

On  one  occasion  Bonaparte  was  sent  from 
Calvi  to  surprise  Ajaccio.  He  embarked  in 
a  frigate,  and  landing  on  the  north  side  of  the 
gulf  with  a  party  of  fifty  men,  took  posses- 
sion of  a  fort  called  the  Torre  di  Capitello. 
He  had  no  sooner  carried  this  point,  than  the 
frigate  was  driven  to  sea  by  a  gale.  While 
thus  insulated  and  unsupported,  the  insur- 
gents attacked  him  with  great  violence,  by 
land  and  water.  He  defended  himself  with 
spirit,  and  with  such  pertinacity,  that  he  and 
his  heroic  little  garrison  were  reduced  to  ra- 
tions of  horse  flesh.  During  the  siege,  he 
called  out  from  the  walls  to  a  party,  and 
harangued  his  misguided  countrymen  in  a 
strain  of  eloquence  so  impressive,  that  he 
made  many  converts.  After  five  days  of 
conflict  and  starvation,  the  frigate  returned 


64  THE    Lir'E    OF 

CHAP^r.^  to  her  station,  and  he  re-embarked,  having 
first  partially  blown  up  the  fort.(i3) 

He  himself  mentions,  that  in  one  of  his 
landings,  he  got  a  few  guns  ashore,  and  with 
a  round  or  two  of  grapeshot^  dispersed  a 
body  of  the  insurgents  who  opposed  him. 
They  returned  to  the  attack  however^  and 
mixed  reproaches  with  their  warfare,  expres- 
sing indignation  that  he,  a  Corsican,  should 
be  fighting  for  France.  In  order  to  make 
themselves  both  seen  and  heard,  they  ascend- 
ed the  neighbouring  hills,  and  even  mount- 
ed up  into  trees.  Bonaparte  had  a  gun  load- 
ed with  ball,  and  aimed  it  so  well,  that  he 
cut  off  a  limb  on  which  one  of  these  exclusive 
patriots  was  perched.  His  fall,  which  creat- 
ed a  general  laugh,  was  followed  by  the  in- 
stant flight  of  his  party. 

These  partial  efforts,  however  sj)irited^ 
were  of  no  avail  against  the  united  force  of 
Paoli  and  the  English.  The  French  repre- 
sentatives, accordingly,  determined  to  aban- 
don the  contest,  and  withdraw  to  France. 
Bonaparte  contrived  to  communicate  with 
his  mother.  Under  his  protection,  she  with- 
drew from  the  storm  which  overwhelmed 


THE    EMPi:KOR    NAPOLEON.  65 

Corsica,  and  souf^lii  sbeUer  oq  the  contiiieiil,    From  1785 

-.  .  .to  1795. 

Stopping  first  at  JSice,  and  settling  finally  in 
Marseilles,  with  the  dependence  of  a  large 
family,  and  the  remnant  of  a  small  fortune. 

This  expulsion  of  his  father's  family  from 
their  home,  and  of  himself  with  circum- 
stances of  odious  solemnity,  from  the  place  of 
his  birth,  was  probably  the  first  occasion  on 
which  he  felt  the  iron  pressure  of  calamity. 
The  severity  of  the  blow,  was  not  lessened 
by  the  reflection,  that  it  was  dealt  by  the 
hand  of  his  paternal  friend.  Yet  it  neither 
embittered  his  affections,  nor  discouraged 
his  enterprise,  nor  damped  his  liberality. 
After  providing  for  the  temporary  establish- 
ment of  his  mother,  he  made  immediate  pre- 
parations for  joining  his  regiment,  which 
was  then  at  Nice.  He  preserved  to  the  last 
a  warmth  of  affection  for  his  native  isle,  (14) 
and  an  affectionate  respect  for  Paoli;  while 
the  Corsican  Phcenix,  languishing  in  the 
cold  and  compulsive  caresses  of  England, 
( 1 5 )  expressed  paternal  joy  at  the  deeds  and 
triumphs  of  his  youthful  friend.  (16  J 

Before  he  joined  his  regiment,  his  ser- 
vices in  several  delicate  operations,  the  pre- 
cise nature  of  which  has  not  been  explained, 

5 


6()  THE    LIFE    OF 

'  CHAP.  II.  were  required  b)  general  Dugear.  This 
general,  who  commanded  the  artillery  of  the 
army  which,  encamped  around  Nice,  was 
called  the  army  of  Italy,  although  it  had  never 
crossed  the  Alps,  nor  tasted  the  waters  of  the 
Po,  had  obtained  authority  from  the  war 
department,  to  employ  young  Bonaparte, 
upon  his  return  from  Corsica. 

About  this  time  the  insurrection  of  Mar- 
seilles broke  out,  a  movement,  consequent 
upon  the  arrest  of  the  leaders  of  the  Girondist 
party,  in  the  Convention,   on  the   3ist  of 
May  and  2d  of  June;  and  which  extended 
wdth  violence  into  departments  of  the  south 
and  west.  The  insurgents  of  Marseilles  orga- 
nized a  force  of  six  thousand  men,  with 
which,  in  order  to  cooperate  with  the  mal- 
contents of  Lyons,  they  took  possession  of 
Avignon,  and  thereby  intercepted  the  com- 
munications of  the  army  of  Italy,  This  greatly 
embarassed  the  commanding  general,  who 
found  his  convoys  of  provision  and  ammu- 
nition, seized  upon  by  the  insurgents.  In  the 
emergency,  which  threatened  to  uncover  the 
frontier  on  the  side  of  Piedmont,  the  intel- 
ligence and  address  of  Bonaparte  Avere  relied 
upon.     x\t  the  instance  of  general  Dugear 


THE    EMPEROR    NA.POLEON.  67 

he  wasdesDatched  on  a  mission  to  the  insur-  From  1785 
gents,  m  order  to  prevail  on  tnem  to  allow 
the  convoys  of  the  army  to  pass.  He  repaired 
to  Marseilles  and  Avignon,  conferredat  both 
places  with  the  leaders  of  the  insurrection, 
convinced  them  that  it  was  against  their  in- 
terest, whatever  might  be  their  sentiments 
respecting  the  convention,  to  provoke  the 
hostility  of  the  army,  and  succeeded  in  per- 
suading them,  to  offer  no  further  interrup- 
tion to  its  communications  and  convoys. 
From  a  statement  made  incidentally  by  him- 
self it  may  be  gathered,  that  while  he  was 
employed  in  reasoning  with  the  rebellious 
leaders  at  Avignon,  general  Cartaux  appeared 
before  that  town,  with  a  body  of  conven- 
tional troops;  a  display  of  force  which  pro- 
bably lent  to,  and  borrowed  from,  his  ar- 
guments, additional  weight. 

His  observations  during  this  excursion,  of 
theweakness,  violence,  and  mismanagement 
of  the  insurgents,  as  well  as  of  their  lawless 
and  unattainable  objects,  furnished  the  occa- 
sion and  materials  for  his  '^Supper  of  Beau- 
caire;"  a  political  essay  thrown  into  the 
shape  of  a  dialogue^  and  published  during 
his  stay  at  Marseilles,  explaining  the  causes 


lo  THT    Lii-r:   or 


^|[^^j_|^-  ^  oC  the  revoliilioiJ,  justifying  the  motives  of 
its  leaders,  and  deprecating  the  proceedings 
of  llie  insurgents.  After  reminding  them  of 
the  superiority  of  disciplined  battalions  to 
untrained  multitudes;  of  light  artillery  in 
field  operations,  to  their  heavy  cannon;  and 
suggesting,  that  although  poor  mountain- 
eers or  starving  peasants,  might  well  afford 
to  run  the  liazard  of  rebellion,  the  citizens 
of  an  oj)uIent  town,  stored  with  the  fruits  of 
indusiry  and  commerce,  had  reason  to  sup- 
port the  authority  of  government,  he  warn- 
ed them  thai  perseverance  in  their  lawless 
project  would  resull  in  failure,  disgrace,  pti- 
nishmeiit,  and  misery.  Of  this  piece,  the 
]>rinciples  and  object  of  Avhich  were  consist- 
ent with  the  htnguage  he  held  to  Paoli,  and 
the  conduct  he  pursued  in  Corsica,  the  doc- 
trine was  patriotic  J  the  topics  persuasive, 
the  reasoning  sound,  and  the  style  vigorous. 
It  contained  no  metaphysical  cant  nor  Jacobi- 
nical violence.  The  author  spoke  in  the  cha- 
lacter  which  he  really  bore,  that  of  a  soldier ; 
and  endeavoured  to  disstiade  his  country- 
men  from  proceedings,  which  had  the 
double  effect  of  plunging  the  nationinto  civil 
war^   and  exposing  it  to  foreign  invasion. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  6<j 

His  essay  was  well  adapted  in  time  and  Fromi7<S5 
form,  to  the  occasion,  and  accordingly  is  v  ^ 
re];)resented  to  have  contributed  in  no  small 
degree,  to  allay  the  violence,  and  restrain  the 
misdirection,  of  the  popular  excitement,  by 
which  the  army  he  belonged  to  was  annoyed. 
(17)  This  useful  production,  although  it  de- 
served to  be  remembered  and  preserved,  he 
cast  upon  the  tide  of  events,  and  after  it  had 
answered  its  purpose,  abandoned  to  oblivion. 
It  was  recovered  at  a  riper  season  of  his 
fortune  and  judgment,  by  those  who  prized 
it  as  a  plume  from  the  eagle's  wing.  But 
neither  the  discretion  of  his  patriotism,  nor 
the  fastidiousness  of  his  taste,  was  to  be  dis- 
armed by  flattery.  He  justly  argued,  that  a 
work  composed  expressly  for  the  crisis  of  a 
civil  war,  and  bearing  the  weight  of  his  name, 
would  be  out  of  season,  and  probably  mis- 
chievous, in  time  of  domestic  concord,  and 
doubtless  felt  that  a  hasty  and  juvenile  pam- 
phlet, might  add  nothing  to  his  mature  and 
majestic  fame.  Influenced  by  these  consi- 
derations he  directed,  it  is  said,  the  Avork  to 
be  suppressed.  (18) 

These  special  duties,  upon  which  he  was 
employed  by  the  order,  or  at  the  instance  of 


^O  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  11.  general  Dugcar,  by  separating  him  from  the 
rarmy  of  Ilaly,  nntil  the  month  of  August, 
prevented  his  taking  part  in  the  two  unfor- 
tunate actions  with  the  Sardinians,  ofwhich^ 
while  he  would  have  been  exposed  to  the 
danger,  the  extreme  subordination  of  his 
rank,  could  hardly  have  afforded  him  the 
opportunity  of  altering  the  issue. 

It  was  during  this  visit  to  Marseilles,  that 
he  became  acquainted  with  the  family  of  M. 
Clary,  a  rich  banker.  His  brother  Joseph 
married,  a  few  months  after,  one  of  the 
daughters,  and  he  himself  seems  to  havepaid 
rather  flattering  attentions  to  the  other,  who 
subsequently  became  the  wife  of  Bernadotte, 
and  is  noAV  the  queen  of  SAveden.  (19) 


(     7^     ) 


CHAPTER  III. 


From  August  1793, 70  March  i794- 

Siege  of  Toulon — Tliat  place  betrayed  lo  lord  Hood 

—  Sensation  produced  by  it- — Situation  of  Toulon —  ^^  ^  ^^^ 
Strength  of  the  allied  garrison  ■ — Measures  of  the 
committee  of  public  safety  —  Their  plan  for  the 
siege — 'Bonaparte  chief  of  battalion  —  Appointed  to 
command  the  artillery  of  the  siege- — General  Car* 
taux — Ignorance  at  head^quarters — -Difficulties to 
contend  with — Bonaparte's  plan  —  Rejected  by  Car- 
taux  —  Folly  of  that  general- — Vigour  and  activity 
of  Bonaparte  —  Council  of  war. —  Bonaparte's  plan 
adopted  —  Its  execution  commenced  —  Little  Gib- 
raltar— Battery  of  the  convention — Mischievous 
interference  of  the  deputies  —  Sally  and  capture  of 
general  O'Hara  —Repulse  of  the  sallying  party  — 
General  Doppet  —  His  cowardice  and  incapacity  — 
General  Dugommier  --  His  courage  and  experience 
- — Discouragement  of  the  besiegers — Confidence 
of  Bonaparte  —  His  batteries  play  on  little  Gibral- 
tar—  Advises  the  storming  that  place  —  Little 
Gibraltar  carried  by  assault  —  Bravery  of  the  gar- 
rison—  Swaggering  of  the  deputies  —  The  allied 
squadron  sweigh  anchor — The  town,  forts,  and  liar- 


/ 


2  THE    Lin:    OF 


CHAP.  in.  l)onr  plniulcred  and  evaciialed- — Tlie  French  fleet, 

nrsennl,  nnd  mnfrazincs  set  on  fire  —  Dreadful  con- 
tlaffration  —  Distress  of  the  Toulonese  —  Anec- 
dotes— Junot  —  Humanity  of  Bonaparte — Duroc  — 
Affection  and  admiration  of  Dugommier  for  Bona- 
parte —  Bonaparte  brigadier  general  —  Is  ordered 
to  ioin  the  a rmv  of  Italy' — Prescribes  a  system  of 
fortifications  for  the  coast  —  His  horror  of  the 
cruelty  of  a  mob  —  His  respect  for  the  memory  of 
Gasparin,  and  of  Dugommier, 

Hitherto,  the  genius  of  Bonaparte  had 
l)een  manifested  chiefly,  in  the  shade  of 
schools,  the  confidence  of  friendship^  or  the 
circles  of  society,  by  brilliant  but  aimless 
flashes,  which  disappeared  like  meteors 
bursting  in  the  air.  An  event  now  occurred, 
which  was  to  be  the  occasion  of  elevating 
him  permanently  to  public  view,  and  of  dis- 
playing the  strength  and  lustre  of  his  mind, 
while  dealing  a  decisive  blow  in  his  coun- 
tr\'s  defence. 

The  overthrow  and  arrest  of  the  Giron- 
dists in  the  convention,  events  which  as  was 
before  observed,  took  place  on  the  3  ist  May 
and  the  2nd  June,  1793,  were  the  occasion 
of  popular  disturbances  in  the  south  of 
France.  Lyons  and  Marseilles  became  the 
seats  of  open  insurrection,  which  spreading 


THE    EM  PER  OK    NAPOLEON.  "J  3 

10    [he.    neighbonriiig     towns,    resnlied    in    FromlTOo 

1  o  n^        ^  1    •  1  1    1-  *^  1794. 

ine  treason  ot  Joiuon,  and  in  the  delivery^ 
ot  that  superb  naval  station,  with  its  forts, 
fleets,  crews,  arsenals,  magazines,  and  stores, 
to  a  combined  English  and  Spanish  squadron 
then  blockading  it,  under  lord  Hood. 
Having  negotiated  successfully  with  the  mal- 
contents, and  effected  an  understanding  with 
the  naval  officer  in  command  (i  j  of  the  port, 
this  Admiral  took  possession  of  Toulon  on 
the  29th  of  August,  in  the  name  and  on  be- 
half of  Louis  XVII.  (2) 

This  disaster  Avas  felt  by  the  French  na- 
tion,  as  the  most  severe  and  shameful  cala- 
mity of  the  war.  Their  chief  naval  force  and 
finest  station,  were  delivered  up  to  their 
most  powerful  maritime  foe.  To  England 
and  her  allies  was  surrendered  by  French 
citizens,  with  an  immense  squadron,  an  ap- 
])arently  inexj)ugnable  position,  in  the  heart 
of  a  strong  and  populous  country,  deeply  in- 
fected by  a  rebellious  spirit,  and  partially  in 
arms  against  the  national  government.  The 
Hag  of  France  it  was  naturally  apprehended, 
would  be  exiled  from  the  Mediterranean, 
and  her  extensive  coast  on  that  sea,  exposed 
to  all  tlie  evils,  which  the  arms  and  intrigues 


74  ^HE    LIFE     OF 

CHAP.iii.  of  her  inveterate  enemies  and  emigrant  prin- 
ces, con!  J  inflict,  by  civil  war  or  foreign  in- 
vasion. The  pride  and  the  safely  of  the  na- 
tion, both  required,  instantaneous  and  slre- 
nnons  exertions  for  the  recovery  of  Toulon. 
On  this  occasion  the  government  could  but 
feel  like  the  people;  and  the  deputies  com- 
j)osing  the  committee  of  public  safety,  w^hich 
had  not  as  yet  failed  in  daring  plans  and 
energetic  measures,  bent  the  whole  force  of 
their  means  and  counsels  to  the  important 
task.  But  their  preparations  hoAvever  prompt^ 
and  their  efforts  however  eaiiiiest,  seemed 
not  commensurate  with  the  difficulties  of 
the  crisis. 

General  Cartaux,  having  succeeded  in  sup- 
pressing the  insurrection  of  Marseilles,  was 
ordered  to  advance  with  a  column  of  eight 
thousand  men  from  that  side  against  Toulon, 
while  general  La  Poype  with  six  thousand 
drayvn  from  thearmy  of  Italy,  was  directed  to 
a|)proach  it  from  the  east.  (3)  The  former 
general  was  attended  by  the  deputies  Albite, 
Salicetti,  and  Gasparin ;  the  latter,  by  Freron 
and  Ba  rras,  who  having  escaped  from  the  mal- 
contents of  Toulon,  had  taken  refuge  with 
the  army  of  Italy.     With  these  were  spec- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  76 

dily  associated  Ricord  and  the  youneer  Ro-  f"^om  1T95 
bespierre,  who  had  been  attached  to  the 
army  of  the  Alps.  These  prehminary  mea- 
sures could  only  be  expected  to  annoy  the 
enemy,  and  straiten  their  communications 
with  the  surrounding  country,  until  vigorous 
and  decisive  operations  could  be  undertaken. 

Toulon  is  situated  at  the  head  of  a  capa- 
cious harbour^  stretching,  in  a  southern  di- 
rection, to  the  sea ;  and  at  the  foot  of  the 
mountains  of  Pharon,  which  recede  in  suc- 
cessive ridges  to  the  north.  It  formed  thus 
the  middle  point  of  an  extensive  barrier, 
which  separated  the  tAVO  divisions  of  the 
French  army^  rendering  their  communica- 
tion difficult,  and  cooperation  precarious. 

The  alh'es  on  the  other  hand  held  their 
force  collected,  possessed  the  powder  of  di- 
recting it  entire  against  either  division  of  the 
besiegers,  occupied  the  fortifications  of  the 
town,  the  fine  of  forts  on  both  sides  of  the 
harbour,  and  the  works  and  passes  in  the  ad- 
jacent mountains.  Their  fleet,  which  cover- 
ed the  harbour,  commanded  the  Mediterra- 
nean, and  enabled  them  to  collect  reenforce- 
ments  and  supplies  from  all  quarters.  De- 
tachments of  Spanish,  Sardinian,  and  Neapo- 


-G  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.^ii.  litaii  tioops,  wer(:  speedily  brought  to  iheir 
aid;  and  lieutenant  general  O'Hara,  an 
officer  who  had  been  distinguished  under 
lord  Cornwallis  in  the  x\merican  war,  and 
was  at  the  time  governor  of  Gibraltar,  ar- 
rived Avith  a  reenforcement of  British  troops, 
and  took  command  of  the  allied  forces, 
amounting,  exclusively  of  a  formidable  flee*^, 
a  population  of  twenty  thousand  inhabitants, 
and  bodies  of  insurgents  from  Marseilles 
and  other  disaffected  towms,  to  fourteen 
thousand  men.  (4) 

A  garrison  thus  strong,  supported,  and  sup- 
plied, felt  little  apprehension  from  the  divi- 
ded and  inconsiderable  forces  of  Cartauxand 
La  Poype.  Accordingly,  lord  Hood,  after 
disarming  the  French  fleet,  manning  the  for- 
tifications of  the  town,  and  occupying  the 
forts  w'hich  protected  the  harbour,  as  Avell  as 
the  various  mountain  passes  contiguous  to 
Toulon,  employed  himself  in  fitting  out  a 
squadron  of  four  French  ships  of  the  line, 
with  French  crews  and  royalist  commanders, 
which  he  sent  round  to  Brest  and  Roche- 
fort,  with  the  double  object  of  reducing  the 
strength  of  the  French  force  in  Toulon,  and 


THE    EMPEROr.    NA.POLEON, 


77 


of  spreading  treason   and  exciting   revolt.    From  1793 
along  the  Atlantic  frontier  of  France.  (5) 

Bnt  the  committee  of  public  safety,  were 
busy  in  concerting  preparations,  on  a  scale 
of  adequate  extent  and  vigour.    By  their  di- 
rection^ general  D'Arron.an  engineer  of  h'gb 
reputation,  in   conjunction  with  the  board 
of  ordnance  at  Paris,  drew  up  a  plan  for  the 
conduct  of  the  siege,  which  prescribed  a  se- 
ries of  regular  approaches  against  the  town, 
a  succession  of  attacks  against  the  surround- 
ing forts,  and  the  erection  of  works  of  pro- 
tection, against  the  broadsides  of  the  fleet. 
It  also  required  the  formation  and   supply 
of  an  armv  of  sixty  thousand  men,  at  a  time 
when  men  and  monev  w^ere  of  difficult  col- 
lection,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  disaffected  and 
exhausted  country.     Thus  operose,  regular, 
and  progressive,  the  plan  of  the  government 
promised    success,   only  at   the  expense  of 
much  time  and  toil,  and  proceeded  on  the 
direct  and  obvious  system  of  warfare;  that 
of  employing  a  greater  portion  of  physical 
force  in  the  attack  of  a  given  position,  than 
can  be  exerted  in  its  defence.  However  unex- 
ceptionable it  might  be,  therefore,  in  a  tech- 


•-8  THE    LIFE    OF 

^^^^jj^^  nical  point  of  view,  this  ministerial  plan  for 
the  siege  of  Toulon,  was  not  adapted  to  the 
critical  nature  of  the  operation,  nor  to  the 
urgency  of  public  aft'airs.  But  the  choice  of 
a  commander  for  the  artillery  of  the  siege, 
though  a  matter,  doubtless,  of  secondary 
importance  in  the  eyes  of  the  functionaries 
who  made  it,  was  destined  to  supply  the  de- 
fects, and  compensate  the  errors,  of  their 
means  and  calculations. 

Shortly  after  his  successfid  negotiation 
with  the  insurgents  of  Marseilles,  Bonaparte 
had  been  promoted  to  the  rank  of  chief  of 
battalion;  (6)  and  some  occasion  requiring 
such  a  mission,  he  was  sent  by  general  Bru- 
net,  the  commander  of  the  army  of  Italy, 
with  written  despatches,  and  verbal  commu- 
nications, to  Paris.  The  committee  of  public 
safety  was  employed,  in  organizing  a  force 
for  reducing  Toulon,  and  had  required  of 
the  committee  of  ordnance  the  designation  of 
a  regular  officer,  well  qualified  for  command- 
ing the  artillery  of  the  siege.  It  was  the  hu- 
mour of  the  time  to  overlook  age  and  rank, 
in  search  of  zeal  and  talent,  as  in  the  cases  of 
Hoche  and  Marceau.  The  decided  patrio- 
tism of  Bonaparte  was  evinced  by  his  writ- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  79 

ings,  and  signalised  by  his  firm  opposition  From  1795 
to  Paoli.  Of  his  professional  abiHties  and 
personal  merit,  the  files  of  the  war  office, 
furnished  ample  testimony,  which  his  repu- 
tation in  the  garrisons  and  corps  he  had 
served  with,  completely  sustained.  These 
facts,  enforced  by  the  pressure  of  public  dan- 
ger, arrested  the  attention  of  the  committees, 
and  determined  their  choice  in  his  favour. 
Neither  interest,  patronage,  intrigue,  nor  so- 
licitation, was  employed.  His  own  merit  was 
his  sole  recommendation  to  a  post,  in  which 
that  merit  was  to  become  conspicuous. 

Having  received  his  orders,  he  left  the 
capital  without  delay,  and  reached  the  head 
quarters  of  the  besieging  army,  on  the  12th 
of  September. 

General  Cartaux  was  a  painter  of  Paris, 
who  by  popular  caprice  and  accidental  suc- 
cess, had  been  raised  from  the  adjutancy  ol 
a  municipal  battalion  to  the  chief  com- 
mand of  a  regular  army;  being  thrust  by  the 
force  of  these  causes,  in  one  day's  advance- 
ment, through  the  degrees  of  brigadier  and 
major  general.  He  had  the  ignorance  inci- 
dental to  this  career,  and  the  presumption 
natural  to  that  ignorance. 


8o  IME    I.IFK    OF 

CHAP.  III.  When  the  young  commander  of  the  artil- 
lery, presented  himself  to  this  aspiring  digni- 
tary, whom  he  found  glittering  in  lace  and 
embroidery,  he  was  told,  in  accents  of  dis- 
dainful benevolence,  that  although  his  ser- 
vices would  not  be  required  in  the  recovery 
of  Toulon,  he  was  welcome  to  share  in  the 
glory  of  the  operation  !  He  was  invited  to 
sup  that  evening  Avith  the  general,  and  early 
the  next  morning,  to  accompany  him  in 
visiting  the  posts  of  the  besiegers,  who  were 
preparing,  he  was  informed,  to  open  a  can- 
nonade, whichwas  to  burn  the  allied  squad- 
rons. His  astonishment  may  be  conceived,  at 
finding  that  the  few  guns  which  had  been 
awkwardly  mounted,  were  at  least  two  gun- 
shots from  the  harbour,  and  that  the  balls 
whichwere  destined  to  destroy  the  fleet,  were 
sent  to  be  heated  in  the  neighbouring  country 
houses,  as  if  their  reconveyance  was  likely  to 
be  easy,  or  their  glow  unremitting.  A  sug- 
gestion of  the  last  mentioned  difficulty,  hav- 
ing somewhat  perplexed  the  general  and  his 
staff  officers,  the  commander  of  the  artillery 
proposed,  that  a  few  cold  balls  should  be  fired 
in  order  to  see,  whether  the  hot  shot  when 
produced,   would   be  within   point  blank 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  8 1 

range.     After  some  difficulty  the  experiment    From  1795 
was  made,  and  the  balls  fell  halfway  short  of  v    ^ 
the  mark.  Upon  this,  the  general  found  fault 
with  the  powder,  and  execrated  the  aristo- 
crats, for  having  purposely  damaged  it.  This 
excessive  ignorance  prevailing  at  head  quar- 
ters, was  owing  as  much  to  the  great  emigra- 
tion of  the  well  educated  officers,  as  to  the 
inconsiderate  manner  in  which  demagogues 
and  their  retainers,  had  been  appointed  in 
their  places.     In  the  midst  of  the  confusion, 
the  deputy  Gasparin  rode   up  to  the  spot. 
Being  a  man  of  sense,  zeal,  and  of  some  mili- 
litary  experience,  he  was  readily  convinced 
of  the  absurdity  of  the  measures  in  progress, 
and  of  the  propriety  of  confiding  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  artillery,  the  uncontrolled  di- 
rection of  the  siege.     With  this  view,  he  de- 
sired Carta ux  to  issue  directions  for  the  gene- 
ral conduct  of  the  operation,  leaving  thedetaits 
to  be  devised  and  executed  by  Bonaparte;  a 
request,  which  the  general  complied  with,  in 
the  following  fulminating  order.  "The  com- 
mander of  the  artillery  will  batter  the  town 
with  shot  and  shells,  for  and  during  three 
days,  at  the  end  of  which  time,  I  will  attack 
in  .three    columns,    and   carry  the  place/* 

6 


82  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  HI.  Such  was  the  Stale  of  affairs  —  so  ill  disposed 
and  desperate  on  the  part  of  the  French,  so 
formidable  and  encouraging,  on  that  of  the 
English— when  Bonaparte  joined  the  army 
of  Car  la  nx. 

It  may  be  proper  to  remind  the  reader, 
that  he  had  but  just  completed  bis  twenty- 
fourth  year,andwith  exception  of  the  slight 
and  unsuccessful  service  in  which  he  had  been 
engag4idin  Corsica,  was  totally  inexperienced 
in  war;  that  the  means  of  attack  which  he 
was  to  direct,  or  cooperate  with,  were  slen- 
der and  separated,  while  the  resistance  to  be 
overcome  was  formidable  and  united,  con- 
sisting of  a  fortified  town,  a  powerful  squa- 
dron, a  defended  harbour,  connected  forts, 
and  mountain  passes.  These,  as  they  had 
been  hitherto  regarded,  whether  by  the  scien- 
tific plan  of  D'Arron,  or  the  ridiculous  or- 
der of  Carta  iix,  had  been  considered,  simply, 
as  a  mass  of  obstruction,  presenting  a  certain 
force  of  resistance,  which  could  be  overcome 
only  by  the  application  of  greater  force  ;  and 
under  the  obvious  view,  of  converging  the 
means  of  attack,  upon  the  place  in  dispute, 
that  is,  upon  tlie  town  itself;  contemplating 
this  as   the  cardinal  point  of  ihe  position. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  83 

But  Bonaparte,  though  thus  young,  inex-  From  1793 
perienced,  and  subordinate,  had  no  sooner  ^ 
cast  over  the  ground,  that  glance  which  was 
to  direct  thecurrentof  future  battles ;  had  no 
sooner  looked  around  upon  the  fortifications, 
the  harbour  and  the  fleet,  than  he  penetrated 
the  complexity  of  the  position,  and  traced  the 
relation  of  its  component  parts.  Redisco- 
vered at  once,  that  the  town,  though  the  ob- 
ject to  be  gained,  was  far  from  being  the 
point  to  be  attacked;  that  in  a  military  view, 
it  was  a  dependent  position,  instead  of  being 
the  essential  one.  Perceiving  that  the  harbour 
was  divided  by  two  opposite  and  approaching 
promontories,  into  the  outer  or  great  road, 
and  the  inner  or  little  road,  and  that  the  wes- 
tern promontory  was  crowned  by  an  emi- 
nence, he  comprehended  instantly,  that  bat- 
teries established  on  the  summit  and  at  the 
base  of  this  promontory,  would  search  com- 
pletely both  roads,  and  either  destroy  the 
hostile  fleet,  or  drive  it  out  to  sea ,  and  that 
in  either  case,  Toulon  must  be  abandoned  or 
surrendered.  This  fine  conception,  which, 
considering  his  want  of  acquaintance  with  the 
ground  and  of  military  experience,  could 
only  be  the  offspring  of  the  highest  genius, 
he  immediately  communicated  to  general 


84  THE    TvlFE    OF 

CHAP^iii^  Cartaux;  recommending  at  the  same  time, 
the  occupation  with  a  force  of  three  thousand 
men,  of  the  eminence  in  question,  which  as 
yet  the  EngHsh  commander  had  neglected. 
But  general  Cartaux  could  not  understand 
its  importance,  nor  the  probability  of  redu- 
cing Toulon,  by  taking  up  a  position  so  re- 
mote from  it.  Yet  with  that  perverseness 
of  incapacity  which  omits  all  the  good,  and 
does  all  the  mischief  practicable  in  a  given 
case,  he  sent  general  Laborde  with  four  hun- 
dred men  to  take  possession  of  the  promon- 
tory; a  measure  which  had  the  effect  of  ap- 
prising the  enemy  of  its  value,  causing  La- 
borde to  be  dislodged,  and  the  position  to 
be  seized  upon  and  fortified  by  the  English 
commander.  Bonaparte's  suggestion,  which 
was  above  rules,  being  thus  worse  than  dis- 
regarded, the  toilsome  plan  of  approaches 
against  the  town,  which  was  according  to 
rules,  was  persisted  in. 

The  commandant  of  the  artillery  it  ap- 
pears, did  not  on  this  account  relent  in  his 
zeal;  but  was  as  bold  and  skilful  in  execu- 
ting the  project  of  others,  as  he  had  been 
prompt  and  sagacious  in  the  invention  of  his 
own.     His  first  care  was  to  select  and  em- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  85 

ploy  officers,  upon  whose  zeal  and  capacity,  From  1795 
he  could  place  reliance.  Among  these  were 
Muiron,  whom  he  made  his  adjutant,  and 
his  former  comrade  at  Valence,  Gassendi, 
whom  he  placed  in  command  of  the  arsenal 
at  Marseilles,  from  which  his  military  sup- 
plies were  to  be  drawn.  His  next  object  was 
to  collect  a  park  of  artillery ;  and  so  active 
and  well  directed  were  his  exertions,  that  in 
less  than  six  weeks,  he  had  two  hundred 
guns,  completely  furnished.  Urging  on  the 
operations,  he  advanced  his  batteries,  placed 
them  on  the  most  advantageous  points,  and 
opened  a  fire  so  effective,  that  he  soon  dis- 
masted several  ships  of  the  line,  sunk  some 
smaller  vessels,  and  forcing  the  squadron  to 
withdraw  to  a  distant  part  of  the  harbour, 
reheved  his  batteries  from  its  broadsides,  and 
broke  ground  yet  nearer  to  the  enemy. 

Still  he  was  not  free  from  the  interference 
of  general  Cartaux,  and  the  embarrassments 
of  his  ignorance.  On  one  occasion,  this 
general  insisted  on  his  planting  a  battery 
against  the  walls  of  a  house,  where  there 
was  no  room  for  the  guns  to  recoil;  on  ano- 
ther, upon  an  insulated  hillock,  which  as  he 
alleged,  would  enable  him  to  fire  on  several 


86  THE    LIFE    or 

CHAP.  IH.  torts  at  once.  Nor  was  he  convinced  of  the 
folly  of  this  order,  by  the  observation,  that 
if  this  ])oint  was  in  reach  of  these  forts,  it 
would  be  exposed  to  their  concentrated  fire. 
At  this  ])eriod  of  the  siege  there  can  be  little 
doubt,  that  had  the  English  commander 
acted  on  the  ofFefisive,  and  assailed  with  the 
whole  force,  either  division  of  the  French 
army,  he  must  have  succeeded  in  relieving 
the  place.  He  however  remained  on  the  de- 
fensive, contenting  himself  with  manning 
and  strengthening  the  fortifications,  and  gave 
time  for  reenforcements  to  join  the  besiegers. 
Bonaparte,  while  engaged  in  executing  a 
plan  which  he  could  not  approve^  thus  sub- 
milting  the  inspiration  of  his  own  mind  to 
the  yoke  of  inferior  judgments^  and  in  ob- 
viating the  blunders  of  a  general  whom  he 
could  but  despise,  exhibited  a  degree  of  ^l- 
diership  and  gallantry,  which  gained  the  at- 
tachment of  the  men.  He  slept  by  his  guns, 
assisted  in  aiming  them^  was  present  where- 
ever  danger  appeared,  headed  parties  in  tak- 
ing ground  in  advance,  and  was  foremost  in 
repelling  the  enemy's  sallies.  The  troops 
looked  up  to  him  with  admiration,  and  re- 
garded him  as  their  real  general^  calling  out 


THE    EMPEROn    NAJOLEON.  87 

for  the  coininander  of  the  artillery,  when-    Front  17^ 

,  ,  .        ,  .  to  1794. 

ever  an  attack  was  aetermined  on,  or  a  sortie 
was  apprehended. 

He  had  thu.s  secured  the  devotion  of  the 
army,  and  the  good  opinion  of  the  deputy 
Gasparin,  when,  on  the  i5th  of  October, 
the  deputies  convened  a  council  of  war,  for 
the  purpose  of  deliberating  on  the  plan  of 
the  siege,  which  had  been  sent  down  by  the 
government^  and  of  deciding  whether  it 
should  be  executed  by  operations  on  the 
west  or  the  east  side  of  the  harbour.  This 
council,  of  which  Gasparin  was  president^ 
andCartaux  and  Bonaparte  memhers,  deci- 
ded at  once,  that  the  principal  operations  of 
the  siege  should  be  prosecuted  on  the  west 
side  of  the  harbour;  but  they  were  greatly 
embarrassed  when  thev  came  to  consider  the 
disproportion  of  their  force,  to  that  which 
the  plan  of  general  D'Arron  required.  It 
was  then  that  the  young  commander  of  ar- 
tillery submitted  to  the  council  the  sugges- 
tion, which  he  had  previously  made  to  gene- 
ral Cartaux^  and  explained  the  certainty  of 
its  success^  even  with  the  means  already  at 
their  command.  He  showed  that  the  posi- 
tion on  the  western  promontory  commanded 


88 


THE    LIFE    OF 


CHAP.^n.  the  entire  harbour ;  that  batteries  erected  on 
it  would  force  lord  Hood,  either  to  aban- 
don the  garrison  to  an  unavoidable  surren- 
der, or,  to  withdraw  it ;  and  that  conse- 
quently the  time,  the  expense,  and  the  army, 
necessary  to  the  success  of  the  ministerial 
plan, might,  in  a  great  measure,  be  dispensed 
with.  He  expressed  his  conviction  that  the 
garrison  would  be  withdrawn,  rather  than 
abandoned,  and  concluded  by  assuring  the 
council,  that  in  two  days  after  they  should 
get  possession  of  the  promontory,  Toulon 
would  be  in  their  power. 

Though  clearly  stated,  and  cogently  ex- 
plained, his  proposition  was  not  received 
without  much  hesitation,  nor  adopted  with- 
out long  discussion.  It  Avas  hard  to  turn 
the  minds  of  men,  suddenly,  from  a  direct  to 
an  indirect  mode  of  attack;  or  to  make 
them  believe,  that  so  simple  a  measure  as 
taking  possession  of  the  height  alluded  to, 
would  be  attended  by  such  important  and 
decisive  consequences  as  were  assigned  to  it 
by  the  commander  of  the  artillery.  When 
at  length,  upon  the  earnest  recommendation 
of  Gasparin,  it  was  adopted,  it  was  only 
in  the  light  of  a  preliminary  and  partial  ope- 


THE    EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.  89 

ration,  and  in  consequence  of  the  statement  From  1793 
of  the  engineers,  that  the  occupation  of  the  --_L^^Z2^ 
promontory  would  effect  a  blockade_,  an 
operation  indispensable,  according  to  the 
maxims  of  their  art,  to  a  regular  siege.  This 
was  the  opinion  of  general  Marescot,  who 
was  then  a  major  of  engineers,  and  did 
not  participate  in  the  grand  and  confident 
inferences  of  Bonaparte.  Perhaps  invention 
in  so  young  a  man,  and  instruction  from  a 
subordinate  officer,  were  not  acceptable  to 
men  of  higher  rank  or  greater  pretensions. 
Probably  the  result  of  the  proposed  measure 
was  less  evident  tlien^  than  it  seems  now. 
But,  at  any  rate,  an  operation  which  was  to 
be  decisive  and  final,  was  resolved  upon  only 
as  an  incipient  and  conducive  one.  Consi- 
dered in  this  point  of  view,  the  vote  for  it 
was  unanimous. 

Before,  however  this  resolution  was  taken, 
the  English  general,  become  apprized  of  the 
importance  of  this  position,  had  constructed 
on  it  a  fortress,  consisting  of  a  main  work 
with  two  flanking  redoubts,  which  was  ren- 
dered so  strong  and  complete,  that  although 
it  was  named  fort  Mulgrave,  it  was  called 
Little  Gibraltar,   It  was  defended  by  three 


op'  TUB    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^HL  thousand  chosen  troops^  with  forty-four 
pieces  of  heavy  artillery.  The  officer  in  com- 
mand of  it,  considering  hi&  post  impreg- 
nable, derided  the  demonstrations  of  the 
French,  exclaiming—  "If  they  take  this  fort, 
then  I'll  turn  Jacobin." 

Bonaparte  who  had  in  vain  urged  Gartaux 
to  reenforce  Laborde,  and  drive  the  allies 
from  this  important  point  before  they  w<3re 
firmly  established,  was  even  at  this  late  stage 
of  the  contest,  of  a  different  opinion  from 
the  British  commander,  and  commenced  his 
operations  against  it,  with  that  energy, which 
confidence  inspires.  He  ordered  six  batte- 
ries of  twenty-four  pounders,  and  platforms 
for  fifteen  mortars,  to  be  raised  immediately 
against  Little  Gibraltar,  and  at  the  same 
time,  directed  a  battery  of  eight  twenty-four 
pounders,  and  four  mortars,  to  be  construct- 
ed againstFort  Malbosquet ;  a  strong,. though 
less  formidable  work,  situated  higher  up  the 
harbour.  To  render  this  latter  operation 
more  efficient,  he  selected  a  position  for  his 
guns,  which  was  mas  ked  by  a  clump  of 
olives;  and  directed  that  the  fire  of  this  bat- 
tery should  not  be  opened,  until  his  attack 
on  Little  Gibraltar  should  be  commenced; 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEOW.  9 1 

SO  that  the  effect  might  be  augmented  by  Fram  1Y93 

to  1 79A. 

surprise.  (7)  It  happened  however,  that  be- 
fore this  proper  time  arrived,  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  people  visited  this  work,  which 
was  called,  t/ie  battery  of  the  convention. 
From  the  cannoneers  they  learned  it  had 
been  finished  for  eight  days,  and  that  al- 
though it  was  expected  to  do  great  execution, 
no  use  had  as  yet  been  made  of  it.  In  per- 
fect ignorance  of  what  they  were  about,  these 
deputies,  without  consulting  thechief  of  the 
artillery,  ordered  a  fire  from  this  battery  to 
be  instantly  commenced ;  an  order  which 
the  gunners  with  alacrity  obeyed. 

General  O'Hara  was  greatly  surprised  at 
this  sudden  attack  on  one  of  his  principal  de- 
fences, and  feeling  the  importance  of  ridding 
himself  of  so  serious  an  annoyance,  prepar- 
ed for  storming  this  battery  next  morning. 
Accordingly,  about  an  hour  before  day,  he 
sallied  out  at  the  head  of  a  column  of  six 
thousand  men,  (8j  and  succeeded  without 
much  difficulty,  in  carrying  the  battery,  and 
spiking  the  guns.  The  alarm  meanwhile 
was  sounded  at  head  quarters.  General 
Dugommier,  the  new  commander,  rallied 
the  troops,  who  having  been  disposed  in  line, 


92  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP,  jii.  ^  -yyere  not  capable  of  withstanding,  on  the 
sudden,  so  heavy  a  column.  Bonaparte  after 
directing  several  field  pieces  to  be  turned 
against  O'Hara's  force,  which  threatened  by 
its  farther  advance,  his  grand  park  near  the 
pass  of  theOllioules,  hastened  to  an  eminence, 
on  which  he  had  established  a  depot  of  ord- 
nance, and  from  which,  an  arm  of  the  trench 
communicated  with  the  captured  battery. 
Behind  this  eminence  was  stationed  a  batta- 
lion of  infantry,  and  with  this,  he  determi- 
ned to  make  a  vigorous  attack  on  the  enemy. 
He  led  his  party  along  the  trench  unper- 
ceived,  and  emerging  from  it  behind  a  screen 
of  brambles,  surprised  O'Hara  by  a  close 
and  destructive  fire.  His  attack  was  so  spi- 
rited, and  the  surprise  so  complete,  that 
the  Neapolitan  troops  fled,  as  if  they  had 
been  assailed  by  overwhelming  numbers; 
while  the  English  officers  supposed  that  a 
party  of  their  own  men,  in  the  obscurity  of 
the  mornings  were  firing  by  mistake.  The 
panic  of  one  party,  and  the  confidence  of  the 
other,  were  equally  unfounded.  General 
O'Hara  himself,  under  this  false  impression, 
advanced  for  the  purpose  of  stopping  the  fire 
when  he  was  wounded  in  the  hand  with  a 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  qS 

musket  ball,  and  taken  by  a  French  sergeant,  Yrom  1793 
who  pulled  him  suddenly  down  into  the  t^'*'^^^- 
trench.  Thus  it  happened,  that  the  com- 
mander in  chief  of  the  allies,  was  a  prisoner 
to  Bonaparte,  while  his  own  troops  were  ig- 
norant of  his  fale,  and  while  the  French  ge- 
neral was  unaware  that  Bonaparte  was  en- 
gaged. In  this  conflict,  he  received  a  bayo- 
net thrust  in  the  left  thigh,  which  though  a 
serious  flesh  wound,  he  did  not  suffer  to 
withdraw  him  from  duty  in  the  trenches. 

General  Dugommier  having  brought  up 
the  reserves,  had  now  taken  a  position  which 
threatened  to  intercept  the  retreat  of  the  sal- 
lying party.  Already  disconcerted  by  the 
\ngour  of  Bonaparte's  attack,  this  movement 
threw  them  into  confusion.  The  English  fol- 
lowed the  example  of  the  Neapolitans,  and 
fled  in  theutmost  confusion.  They  were  pur- 
sued to  the  walls  of  the  town,  which  they 
entered,  not  more  discouraged  by  the  unex- 
pected failure  of  their  sally,  than  by  the 
strange  disappearance  of  their  general.  The 
allied  officers^  who  had  already  become  jea- 
lous of  the  English  commanders,  and  suspi- 
cious of  their  goodfaith^  expressed  an  appre- 
hension that  general  O'Hara  had  given  him- 
self up  to  the  enemy,  for  the  purpose  of  ne- 


94  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  lu.  gotiating  an  advantageous  surrender  of  the 
place.  Thus  internal  discord,  was  added 
to  the  military  disasters  of  this  abortive  sally. 
The  French  on  the  contrary  had  reason 
to  exult.  The  commander  of  the  artillery, 
who  by  energy  and  promptness,  had  repair- 
ed the  mischief  occasioned  by  the  folly  of  the 
deputies,  had  offered  the  chief  opposition, 
and  occasioned  the  principal  loss^  to  the  ene- 
my. In  consequence  he  was  promoted  to 
the  rank  of  colonel. 

Previously  to  this  affair,  the  incapacity 
of  Cartaux  had  become  so  evident  as  to 
cause  his  removal,  and  the  committee  of 
pubHc  safety  had  given  the  command  of  the 
siege  to  general  Doppet;  a  physician,  who 
had  been  thrown  up  from  noisy  insignifi- 
cance  to  military  rank,  by  the  whirls  and  ed- 
dies of  popular  excitement,  and  at  the  siege 
of  Lyons  had  obtained  a  reputation,  which 
concealed  for  a  moment  his  real  demerit. 
To  the  faults  of  ignorance  he  added  the  vices 
of  cowardice  and  envy.  His  arrival  which 
soon  made  the  army  regret  the  departure  of 
Cartaux,  was  near  being  followed  by  an 
event  equally  surprising,  and  more  momen- 
tQps.  The  French  troops  on  duty  in  the 
trenches  before  Little  Gibraltar^  had  one  of 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  QO 

iheir  comrades  taken  by  a  Spanish  company    ^^om  1795 
on  guard  in  ihe  fort.     This  unfortunate  pri- 
soner, the  Spaniards  beat  and  abused  in  sight 
of  his  brother  soldiers,  whom,  at  the  same 
time,  they  insulted  by  provoking  shouts  and 
indecent  gestures.     Irritated  beyond  endu- 
rance, the  French,  by  a  spontaneous  impulse 
re^mbling  such  as  we  read  of  in  the  Roman 
legions,  vseized  their  arms,  and  in  a  paroxysm 
of  fury,  rushed  to  the  assault.     Bonaparte, 
whose  vigilance  let  nothing  escape  his  ob- 
servation, hastened  to  report  this  affair  to 
the  general,  and  saying,   as  the  wine  was 
draff  n^  it  was  better^  to  drink  it ^  assured  him 
it  would  be  more  difficult  to  draw  oflf  the 
troops  in  safety,  than  to  follow  up  the  attack 
with  success.     Doppet  consented  :  the  re- 
serve was  put  in  motion,  and  Bonaparte  at  its 
head.    But  while  he  was  in  the  act  of  moving 
to  the  support  of  the  assailants,  who,  hav- 
ing driven  in  the  enemy's  light  troops  and 
reached  the  gorge,  were  on  the  point  of  forc- 
ing their  way  into  the  body  of  the  work,  an 
aid-de-camp  of  the  general  was  killed  by  his 
side.     At  so  dangerous  a  symptom,  the  doc- 
tor was  panic  struck,  and  instantly  retiring, 
ordered  a  retreat.     This  palpable  poltroon- 


9  6  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHARjii^  ery  could  not  but  rouse  the  indignation  of 
the  men.  They  complained  aloud,  that,  in- 
stead of  having  generals  to  lead  them  to  vic- 
tory, they  were  thwarted  and  disgraced  by 
painters  and  doctors.  In  consequence,  the 
committee  recalled  Doppet,  and  felt  at  last 
the  necessity  of  employing  a  military  man. 
Their  choice  fell  upon  general  Dugommier, 
a  veteran  with  the  scars  of  fifty  campaigns, 
and  a  courage  as  well- tempered  as  his  own 
good  sword,  (q) 

The  garrison  being  strengthened  by  fresh 
supplies  and  frequent  reenforcements,  the 
hopes  of  the  besiegers  began  to  decline^  and 
the  dissatisfaction  of  the  public  to  be  mani- 
fest. The  prudence  of  directing  the  chief 
operations  against  a  remote  and  apparently 
unimportant  work,  was  again  denied,  and 
the  necessity  of  turning  their  principal  efforts 
against  the  town  itself,  loudly  insisted  on. 
The  popular  societies  denounced  the  ill- di- 
rected and  tardy  progress  of  the  siege,  in 
terms  of  crimination,  which  the  people  of 
Provence,  distressed  by  famine,  reechoed. 
Even  the  deputies  became  alarmed ;  and  Fre- 
ron  and  Barras,  although  in  the  council  of 
war  they  had  concurred   in   the  qualified 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  97 

adoption  of  Bonaparte's  plan,  now  despair-    From  1793 

1      p.  1  1  .  to  1794. 

ed  01  Us  success,  and  wrote  to  the  committee 
of  public  safety,  proposing  that  the  siege  be 
abandoned  and  the  army  withdrawn  to  the 
strong  and  plentiful  country  north  of  the 
Durance.  This  counsel  they  enforced  by 
observing  that  after  constant  operations  of 
three  months,  Toulon  was  not  yet  even  at- 
tacked; that  the  garrison  was  receiving 
strong  and  constant  accessions  ;  that  in  all 
probability  the  besiegers  would  soon  be 
compelled  to  retreat  with  precipitation; 
whereas,  it  was  now  in  their  power  to  retire 
in  good  order  and  without  loss.  To  this 
they  added,  that  the  English  would  be 
placed  under  the  necessity  of  providing  sus- 
tenance for  the  population  of  Provence  du- 
ring the  winter,  and  that  in  the  approach- 
ing spring,  the  army,  recruited,  refreshed, 
and  supplied,  could  undertake  the  siege  with 
renewed  vigour  and  every  prospect  of  suc- 
cess. Happily  for  the  safety  of  France,  be- 
fore this  sinister  counsel  had  time  to  make 
an  impression  at  Paris,  Toulon  was  in  pos- 
session of  the  French  army. 

In  this  season  of  dejection  and  discon- 
tent^ when  the  chief  authorities  themselves 

7 


C)8  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  III.  were  blind  to  ihe  efficacy  of  the  operations 
in  progress,  the  commander  of  the  artillery 
remained  unshaken  in  his  opinion  and  un- 
ceasing in  his  activity.  Repeating  to  gene- 
ral Dugommier  the  assurance  which  he  had 
given  his  predecessors,  that  to  take  Toulon,  it 
was  only  necessary  to  carry  Little  Gibraltar, 
and  infusing  his  confidence  into  those  around 
him,  he  pushed  on  the  works  with  unabated 
vigour.  On  the  i4th  December  when  his 
batteries  were  ready,  he  opened  a  rolling  fire 
of  round  shot  and  shells  from  thirty  twenty- 
four  pounders  and  fifteen  mortars  upon  that 
fortress,  and  maintained  it  incessantly,  for 
sixty  hours.  The  guns  being  well  posted  and 
well  aimed,  the  cannonade  was  destructive. 
The  enemy's  pieces  were  dismounted,  their 
palisades  destroyed,  their  bastions  demo- 
lished, and  their  men  forced  to  withdraw 
from  the  fort  and  take  shelter  behind  the 
crest  of  the  iiill. 

Bonaparte,  attentive  to  the  effect  of  his 
fire,  perceiving  that  the  time  for  an  assault 
had  arrived,  proposed  preparing  for  that 
final  operation.  The  deputies  consented^ 
and  midnight  of  the  17th,  was  fixed  on  for 
the  attack.     Bui  when   the    moment   ap- 


THE    EMPEROR    >APOLEO>'.  99 

proached  the  rain  fell  in  such  torrents,  that    From  1795 

.  to  1 T94. 

general  Dugommier  was  inclined  to  defer 
the  assault  twenty-four  hours  longer.     At 
this    suggestion    the    deputies    manifested 
both  impatience  and  indignation,  and  pro- 
testing against  it,  offered,  in   a  conference 
with  Bonaparte,   to   suspend  Dugommier^ 
and  confer  the  chief  command  upon  him. 
(lo.)     He  refused  to  supplant  his  gallant  ge- 
neral, but  undertook  to  convince  him  that 
the  rain  was  not  an  obstacle  to  success,  as 
the  bayonet  was  the  weapon  to  be  chiefly 
employed;  and  apprising  him  of  the   ex- 
treme discontent  of  the  deputies,  prevailed 
on  him  not  to  delay  the  assault.     Accord- 
ingly the  infantry  and  reserves  were  moved 
forward  to  a  position  in  attacking  distance^ 
and  every  preparation  for  the  onset  made. 
But  now  the  deputies  either  grown  cautious 
from  the  approach  of  danger,  or  wishing  lo 
shift  the  responsibility  of  failure  from  them- 
selves to  the  general,  or  deterred  by  the  ar- 
guments of  certain  officers,  who  contended 
that  the  place  could  not  be  stormed,  propo- 
sed calling  a  council  of  war,  and  delibe- 
rating afresh  on  the  propriety  of  an  attack. 
But  Dugommier  had  become  as  determined 
as  Bonaparte.     He  rejected  their  proposal, 


100  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^ni.^  ridiculed  their  doubts,  and  refused  to  he- 
sitate a  moment  longer.  Dividing  his  force 
into  two  columns,  he  himself  took  command 
of  the  first,  and  placed  the  second  under  the 
conduct  of  Bonaparte.  In  this  order^  sup- 
ported by  light  parties  on  their  flanks,  they 
advanced  through  rain  and  darkness  to  the 
assault. 

As  it  was  known  that  the  body  of  the 
garrison  was  sheltered  behind  the  hill,  the 
assailants  hoped  to  reach  the  fort  unper- 
ceived  and  unresisted,  and  to  force  an  en- 
trance without  much  opposition.     But  in 
this  conjecture  they  were  deceived;  for  the 
English  commander  had  stationed  a  dense 
line  of  light  troops  at  the  foot  of  the  emi- 
nence, who  receiving  the  leading  column  of 
the  French  with  a  volley  of  small  arms,  re- 
called the  garrison  to  their  guns.     Their 
fire,  which   was  rapid  and  constant,  w^s 
chiefly  of  grape  shot^  and  did  great  execu- 
tion.    After  a  dubious  and  bloody  struggle, 
the  brave  Dugommier,  who  had  at  one  time 
forced  his  way  into  the  work,  was  driven 
back.     In  despair,  and  expecting  to  expiate 
on  the  scaffold,  misfortune  in  the  field,  the 
aged  warrior  exclaimed.  "I  am  a  lost  man." 
Rallying  the  fugitives,  Bonaparte,  whose 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEOJi.  XOI 

horse  had  been  killed  under  him,  and  who  was 
severely  bruised  by  the  fall,  pushed  forward 
undismayed  by  his  leader's  repulse,  prompt 
to  revenge,  and  skilful  to  retrieve  it.  Perceiv- 
ing that  the  enemy  continued  their  fire  di- 
rectly in  frontjhc  detached  a  battalion  of  light 
troops  under  captain  Muiron,  who  was  well 
acquainted  with  the  ground;  ordering  him 
to  ascend  the  hill  circuitously  and  under  co- 
ver   of  certain    inequalities  in  its  surface. 
Muiron  conducted  his  party  so  adroitly  that 
he  reached  the  fort  undiscovered,  and  rush- 
ing in  through  an  embrasure  with  a  small 
party,  threw  the  garrison  into  confusion. 
Bonaparte  who  followed  in  supporting  dis- 
tance, and  had  been  joined  by  Dugommier  in 
person,  attacked  Avith  his  column  at  this  cri- 
tical moment,  and  overpowering  all  resist- 
ance, carried  the  fort.     The  garrison  though 
vanquished  was  not  disgraced ;  the  English 
and  Spanish  cannoneers  vied  with  each  other 
in  valour  and  pertinacity,  and  resisting  to 
the  last,  were  cut  down  to  a  man  at  their 
guns.      Bonaparte  was   slightly  wounded; 
Muiron,  Victor,  and  Laborde  severely.     The 
enemy  being  reinforced  from  the  two  for- 
tifications at  the  foot  of  the  hill,^made  three 
spirited   attempts  to  retake   the  important 


From  1795 
to  1794 


102  THE    LIFE,  OF 

^^fjj}h  post,  but  their  own  guns  were  turned  against 
them,  and  they  were  repulsed  with  consi- 
derable slaughter.  Their  loss  including  pri- 
soners exceeded  two  thousand  men ;  that  of 
the  French  in  killed  and  wounded  amounted 
to  one  thousand.  About  three  hours  after 
Dugommier  and  Bonaparte  were  in  quiet 
possesion  of  Little  Gibaltar,  the  deputies, 
who  had  first  encouraged,  and  then  dis- 
suaded the  assault,  came  gallantly  forward 
sword  in  hand,  lavishing  praise,  with  the 
warmth  of  witnesses  and  the  confidence  of 
fellow  labourers,  upon  the  victorious  troops, 
(i  I ,)  This  swaggering  was  contemptible;  but 
the  vanity,  assentation,  and  injustice,  which 
followed  it,  were  infamous. 

The  commander  of  the  artillery,  having 
thus  gained  the  position,  to  the  possession  of 
which  he  attached  such  decisive  consequence, 
lost  no  time  in  employing  its  advantages, 
and  in  bringing  his  plan  of  proceeding  lo 
the  test  of  experiment.  At  the  dawn  of 
day  he  directed  an  attack  to  be  made  upon 
TEguillette,  and  Balaguier,  as  the  forts  at 
the  two  extreme  points  of  the  promontory 
were  called.  These  though  they  were  com- 
manded by  Little  Gibraltar,  more  immedi- 


THE    EMPEROR    .NAPOLEO>.  I  o3 

atelv  commanded   the  two  ro.'ids,  and  me-   Froin  1 7^5 
^  .to  1794. 

naced  the  fleet,   than  even  that  fortress  itself 

did.  Their  garrisons  however  evacuated 
these  places  without  waiting  to  be  driven 
out,  as  they  must  have  been  by  the  guns  of 
Little  Gibraltar.  Bonaparte  then  ordered 
up  the  heavy  artillery  from  his  own  batteries 
with  a  view  of  mounting  them  in  I'Eguillette 
and  Balaguier,  of  closing  the  communication 
between  the  two  roads,  and  opening  a  fire 
upon  the  aUied  squadrons,  which  were  now 
in  their  turn  blockaded.  But  upon  examin- 
ing the  works  he  discovered  that  they  were 
constructed  of  masonry,  and  that  close  in 
front  of  each  was  a  tower  serving  for  a 
lodgment  and  redoubt.  These  towers  were 
also  of  stone  and  so  incommodiously  si- 
tuated that  rebounding  shot  and  splintering 
stones  would  glance  from  them  upon  the 
gunners  in  the  forts.  He  therefore  de- 
termined, at  the  expense  of  a  delay  of  some 
hours,  to  throw  up  batteries  of  earth  on  the 
surface  of  the  hill.  In  the  mean  time  he 
was  so  confident  of  success  that  he  said  to 
Dugommier,  and  repeated  to  the  officers — 
"To-morrow  night,  or  the  night  after,  you 
shall  sleep  in  Toulon." 


104  THE  LIFE    OF 

CHAP^iiL  But  already  began  to  be  manifested  the 
efficiency  of  his  plan  of  operations,  and  the 
magnitude  of  its  results.  Lord  Hood  had 
no  sooner  discovered  that  the  forts  on  the 
summit  and  at  the  base  of  the  promontory 
were  in  possession  of  the  French,  than  he 
made  signal  to  the  fleet  to  weigh  anchor  and 
get  out  to  sea.  A  council  of  war  assembled 
in  Toulon,  at  which  it  is  said  he  proposed  an 
instant  and  powerful  effort  to  recover  pos- 
session of  Little  Gibraltar  and  the  fortified 
points  which  it  commanded  (12).  This 
proposition  which  did  credit  to  his  spirit, 
was  rejected  by  a  majority  of  the  council, 
who  decided  that  the  place,  being  no  longer 
tenable,  should  be  immediately  abandoned. 
In  the  course  of  the  evening  the  evacua- 
tion was  commenced,  in  the  midst  of  in- 
creasing dismay  and  confusion.  Although 
the  allies  had  obtained  possession  of  Toulon 
upon  the  assurance  of  protecting  its  inha- 
bitants, and  of  preserving  and  restoring  its 
vast  military  and  marine  establishments, 
sensible  of  their  danger  and  of  their  force, 
but  forgetful  of  their  faith  and  honour,  they 
resolved  to  carry  off  as  prizes  whatever  ships 
they  could  get  to  sea,  to  burn  the  rest,  to 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  I  o5 

destroy  the  forts  and  arsenals,  and  then  to    FromiT93 

.  .  ...  to  1794. 

convey  into  banishment  such  of  the  citizens 
as  had  been  tempted  by  the  promise  of  lord 
Hood  into  a  degree  of  guilt  which  exposed 
them  to  the  utmost  rigour  of  justice,  and 
had  been  plunged  by  its  violation  into  a 
depth  of  responsibility,  which  placed  them 
beyond  the  reach  of  mercy.  Orders  for 
destroying  the  fleet  and  arsenals  were  given 
accordingly  ;  and  their  execution  entrusted 
to  the  courage  and  activity  of  sir  Sidney 
Smith.  But  the  French  army  was  ap- 
proaching on  all  sides.  General  La  Poype 
had  got  possession  of  fort  Pharon ;  Bona- 
parte from  the  promontory  which  he  had 
stormed,  and  from  Malbosquet  which  the 
English  had  abandoned,  was  throwing  hot 
shot  and  shells  into  the  harbour  and  the 
town;  and  the  rapacity  of  the  allies,  un- 
allayed  by  considerations  of  justice  or  huma- 
nity, was  restrained  by  their  fears.  Many 
of  the  ships,  most  of  the  arsenals,  and  the 
principal  fortifications  were  preserved.  The 
French  galley  slaves  broke  their  chains  and 
extinguished  the  English  fires.  Four  ships 
of  the  fine  and  several  frigates  were  loaded 
with  stores  and  carried  off;  nine  ships  and 


io6 


THE    LIFE    OF 


P^^'^-  ^  four  frigates  were  burnt ;  but  thirteen  ships 
which  had  been  dismantled,  Were  left  un- 
destroyed  in  the  harbour.  The  allied  fleet, 
eager  for  pillage  and  intent  to  escape,  offered 
but  a  tardy  refuge  to  the  distracted  inhabi- 
tants, who  hurried  in  the  midnight  confla- 
gration to  the  wharfs,  and  rushed  into  the 
boats,  as  they  were  directed  by  chance,  or 
driven  by  terror.  Suddenly  the  floating 
magazines  which  had  been  fired,  not  sunk, 
exploded  with  a  shock  and  a  glare  that 
illumed  and  suspended  the  surrounding 
horrors.  But  Bonaparte  soon  revived  his 
cannonade  and  continued  it  with  fury 
throughout  the  night.  Some  of  the  English 
ships  were  injured,  and  several  boats  loaded 
with  emigrants  were  sunk.  After  a  night 
of  terror,  violence,  and  confusion,  the 
hostile  squadrons  were  seen  at  day  break 
just  clearing  the  harbour,  freighted  with 
plunder,  ignominy,  and  grief  (i3j. 

Lord  Hood^  who  was  the  principal  agent 
in  this  transaction,  sacrificed  to  the  passions 
of  his  government^  the  honour  of  his  flag. 
The  rage  and  rapine  of  his  last  hold  upon 
Toulon,  threw  a  dark  colouring  on  his  cau- 
tious entrance,  and  his  hasty  retreat;  ag- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  IO7 

gravating  the  insidious  aspect  of  the  first,    From  1793 

and  giving  a  corsair  appearance  to  the  second. 

In  this  spirit  the  war  in  which  Bonaparte 

had  now  effectually  entered,  was  commen- 

ced  by  the  alHes,  and  in  the  same  spirit  it  was 

concluded. 

The  joy  of  the  pubHc  at  the  event  of  the 
siege,  was  the  greater,  because  the  success 
was  unexpected.  The  people  classed  it  with 
the  greatest  triumphs  of  the  republic,  and, 
a  proceeding  unprecedented  in  the  history 
of  France,  it  was  celebrated  in  conformity 
with  a  decree  of  the  convention,  by  a  national 
festival  of  careful  ostentation  and  elaborate 
pomp.  But  neither  in  the  report  of  the  de- 
puties^ nor  in  the  solemnity  of  the  conven- 
tion, was  the  name  of  the  real  captor  of  Tou- 
lon even  mentioned.  His  merit,  though 
slighted,  could  not  be  suppressed.  General 
Dugommier,  upon  reading  the  minutes  of 
lord  Hood's  council  of  war^  which  that  as- 
sembly had  left  behind,  was  lost  in  wonder 
at  the  precision  with  which  the  proceedings 
of  the  enemy  had  corresponded  with  the 
conclusions  of  Bonaparte.  His  admiration 
was  increased  by  the  reflection  that,  as  he 
owed  the  capture  of  Toulon  to  the  skill  of 


I08  THE    LIFE    OF 

c^^j^iii^  that  officer,  so  he  was  indebted  to  his  disin- 
terestedness for  the  command  of  the  siege. 
Therefore  he  not  only  included  his  name  in 
a  Hst  of  officers  whom  he  recommended  for 
promotion,  but  assured  the  committee  of 
pubhc  safety,  that,  his  merit  and  talents 
fpere  so  great^  that^  if  he  was  neglected  by 
the  government^  he  would  advance  him- 
self. The  officers  confessed  his  excellence, 
the  soldiers  were  loud  in  his  praise,  and  the 
clubs  of  Marseilles  extolled  his  services  ;  so 
that  military  candour  and  popular  feeling, 
counteracted  the  silence  of  the  deputies,  and 
the  indifference  of  the  government.  Even 
Madam  Cartaux,  who  had  witnessed  the  al- 
tercations between  the  general  and  Bona- 
parte, applauded  those  talents  which  made 
the  folly  of  her  lord  more  conspicuous.  At 
a  public  entertainment  she  praised  the  young 
officer  of  artillerv,  and  observed  that  he 
had  too  much  sense  to  be  a  sans  cullotte, 
"Then,"  said  the  indignant  husband,  ''we 
must  be  blockheads,  all  of  us."  "  Not  at  all," 
replied  the  lady,  "I  don  t  pretend  to  say 
that;  but  he  is  not  one  of  your  class^  that 
you  may  be  sure  of." 

Bonaparte  appears  to  have  been  indiffer- 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLfiON.       IO9 

ent  to  the  praise,  and  insensible  to  the  neg-    From  4795 

\  '  ^        to  1794. 

lect  of  which  he  was  the  object.      But  he 

doubtless  felt  great  satisfaction  at  vindica- 
ting the  safety  and  reputation  of  his  conn- 
try,  and  at  embodying  in  an  exploit  so  use- 
ful and  glorious,  a  ray  of  that  genius  whose 
untried  force  and  impatient  consciousness,  he 
had  felt  amid  the  clouds  of  fortune,  and  the 
fluctuations  of  hope. 

Anecdotes  of  his  personal  conduct  have 
been  related,  which  repetition  can  hardly 
render  trite.  On  one  occasion,  when  he 
was  superintending  the  erection  of  a  battery 
under  the  enemy's  fire,  being  anxious  to  des- 
patch an  order,  he  called  for  the  attendance 
of  a  soldier  who  could  write.  A  handsome 
young  sergeant  stepped  forward,  and  resting 
the  paper  on  the  parapet,  wrote  as  he  dicta- 
ted .  A  ball  struck  the  parapet,  covering  the 
amanuensis  and  his  paper  with  earth,  "Very 
good,"  coolly  remarked  the  sergeant,  '^we 
shall  not  want  sand  this  time.''  The  eye 
and  favour  of  Bonaparte  were  attracted  by 
a  courage  thus  playful  on  the  brink  of  death, 
and  the  unknown  sergeant  was  transformed 
eventually  into  general  Junot,  governor  of 
Paris,  and  duke  of  Abrantes.  (14) 


CHAP.  III. 


no  THE    LIFE    OF 

Soon  afterwards,  while  throwing  up 
works  against  Little  Gibraltar,  the  besiegers 
were  exposed  to  a  destructive  fife,  which 
was  so  fatal  at  a  certain  battery,  that  the  gun- 
ners refused  to  stand  by  it.  It  was  of  im- 
portance to  serve  these  guns,  since,  however 
exposed,  they  were  in  a  position  to  do  great 
execution.  Bonaparte  neither  punished  nor 
reproached  his  men^  but,  resorting  to  that 
magic  by  which  genius  subjects  to  its  autho- 
rity the  impulses  of  mankind,  directed  his 
favourite  sergeant  to  post  up  conspicuously 
above  the  deserted  guns,  a  card  with  these 
words  :  —  '^  The  battery  of  men  without 
fear !"  The  appeal  flew  electrically  through 
the  ranks,  and  the  soldiers,  instead  of  avoid- 
ing the  dangerous  post,  contended  for  the 
honour  of  serving  at  it.  To  confirm  their 
spirit,  the  commander  of  the  artillery  took 
his  station  upon  this  battery,  and  ordered 
'Hhe  men  without  fear,''  to  open  their  fire. 
Thus  out  of  discouragement  he  created 
heroism. 

So  great  was  the  slaughter  at  this  post  that 
one  of  the  guns  was  left  without  its  compli- 
ment of  men.  Bonaparte  seized  the  rammer 
of  an  artilleryman  who  had  just  fallen,  and 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  Ill 

assisted  in  loading    and  firing  repeatedly;    From  1793 

11  1  T    .  to  1794. 

and  tnus  contracted  a  cutaneous  complauit, 
with  which  the  poor  soldier  had  been  af- 
fected. By  unskilful  treatment  its  tendency 
to  the  surface  was  repelled,  with  effects, 
from  which  his  constitution  was  not  per- 
fectly relieved,  until  after  his  Italian  cam- 
paigns, when  he  was  able  to  take  the  advice 
of  Corvisart. 

The  milder  virtues  of  justice  and  huma- 
nity he  also  displayed  at  Toulon.  When  the 
besieging  army   entered  that  place  it  was 
attended   by  the  deputies,  two   of  whom, 
Freron  and  Barras,  had  been  compelled  to 
fly  when  it  was  delivered  up  to  the  public 
enemy,  and  consequently  were  disposed  to 
exceed  in  their  punishments  the  ordinary 
rigour   of   the   convention.     The  popular 
societes  and  volunteer  companies  of  the  sur- 
rounding country  and  neighbouring  towns, 
soon  followed,  with  tempers  averse  to  mercy 
or  moderation.     But  when  the  destruction 
of  public  property  came  to  be  viewed  in  all 
its  extent  of  vastation;  when  the  remains  of 
the  magazine,  the  ruins  of  the  forts,  the  half- 
burnt  arsenals  and  half-saved  ships,  were 
seen  yet  smoking  with  hostile  fire  ;  when 


112  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  III.  it  was  considered  that  the  traitors  of  Toulon 
had  given  up  to  the  enemies  of  their  coun- 
property  which  belonged  to  all  France  ; 
which  fed  her  pride,  nourished  qer  strength, 
and  contributed  to  her  safety ;  and  when 
the  troops  beheld  or  remembered  the  num- 
ber of  their  dead  and  wounded  comrades  ; 
then  indeed  were  the  army  and  the  people 
excited  to  furious  indignation  and  unquali- 
fied revenge.  (i5)  A  revolutionary  tribu- 
nal was  estabHshed  by  the  deputies  for  the 
punishment^  rather  than  the  trial  of  offen- 
ders. But  it  was  found  that  the  principal 
agents  in  the  treason  had  fled  w^ith  the  alh'es. 
Of  those  who  remained,  few  were  cul- 
pable but  in  a  venial  degree.  Nevertheless 
upwards  of  a  hundred  victims  were  selected 
and  sentenced  to  be  shot.  General  Du- 
gommier  discountenanced  this  ill  directed 
severity,  and  Bonaparte  lost  the  favour,  and 
braved  the  resentment  of  the  government, 
by  refusing  to  order  the  execution  of  the 
sentence,  (i6)  which  was  carried  into 
effect  by  a  detachment  of  the  revolutionary 
militia. 

Thus  the  wretched  Toulonese    suffered 
not  only  for  the  crime  of  their  fellow  citizens 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  Il3 

and  their  own  guilt,  but  for  the  bad  faith  From  1793 
of  the  allies.  A  melancholy  but  wholesome  ^  ^  * 
example  of  that  dreadful  retribution  which 
awaits  those  who  in  time  of  war,  direct  the 
dagger  of  the  enemy  against  the  bosom  of 
their  country.  The  indiscriminate  sacrifice 
of  these  unhappy  men  was  doubtless  cruel, 
but  every  lover  of  his  country  must  confess, 
that  the  popular  resentment  which  over- 
whelmed them  was  natural,  and  that  its 
effects  were  salutary,  as  they  had  a  direct 
tendency  to  destroy  the  connection  which 
had  been  formed,  between  the  foreign  ene- 
mies of  France  and  her  domestic  factions.  (17) 

It  was  at  this  siege  that  Bonaparte  con- 
ceived a  regard  for  Duroc,  who  rose  so  high 
in  his  confidence  and  favour.  [18^  On  the 
same  occasion  Victor,  Suchet,  St.  Hilaire, 
and  Marescot,  first  felt  that  ascendancy 
which  they  were  destined  so  often  to  witness 
and  so  long  to  obey. 

In  effecting  the  reduction  of  Toulon,  the 
commander  of  the  artillery  not  only  per- 
formed a  most  important  service  at  a  most 
critical  moment,  but  young  and  subordinate 
as  he  was,  displayed  the  qualities  of  a  con-- 
summate  general  ;  personal  intrej^idity,,  pro- 

8 


114  "^^^  ^^^^  ^^ 

CHAP.  iir.  fessional  skill,  humanity  which  neither  in- 
terest could  tempt  nor  power  overawe,  effi- 
ciency in  collecting  the  means  of  warfare, 
and  genius  in  kindling  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  troops^  and  in  detecting  in  a  complex  and 
extended  position  the  true  point  of  attack. 
These  qualities  which  rank  him  with  great 
captains,  entitle  him  to  the  praise  of  history ; 
but  what  is  especially  memorable  in  a  record 
of  his  life,  is  that  sublime  judgment  which 
enabled  him  to  foreshow  with  perfect  accu- 
racy of  discernment^  the  consequences  of  a 
proposed  operation,  in  the  fears  and  ne- 
cessities of  the  enemy.  This  crowns  the 
glory  of  his  success  at  Toulon,  and  associates 
it  with  all  his  subsequent  victories,  in  which 
judgment  bore  so  great  and  fortune  so  small 
a  part. 

The  account  of  his  conduct  at  this  siege 
might  be  deemed  unfaithful,  were  the  offer 
of  personal  civility  to  his  prisoner,  general 
O'Hara,  omitted.  '^  All  I  ask,''  replied  the 
latter,  "  is  to  be  left  alone,  and  to  owe  no- 
thing to  pity,"  with  a  dignity  of  mind,  which 
though  obscured  by  a  surliness  of  temper, 
was  perceived  and  respected  by  Bonaparte. 
General  Dugommier  after  completing  the 


THE    EMPKROIi    NAPOLEON.  Il5 

leduction  of  Toulon,  was  appointed  to  the  From  1793 
command  oi  ine  army  oi  the  eastern  Py- 
renees. He  was  desirous  that  Bonaparte 
should  accompany  him,  and  with  a  view  of 
ensuring  so  important  an  acquisition,  issued 
an  order,  directing  that  officer  to  follow  him 
to  the  neighbourhood  of  Perpignan.  But 
the  committee  of  public  safety,  though 
tardy  in  acknowledging,  and  penurious  in 
rewarding  Bonaparte's  services,  were  prompt 
and  free  in  employing  his  talents.  This 
they  did  by  sending  him  in  the  opposite 
direction,  and  by  assigning  to  him  a  duty, 
which  though  it  promised  no  accession  of 
glory,  was  likely  to  be  attended  by  unplea- 
sant responsibihty  and  vexatious  difficulties. 
During  its  performance  he  received  his  pro- 
motion to  the  rank  of  brigadier-general,  and 
instructions,  after  its  completion,  to  rejoin 
the  army  of  Italy,  and  lake  command  of  its 
artillery. 

The  recovery  of  Toulon,  with  the  exile  or 
punishment  of  its  misguided  inhabitants, 
although  it  had  humbled  the  spirit  of  insur- 
rection in  the  southern  departments,  had  not 
extinguished  it.  The  English  had  been 
forced  to  relinquish  their  hold  on  this  impor- 


I  if)  THE    LIFE    OF 

ciiAP^i.^tant  Station,  but  they  had  not  done  so  with- 
out augmenting  their  OAvn  naval  power,  and 
impairing  essentially  that  of  France.  Their 
flag  in  consequence  ruled  the  Mediterra- 
nean, and  the  French  territory  on  that  sea, 
vulnerable  from  the  factious  temper  of  the 
population,  was  exposed  more  than  ever  to 
insult  and  aggression.  It  became  therefore  a 
matter  of  pressing  importance  to  supply  by 
fortifications  on  land  that  protection  to  the 
coast  which  the  fleets  and  forts  of  Toulon 
had  formerly  afforded.  This  task  was  en- 
trusted toBonaparte.  It  was  barren  and  de- 
terring ;  yet  he  performed  it  in  a  manner 
which  was  in  the  highest  degree  useful,  and 
gave  striking  evidence  of  the  analytical  power 
<of  his  understanding. 

At  that  time  no  rule  had  been  observed  in 
the  construction  of  fortifications  on  the  coast 
of  France.  Their  numbers,  situation,  and 
strength,  had  been  determined,  not  by  the  na- 
ture of  the  ground,  or  the  degree  of  its  expo- 
sure, but  by  the  caprice  of  the  government,  or 
the  interest  or  apprehensions  of  the  local  au- 
thorities. This  gave  rise  to  frequent  alterca- 
tions between  the  magistracy  of  the  maritime 
towns  and  the  officers  of  artillery,  and  left  the 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLfiON.  II7 

coast  but  feebly  defended.  Bonaparte  pro-  From  1T93 
ceeded  on  a  system,  which  was  to  leave  no- 
thing to  the  chances  of  ministerial  humour, 
or  to  the  effects  of  local  importunity.  Di- 
viding the  positions  of  this  coast  into  three 
classes,  of  which,  the  great  naval  stations 
were  the  first,  important  commercial  har- 
bours the  second,  and  capes  or  promontories 
favourable  to  sudden  descents  the  third,  he 
prescribed  for  each  class,  fortifications  adapt- 
ed to  its  importance  and  exposure.  Sup- 
posing a  scale  of  the  expense  of  constructing 
them,  to  denote  with  sufficient  accuracy  the 
relative  force  and  magnitude  of  these  batte- 
ries, it  may  be  observed_,  that  a  fortification 
of  the  first  class  was  to  cost  sixty  thousand 
francs;  one  of  the  second,  forty  thousand; 
and  one  of  the  third,  six  thousand. 

It  appears  that  he  assigned  to  these  works 
ordnance  of  a  calibre  proportioned  to  the 
danger  they  were  intended  to  repel^  and 
embraced  in  his  regulations  the  angle  of  ele- 
vation, proper  to  be  provided  for  in  the 
gun-carriages  at  the  various  stations,  accor- 
ding to  the  range  which  was  expected  to  be 
covered  by  their  pieces.  The  observations 
on  this  subject,  which  he  dictated  at  St.  He- 


I  1  8  THE   LIFE    OF 

GHAP.  ui.^  lena,  must  be  useful  to  the  engineers)  of  all 
countries  which  are  exposed  to  the  annoy- 
ance of  a  maritime  foe. 

While  engaged  in  superintending  these 
fortifications,  he  was  an  unwilling  wit- 
ness of  the  barbarous  excesses  of  the 
populace  and  their  leaders,  at  Marseilles. 
They  seized  upon  a  rich  merchant  named 
Hughes^  whose  age  and  infirmities  would 
have  entitled  him  to  mercy,  had  he  not  been 
innocent.  He  was  accused  by  these  brutes, 
andby  them  pronounced  guilty  of  conspiring 
against  the  republic,  although  he  was  eighty- 
four  years  old,  feeble,  deaf,  and  almost  blind. 
His  real  crime  in  their  eyes,  was  his  enor- 
mous wealth,  which  was  estimated  at  eigh- 
teen millions  of  francs.  This  the  unhappy- 
man  offered  to  resign,  only  entreating  that 
half  a  million  might  be  spared  to  him,  ur- 
ging that  in  the  course  of  nature  he  could 
enjoy  it  but  a  very  short  time.  But  neither 
his  bribe,  nor  his  tears,  nor  his  age,  nor  his 
innocence,  could  soften  the  ferocity  of 
the  butchers  around  him,  who  thirsting 
for  his  blood  as  well  as  for  his  money, 
hurried  him  to  the  guillotine.  The  pain 
with  which  Bonaparte  witnessed  this  mur- 


THE    EMPEROR    >'APOLEO>'.  I  IQ 

der,  he  exjiressed  at  St.  Helena  by  exclaiming,    From  1795 

^  J  &?       to  1794. 

"  Truly  I  thought  myself  at  the  end  of  the 
world, "  a  forui  of  speech  which  he  employed 
to  denote  the  strongest  detestation  and  hor- 
ror. It  seemed  that  the  nerves  of  his  body 
as  well  as  the  feelings  of  his  soul,  shuddered 
to  the  quick  at  spectacles  of  cruelty. 

It  appears,  he  always  deemed  the  support 
he  received  at  Toulon,  first  from  Gasparin, 
and  afterwards  from  Dugommier,  instru- 
mental in  opening  his  way  to  fortune  and  to 
fame.  The  value  of  his  services  not  only 
to  the  country  but  to  themselves,  greatly 
overpaid  the  general  and  the  deputy.  Ne- 
vertheless, in  his  will,  he  left  substantial  me- 
morials of  his  respect  and  gratitude  for  their 
names;  thus  by  a  magnificent  retrospect, 
looking  from  the  melancholy  end  of  his  ca- 
reer, to  its  bright  beginning. 


(   12^   ) 


CHAPTER  TY. 


From  March,  1794?  to  October^  ^795. 

CHAP.  IV.  Bonaparte  joins  tlie  army  of  Italy  as  general  of 
artillery' — His  first  aides-de-camp  —  General  Du- 
merbion- — Position  of  the  two  armies  —  Strong 
camp  of  the  Sardinians — Bonaparte's  plan  for  dis- 
lodging them^ — Adopted  by  a  council  of  war  — 
Massena — Bonaparte's  active  operations — Their  ra- 
pidity and  success  —  Beats  the  Austrians- — Takes 
Oneille,  Ormea,  and  Garessio — The  Sardinians  dis- 
lodged and  Saorgio  taken  by  Massena,  wbo  drives 
them  from  the  Col  de  Tende — Positions  occupied 
by  the  French  army — Their  sufferings- — Bonaparte's 
plan  for  uniting  the  armies  of  Italy  and  the 
Alps — Prevented  by  the  events  of  the  9th  Thermi- 
dor — Preparations  of  the  allies — Plan  proposed  bv 
Bonaparte  for  counteracting  them — Carries  it  into 
execution — Its  effects — End  of  the  campaign — His 
chief  occupations  in  autumn  and  winter  • —  Ma- 
dam Thurreau  —  Bonaparte's  infatuation  —  Its 
probable  effect  on  his  fortune- — Robespierre  the 
younger- — Anecdote — Bonaparte  put  under  arrest — 
Released  without  trial — Zeal  and  fidelity  of  Junot — 
Bonaparte  summoned  to  the  bar  of  the  convention, 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  121 

on  a  charge  which  is  withdrawn- — Attached  to  the     From  1794 
armament  prepared  for  an  attack  upon  Rome — By  ^    to  1795. 
his  advice  that  project  abandoned — Mob  at  Toulon 
— Saves  two  deputies  of  the  assembly — Rescues  the 
Chabrillanls — Rejoins  the  army  of  Italy- — Ordered  to 
take  a  command  in  the  infantry— Is  dissatisfied  and 
proceeds  to  Paris — Visits  his  mother  on  his  way  and 
stops  at  Chatillon-sur-Seine — Anecdote — His  inter- 
view with  Aubry,  the  minister  of  war — His  retort — 
Tenders  his  resignation* — It  is  not  accepted — Ap- 
pointed to  command  the  artillery  of  the  army  of  the 
West— Kellerman's  disasters — Danger  of  the  Italian 
frontier — The  committee  of  public  safety  consult 
Bonaparte  —  He  draws  up  instructions  which  are 
sent  to  Kellerman — Is  employed  in  the  war  office 
in  directing  the   operations   of  the   armies  —  His 
reputed  idea  of  obtaining  orders  to  seek  a  command 
in  the  army  of  the  Grand  Signior  —  Independent 
in  his  circumstances,   though   not  rich- — His  dis- 
posal of  his  time  while  at  Paris — His  impression  in 
society. 


Having  digested  the  order,  arranged  the  po- 
sition, and  prescribed  thestructure  of  suitable 
fortifications  along  the  coast  of  France,  from 
the  Rhone  to  the  Var,  general  Bonaparte  pro- 
ceeded in  March,  ^794?  ^^  ^he  head  quarters 
of  the  array  of  Italy,  which  were  estabhshed 
at  Nice.  He  was  preceded  by  the  reputation 
he  had  acquire  d  at  Toulon,  and  accompanied 


1:2  2  THE    LIFE    OF 


CHAP.JLV.  ^  byhisfirst  aides-de-camp,  Mairon  and  Junot. 
The  commander  in  chief,  general  Dumer- 
bion,  was  a  veteran,  who  by  hard  service  had 
gained  high  rank.  He  was  intrepid,  upright, 
and  well  informed  ,  and  having  served  the 
two  previous  campaigns  on  this  frontier, 
was  acquainted  with  its  positions.  He  was 
severely  afflicted  with  the  gout,  but  as  he 
discovered  the  merit  and  relied  on  the  coun- 
sels of  the  young  general  of  artillery,  his 
efficiency  was  by  no  means  impaired  by  his 
infirmities,  (i)  Macquart,  d'Allemagne,  and 
Massena,  were  his  generals  of  division. 

The  French  army  was  stationed  in  the 
county  of  Nice,  which  is  situated  on  the 
Mediterranean  side  of  the  maritime  Alps, 
and  between  the  rivers  the  Var  and  the 
Eoya.  On  the  declivities  of  the  Alps  over- 
hanging this  territory,  the  Sardinian  army 
of  twenty  thousand  men,  occupied  the  camp 
of  Fourches  ;  a  formidable  position  resting 
on  the  strong  fort  of  Saorgio,  which  com- 
manded the  principal  route  from  Nice  to 
Ttirin.  Fixed  on  this  height,  unassailable 
on  his  flanks  from  the  nature  of  the  ground, 
inexpugnable  in  his  front  as  experience  had 
demonstrated,  and  fortified  both  by  nature 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  123 

and  art  in  his  rear,  the  Sardinian  commander   From  1T94 

'  ,  .to  179d. 

menaced  the  French  frontier,  communicated 
by  his  left  with  that  of  Genoa,  and  with  the 
line  of  Austrian  posts  which  were  extended 
across  the  mountains  from  the  vallev  of  the 
Bormida  to  the  harbour  of  Oneille;  and  with 
the  Enghsh  cruisers  and  privateers,  which 
intercepting  from  that  port,  the  commerce 
between  Genoa  and  Marseilles,  interrupted 
the  alleviation  and  supply  afforded  by  it,  to 
the  French  army  and  to  the  famine  of  Pro- 
vence. The  importance  of  dislodging  the 
enemy  from  this  effective  position,  had  been 
felt  so  sensibly  by  general  Brunet,  that  on 
the  8th  and  12th  of  the  previous  June,  he 
had  assailed  it  with  a  superiority  of  force  and 
with  persevering  vigour.  His  efforts  were 
vain  and  his  loss  considerable.  With  the 
government,  which  he  served,  as  suspicion 
and  proof  were  equivalent,  failure  and  guilt 
were  identical.  General  Brunet,  unfortu- 
nate in  battle,  was  charged  with  treason  and 
punished  with  death.  General  Dumerbion 
who  was  to  contend  with  equal  difficulties, 
was  subject  to  similar  misfortune,  and  ex- 
posed to  the  same  fate,  for  neither  the  in- 
terest of  the  nation   nor  the  temper  of  the 


124  ^^^   ^^^^    ^^ 

CHAPPY.  ^  convention,  would  tolerate  an  inactive  cam- 
paign. Thus  circumstanced  he  must  have 
regarded  his  antagonist,  with  feehngs  akin 
to  those  of  the  shepherd,  who  sees  the  eagle 
that  preys  upon  his  lambs,  perched  upon  an 
inaccessible  rock,  where  neither  his  shouts 
can  alarm  nor  his  missiles  reach  her.  But  a 
hunter  approached,  from  whose  daring 
footsteps,  and  unerring  eye,  the  only  secu- 
rity was  in  instant  flight. 

The  first  care  of  the  general  of  artillery 
after  his  arrival,  was  to  make  himself  ac- 
quainted with  the  station  and  force  of  the 
several  divisions  of  the  army.  The  perform- 
ance of  this  duty  gave  him  an  opportunity 
of  studying  the  ground,  of  observing  the 
enemy's  position,  and  of  tracing  on  the  spot 
the  unfortunate  operations  of  general  Bru- 
net.  He  perceived  that  the  camp  of  Four- 
ches  was  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  a  direct 
attack,  hoAvever  skilfully  or  gallantly  con- 
ducted, and  felt  convinced  that  if  general 
Dumerbion  repeated  the  attempt  of  his  pre- 
decessor, he  would  meet  with  no  better  suc- 
cess. The  same  military  penetration  which 
had  revealed  to  him  the  mode  of  expelling 
the  English  from  Toulon,  now  suggested  to 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  I  ^5 

him  the  method  of  dislodging  the  Sardinians    From  1794 

P  r,  •         ,     \  to  1795. 

irom  oaorgio.   (2.) 

His  plan  was  projected  on  a  scale  of  saga- 
city and  enterprise  which  was  as  yet  new 
and  unattempted  in  this  army,  whose  head 
quarters  during  t^vo  campaigns  had  been 
stationary  at  Nice.  It  proposed  extending 
the  right  wing  divided  into  two  columns, 
along  the  precipitous  and  narrow  slope,  be- 
tween the  sea  and  the  Alps,  as  far  as  Oneille 
and  Loano ;  separating  the  Austrian  and  Sar- 
dinian armies  from  communication  with  the 
British  squadron;  passing  with  the  further 
column  across  the  crest  of  the  mountains 
and  seizing  Ormea  and  Garessio,  two  Sardi- 
nian forts  on  the  sources  of  theTanaro;  as- 
cending with  the  nearer  column  to  the 
heights  of  Tanardo  and  Tanarello^,  and  occu- 
pying the  route  from  Nice  to  Turin  at  a  point 
in  the  rear  of  Saorgio.  This  movement,  if 
successfully  executed,  would  expel  the  Eng- 
lish cruisers  and  privateers  from  Oneille 
and  Loano,  protect  the  French  coasting 
trade,  cut  off  the  enemy's  communication 
with  the  sea;  by  endangering  his  retreat, 
compel  him  to  abandon  the  camp  of  Four- 
ches,  from  which,  after  sanguinary  efforts  it 


126  THE    LIFE    OF     ^ 

^^^ARTV^  i^aj  been  found  impracticable  to  force  him ; 
and  would  place  the  French  army  on  the 
summits  of  the  Alps,  where,  while  their  posts 
could  neither  be  turned  nor  commanded, 
they  would  disquiet  one  member  of  the  coa- 
lition for  the  safety  of  his  country,  and  the 
security  of  his  capital. 

If  the  Sardinian  general  should  attempt  to 
counteract  this  operation  by  assuming  the 
offensive  and  attacking  the  French  in  their 
positions  on  the  Var,  besides  thai  these  po- 
sitions were  in  themselves  strong  and  capa- 
ble of  being  maintained  against  a  superior 
force^  his  advance  would  place  the  French 
right  more  completely  on  his  flank  and  rear 
and  render  the  movement  proposed  by 
Bonaparte  still  more  efficacious  and  suc- 
cessful. Or,  should  he,  which  was  not 
probable,  detach  a  corps  from  his  left 
in  time  and  strength  sufficient  to  arrest 
the  progress  of  the  French  column,  he 
must  thereby  expose  his  main  position  at 
Fourches,  to  a  direct  and  victorious  assault. 
So  that  whether  the  enemy  remained  quiet 
or  moved  forward,  his  eventual  retreat  was 
equally  certain;  he  would  lose  all  the  advan- 
tages of  superiority  of  ground,  which,  in- 


THeN  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.       I 2y 


dependenlly    of    other     favourable    conse-    ^''^"iiJ^^ 

^  "  to  17Qt. 

quences,  would  result  in  their  full  force  to 
the  French  (3  ). 

In  forming  this  plan,  Bonaparte  appears 
to  have  reasoned  on  principles  deduced  from 
the  nature  of  mountain  warfare;  in  which 
strength  of  ground  becomes  a  considera- 
tion so  preponderating,  that  even  in  the 
conduct  of  an  offensive  campaign,  an  able 
general  endeavours  to  conquer  his  enemy 
by  positions.  By  these  he  forces  him  to 
fight  to  disadvantage  or  to  retreat  without 
fighting,  losing  in  the  first  case  the  moral 
impulse  and  physical  momentum  of  attack; 
in  the  second  relinquishing  the  command 
of  territory  which  otherwise  he  might  have 
held  (4). 

To  this  mode  of  commencing  the  cam- 
paign there  was  no  serious  military  objection, 
while  it  was  easy  to  remove  the  pohtical 
one  which  was  suggested.  It  involved  the 
necessity  of  violating,  or  to  use  an  equivalent 
for  the  softer  French  term,  of  borrowing  the 
neutral  territory  of  Genoa.  But  in  the  pre- 
vious campaign,  a  detachment  of  Sardinian 
troops  two  thousand  strong,  had  been  per- 
mitted to  pass  in  martial  array,  with  drums 


1 28  THE    LIFE    OF 

^^^1^^'^  beating  and  colours  flying  through  the  terri- 
tory of  the  repubh'c,  and  to  embark  atOneille 
asareenforcement  to  the  allied  armament  in 
Toulon.  About  the  same  time,  so  domi- 
neering was  the  influence  of  England  on 
that  coast,  while  she  held  possession  of  Tou- 
lon, that  a  British  squadron  had  been 
suffered  to  attack  and  lake,  with  circum- 
stances of  outrage  and  cruelty,  the  French 
frigate  La  Modeste  while  at  her  moorings 
in  the  harbour  of  Genoa  (5).  The  neutral 
rights  of  this  once  proud  republic^  thus  pro- 
stituted, were  entitled  on  principle  to  no 
respect  from  France.  It  was  true  that  the 
importance  of  the  commerce,  which,  under 
the  Genoese  flag,  was  maintained  with  the 
south  of  France,  had  impressed  on  the  policy 
of  the  convention  a  character  of  unusual  for- 
bearance, from  which  it  was  not  expected, 
that  the  commander  would  deviate.  But  the 
operation  in  question  would  free  that  com- 
merce from  obstruction,  would  establish  a 
French  force  on  the  Genoese  frontier,  and 
be  more  likely  to  overawe  than  to  irritate, 
so  small  and  so  mercantile  a  state. 

General  Dumerbion  yielded  full  attentiou 
and  a  ready  assent,  to  the  plan  proposed  by 


THE   EMPEROR   NAPOLEON.  1 29 

the  general  of  artillery,  and  submitted  it  to  ^^^^  ^"^^^ 

.  ...         to1T95. 

a  council  of  war,  composed  of  his  princi- 
pal officers  and  the  deputies  of  the  conven- 
tion. It  was  no  sooner  explained  than  it 
was  adopted;  its  intrinsic  advantages  con- 
curring with  the  fresh  and  rising  reputation 
of  its  author,  to  obviate  unreasonable  doubt 
and  pertinacious  discussion. 

To  carry  this  bold  plan  into  execution, 
Massena,  on  the  6th  of  April,  crossed  the 
Roya  at  the  head  of  fourteen  thousand  men, 
with  the  first  division  of  which,  after  taking 
the  small  castle  of  Vingtimilia^  he  turned  to 
his  left,  penetrated  into  his  native  moun- 
tains, and  took  post  on  Mont  Tanardo  and 
Monte  Grande,  inferior  elevations  of  the 
Alps ;  thus  beginning  his  career  of  glory  in 
the  rough  cradle  of  his  infant  sports.  (7)  Bo- 
naparte, who  conducted  the  second  division, 
taking  a  wider  range  between  the  English 
fleet  on  his  right,  and  the  Austro-Sardinian 
posts  on  his  left,  passed  rapidly  the  Nervia 
and  the  Taggia,  routed  a  strong  body  of 
Austriansat  St.  Agata,  and  taking  possession 
of  Oneille,  put  that  sea-port  in  a  condition 
of  repelling  hostile  cruisers,  and  sheltering 
French  trading  vessels.     Ardently  prosecut- 

9 


l3o  THE    LIFE    OF 

CUAV^Y.^  ii]g  his  movement^  he  ascended  from  Oneille 
to  the  pass  of  Ponte  di  Nave,  where  an 
Austrian  force  waited  to  oppose  him.  This 
he  defeated  on  the  1 5th  of  April^  and  driving 
it  over  the  mountains  before  him,  compelled 
the  neighbouring  garrison  of  Ormea,  con- 
sisting of  four  hundred  men,  to  surrender. 
Twenty  pieces  of  artillery,  several  thou- 
sand muskets,  and  a  quantity  of  mihtary 
clothing,  of  which  the  troops  were  in  want, 
fell  into  his  hands.  (8)  His  next  object  was 
Garessio,  which  being  instantly  attacked, 
fell  an  easy  conquest.  From  Garessio,  the 
ultimate  point  of  his  invasion,  while  he  » 
threatened  the  plains  and  capital  of  Pied- 
mont, he  secured  his  communication  with 
the  sea  at  Loano,  by  occupying,  on  the  i8th 
of  April,  Monts  St.  Bernard  and  Rocca  Bar- 
bena. 

Thus,  in  the  short  space  of  twelve  days, 
Bonaparte  had  advanced  the  positions  of  the 
French  army  a  distance  of  about  eighty 
miles,  through  a  tract  of  the  most  difficult 
country  in  Europe,  driving  the  British 
cruisers  from  the  coast  on  one  side,  dis- 
lodging the  Austrian  army  from  the  moun- 
tains  on    the   other,  and  had    gained   a 


THE   EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  l3l 

position    which  overlooked  the   plains    of   From  1794 

.  .  .  to  1795. 

Piedmont,  and  menaced  that  kingdom  with 
invasion. 

Massena,  meanwhile,  had  conducted  his 
operations  on  a  line  nearer  to  the  enemy's 
camp,  and  in  a  manner  equally  vigorous  and 
successful.  Pushing  onward  from  Tanaro, 
he  reached  the  higher  position  of  Tanarello, 
and  posted  himself,  after  several  conflicts, 
on  the  route  from  Nice  to  Turin,  and,  in 
conformity  with  the  indications  of  Bona- 
parte, at  a  point  in  the  rear  of  Saorgio.  The 
effect  of  these  daring  movements,  on  this 
skilful  plan,  was  as  decisive  and  complete  as 
that  which  attended  the  storming  of  Little 
Gibraltar  at  Toulon.  The  Sardinian  army, 
its  flank  turned  and  its  retreat  endangered, 
evacuated,  in  haste,  the  camp  of  Fourches, 
and  leaving  behind  numerous  cannon  and 
immense  stores,  retreated  higher  up  into  the 
Alps  to  a  pass  called  the  Col  de  Tende.  So 
great  were  the  alarm  and  precipitation  that 
Saorgio,  though  strongly  garrisoned  and  re- 
gularly fortified,  surrendered  to  Masseua, 
after  a  show  of  resistance,  on  the  29th  of 
April ;  and  the  intrenched  camp  of  Fourches, 
which  had  been  so  triumphantly  defended 


1 32  THE   LIFE    OF 

CHAP^V-^  the  year  before,  was  now  resigned  without 
resistance,  and  taken  without  an  attack. 

On  the  8th  of  May,  Massena  having  re- 
freshed his  troops  by  a  few  days  of  repose, 
passed  the  Col  Ardente^  and  moved  upon 
the  left  and  rear  of  the  Sardinians  in  their 
new  position  in  the  Col  de  Tende;  while 
Dumerbion,  no  longer  apprehending  a  coun- 
teracting effort  of  the  enemy,  directed  the 
division  of  Macquart  againt  their  front.  This 
combined  attack  succeeded,  and  general 
Dumerbion  becoming,  in  consequence,  mas- 
ter of  the  maritime  Alps,  extended  his  left 
into  communication  with  the  nearest  post  of 
the  army  of  the  Alps,  which,  in  emulation  of 
his  success,  had  lately  dislodged  the  Sar- 
dinians from  Mont  Cenis. 

Thus  the  army  of  Italy,  which,  after  re- 
peated change  of  commanders,  and  frequent 
bloody  actions,  had  been  unable,  in  the  space 
of  two  years,  to  advance  a  step  beyond  the 
valley  of  the  Var,  was  empowered,  by  the 
bold  and  original  combinations  of  Bona- 
parte's judgment,  in  a  single  month,  to  sur- 
mount and  to  hold  the  frowning  barrier  of 
the  Alps,  from  the  Col  de  Tende  to  the 
Appeninas,  to  rend  asunder  the  tenacious 


THE   EMPEROR   NAPOLEON.  1 33 

connection  of  the  allied  forces,  to  expel  the    From  1794 

r  1  to  1795. 

Sardinians  and  Austrians  from  the  moun- 
tains, and  the  English  fleet  from  the  coast, 
with  inconsiderable  loss,  to  take  three  thou- 
sand prisoners,  an  intrenched  camp,  three 
mountain  fortresses,  a  numerous  train  of 
artillery,  with  large  stores  of  provisions  and 
ammunition;  and,  cutting  off  the  enemy's 
communication  with  the  sea,  to  transfer  the 
danger  of  invasion  from  the  frontiers  of 
France  to  the  Sardinian  capital.  (9) 

The  court  of  Turin,  no  longer  sup- 
ported by  intercourse  with  the  British  fleet, 
was  thrown  into  the  greatest  consternation 
upon  finding  that  frontier  of  the  kingdom, 
whose  natural  obstruction  was  its  greatest 
strength,  overpassed  without  difficulty  or 
delay,  by  a  powerful  and  active  enemy.  The 
king,  in  his  alarm,  ordered  a  levy,  enmasse^ 
of  his  subjects.  Nor  could  the  cabinets  of 
London  and  Vienna  regard,  without  serious 
apprehension,  a  rapidity  of  conquest  which 
was  then  unexampled  in  the  French  armies, 
and  which,  if  not  counteracted,  seemed  likely, 
by  placing  the  Sardinian  monarch  at  the 
mercy  of  the  French  Republic,  to  create  an 
important  alteration  in  the  state  of  the  war. 


1 34  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV,        Such  was  the  outhne,  and  so  great  were 
the  effects  oC  this  second  stroke  of  Bona- 
parte's mihtary  genius.     Though  his  glory 
was  again  shaded  by  superior  rank,  though 
a  secondary  station  still  kept  his  name  un- 
known to  the  annals  of  Europe,  and  his  sub- 
sequent exploits  soon  outshone  the  lustre 
of  his  present  deeds,  this  expedition  in  the 
Alps,  in  the  boldness  and  rapidity  of  its 
movements,  and  in  the  exact  correspondence 
between  its  result  and  its  conception,  must 
be  admitted  to  bear  impressions  of  the  same 
originality  and  excellence  which  distinguish 
his  greatest  campaigns.    It  ought  to  be  men- 
tioned, in  justice  to  General  Dumerbion, 
that  so  far  from   desiring  to  suppress  the 
merit  of  his  general  of  artillery,  in  his  des- 
patch to  the  government  describing  his  suc- 
cesses, he  said,  "  It  is  to  the  talent  of  general 
Bonaparte  that  I  am  indebted  for  the  skilful 
plans  which  have  assured  our  victory." 

The  positions  of  the  army  of  Italy  on  the 
Alps,  though  safe  and  formidable,  were  at- 
tended by  many  disadvantages.  The  air 
and  water  of  these  snowy  regions  were  both 
unwholesome^  and  the  routes  so  difficult 
that  the  posts  were  insulated  and  the  sup- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON,  1 35 

plies   irregular.      The    men  fell   sick,   the    From  1794 

.  .to  1795. 

horses  perished,  the  guns  were  left  behind, 
and  the  cavalry  dismounted;  so  that  the 
strength  of  the  army  rapidly  diminished, 
while  its  expense  was  greatly  increased.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  rich  plains  of  Piedmont 
which  reposed  and  refreshed  the  Sardinian 
army,  tempted  the  French  forward  to  plenty 
and  conquest.  The  committee  of  public 
safety,  emboldened  by  the  success  already 
gained,  were  impatient  of  delay,  and  directed 
that  offensive  operations  should  be  inces- 
santly pursued.  But  as  his  adversary  was 
now  in  connection  with  his  fortresses  and 
reenforcements,  general  Dumerbion,  whose 
sickness  probably  damped  his  enterprise, 
did  not  think  himself,  reduced  as  he  was  in 
artillery  and  cavalry,  in  strength  sufficient 
to  invade  Piedmont,  and  meet  the  enemy  in 
the  plain.  He,  therefore,  endeavoured  to 
procure  the  cooperation  of  the  army  of  the 
-Alps,  and  for  that  purpose  authorized  the 
general  of  artillery  to  confer  with  general 
Dumas  and  his  principal  officers.  Bona- 
parte, on  this  occasion,  submitted  a  plan  for 
invading  Piedmont,   by   uniting    the   two 


1 36  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.  armies  in  the  valley  of  the  Stura,  which  was 
approved  by  the  deputies  Ricord  and  Ro- 
bespierre, and  by  the  committee  of  pubhc 
safety,  to  whom  it  was  transmitted.  But  a 
difference  of  opinion  on  the  part  of  the 
deputies  employed  Avith  the  army  of  the 
Alps,  which  could  not  be  reconciled,  and  an 
insufficiency  of  means,  especially  in  regard 
to  cavalry,  which  could  not  be  provided  for, 
retarded  its  execution  until  the  events  in  the 
convention  of  the  9th  Thermidor  prevented 
it  altogether.  (10)  In  September,  how- 
ever, the  preparations  of  the  Austrians  and 
the  English  put  an  end  to  this  state  of  irk- 
some inaction.  An  Austrian  corps,  under 
general  CoUoredo,  was  assembled  on  the  Bor- 
mida,  which,  by  establishing  magazines  as 
high  up  as  Dego,  near  the  source  of  that 
river,  indicated  a  movement  towards  the 
sea  coast,  and  a  design  of  reopening  a  com- 
munication between  the  Austro-Sardinian 
army  and  the  British  fleet.  Corresponding 
with  this  demonstration,  the  English^  it 
appeared,  were  to  effect  a  landing  at  Vado, 
a  Genoese  port,  and  uniting  with  the  Aus- 
trians, take  possession  of  Savona,  and  force 


THE    EMPEROB    NAPOLEON.  1 87 

the  republic  of  Genoa,  straitened  by  sea  and    ^^^"jJql^'^ 
land,  to  abandon  her  gainful  neutrahty,  and 
declare  war  against  France. 

In  forming  this  project,  the  allied  powers, 
who  were  now  strengthened  by  the  renewed 
accession  of  Prussia  to  the  coalition,  with  an 
army  of  sixty-two  thousand  men,  ( 1 1  )  pi'O- 
posed  taking  advantage  of  their  own  wrong. 
Having  first  violated,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
neutrality  of  Genoa,  they  were  making  the 
lawful  consequence  of  that  outrage,  a  pretext 
for  further  encroachment  and  oppression 
upon  the  rights  of  that  feeble  state;  thus 
unjustly  continuing  a  course  of  injury  which 
they  themselves  had  wantonly  commenced. 

To  counteract  this  dangerous  and  lawless 
scheme,  which,  besides  its  military  conse- 
quences, would  have  had  the  effect  of  cutting 
off  all  relief  to  thescarcitywhichstillprevailed 
in  the  South  of  France,  Bonaparte  advised 
general  Dumerbion  instantly  to  advance 
his  right  wing,  take  possession  of  the  heights 
above  Vado,  and  establish  a  communication 
across  the  mountains,  between  that  point  on 
the  coast  and  the  positions  which  the  army 
already  held  on  the  sources  of  the  Tanaro, 
by  the  way  of  St.  Jacques  and  Montenotte. 


1 38  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.  He  would  thus  be  in  a  situation  to  counte- 
nance the  friends  of  France  in  Genoa,  to 
prevent  any  direct  attempt  of  the  alHes  on 
that  city,  in  case  it  should  be  meditated, 
would  assure  the  neutrality  of  that  republic, 
place  the  French  in  command  of  the  entire 
coast  from  thefrontier  of  France  to  theneigh- 
bourhood  of  Genoa,  protect  tbe  French  com- 
merce, maintain  the  separation  between  the 
Austro-Sardlnian  forces  and  the  British  fleet, 
and  disconcert  completely  the  projects  of 
the  alHes  on  this  theatre  of  the  war.  (  12  ) 

General    Dumerbion   and   the   deputies 
having  considered  and  approved  this  sugges- 
tion, a  column  of  eighteen  thousand  men, 
with  twenty  pieces  of  light  artillery,  was  put 
in  motion  to  execute  it.     This  force,  from 
the  impregnable  nature  of  the  French  posts 
on  the  great  chain  of  the  Alps,  could  be  de- 
tached without  danger.      Bonaparte,  who 
advised,  directed  the  movement,  although 
the  commander  in  chief  was  present.     He 
first  penetrated  through  the  pass  or  Col  de 
Bardinetto^  into  Montferrat^  along  the  road 
which  borders   the    Bormida,  and  on  the 
5lh  of  October,  having  left  the  heights  of 
Biestro,    descended  rapidly  into   the  plain. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  iSq 

His  intention  was  to  get  into  the  rear  of  Col-  ^^^^^^^^ 
loredo's  corps  of  Austrians,  amounting  to 
twelve  thousand  men.  But  by  retreating 
upon  Cairo,  and  thence  upon  the  forti- 
fied town  of  Acqui,  Colloredo  prevented 
the  full  success  of  this  attempt.  Neverthe- 
less, the  French  vanguard,  under  general 
Cervoni,  maintained  so  active  a  pursuit,  that 
the  Austrians,  besides  abandoning  their 
magazines,  sustained  the  loss  of  a  thousand 
men. 

General  Dumerbion  was  not  in  a  condi- 
tion to  prosecute  his  movement  in  this  direc- 
tion, or  in  other  words  to  invade  Italy. 
Want  of  forage  had  compelled  him  to  send 
his  horses  to  the  pastures  on  the  Rhone;  so 
that  he  had  no  cavalry,  a  force  indispensable 
in  the  plain;  and  no  heavy  artillery,  without 
which  a  country  strong,  populous  and 
studded  with  fortresses,  could  with  difficulty 
he  deemed  be  conquered.  Moreover  the 
authority  Avhich  had  been  given  by^the  go- 
vernment for  uniting  the  armies  of  the  Alps 
and  of  Italy, at  the  suggestion  of  Bonaparte,  in 
the  valley  of  the  Stura,  had  been  revoked,  not 
without  expressions  of  suspicious  displeasure. 
Declining  to  expose  himself  to  the  frowns 


l40  THE    LIFE    OF 

^^i^'  ^  of  a  ]  ealous  authority,  and  to  the  Austrian  and 
Sardinian  forces  which  had  been  united  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Acqui,  he  withdrew  to  his 
positions  on  the  head  waters  of  the  Tanaro, 
and  completed  the  object  of  his  expedition, 
by  taking  possession  of  Savona,  and  forti- 
fying the  heights  which  command  the  town 
and  harbour  of  Vado. 

Thus  the  French  were  placed  in  command 
of  a  still  greater  extent  of  the  coast  and  of 
the  impending  mountains;  and  had  their  ad- 
vanced parties  securely  established  within  a 
forced  march  of  Genoa.  While  the  allies— 
their  formidable  projects  both  by  sea  and 
land  completely  frustrated,  the  English  ex- 
pelled from  the  coast  and  their  confederates 
driven  beyond  the  mountains — appeased  the 
mortification  of  their  common  defeat,  by 
mutual  suspicion  and  reciprocal  censure.  ( 1 3) 
This  ill  humour  though  not  among  the  mili- 
tary effects,  was  a  desirable  consequence  of 
the  successes  of  the  French,  and  might,  it  was 
hoped,  loosen  the  ties  of  the  coalition. 

So  ended  this  active  and  victorious  cam- 
paign of  the  army  of  Italy. 

The  leisure  of  autumn  and  winter  Bona- 
parte employed  in  completing  the  fortifi^ 


THE   EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  l4l 

cations  of  Vado  and  Oneille,  in  inspecting  From  179-4 
the  line  of  maritime  forts  from  the  Var  to ' 
the  Rhone,  which  were  in  the  progress  of 
construction  under  his  superintendence,  and 
in  perfecting  his  acquaintance  with  that  part 
of  the  grand  chain  of  the  maritime  Alps,  in 
which  he  had  not  been  personally  employed. 
So  intent  were  his  observations  that  in 
company  with  St.  Hilaire,  he  passed  a  night 
in  January  on  the  top  of  a  mountain  near  the 
Col  de  Tende ;  whence  at  sunrise,  in  the 
gorgeous  light  of  the  eastern  horizon,  he 
descried  the  lovely  plains  of  Italy,  and  the 
distant  waters  of  the  Po.  So  strong  was 
his  emotion  that  he  was  tempted  to  exclaim, 
ItaliamI  Italiam!  his  ardent  genius  pro- 
phetic of  future  glories,  and  dazzled  by  the 
visions  which  itself  inspired. 

But  his  time  was  not  altogether  engrossed 
by  the  toils  of  war  or  the  rude  grandeur  of 
mountain  prospects.  Scenes  less  inclement 
and  softer  contests  occasionally  engaged  him. 
Among  the  members  of  the  convention 
in  attendance  on  the  army  of  Italy,  was 
M.  Thurreau— a  gentleman  whose  personal 
insignificance  in  the  deputation,  was  re- 
deemed by  the  wit  and  beauty  of  his  wife. 


1 42  THE  LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.  This  lady  was  not  insensible  to  the  merit, 
nor  unkind  to  the  devotion  of  the  young  ge- 
neral of  artillery,  who  proud  of  his  success, 
ventured  to  manifest  his  adoration,  by  order- 
ing for  her  amusement,  as  they  walked  out 
on  the  great  theatre  of  the  Alps,  an  attack  of 
the  advance  posts  stationed  below  them. 

The  French  party  was  victorious,  but 
they  lost  some  of  their  number,  and  as  the 
affair  could  lead  to  no  result,  it  was  in  every 
sense  of  the  term  a  wanton  sacrifice  of  brave 
men's  lives.  In  his  youth,  his  infatuation, 
and  the  compunction  with  which  he  re- 
membered and  confessed  this  criminal  folly, 
indulgent  readers  may  find  some  excuse  for 
it.  The  incident  is  worthy  of  being  re- 
corded, because  the  faults  of  such  a  man  are 
sacred  to  history,  and  because  the  intimacy 
out  of  which  it  sprung  was  the  means  pro- 
bably of  saving  his  Hfe.  (i4) 

Robespierre  the  younger,  who  with  his 
colleague  Ricord,  had  joined  the  army  of 
Italy  after  the  siege  of  Toulon,  became  a  great 
admirer  of  Bonaparte's  talents  j  and  a  steady 
advocate  for  the  plans  he  recommended. 
The  character  of  this  deputy  it  appears,  was 
very  different   from  that  of  his  infamous 


THE    EMPEBOR    NAPOLEON.  1 43 

brother — he  was  capable  of  feehng  and  in-    From  1794 

.  .  .  to  1795. 

spiring  a  virtuous  friendship.  (i5)  Being 
recalled  to  Paris  by  the  elder  Robespierre  a 
few  days  before  the  9th  Thermidor,  he 
earnestly  invited  the  general  of  artillery  to 
accompany  him,  his  instances  proceeding 
probably,  from  a  desire  to  promote  Bona- 
parte's professional  advancement.  That  the 
latter  resisted,  at  this  inactive  period  of  the 
campaign,  these  imposing  solicitations,  and 
thereby  escaped  being  sacrificed  in  the  un- 
looked  for  catastrophe  of  Robespierre  and  his 
partisans,  was  OAving  doubtless  in  no  slight 
degree,  to  the  force  of  his  attachment  for 
Madam  Thurreau. 

Years  had  revolved  ;  the  general  of 
artillery  filled  the  imperial  throne,  whilst 
the  fair  one  whose  attractions  had  pleased 
and  preserved  him,  was  become  a  poor 
and  faded  widow.  After  many  petitions 
which  failed  to  pass  the  barrier  of  indif- 
ference that  environs  power.  Madam  Thur- 
reau obtained  by  accident,  an  interview 
with  the  Emperor — ^'Why,'^  said  the  so- 
vereign kindly  ^'  have  you  not  before  made 
known  your  situation  :  many  of  our  former 
acquaintances  at  Nice,  are  now  personages 


1 44  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.^V.  ^  Qf  ii^Q  court,  and  in  constant  intercourse 
with  me. "  The  answer  of  the  widow  is  yet 
another  proof,  that  friendship  is  faithful 
only  to  prosperity.— "Alas,  sire^  since  my 
misfortunes,  they  have  ceased  to  know  me." 
He  felt  for  her  distress^  and  if  he  remember- 
ed her  former  weakness,  was  certainly  not 
the  person  to  chastise  it.  Her  wants  were 
instantly  relieved,  and  her  future  comfort 
liberally  provided  for. 

Before  the  downfal  of  Robespierre,  while 
the  army  held  its  positions  on  the  higher 
crest  of  the  Alps,  Bonaparte  had  been  di- 
rected by  secret  instructions  which  bear  the 
signature  of  Ricord,  to  visit  Genoa,  to  notice 
the  state  of  the  fortifications  of  that  city,  to 
penetrate  if  possible  the  pohtical  intentions 
of  the  republic  with  regard  to  the  belhgerent 
powers,  and  more  especially  to  observe  the 
conduct  of  Tiily,  the  French  charge  d'af- 
faires, respecting  whose  fidelity  or  fitness, 
some  doubts  were  entertained.  Soon  after 
the  9th  Thermidor,  Ricord  being  superseded, 
and  Robespierre,  the  younger,  guillotined, 
Albite,  Salicetti,  and  Laporte,  who  had  pre- 
viously been  in  attendance  on  the  army  of  the 
Alps,  succeeded  them  in  superintending  the 


THE   EMPEROB    NAPOLEON.  1 45 

army  of  Italy.     Heated  by  the  passions  of  From  179^ 
the  new  government,  and  acting  on  its  prin- 
ciples of  distrust  towards  the  agents  of  the 
defeated  party,  they  interpreted  this  mission 
to  Genoa  into  an  act  of  secret  correspondence 
with  the  enemy.     The  plan  which  Bona- 
parte had  proposed,  and  which  shortly  be- 
fore his  death  the  younger  Robespierre  had 
approved  and  transmitted  to  the  govern- 
ment for  their  adoption,  they  affected  to 
think  a  scheme    for  placing   the  army  of 
France  in  the  power  of  the  enemy.     About 
the  same  time  they  were  informed  by  an 
anonymous  letter  from  Genoa,  that  a  mil- 
lion of  francs  had  been  sent  from  that  city, 
to  corrupt  one  of  the  French  generals.     As 
Bonaparte  was  the  most  conspicuous  among 
these,  and  was  known  to  have  planned  and 
conducted  the  successful  operations  of  the 
campaign,  they  believed,  or  pretended  to  be- 
lieve, that  he  was  a  mercenary  accomplice 
of  Robespierre  the  younger  and  Ricord,  in  a 
scheme  to  betray  the  army  into  the  power  of 
the  allies.  Early  in  August  accordingly,  these 
deputies  ordered  the  arrest  of  general  Bona- 
parte, and  the  seizure  and  examination  of  his 
papers.     Instead  of  finding  evidence  of  his 

10 


l46  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.  guilt,  lliey  found  sueli  strong  proofs  of  his 
innocence,  that  in  the  course  of  a  fortnight, 
he  was  released  without  trial. 

Junot  his  aide  de  camp  who  was  faith- 
fully attached  to  him,  had  with  other 
mihtary  friends  determined,  rather  than 
he  should  be  transferred  to  the  dreaded 
tribunals  of  Paris,  to  rescue  him  from  con- 
finement by  force  and  convey  him  beyond 
the  French  territory.  (i6)  In  effecting  this 
design  they  would  have  experienced  little 
difficulty,  inasmuch  as  general  Dumerbion 
who  knew  and  had  confessed  his  merit,  and 
the  troops,  who  here,  as  they  had  done  at 
Toulon,  looked  up  to  him  as  the  real  com- 
mander, were  indignant  at  his  arrest.  Junot 
made  known  to  him  the  project  which  had 
been  formed  in  his  favour;  but  he  mildly 
rebuked  his  friendly  zeal,  interdicted  every 
thing  like  forcible  interference,  observing 
calmly,  that  he  would  trust  for  safety  to  his 
innocence,andthatJunot'sinterferencemight 
commit  him.  (17J  It  appears  nevertheless, 
that  he  wrote  a  letter  of  very  bold  remon- 
strance which,  (Laporte  having  rejoined 
the  army  of  the  Alps,)  he  addressed  to  Albite 
and  Salicetti.     From  the  personal  acquain- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  I 47 

tance  of  the  last  two  deputies,  of  Salicetti  From  1794 
more  particularly,  with  his  services  at  Tou- 
lon, he  regarded  Laporte  as  the  real. author 
of  his  arrest.  In  the  despatch  of  Albite  and 
Salicetti  to  the  government,  mentioning  the 
release  of  general  Bonaparte  from  arrest, 
they  not  only  admit  that  there  existed  no 
foundation  for  the  charges  which  they  had 
made  against  him,  but  they  allege,  that  his 
talents  were  too  great,  and  his  services  too 
important,  to  justify  at  so  critical  a  period 
of  the  campaign,  his  longer  suspension  from 
duty.  (18}  The  officer  by  whom  he  was  re- 
leased, found  him  poring  over  a  map  of  Italy. 
During  the  succeeding  winter,  in  one  of 
his  visits  of  inspection  to  the  fortifications 
along  the  coast,  Maignier  the  representative 
of  the  people  at  Marseilles,  expressed  to  him 
an  apprehension  that  the  popular  societies 
of  that  city,  which  was  then  agitated  by 
violent  tumults,  would  attack  and  plunder 
the  magazines  of  powder  and  arms,  esta- 
blished in  the  dismantled  forts  of  St.  Nicholas 
and  St.  John.  On  the  requisition  of  this 
representative,  Bonaparte  sketched  a  plan 
for  protecting  these  magazines,  by  a  wall 
with  battlements,  on  the  side  next  the  town. 


1^8  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.jy.^  Xhis  plan  was  sent  to  Paris,  and  denounced 
by  the  successors  of  Maignier,  as  a  project 
for  reconstructing  those  fortresses,  in  order 
to  bridle  and  oppress  the  people:  for  it 
often  happened  in  this  season  of  political 
passion,  that  conduct  which  appeared  laud- 
able to  one  deputy  or  at  one  moment, 
would  be  held  culpable  the  next,  by 
another  deputy.  The  convention,  counte- 
nancing the  charge  of  their  colleagues,  di- 
rected by  a  special  decree,  the  commander  of 
the  artillery  at  Marseilles  to  repair  to  Paris  and 
justify  himself  at  their  bar.  Bonaparte  who 
was  attached  to  the  army  of  Italy,  had  re- 
turned to  his  post,  and  colonel  Sugny,  being 
actually  the  chief  officer  of  artillery  at  Mar- 
seilles, was  designated  by  the  terms  of  the 
decree.  Sugny  accordingly  repaired  to  Paris, 
and  as  the  thirst  for  innocent  blood  was 
in  some  measure  allayed  since  the  overthrow 
of  the  reign  of  terror,  satisfied  the  conven- 
tion, that  he  was  not  the  author  of  the 
project  in  question.  In  the  course  of  the 
investigation  it  was  readily  discovered  that 
the  plan  had  been  furnished  by  Bonaparte ; 
and  a  decree  was  pronounced  requiring  his 
appearance  before  the  convention,  in  place 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  1 49 

of  colonel  Sugny.  From  the  violence  of  the  From  1794 
reaction  which  the  thermidoriens,  in  the ' 
tide  of  their  ascendency,  directed  against  all 
who  were  suspected  in  the  remotest  degree, 
of  having  been  partisans  of  Robespierre, 
there  was  just  ground  to  apprehend,  that 
the  convention  would  deal  with  severe  in- 
justice toward  a  general,  who  after  being 
recently  arrested  as  an  accomplice  of  the 
tyrant's  brother,  was  again  involved  in  an 
offensive  charge.  Fully  comprehending  the 
danger  of  his  position^  Bonaparte  was  unwil- 
ling to  encounter  a  prosecution,  in  which,  it 
was  probable,  innocence  would  constitute  but 
a  feeble  defence.  He  exerted  himself  there- 
fore to  procure  a  repeal  of  the  decree,  and  the 
enemy  happening  to  make  serious  demon- 
strations at  the  time,  he  was  successful.  The 
deputies,  upon  whom  rested  great  responsi- 
biUty,  became  alarmed,  and  wrote  to  the  go- 
vernment, that  the  presence  of  general  Bona- 
parte with  the  army  was  indispensable.  By 
their  exertion,  the  accusation  which  had 
been  transmitted  to  the  convention  was 
withdrawn,  and  the  decree  revoked.  (19) 

These  were  the  principal  dangers  to  which 
he  was  exposed  from  the  fury  of  the  revolu- 


^5p  THE    3LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.  tionary  government.  (20)  In  every  situation 
through  which  he  had  passed,  it  appears, 
that  whether  the  balanpe  of  l)is  fortune  in- 
dlned  to  depression  or  turned  to  advance- 
ment^ he  was  indebted  to  the  force  of 
merit  alone,  for  safety  or  preferment.  His 
proficiency  as  a  studei^jt  antedated  his  trans- 
fer from  Brienne  to  Paris,  His  attainments 
there,  accelerated  his  promptiou  to  a  heute- 
nancy.  The  same  causes  produced  his  selec- 
tion for  the  command  of  the  artillery  at 
Toulon;  where  his  services  protected  him 
from  the  rage  of  the  terrorists  at  his  fearless 
humanity  ;  as  his  commanding  talent  at 
Saorgio,  shielded  him  from  the  blind  reaction 
of  the  thermidoriens.  And  it  may  be  ad- 
ded, that  while  the  firmness  of  his  principles 
exposed  him  to  the  umbrage  of  both  parlies, 
neither  was  able  to  fix  a  stain  qu  his  integrity. 
The  English,  under  the  guidance  of  the 
unfortunate  Paoli,  having  succeeded  in  sub- 
duing Corsica,  and  establishing  a  govern- 
ment in  that  island,  and  the  Holy  See  having 
perpetrated  a  variety  of  insults,  besides  per- 
mitting the  murder  of  Basseville,  the  French 
minister  at  Rome,  the  committee  of  public 
safety,  actuated  by  just  indignation,  pre- 


THE    EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.  l5l 

pared,  in  the  early  part  of  the  year  i  -ygS,  for    From  4T94 

to  ITQS* 

Spending  an  expedition  to  Corsica,  and  then 
for  making  an  unexpected  attack  upon  Rome. 
With  the  ships  of  Avar  Avhich  had  been  re- 
scued from  the  Enghsh  at  Toulon,  they 
composed  a  squadron  of  sixteen  sail  of  the 
line,  to  which  were  attached  a  hundred  trans- 
ports, having  on  board  ten  thousand  select 
troops.  This  fleet,  commanded  by  Admiral 
Martin,  was  lying  in  Toulon,  while  a  British 
squadron  of  equal  force  cruised  off  the  har- 
bour. The  French  government,  after  some 
fluctuation  between  the  two  objects,  finally 
determined  to  direct  their  first  effort  against 
Rome,  and  a  member  of  the  convention, 
Letourneur,  was  sent  down  to  Toulon  in- 
vested with  extraordinary  powers,  and  Avith 
authority  to  equip  the  expedition,  and  con- 
duct it,  without  delay,  to  the  capital  of  the 
Catholic  world.  This  deputy,  upon  his  ar- 
rival, held  a  council  of  war,  which  he  ac- 
quainted with  the  intentions  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  consulted  upon  the  best  mode  of 
executing  them.  General  Bonaparte,  whose 
reputation  for  patriotism  seemed  to  have 
been  corroborated  by  repeated  and  abor- 
tive accusation,  had  been  selected  to  com- 
mand the  artillery  of  the   armament,  and 


1 52  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.    in    this  capacity  had    arrived    at    Toulon 
and  was  summoned  to  the  council.     His 
opinion  was    adverse    to   the    expedition, 
and  to  the  wishes  of  the  deputy  Letour- 
neur.       He    argued    that    the     squadron 
would  probably  be  worsted,  and  the  trans- 
ports taken,  if  attacked  by  the  unincumbered 
English  fleet,  and  insisted  that  the  expedi- 
tion could  not  be  safely  attempted,    unless 
the  French  were  masters  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean.     He,   moreover,  affirmed,  that  it 
would  be  sacrificing  ten  thousand  troops  to 
land  them  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Rome 
without  cavalry  and  without  artillery  horses, 
to  convey  which  an  augmentation  of  the  con- 
voy, of  the  delay,  and  the  risk,  wouldbe  neces- 
sary.   His  arguments  were  the  less  palatable 
to  the  deputy,  as  they  were  perfectly  con- 
vincing to  the  other  members  of  the  council. 
In  pursuance  of  his  advice.  Admiral  Martin 
leaving  the  transports  in  the  harbour,  sailed 
on  the  I  St  of   March  with  the  deputy  on 
board,    for   the  purpose  of  engaging    the 
Enghsh  fleet,  and  gaining   the  mastery  of 
the  Mediterranean.      The  hostile  squadrons 
came  in  sight  off  Leghorn,  when  Letourneur 
thought  it  prudent  to  retreat,  and  the  Eng- 
lish admiral  to  chace. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  I 53 

Admiral  Martin,  after  capturing  a  single    From  1794 
ship,  the  Berwick,  on  going  to  sea,  and  losing 
two,  the  Ca  Ira  and  the  Censeurin  retreat- 
ing, took  shelter  under  the  lies  d'Hjeres. 
(21)     Any  doubts  which  the  deputy  might 
have  felt    respecting   the    opinions  of   the 
general  of  artillery,  seem  to  have  been  re- 
moved by  the  experimental  terrors  of  his 
voyage.     The  ill  judged  expedition  against 
Rome  was  abandoned,  and  the  ten  thousand 
troops  marched  back  to  the  camp  near  Nice. 
The  party  which  had  triumphed  in  the 
convention  on  the  9th  Thermidor  had  not  yet 
obtained  predominance  in  the  cities  of  the 
south.     In  Marseilles  and  Toulon  the  im- 
pulse of  that  movement  had  been  felt  violent- 
ly, but  the  Jacobin  leaders,  animated  and 
abetted  by  the   existing  resentment  at  the 
treasonable  proceedings  of  the  opposite  party 
in  1793,  had  been  able  still  to  maintain  a 
control  over  the  passions  of  the  populace. 
At    Toulon,    the     thermidorean    deputies, 
Mariette  and  Cambon,  were  extremely  ob- 
noxious to  Jacobin  hatred,  and  were  accused 
in  their  societies  of  being  disposed  to  lead 
back  the  revolution  to  legitimacy.     In  this 
stateof  things  a  French  privateer  had  brought 
in  a  Spanish  prize,  on  board  of  which  were 


1 54  TWE    LIFE   OF 

CHAP. jv.  twenty  French  emigrants,  consisting,  for 
the  greater  part,  of  the  family  of  Chabril- 
lant.  They  were  conveyed  to  the  jail  pf 
the  town,  and  there  confined.  In  the  cou^sje 
of  the  succeeding  tumults,  a  crowd  collected 
at  the  arsenal,  and  rushed  to  the  jail  for  thj? 
purpose  of  murdering  its  unhappy  tenants. 
The  deputies  interposed,  harangued  the  po- 
pulace, exhorted  their  leaders  to  desist  from 
violence,  and  promised  to  have  these  unfor- 
tunate emigrants  brought  to  trial  in  twenty-: 
four  hours.  But  being  themselves  already  sus- 
pected, instead  of  allaying  the  tumult,  their 
exertions  only  served  to  inflame  it.  It  was 
late  in  the  eveningj  they  were  lighting  the 
lamps,  and  a  voice  answered  the  harangue 
of  thedeputies  by  shouting, /e^  ushangupto 
the  lanterns  these  protectors  of  emigrants. 
At  this  dreaded  signal  the  outcry  became 
more  furious, and  ''deep calling  unto  deep," 
the  disturbance  more  extended  and  stormy. 
The  miUtary  guard  being  summoned,  ap- 
droached,  and  was  instantly  repulsed.  Bo- 
naparte, who  was  present,  recognized, 
among  the  leaders  of  the  mob,  several  can- 
noniers  who  had  served  under  him  at  the 
siege  of  Toulon,  and  calling  out  to  them, 
at  this  awful  moment,  mounted  a  pile  of 


THE   EMPEROR   NAPOLEON.  1 55 

timber.  The  cannoniers  caused  their  general    From  1794 

to  1795. 

to  be  respected,  and  his  voice  to  be  heard.  He 
calmed  the  infuriated  crowd  in  the  arsenal, 
and  the  deputies  were  permitted  to  with- 
draw in  safety.  In  the  streets,  however, 
the  uproar  continued  with  fearful  violence, 
and  the  prison  guard  were  upon  the  point 
of  being  overpowered  by  the  mob.  Thither 
Bonaparte  hastened,  and  there  his  inter- 
ference was  again  successful. 

The  populace  soothed  and  controlled  by 
his  address  and  manner,  retired,  and  in  the 
night  he  had  the  unhappy  emigrants  con- 
cealed in  ammunition  waggons,  conveyed 
out  of  the  town  and  safely  embarked  in 
the  road  of  Hjeres.  Thus  bold  and  ac- 
tive was  he  in  the  cause  of  humanity,  at  a 
time  when  mercy  seemed  banished  from 
France.  (22) 

About  the  end  of  March  general  Bonaparte 
rejoined  the  army  of  Italy  in  the  maritime 
Alps.  It  was  soon  afterwards  incorporated 
with  the  army  of  the  Alps,  and  the  command 
of  the  united  force  given  to  general  Keller- 
man,  This  arrangement  was  accompanied 
by  a  new  classification  of  general  officers, 
which  restored  to  active  service,  those  among 


1 56  THE    LIFE    OF 

^HAP^iV.  them,  who^  in  consequence  of  personal  im- 
becility orpolitical  disaffection,  had  estranged 
themselves  from  the  cause  of  their  country 
from  the  moment  of  the  overthrow  of  the 
monarchy,  in  the  year  1792.  Its  effect  was 
to  exclude  from  employment  a  number  of 
generals  of  artillery,  and,  in  its  application 
to  Bonaparte,  who  was  the  youngest  on  the 
list,  to  place  him  in  the  infantry.  His  com- 
mand of  the  artillery  in  Kellerman's  army 
being  thus  annulled^  he  set  out  for  the  seat 
of  government,  with  a  view  of  applying  for 
other  and  suitable  employment.  On  his 
route  he  visited  his  mother  at  Marseilles,  to 
whose  heart  his  safety  from  danger,  and  his 
rising  fame,  must  have  communicated  the 
tenderest  pleasure.  He  found  too  his  bro- 
ther Joseph  happily  married,  and  the  com- 
forts of  the  family,  which  had  been  seriously 
impaired  by  the  cruelty  of  Paoli,  in  a  great 
measure  renovated  by  his  mother's  pru- 
dence. At  Marseilles  he  met  general  Kel- 
lerman,  on  his  way  to  Nice,  and  communi- 
cated to  him  much  information  respecting 
the  theatre  of  war,  on  which  the  hero 
of  Valmy  Avas  not  destined  to  gain  lau- 
rels.    Then  adopting    his  brother  Louis, 


THE   EMPEROR   NAPOLEON,  1 57 

whose  education  he  had  particularly  super-    From  1794 

to  1795, 

intended,  as  an  extra  aide  de  camp,  he  pro- 
ceeded on  his  way  to  Paris.  At  Chatillon- 
sur- Seine  he  met  inteUigence  of  the  insurrec- 
tion of  the  ist  of  Prairial,  in  which  the  Jaco- 
bins were,  after  temporary  and  terrible  suc- 
cess, again  overcome.  The  father  of  his  aide 
de  camp,  Marmont,  resided  at  Chatillon ; 
and  to  gratify  this  officer  at  whose  instance 
he  had  taken  Chatillon  in  his  route,  as  well 
as  to  wait  the  return  of  public  order  in  the 
capital,  having  been  sufficiently  disgusted 
with  popular  tumults,  he  remained  there  se- 
veral days.  The  father  of  Marmont,  a  knight 
of  St.  Louis,  was  a  rich  proprietor  of  iron 
works  in  Burgundy.  His  son  who  felt  a 
strong  inclination  for  a  military  life,  after 
faihng  to  obtain  entrance  into  the  royal  artil- 
lery, had  been  contented  to  join  a  provin- 
cial regiment.  He  was  recommended  to  the 
friendship  and  protection  of  Bonaparte  by 
an  uncle  who  was  a  schoolfellow  of  the  latter 
atBrienne,  and  his  comrade  and  friend  in 
the  regiment  of  La  Fere.  A  royalist,  this 
uncle  forsook  his  country  to  follow  the  emi- 
grant princes,  and  bespoke  of  Bonaparte  that 
care  of  his  nephew,  which  he  himself  could  no 


1 58  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.  longer  bestow  on  him.  It  is  needles  to  say 
that  this  confidence  of  the  exile  was  not  mis- 
placed. Marmont's  father,  though  avari- 
cious, was  profuse  and  extravagant  in  enter- 
taining the  hero  of  Toulon  and  Saorgio,  and 
the  liberal  patron  of  his  son.  Though  the 
weather  was  warm,  his  hearths  blazed  with 
fires,  so  that  his  hospitality  amused  more 
than  it  comforted  his  guest.  (28  ) 

Upon  arriving  in  Paris,  Bonaparte  pre- 
sented himself  at  the  war  office.  In  the 
changes  which  had  followed  the  revolution  of 
parties  of  the  9th  of  Thermidor,  and  had  suc- 
ceeded more  recent  convulsions,  Aubry,  an  an- 
cient captain  of  artillery,  who  as  an  indifferent 
patriot,  and  a  spiritless  officer,  had  been, 
though  not  an  emigrant,  aloof  from  service 
throughout  the  war,  was  elected  to  the  con- 
vention, chosen  a  member  of  the  committee 
of  public  safety,  and  entrusted  with  the  ma- 
nagement of  military  affairs.  To  this  mi- 
nister, who  was  moreover  a  secret  enemy  of 
the  revolution,  (2  4)  the  character  and  services 
of  Bonaparte  could  not  fail  to  present  an  un- 
pleasant contrast  with  his  own.  According- 
ly when  in  applying  for  active  employment, 
Bonaparte  represented  that  he  had  com- 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEOIN.       iSq 

mandecl  the  artillery  at  the  siege  of  Toulon;  From  1794 
had  superintended  the  work  of  fortifying 
the  coast  and  harbours  of  Provence ;  had 
ever  since  commanded  the  artillery  of  the 
army  of  Italy  ;  and  added  that  it  would  be 
extremely  painful  for  him  to  leave  a  corps  in 
which  he  had  served  from  his  very  infancy, 
Aubry  coldly  observed,  that  there  were  a 
great  many  artillery  generals,  that  Bonaparte 
w^as  the  youngest  of  the  number,  and  could 
not  be  employed  out  of  turn.  As  Aubry 
had  not  been  on  duty  during  the  war,  and 
nevertheless  had  the  effrontery  to  promote 
himself  from  a  retired  captaincy  to  the  rank 
of  general  of  division,  and  inspector  of  artil- 
lery, this  observation  was  received  and  re- 
torted as  unjust  and  impertinent.  "  Officers 
soon  grow  old  on  the  field  of  battle,"  was  the 
mixture  of  irony  and  logic,  with  which  Bo- 
naparte abashed  and  irritated  the  inexpe- 
rienced veteran,  A  few  days  afterwards^ 
more  in  punishment  than  reward,  he  was 
ordered  to  join  the  army  of  the  west  engaged 
m  the  Vendean  war,  and  take  command  of  a 
brigade  of  infantry.  (25)  The  service  was 
unpleasant  to  his  feelings,  the  destination  an 
outrage  to   his   pride,  and  actuated  by  a 


l6o  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.  proper  feeling  of  dignity,  he  sent  in  his  re- 
signation. This  was  not  accepted,  nor  was 
it  at  once  refused.  In  the  meantime  Aubry's 
selfish  and  reacting  system,  by  which  a 
number  of  officers,  who  like  himself  had  been 
out  of  danger  and  service  from  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  were  put  in  the  place  of  those 
who  had  been  constantly  in  the  field,  excited 
violent  dissatisfaction  and  provoked  a  num- 
ber of  remonstrances.  Of  the  persons  thus 
displaced  not  a  few  were  officers  of  science 
and  merit,  while  many  like  those  who 
attended  general  Cartaux  at  Toulon,  were 
the  mushrooms  of  popular  clubs,  noisy, 
imbecile,  and  ignorant.  They  all  however, 
by  referring  to  Bonaparte's  case,  as  the  most 
glaring  example  of  their  common  oppression, 
furnished  the  best  evidence  of  his  undisputed 
superiority.  Unwilling  to  lose  such  an  offi- 
cer, the  committee  of  public  safety  corrected 
very  soon  the  procedure  of  Aubry,  so  far  as 
to  restore  general  Bonaparte  to  the  corps  of 
which  he  was  the  acknowledged  ornament, 
though  not  to  the  army  in  which  he  wished 
again  to  serve.  The  order  to  command  the 
brigade  of  infantry  was  revoked,  and  he  was 
nominated  to  command  the  artillery  of  the 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  l6l 

armyof  the  west;  a  destination,  which  though  From  1794 
notagreable  was  not  degrading.  But  from 
this  crisis  of  displeasure  and  embarrassment, 
he  was  extricated  by  causes  which  had  often 
reUevedhim  before;  the  pubhc  danger,  and 
his  professional  excellence. 

General  Rellerman,  whose  abilities  were 
not  so  high  as  his  reputation,  had  been  driven 
on  the  27  th  June  from  the  positions  in  which 
Bonaparte  had  placed  the  right  of  Burner- 
bion's  army;  and  had  written  to  the  com- 
mittee of  public  safety  that  if  he  was  not 
speedily  reenforced,  he  should  be  compelled 
even  to  abandon  Nice.  This  intelligence 
excited  great  alarm,  as  Rellerman's  defeat 
opened  that  vulnerable  frontier  again  to  in- 
vasion. The  committee  of  public  safety 
convoked  and  consulted  such  of  the  members 
of  the  convention,  as  had  been  on  mission  to 
the  army  of  Italy,  who  instead  of  presenting 
any  opinions  of  their  own,  with  a  unani- 
mity like  that  of  the  dissatisfied  officers,  con- 
curred in  referring  the  committee  to  general 
Bonaparte,  as  the  individual  most  capable  of 
affording  them  information  and  giving  them 
advice,  in  this  unwelcome  emergency.  He 
was    immediately    ordered   to  attend    the 

n 


1 62  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.    committee  of  wbicli  Sieyes^  Ponte-Coulanl, 
lean -de-Brie,  and  liis  former  acquaintance 
Letonrneur,  Avere  members;   after  several 
conferences  with  w^liom,  he  drew  up  instruc- 
tions for  Kellerman  which  the  committee 
adopted.     They  are  preserved    in  his  me- 
moirs, and  shew,  his  perfect  comprehension 
of  the  ground  on  which  Kellerman  had  been 
beaten,  of  the  means  by  which  that  disaster 
might  have  been  avoided;  the  position  which 
it  was  now  advisable  to  take,  and  those  to  be 
taken  in  case  of  farther  retreat,  as  well  as  the 
total  incapacity  of  the  hero  ofValmy  to  act 
uppn  the  exact  and  extended  combinations 
which  had  led  to  the  successes  of  the  previous 
campaign.  (26J     When  received  at  the  head 
quarters  of  Kellerman,    the   military  skill 
which  they  displayed  excited  surprise;  but 
the  officers  who  had  served  with  Bonaparte, 
soon  recognized  the  hand  of  their  author. 
Under  these  instruciioir,  on  the  'yth  of  July, 
Kellerman  took  up  the  line  of  Borghetto,  his 
right  touching  the  sea  at  an  eminence  which 
commanded  the  plain  and  port  of  Loano; 
his  left  on  a  steej)  and  insulated  rock,  upon 
which  Massena   had   erected  a  strong  for- 
tification.    This  line  the  Austrian   general 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  1 63 

attacked  several  times,  but  not  with  much    ^l^^Jr!^^ 

'  to  1795. 

vigour,  as  he  had  no  hopes  of  success.  The 
committee  of  pubUc  safety  were  so  well  sa- 
tisfied with  the  first  fruits  of  Bonaparte's  la- 
bours in  the  war  office,  that  they  revoked 
the  order  appointing  him  to  command  the 
artillery  of  the  army  of  the  west,  (27)  and 
by  a  special  decree,  attached  him  until  fur- 
ther orders  to  the  department  of  war,  with 
his  rank  of  general  of  artillery,  and  charged 
him  with  the  special  duty  of  directing  the 
active  operations  of  the  forces.  This  station 
which  he  held  until  October,  was  important 
and  pleasing,  as  it  ascertained  his  proper 
rank,  gave  scope  to  the  exercise  of  his  talents, 
and  enabled  him  though  he  could  not  com- 
mand the  army  of  Italy  in  person,  to  guide 
its  movements  and  light  its  way  to  success. 
In  November,  general  Scherer,  who  super- 
seded Rellerman,  attacked  and  worsted  the 
Austrians,  cut  off  their  communication  with 
the  British  fleet,  reestablished  his  own  with 
Genoa,  and  retrieved  that  command  of  the 
coast  and  of  the  Alps,  which  the  skill  and 
enterprise  of  Bonaparte  had  gained,  and  the 
incompetence  of  Kellerman  had  lost. 

It  has  been  asserted,  and  with  some  pro- 


l64  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP. IV.    bability,  that  in  the  interval  of  eight  days, 
which  elapsed  between  his  conference  with 
Aubry  and  his  restoration  to  suitable  employ- 
ment,  Bonaparte  conceived  for  a  moment  the 
design  of  obtaining  authority  from  the  go- 
vernment to  offer  his  services  as  general  of 
artillery,  to  the  Grand  Seignior,  who  was  at 
that  time  disposed  to  enter  into  the  Euro- 
ropean  war  as  an  ally  of  France  (28).    It  was 
natural  that  his  imagination,  all  passionate 
for  glory,  when  forbid  the  heroic  fields  of 
Italy,  should  spread  its  classical  wings,  for 
the  shores  of  the  Hellespont.     And  the  idea 
once  implanted  in  a  mind  so  rich  and  ar- 
dent, might  well  shoot  forth  into  a  luxuriance 
of  brilliant  details  and  illustrious  fortune. 
The  likehhood  that  he  did  conceive  and  en- 
tertain this  spirited  project,  is  strengthened 
by  the  fervid  activity  of  his  intellect  and  ha- 
bits. For,  as  the  youthful  reader  will  do  well 
to  observe,  from  his  entrance  at  the  school 
of  Brienne,  in   1779,  to  the  moment  which 
our  narrative  has  now  reached,  comprehend- 
ing the  entire  season  of  boyish  folly  and  ju- 
venile effervescence,  his  exertion  of  mind 
and  body  appears  to  have  been  strenuous, 
voluntary,  and  unintermitting. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  1 65 

Against  all  probability,  it  has  been  pre- 
tended, that  during  his  residence  in  Paris  on 
this  occasion,  he  languished  in  professional 
destitution  and  personal  poverty ;  a  friend- 
less object  of  casual  pity  and  uncertain  as- 
sistance. As  his  resignation  was  not  ac- 
cepted, he  was  never  deprived  of  his  com- 
mission; and  his  pay  as  a  general  ofScer, 
independently  of  other  resources,  renders  it 
certain,  that  he  could  not  have  been  exposed 
to  greater  inconveniences  of  this  sort,  than 
such  as  were  common  to  men  of  his  rank. 
To  suppose  that  in  a  season  of  general 
scarcity,  and  under  the  pressure  of  a  deprc 
ciated  currency,  he  was  exempt  from  ordi- 
nary discomforts,  would  be  to  form  an  hy- 
pothesis, at  variance  with  his  admitted  supe- 
riority to  all  mercenary  considerations.  In 
the  French  revolution,  as  in  the  American, 
few  that  were  honest  were  rich.  But  from 
Bonaparte's  prudent  habits  and  simple 
tastes,  incessant  application  to  duty,  and 
long  absence  from  the  capital,  it  may  be 
safely  inferred  that  in  this  crisis  of  na- 
tional difficulty,  he  was  subjected  personally 
to  but  slight  annoyance.  (29)  For,  although 
it  appears  that  he  sold  his  carriage  and  a  set 


From  179-4 
to1T95. 


1 66  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  IV.  of  books  soon  after  his  arrival  in  the  metro- 
polis,  il  is  certain  that,  about  the  same  time, 
he  placed  his  brother,  Louis,  at  a  provincial 
military  school,  and  at  his  own  expense  main- 
tained him  there. 

His  lime  was  chiefly  devoted  to  official 
duty  and  professional  studies  ;  his  hours  of 
recreation,  to  the  society  of  his  early  friends, 
and  the  entertainments  of  the  theatre.  Pri- 
vate circles  felt  the  energy  of  his  language; 
public  men^  the  scrutiny  of  his  look.  His 
conversation  was  remarked  as  picturesque 
and  original.  His  demeanour,  which  was 
generally  sedate,  sometimes  indicated  intense 
meditation.  For  he  looked  into  himself, 
and  lingered  to  contemplate  the  glorious  in- 
spirations of  his  genius;  as  a  beauty  gazes 
with  secret  pride,  on  the  reflection  of  those 
charms,  which  are  to  delight,  she  feels,  and 
to  subdue  mankind. 


(     ^67     } 


CHAPTER  V. 


FromOctoher  1795,  to  March  1796. 

The  convention  adopt  tlie  constitution  of  the  year  III —  From  1 795 
Its  principal  provisions — Likely  to  be  acceptaffete  to  to  1796. 
the  nation — The  additional  acts  engrafted  on  it  ex- 
cite dissatisfaction — Wisdom  of  those  acts — G6m- 
bined  opposition  of  the  royalists  and  jacobins — 
The  people  of  Paris  stirred  up  to  opposition — They 
vote  for  accepting  the  constitution  and  for  rejecting 
the  acts< — A  majority  of  the  nation  and  the  armies 
give  their  suffrages  for  both — Resistance  and  insur- 
rection of'  the  section  of  Paris — Violence  of  the 
section  Lepelletier — Measures  of  the  convention- — 
General  Menou  commander  in  chief  of  the  army  of 
the  interior — He  attempts  to  disperse  an  armed  body 
of  insurgents — Hesitates  and  fails — Danger  of  the 
crisis — Bonaparte  an  accidental  w^itness  of  Menou's 
miscarriage- — Repairs  to  the  gallery  of  the  convene 
tion. — Agitation  of  that  assembly — -His  conference 
with  the  executive  committee- — Protests  against  being 
fettered  by  commissaries  of  the  convention — Is  ap- 
pointed by  the  committee  to  command  the  troops — 
Barras  made  nominal  commander  in  chief — Bona- 
parte's prompt  and  judicious  measures — Gets  pos- 


1 68  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  V.  session  of  llie  cannon  and  occupies  llie  bridges — 

Danican,  commander  in  cliief  of  llie  insurgents, 
summons  llie  convention  lo  dismiss  llieir  troops- — 
Bonaparte  furnishes  tlie  members  with  arms — Move- 
ment of  ibe  insurgent  leader  Lafonde,  upon  Pont 
Neuf — Cartaux  abandons  lliatpost,  and  falls  back  to 
the  Louvre  —  The  insurgents  close  in  and  fire  upon 
ihe  Tuileries — Bonaparte  orders  his  troops  to  act — 
Spirit  and  success  of  his  operations — Courage  and 
repulse  of  Lafonde — The  insurgents  defeated  on  all 
points — Humanity  of  Bonaparte — The  insurrection 
quelled- — Exultation  of  the  convention — Meanness 
of  Barras — The  appointment  of  Bonaparte,  as  com- 
mander of  the  army  of  the  interior,  confirmed  by 
the  convention  —  Their  moderation  —  Trial  and 
danger  of  Menou^ — Saved  by  the  influence  of  Bona- 
parte— Bonaparte  disarms  the  national  guard,  and 
executes  other  unw^elcome  but  salutary  measures — 
Scarcity  in  Paris — Discontent  of  the  populace — • 
Anecdote — Becomposes  the  legislative  guard  for  the 
new^  government — Organises  a  legion  of  police,  and 
a  guard  for  the  directory — Becomes  acquainted  vv^ith 
Madam  Beauharnais  and  her  son — Interesting  inter- 
vievs^ — The  Italian  frontier  again  in  danger— Bona- 
parte consulted  by  the  directory — Furnishes  a  plan 
of  campaign— Appointed  commander  in  chief  of  the 
army  of  Italy — Marries  Madam  Beauharnais — State 
of  his  fortune  and  his  probable  reflections — Leaves 
Paris  and  takes  command  of  his  army.  ^ 

In  the  summer  of   1795,  while   general 
Bonaparte  was  employed  in  the  war  depart- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  169 

nient  at  Paris,  the  convenlion  discussed  and    From  1795 

1  •         •  PI  TTT  ^^  1796. 

adopted  the  constitution  of  the  year  111. 
By  this  plan  of  government,  which  was  a 
manifest  improvement  on  the  one  it  was  in- 
tended to  supersede,  the  executive  power 
of  France,  under  certain  hraitations,  was 
lodged  in  a  directory  of  five  members ;  the 
judicial  power  in  a  body  of  elective  magis- 
trates, whose  sentences,  in  criminal  cases, 
were  to  be  founded  on  the  verdicts  of  juries ; 
and  the  legislative  power,  in  two  houses^ 
the  upper,  or  council  of  ancients,  consisting 
of  two  hundred  and  fifty  members,  and  the 
lower^  consisting  of  twice  that  number  and 
called  the  council  of  five  hundred.  The 
legislative  bodies  were  to  appoint  the  mem- 
bers of  the  directory,  and  to  reappoint  one 
out  of  the  five  every  year,  and  were  them- 
selves to  be  chosen  by  electors  delegated  for 
that  purpose  by  the  people  in  their  primary 
assemblies.  One-third  of  each  council  was 
to  be  elected  annually,  so  that  the  entire 
legislature  was  to  be  triennially  renewed  by 
the  popular  will,  and  the  entire  directory 
quinquennially,  by  the  will  of  the  legisla- 
ture. There  was  not  only  a  proper  separation 
of  the  great  branches  of  power  in  the  state^ 


170  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  V.  andan  approved  subdivision  of  the  legislative 
branch,  but  an  approximation  to  unity  in 
the  executive,  and  to  independence  irl  the 
judicial  departments.  The  advantage  of  a 
single  executive  magistrate,  like  the  presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  AV^as  not  over- 
looked in  the  dehberations  of  the  cotiventibil^ 
but  a  long  line  of  paternal  princes  had  created 
such  a  natural  horror  of  monarchical  p(3Wier, 
that  a  nearer  approach  to  unity  than  five,  had 
it  been  proposed  by  the  convention,  would 
have  been  repelled  by  their  constituents,  ffj 

Although^  in  this  form  of  government, 
there  was  much  to  recommend  it  to  the 
nation,  it  was  modified  by  two  supplement- 
ary decrees  or  additional  acts,  which,  after 
animated  debate,  the  convention  thought  fit 
to  adopt,  and  which  exposed  their  work  and 
themselves  to  mischievous  misrepresentation 
and  violent  resistance. 

By  these  decrees,  the  one  engrafted  as  an 
unavoidable  sanction  (2)  on  the  other,  and 
both  made  inseparable  parts  of  the  consti- 
tution, the  delegated  choice  of  the  people 
was  to  be  so  restricted,  on  the  first  occasion, 
as  to  compose  two  thirds  of  the  new  legisla- 
ture of  members  of  the  existing  convention. 


to   1796. 


THE    EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.  I^I 

(3)  So  that,  by  this  constitution,  five  him-  From  1T95 
dred  members  of  the  assembly  which  framed 
it,  were  to  enter,  by  privilege,  into  the  com- 
position of  the  legislature  which  it  ])roposed 
to  create,  while  two  hundred  and  fifty  mem- 
bers  only  were  to  be  drawn,  by  right  of  elec- 
tion^ from  the  nation  at  large. 

Whatever  might  be  the  motives  of  pru- 
dence, or  prospects  of  advantage  by  which 
this  arrangement  was  dictated,  it  could 
scarcely  be  expected  to  escape  exceptions, 
even  from  a  constituency  united  in  political 
concord.  The  people,  it  was  true,  in  their 
primary  assemblies,  might  rejecl:  both  the 
constitution  and  the  additional  acts  incor- 
porated with  it.  But  the  necessity  of  a  bet- 
ter organized  government  than  the  rule  of 
a  popular  assembly^  in  which  all  the  authority 
of  the  state^  in  spite  of  theory  and  expe- 
rience, was  accumulated,  was  generally  felt 
and  acknowledged.  In  this  state  of  things, 
when  the  heaving  of  recent  convulsions,  and 
the  pressure  of  foreign  war,  rendered  hesita- 
tion in  domestic  councils  critically  dangerous, 
to  submit  to  the  nation  a  form  of  govern- 
ment, which,  desirable  in  itself,  was  clogged 
with  offensive  conditions,  was  a  proceeding 


l'J2  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  V.  tending  to  place  the  prejudices  of  the  people 
directly  in  the  way  of  their  judgment.  But 
a  faithful  physician  offers  to  the  lips  of  his 
patient  the  salutary  draught,  although  it  may 
disgust  his  taste  and  nauseate  his  stomach. 

This  natural  irritation  of  public  feeling  it 
was  the  business  of  the  existing  parties  to 
increase.  The  jacobins  were  smarting  un- 
der the  severity  of  the  thermidoriens^  while 
the  royalists  had  profited  by  their  indulgence. 
These  were  grown  bold,  those  desperate. 
Both  parties  saw,  in  the  tranquil  vigour  of 
public  affairs,  likely  to  follow  the  adoption 
of  the  new  constitution,  the  defeat  of  their 
hopes  and  projects.  Thus,  while  their 
opinions  differed,  their  interests  coincided 
and  their  passions  combined,  and  they  rea- 
dily cooperated  in  reprobating  the  additional 
acts,  and  opposing  the  adoption  of  the  con- 
stitution, as  well  as  in  exciting  resistance  to 
it  after  it  was  accepted  and  proclaimed.  The 
jacobins  adhering  to  their  theories,  and  the 
royalists  speculating  on  the  accidents  of 
domestic  confusion  and  foreign  aid,  insisted, 
with  equal  violence,  on  leaving  with  the 
people  the  unlimited  choice  of  their  repre- 
sentatives, and  denounced  the  supplementary 


THE    EMPEROK    NAPOLEON.  1 73 

decrees  as  acts  of  gross  usurpation,  of  self-   From  1795 

.   J       •    -1  1-      •    •  T)  to  1796. 

created  privilege,  and  incipient  tyranny.  But 
the  motives  of  these  parlies  were  as  foul  as 
their  professions  were  fair;  while  the  con- 
duct of  the  convention,  though  to  appear- 
ance selfish  and  absurd,  was  really  founded 
on  considerations  of  foresight  and  caution, 
which  prudent  and  patriotic  men  could  not 
well  disregard.  (4) 

In  1 791,  the  constituent  assembly,  acting 
upon  a  principle  of  disinterestedness,  in 
which  there  was  more  of  prudery  than  wis- 
dom, had  decreed  the  exclusion  of  its  own 
members  from  the  legislative  assembly.  By 
this  respectable  but  inconsiderate  delicacy, 
the  newrepublic  was  deprived  of  the  services 
of  her  most  enlightened  and  experienced 
statesmen,  at  a  season  when  she  most  needed 
them ;  when  howling  factions  were  to  be 
chained  down  with  one  hand,  and  rapacious 
kings  to  be  held  off  with  the  other.  To  this 
error  of  the  constituent  assembly,  many  of 
the  military  miscarriages,  financial  blunders, 
and  pohtical  crimes  which  ensued,  were 
generally  and  justly  attributed.  Without, 
therefore,  a  downright  defiance  of  expe- 
rience, and  a  violent  sacrifice  of  the  public 


1^4  THE    LIFE    OF 

p  CHAP.  V.  good  to  popular  humour  and  personal  re- 
putation, the  members  of  the  convention,  it 
is  plain,  could  not  have  repeated  a  measure, 
which,  in  the  moment  of  transition  from  one 
form  of  government  to  another,  was  not  likely 
to  be  less  mischievous  in  its  second  trial  than 
it  had  proved  to  be  in  its  first.  They  deter- 
mined to  serve  their  countrymen  faithfully 
at  the  risk  of  offending  them ;  not  only  to 
avoid  the  indiscretion  of  their  predecessors, 
but  to  profit  by  their  example  ;  and,  instead 
of  debarring  the  men  who  were  already 
in  power  from  participation  in  the  new 
government,  to  render  their  exclusion,  for  a 
limited  time,  impracticable. 

The  wisdom  of  this  determination,  had 
it  not  been  sanctioned  by  recent  experience, 
and  by  regard  to  the  newness  of  the  French 
people  in  the  duties  of  self-government,  was 
demonstrated  by  its  eifects  on  the  two  fac- 
tions, to  the  hostility  of  which  the  real 
friends  of  the  republic  were  exposed.  The 
royalist  and  jacobin  leaders  were  sorely 
disappointed  to  find  they  would  still  have 
to  contend  against  the  resolute,  experienced, 
and  incorruptible  men,  who  had  abolished 
monarchy,  overthrown  Robespierre,  could 


THE    EMPEROB    NAPOLEON.  l']5 

neither  be  bribed  nor  terrified,  and  in  the    From  1795 
midst  of  civil  discord  had  kept  more  than  half 
the  European  world  at  bay.    In  the  agitation 
of  a  general  election,  in  the  disaffection  of 
untried  men,  or  in  the  folly  of  inexperienced 
counsellors,  both  parties  hoped  for  the  de- 
struction of  liberty  ;    one   sighing  for  the 
despotism  of  clubs   and    demagogues,    the 
other  for  the  rule  of  concubines  and  kings. 
Although  the  operation  of  the  additional  acts 
was  expressly  limited,  and  with  decreasing 
force,  to  the  two  first  years  of  the  proposed 
government,  it  was  not  the  less  objectionable 
to  these  parties.    For  it  was  precisely  in  this 
early  stage  of  its  existence  that  they  hoped, 
the  royalists  with  the  help  of  foreign  gold, 
the  jacobins  by  the  effect  of  declamation  and 
turbulence,  to  introduce  into  the  two  coun- 
cils a  majority  of  members  opposed  to  the 
new  government. 

The  opposition,  thus  compounded,  was 
felt,  more  or  less,  in  various  parts  of  France, 
but  in  Paris  it  became  overwhelming;  so 
that  the  timid^  the  imitative,  and  the  idle 
of  the  capital,  followed  in  its  train  and 
swelled  its  numbers.  The  convention,  how- 
ever, maintained  a  firm   tonej   submitted 


1^6  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  V.  their  work  fairly  to  the  judgment  of  their 
countrymen,  and  waited  the  decision  with 
becoming  confidence. 

In  Paris,  the  focus  of  the  factions,  as  well 
as  the  centre  of  the  government,  the  result 
was^  of  course,  to  be  first  known,  both  to 
the  convention  and  its  leading  adversaries. 
Orations  in  the  halls,  essays  in  the  journals^ 
the  arts  of  intrigue,  and  the  force  of  inti- 
midation, were  all  employed  by  designing  or 
intemperate  malcontents,  to  embolden  and 
augment  the  opposition.  At  first,  their  ef- 
forts were  more  successful  than  they  de- 
served to  be.  Of  the  forty-eight  sections 
into  which  the  population  of  the  metropolis 
was  divided,  forty-seven  voted  for  accepting 
the  constitution,  but  rejecting  the  decrees. 
This  decision  was  pronounced  at  the  expense 
of  the  most  scandalous  injustice  and  violence. 
In  some  sections  the  friends  of  the  conven- 
tion were  turned  away  by  force  from  the 
polls,  and  in  others  they  were  deterred  by 
threats  from  approaching  them.  However, 
the  ill  got  triumph  was  short  lived.  The 
returns  from  the  departments  exhibited  a 
great  majority  for  the  constitution  and  the 
decrees ;  the  returns  from  the  armies  on  the 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  1 77 

frontiers  an  enthusiastic  unanimity.  Havin^j    From  1795 

to  1 796. 

been  formed  by  the  requisition  of  1793,  or 
by  subsequent  conscriptions,  the  armies 
were  composed  of  the  soundest  part  of 
the  population.  Their  camps^  or  their  bat- 
tle plains,  reechoed  their  acclamations  in 
favour  of  the  constitution  and  additional 
acts.  The  army  of  Jourdan,  the  victors  of 
Fleurus,  sent  to  the  convention  from  beyond 
thcRhine^  sixty  thousand  suffrages  in  favour 
of  the  new^  government. 

In  some  of  the  departments  strong  mi- 
norities voted  for  rejecting  the  decrees, 
while  here  and  there,  individuals  proposed 
a  king  instead  of  the  directory.  These  ex- 
ceptions to  the  general  and  decided  appro- 
bation of  the  country  were  fortunate  for  the 
convention,  as  they  manifested  the  perfect 
freedom  with  which  public  opinion  had  been 
expressed.  The  votes  having  been  all  re- 
ceived, the  result,  importing  that  the  consti- 
tution and  the  additional  acts  had  been 
ratified  by  the  people,  was  proclaimed  by  the 
government  on  the  23d  of  September,  and 
the  constitution  with  the  acts  was  declared 
the  fundamental  law  of  the  state.  The 
convention,    acting   with   a    prudent  des- 

12 


I  "7 8  THE    LIFE    OF 

^^HAP^^^  patch,  next  decreed  that  the  people,  in  their 
primary  assemblies,  should  nominate  their 
electors  by  the  2nd  of  October,  that  these 
should  complete  the  election  of  members  of 
the  two  councils  on  or  before  the  21st,  and 
*  that  the  legislature,  under  the  new  con- 
stitution, should  assemble  on  the  6th  of  No- 
vember. (5) 

The  factious  leaders  of  Paris  questioned 
the  accuracy  of  the  returns,  and  demanded 
of  the  government  a  formal  inspection  of 
the  registers.  These  were  submitted  to 
them,  and,  tp  their  chagrin^,  were  found 
faithful  and  exact.  In  this  situation  of  af- 
fairs, their  only  expedient  was  seditious  vio- 
lence, and  their  final  resource  a  general  in- 
surrection of  the  capital^  in  hopes  of  destroy- 
ing the  actual  government  before  the  pro- 
posed one  could  get  into  operation. 

The  section  Lepelletier  was  particularly 
active  and  violent.  At  their  instance  a  num- 
ber of  the  electors  appointed  by  the  people 
of  Paris,  in  conformity  with  the  new  consti- 
tution, instead  of  waiting  until  the  time  pre- 
scribed by  the  decree  of  the  convention  for 
exercising  iheir  functions,  met  at  the  theatre 
of  the  Odeon  on  the  2nd  of  October,  under 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  1 79 

the  ])rotection   of  several  battalions  of  the    From  1795 

»•  1  1         rri  1-  1  to  1796. 

national  guard.  ine  police  attempted  to 
disperse  them,  but  were  themselves  easily 
and  shamefully  driven  away.  An  armed 
force,  under  general  Menou,  was  then  em- 
ployed, but  it  did  not  arrive  until  after  night, 
when  the  crowd  had  separated,  and  the 
assembly  retired. 

In  the  course  of  the  night  and  the  next 
morning,  the  government  delivered  arms  to 
the  few  well-affected  citizens  of  all  parties 
who  volunteered  their  services,  and  placing 
them  under  the  command  of  general  Ber- 
ruyer,  attached  them  to  general  Menou's 
regular  force,  During  the  same  time,  the 
section  Lepelletier,in  conjunctionwith  seven 
others,  declared  itself  to  be  in  a  state  of  re- 
bellion, and  took  instant  measures  for  rous- 
ing the  whole  city  to  arms.  Its  leaders  des- 
patched emissaries,  and  sounded  the  tocsin 
throughout  Paris ;  and  the  people,  inflamed 
and  deluded,  seized  their  arms^  and  has- 
tened to  the  places  of  rendezvous. 

The  convention,  upon  this,  decreed  their 
session  to  be  permanent,  and  charged  their 
appropriate  committees  with  the  main- 
tenance   of  public  order.     The    executive 


l80  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  V.     committee,    composed  of  the    committees 
of  public  safety  and  general  security,  then 
proceeded  to   direct  that  the  section  Le- 
pelletier  should  be  instantly  disarmed  by 
military  force.     About  eight  o'clock  in  the 
evening  of   the    3d,  general  Menou,  who 
commanded  the  army  of  the  interior,  accom- 
panied by  the  three  representatives  of  the  peo- 
ple who  were  in  attendance  as  commissaries 
of  the  convention,  proceeded,  at  the  head  of 
a  strong  force,  with  a  detachment  of  cavalry 
and  two  pieces  of  cannon,  to  carry  this  order 
into  execution.     The  force  of  the  section 
was  drawn  up  in  the  court  of  the  convent 
cles  Filles  St.  Thomas j  at  the  head  of  the 
street  Vivienne,  where  the  Exchange  is  now 
situated.     Their  parties  occupied  the  win- 
dows of  the  street,  and  the  interior  of  the 
convent.     Menou  entering  this  street  from 
that  of  St.  Honore,  marched  towards  them, 
and  got  his  troops  wedged  into  this  long  and 
narrow  space,  where  neither  his  horse  nor 
his  infantry  could  act  to  advantage.    Afraid 
to  advance^  and  ashamed  to  retire,  the  ge- 
neral and  the  deputies  resorted  to  words. 
They  summoned  the  insurgents  to  obey  the 
order  of  the  government,  to  deliver  up  their 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  l8l 

arms,  and  retire  to  their  homes.     But  they    FromlT95 

to  1796. 

gained  as  Httle  by  parley  as  by  force;  for '^^ 
Delalot,  the  leader  of  the  rebels,  not  only 
refused  obedience  to  the  summons,  but  de- 
livered an  inflammatory  harangue  to  the 
troops,  in  which  he  boldly  declared,  that 
force  alone  should  deprive  the  citizens  of 
Paris  of  their  arms.  Instead  of  ordering  a 
charge,  Menou  and  his  council  of  deputies, 
w^ere  glad  to  enter  into  a  compromise,  by 
which  the  insurgents  agreed  to  disperse 
themselves,  if  Menou  would  first  withdraw 
his  troops.  This  capitulation  enabled  the 
regular  troops  to  retreat,  and  the  insurgents 
to  maintain  their  ground,  continue  their  vio- 
lence, defy  the  government,  and  proclaim 
their  triumph. 

Fortunately  for  the  convention,  the  taste 
of  Bonaparte  for  dramatic  entertainments 
had  led  him  that  evening  to  the  theatre 
Feydeau,  which  is  close  by  the  head  of  the 
street  Vivienne.  Informed  of  the  threaten  ed 
conflict,  he  left  the  theatre  for  the  purpose 
of  observing  this  more  important  scene.  He 
witnessed  the  unfortunate  check  of  the  go- 
vernment force,  and,  by  a  natural  movement 
of  concern  and  curiosity,   hastened  to  the 


1 82  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  t.     gallery  of  llic  convention  to  see  Avhat  would 
be  done  to  repair  it.     He  found  that  assem- 
bly in    the  greatest  agitation;  the  commis- 
saries, who   had   accompanied   Menou,    in 
order  to  shift   the  blame   from  their  own 
shoulders,  were  accusing  the  absent  general 
of  treason.     On  their  representation,  Me- 
nou's  arrest  was  decreed;   and,  of   conse- 
quence, a  successor  was  to  be  appointed. 
The  danger  was  great;  and  the  intelligence 
of  every  moment  proved  that  it  was  increas- 
ing.    Various  members  proposed  different 
commanders,  some  Barras,  some  Bonaparte; 
the  leading  thermidoriens  the  former,   be- 
cause of  his  activity  in  the  defeat  of  Robes- 
pierre ;   the  commissaries    of    the  army  of 
Italy,  and  the  members  of  the  committee 
who  were  in  daily  intercourse  with  him,  the 
latter^  because  of  his  military  talents,   and 
energetic,  but  moderate  character.  (6)    At- 
tending in  the  gallery,  he  heard  these  sug- 
gestions, deliberated  whether  he  should  ac- 
cept  a  service,  which,  from  Menou's  fate, 
was  not  in viting,might  prove  more  distasteful 
than  the  war  of  Vendee  or  the  mobs  of  Tou- 
lon, might  bathe  him   deep  in  civil  blood, 
and  blight  for  ever  his  hopes  of  serving  his 


V 

THE    EIMPEROTl    NAPOLEON.  1 83 

country.      But,    reflecting,  that  if  the  in-    Froni  iT95 

IT-  .  1  to  1796. 

snrgents  succeeded  in  overturning  the  go- 
vernment, the  proposed  im[)rovenient  in  the 
constitution  of  the  cjuntry  would  fail  to  be 
effected,  and  the  royahst,  or  foi'eign  party, 
woidd  gain  the  ascendancy,  and  surrender 
France  to  the  coalition,  he  resolved,  if  he 
could,  to  defend  the  convention.  (7) 

Having  come  to  this  decision  Bonaparte 
repaired  to  the  executive  committee^  told 
them  he  had  been  a  w^itness  of  the  affair  in 
the  street  Vivienne,  and  that  the  deprtrties 
w^ere  more  to  blame  than  Menou  was  ;  assur- 
ing them  it  Avould  be  impossible  for  him, 
should  he  be  appointed  to  command  the 
troops,  to  execute  their  orders  on  this 
critical  occasion,  with  his  hands  tied  by  a 
coinmission  of  deputies.  The  members  of 
the  committee,  struck  by  his  confidence, 
were  convinced  by  his  representation  ;  but  it 
was  not  in  their  power,  without  exciting  a 
debate,  for  the  issue  of  which  there  was  not 
lime,  to  procure  a  decree  of  the  convention 
innovating  their  long  established  custom  so 
completely,  as  to  send  forth  a  general  in 
chief  unattended  by  a  deputation  of  their 
own  body.  In  this  exigency  they  devised 
an  expedient,  which,  while  it  conformed  to 


1 84  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP,  V.  their  rule,  obviated  its  inconvenience.  They 
resolved  to  nominate  their  colleague  Barras 
as  general  in  chief  of  the  army  of  the  interior, 
and  to  appoint  Bonaparte  second  in  com- 
mand; so  that  while  Barras  was  to  have  the 
attendance  of  the  deputies,  Bonaparte  was  to 
take  the  direction  of  the  troops. 

This  being  agreed  upon,  Merhn  de  Douai, 
an  active  member  of  the  committee,  at  half- 
past  four  in  the  morning,  reported  the 
project  of  a  decree  appointing  Barras,  pro- 
visionally, commander  in  chief  of  the  army 
of  the  interior,  and  the  deputies  Delmas, 
Goupilleau  de  Fontenay  and  Laporte  com- 
missaries to  aitend  him.  Bonaparte  who  was 
immediately  appointed  by  the  committee 
second  in  command^  had  in  consequence  of 
this  arrangement  previously  entered  on  his 
duties.  It  will  be  readily  conceived  as  he 
had  controlled  the  warlike  veteran  Dugom- 
mier,  when  he  was  only  lieutenant  colonel, 
and  had,  as  fifth  in  command,  actually 
conducted  an  important  campaign,  that 
Barras  though  nominally  his  superior  offi- 
cer, was  really  nothing  more  than  his  aide 
de  camp.  (8)  His  actual  independence 
in  command,  on  this  occasion,  becomes 
still   more  evident,  when  we  reflect,   that 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  1 85 

having  lust  refused  lo  subiect  himself  to  the    From  1795 

^/,  .  •'  to  1T96. 

supervision  of  the  deputies,  he  would  natu- 
rally have  rejected  the  authority  of  Barras 
as  an  additional  incumbrance. 

Having  undertaken  this  service  with  de- 
hberation,  he  proceeded  to  perform  it  with- 
out delay.  From  Menou^  who  was  detained 
in  an  adjoining  apartment  of  the  Tuileries, 
he  procured  information  respecting  the  force 
upon  which  he  was  to  rely.  This  consisted 
of  five  thousand  troops.  The  artillery,  com- 
posed of  forty  pieces,  was  at  the  camp  of 
Sablons  guarded  only  by  twenty-five  men. 
With  promptness,  quickened  probably  by 
his  familiarity  with  this  instrument  of  war, 
he  despatched  Murat,  then  a  lieutenant  col- 
nel  of  cavalry,  with  three  hundred  horse, 
to  secure  these  guns  and  convey  them  in- 
stantly to  Paris.  The  insurgents^  not 
inattentive  to  this  object,  had  sent  a  bat- 
talion of  national  guards  to  seize  the  ar- 
tillery. But  the  distance  being  considerable, 
Murat  arrived  first,  and  the  insurgent  party 
not  daring  to  face  his  horse,  by  five  o'clock 
in  the  morning  this  active  officer  had  the 
cannon  safe  at  the  Tuileries. 

The   insurrection   was  now    too    deeply 
rooted  and  too  widely  spread,  to  be  sup- 


1 86  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  V.  ^  press^ed  by  effecting  the  measure  which  Me- 
noil  had  attempted.  The  section  Lepelletier 
was  in  concert  with  nearly  all  the  other 
sections,  and  the  insurgents  were  capable  of 
collecting  a  force  of  forty  thousand  national 
guards.  A  plan  of  operations  was  to  be 
adopted  suited  to  this  new  state  of  things ; 
and  this  Bonaparte  determined  to  make  a 
defensive  one,  of  which  the  safety  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  convention,  the  paUadium 
of  his  party,  was  to  be  the  main  object.  His 
measures  accordingly  were  taken  to  repel 
any  attacks  that  might  be  made  on  the  Tuile- 
ries,  to  collect  a  supply  of  provisions  and  ani- 
munition  ;  to  protect  and  encourage  as  far 
as  possible  the  Avell-affected  part  of  the  po- 
pulation, and  to  keep  open  a  line  of  retreat 
to  the  country,  should  that  be  necessary,  in 
order  to  obtain  support  from  the  depart- 
ments and  the  armies.  For  this  purpose,  he 
seized  the  bridges  over  the  Seine  and  de- 
fended them  with  cannon;  and  occupied  in 
a  similar  way  the  issues  leading  to  theTuile- 
ries  and  the  river  from  the  street  St.  Ho- 
nore,  which  is  long  and  parallel  to  the  Seine. 
Thus  on  one  side  he  Avas  defended  by  a  long 
range  of  houses,  on  the  other  by  the  river. 
The  place  J  eridome^Sind  ihe  place  de  la 


TUE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  1 87 

Concorde,  he  also  occupied  with  infantry    ^^^^JZ^^ 

'  i  "^        to  1796. 

and  artillery,  placing  his  reserves  to  which 
all  his  cavalry  was  attached,  in  the  place  du 
Carrousel  and  the  garden  of  the  Tuileries. 
He  sent  a  detachment  to  hold  the  heights  of 
Meudon,  as  a  point  to  retreat  npon,  and 
another  to  guard  the  road  from  St.  Ger- 
main, so  as  to  intercept  any  cannon  that 
might  be  sent  from  that  place  to  the  insur- 
gents. He  ordered  all  the  ammunition  and 
provisions  that  could  be  collected,  to  be 
brought  to  the  Tuileries,  and  sent  a  snpply  of 
small  arms  to  the  section  Quinze  Vingts, 
the  only  one  which  had  voted  for  accepting 
the  decrees. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  examine  a  map  of 
Paris,  in  order  to  be  satisfied  of  the  advan- 
tage of  occupying  these  positions.  As  long 
as  they  w^ere  held,  the  convention^  inacces- 
sible on  all  sides,  was  safe  even  from  insult, 
and  a  line  of  retreat  through  the  Champs 
Elysees,  and  the  plain  of  Crenelle,  free  for 
the  o[)eration  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  and 
out  of  reach  of  fire  arms  from  barricades  and 
windows,  was  open  for  them  and  their 
troops,  to  the  friendly  population  of  the 
country  and  the  approaching  support  of  the 
armies.     Each  position  was  in  itself  strong; 


1 88  THE    LIFE    OF 

^2JJ^^:,Jj^  the  troops  were  concentrated  nntlcr  the  eye 
of  the  commander,  and  within  reach  of 
immediate  reenforcement  and  direction. 
Having  made  these  dispositions,  and  placed 
in  command  of  the  several  posts,  officers, 
who  from  rank  or  character  were  entitled  to 
confidence,  Bonaparte,  in  conformity  with 
the  recommendation  of  the  government, 
ordered  his  troops  to  wait  the  attack  of  the 
insurgents,  and  in  no  case  to  provoke  it. 
Thiswaspohtic,asit  cast  the  blame  of  agres- 
sion on  his  adversaries;  and  it  was  prudent, 
as  it  held  his  force  collected,  Avhich  was  too 
small  to  be  risked  in  narrow  streets,  and  ex- 
posed to  be  overpowered  or  seduced  while 
in  the  pursuit  of  separate  parties.  For  with 
the  addition  of  the  volunteers  under  general 
Berruyer,  the  gendarmes  and  police,  his 
aggregate  force  did  not  exceed  eight  thou- 
sand: and  as  the  passions  when  carried  to 
extremes  are  apt  to  run  into  their  opposites, 
the  best  m.ode  of  striking  a  panic  into  the 
multitude,  was  to  allow  at  first  a  free  indul- 
gence to  their  audacity.  (9) 

Meanwhile,  the  insurgents,  who  had  not 
been  idle,  had  assembled,  on  the  morning 
of  the  4^h  of  October,  an  armed  body  of 
twentv-seven  thousand  men.     Their  com- 


THE    EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.  1 89 

mittee,  which  renewed  its  meeting  in  the    ^^^^  ^"^^^ 
convent  at  the  head  oi  the  street  Vivienne, 
had  issued  a  decree  of  outlawry  against  the 
executive  committee,  and  established  a  tri- 
bunal for  passing  sentence  on  all  persons 
found  in  arms  against  the  sovereign  people 
of  Paris.    Several  generals  had  offered  them 
their  services,  among  whom  were  Danican 
and  Duhoux,  who  had  commanded  the  re- 
publican troops  against  the  royahsts  in  La 
Vendee.      By  a  strange   association,  count 
Maulevrier,  a  Vendean  chief,  and  an  emi- 
grant royalist  Lafond,  young,  enthusiastic, 
and  daring,  were  also  among  their  military 
leaders.     Danican,  who  had  been  a  friend  of 
Hoche,   was  not  without  talent,  and  being 
restless  and  declamatory,  took  with  the  fac- 
tious leaders,  and  was  appointed  their  com- 
mander   in    chief.      They  intercepted   the 
arms  destined  for  the  section  Quinze  Vingts, 
as  well  as  a  quantity  of  provision  which  was 
being    conveyed  to  the    Tuileries.      Their 
troops  were  well   armed,  and  being  com- 
posed of  the  national  guard,  had  been  in 
regular  training   since  the  gth  Thermidor, 
the  year  before.    In  addition  to  the  corps  of 
twenty-seven  thousand  men,  which  was  al- 
ready embodied,  they  had,  in  reserve,  about 


I  go  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  V.  half  that  number.  The  women  of  the  lower 
classes  were  all  in  their  favour,  and  were 
busy  in  efforts  to  shake  the  fidelity  of  the 
troops  of  the  convention.  So  that,  if  Bona- 
parte had  adopted  the  most  skilful  plan  of 
defence,  the  means  of  attack  in  possession  of 
the  insurgents,  whether  consisting  of  force 
or  seduction,  were  truly  formidable.  (lo) 

The  executive  committee,  as  the  danger 
thickened  around  them,  debated  various  pro- 
positions, but  came  to  no  effective  resolution. 
Some  members  proposed  that  they  should  dis- 
miss their  forces,  and  receive  the  insurgents 
as  the  Roman  senators  did  the  Gauls,  Some 
advised  that  they  should  retreat  at  once  to 
thecamp  of  Caesar  on  the  heights  of  St.  Cloud, 
and  wait  for  reenforcements  from  the  army 
of  the  west.  Others  recommended  the  ap- 
pointment of  commissioners  to  make  propo- 
sitions of  accommodation  to  the  different 
sections,  a  suggestion  which,  though  it  was 
adopted,  led  to  no  important  result. 
While  these  vain  discussi  ons  were  prolonged, 
Lafond,  at  the  head  of  a  column  of  the  insur- 
gents who  had  intimidated  Menou,  marched 
about  half-past  two  o'clock  from  the  section 
Lepelletier  to  the  bridge  called  Pont  Neuf. 
4t  the  same  time,  another  column  from  the 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.      IQI 

place  Je/'Or/eo// approached  in  theopposite      ^^  ^,79^ 
direction,  and  formed  in  the  place   Dau- 
phine^  at  the  south  end  of  the  bridge.     Ge- 
neral   Cartaux,    Bonaparte's    former   com- 
mander at  Toulon,  had  been   stationed  at 
thisbridge  with  four  hundred  men  and  four 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  with  orders  to  defend 
both  ends  of  it.     But  unwilhng  to  come  to 
blows,  he  retired  down  the  quai  to  the  rail- 
ing of  the  Louvre^    and  allowed  Lafond, 
without  obstruction,  to  join  in  triumph  his 
friends,  in  the  place  Dauphine.     The  in- 
surgents, at  the  same  time,  took  possession 
of  the  jardin  des  Infants^  and  occupied,  in 
force,  the  front  and  steps  of  the  church  of 
St.  Roch,    the    theatre  Francais,    and  the 
hotel  de  Noailles,  so  as  to  hold  possession  of 
the  Palais  Royal,  and  the  great   street   of 
St.Honore^  and  to  close  in  upon  the  posts  of 
Bonaparte  as  nearly  as  possible.     Women 
were  sent  forward,  at  all  points,  to  tempt  the 
men  from  iheir  colours,  and  even  the  po- 
pular   leaders    themselves    advanced,   with 
flourishing   and  fraternal  gestures,   in  the 
hope  of  corrupting  them. 

Thus  the  day  was  passing  away,  one  side 
threatening  to  attack^  the  other  resolved  on 
defence,  when  about  half-past  three  in  the 


192  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^ V.  ^  afternoon,  the  rebel  commanders,  apprized 
of  the  state  of  feeling  in  the  mass  of  the  na- 
tion and  the  ranks  of  the  army,  saw  the  ne- 
cessity of  precipitating  matters.   (11)     To 
cover  their  violence  with  the  respectability 
of  peaceful  forms,  and  probably  in  hopes  of 
overawing  the  convention,  they  summoned 
the  government  by  a  flag  of  truce,  to  remove 
the  troops  whose  presence  menaced  the  good 
citizens  of  Paris,  and  to  disarm  the  men  of 
terror  as  they  denominated  the  volunteers, 
who   were  arrayed  against  them.       Their 
herald  was  conducted  blindfold   to  Bona- 
parte^ by  whom  he  was  introduced  to  the 
executive  committee,  as  to  the  council  of  a 
besieged   garrison.      His    threatening    lan- 
guage agitated  them  sensibly,  but  did  not 
overcome  their  resolution.     The  shades  of 
evening  were  now  approaching,  and  parties 
of  the  insurgents  had  glided  from   house 
to  house,  so  as  to  get  into  windows  within 
gun  shot  of  the  Tuileries.   Bonaparte,  with 
a  view  of  strengthening  his  reserve,   had 
eight  hundred  muskets  and  a  supply  of  car- 
tridgeSj  conveyed  to  the  hall  of  the  conven- 
tion; a  measure  which  although  it  alarmed 
some  of  the  members,  by  shewing  them  the 


THE    EMPEROR   NAPOLEON.  IqS 

full  extent  of  the  danger,  committed  all  irre-  Fro^n  ^795 

to  1796. 

trievably  in  the  contest,  and  enabled  the  re- 
solute .in  case  of  need,  to  give  the  modern 
Gauls  a  warmer  reception,  than  their  ances- 
tors had  experienced  from  the  senate  of  Rome. 
About  half  past  four,  when  an  orderly 
dragoon  had  been  already  shot  in  the  street 
St.  Honore,  and  a  woman  wounded  on  the 
steps  of  the  Tuileries ;  and  when  the  head 
of  Lafond's  column  was  seen  approaching 
the  Tuileries  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river,  Bonaparte  determined  to  put  forth  his 
strength.  Sending  orders  to  his  posts  on 
the  Seine^  to  open  a  fire  of  artillery  on  La- 
fond,  he  hastened  to  the  street  Dauphin, 
where  one  of  his  detachments  was  menaced 
by  a  large  body  of  the  national  guard,  drawn 
up  in  front  and  on  the  steps  of  the  church  of 
St.  Roch,  and  preparing  to  force  their  way 
to  the  Tuileries.  To  run  forward  his  pieces, 
and  pour  upon  this  party  repeated  dis- 
charges of  grape  shot ;  to  drive  them  with  ge- 
neral Berruyer's  volunteers  from  the  front  and 
steps  of  the  church  into  its  body;  and  then, 
pointing  his  cannon  up  and  down  the  street, 
to  clear  that  important  avenue  of  the  enemy, 
was  the  work  of  a  few  minutes.     Leaving 

i3 


ig\  THE    EIFL    OF 

CHAP^.  ^  ^1^^^^  pQj^i"  ^TiiJ  ^q  very  guarded   pursuit,   in 
charge  of  an  approved  officer,  iie  galloped  to 
the  river.      Danican  and   Maulevrier   had 
united  themselves  by  this  time  with  Lafond, 
and  they  were  all  three,  with  about  seven 
thousand  men,   advancing  in  close  column 
and  at  the  charging  step,    along  the  quay 
upon  the  Pont  Royal^  which  emboldened 
by  Cartaux's  indecision  at  the  other  bridge, 
they  hoped   by  one   determined   effort   to 
carry.     With  the  battery  at   the    Louvre, 
that  at  the   Pont  Eoyal,   and   with    pieces 
planted  at  intermediate  points  along  the  quay 
of  the  Tuileries,  Bonaparte  directed  a  rapid 
discharge  of  grape  shot  on  the  front,  flank, 
and  rear,  of  this  dense  mass.      The  effect 
was  of  course  murderous.     The  insurgents 
shewed  no  want  of  courage,  and  though  they 
several  times  wavered  and  broke,  were  as 
often  rallied.      Lafond    proved    himself  a 
hero.   Remembering  the  weakness  of  Menou, 
and  impelled  by  his  own  fierce  valour,  he 
-:  collected  his  bravest  followers,  and  while  his 

main  body  fired  from  the  quay,  twice  threw 
himself  upon  the  bridge,  attempting  to  seize 
the  guns  and  force  the  pass  by  a  headlong 
charge.    But  Bonaparte  was  there  in  person. 


THE    EMPErvOR    NAPOLEON.  IQS 

and  twice  repelled  him  by  volleys  of  grape  From  1795 
and  musketry.  The  undaunted  zealot,  who 
had  been  a  subaltern  in  the  royal  guard, 
rushed  a  third  time  to  the  charge,  and 
desisted  not  till  the  fire  of  his  adversary  had 
by  death  or  terror,  destroyed  his  column. 
At  this  point  and  at  the  church  of  St.  Roch, 
the  loss  on  both  sides  was  considerable.  At 
six  o'clock,  the  insurgents  after  an  action  of 
an  hour  and  a  half,  were  defeated  in  all  their 
attacks,  and  their  cannon  sent  from  St.  Ger- 
main being  intercepted,  had  lost  all  hope. 
Bonaparte  in  taking  in  his  turn  the  offensive, 
with  a  sentiment  like  that  of  Caesar  at 
Pharsalia,  ordered  blank  cartridges  only  to 
be  fired,  justly  inferring,  that  when  such 
crowds,  after  the  indulgence  of  confidence 
and  a  desperate  exertion  of  courage,  were 
once  put  to  flight,  the  sound  of  a  gun  would 
keep  up  their  panic.  (12)  This  forbearance 
saved  many  lives.  During  the  night  he 
cleared  the  streets  of  barricades,  patroled  the 
rue  Royale  and  the  Boulevards,  dislodged  a 
party  from  the  church  St.  Roch,  and  sur- 
rounded with  detachments  of  infantry  and 
artillery  another  party  in  the  Palais  Royal. 
The  next  day  it  was  easily  dispersed,  as  was 


igG  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  V.  ^  a  body  who  had  collected  in  the  convent  at 
the  head  of  the  rue  Vivienne.  By  noon  on 
the  5th  of  October,  the  insurrection  was 
suppressed,  and  tranquillity  perfectly  re- 
stored. The  killed  and  wounded,  of  which 
rather  the  smaller  number  belonged  to  the 
troops  of  the  convention,  amounted  to  be- 
tween four  and  five  hundred.  Bonaparte 
had  a  horse  shot  under  him.  The  deputies 
Sieyes,  Louvet,  and  Freron,  behaved  with 
remarkable  firmness. 

This  victory,  which  caused  infinite 
satisfaction  to  the  real  friends  of  the 
republic,  who  saw  in  it  the  defeat  of 
Bourbon  hopes,  foreign  intrigues,  and 
domestic  treason  renewed  and  augmented 
the  authority  of  the  convention,  very 
seasonably  for  the  establishment  of  the 
new  constitution.  The  members  of  that 
assembly  were  sensible  of  its  value,  as  well 
in  regard  to  the  imminence  of  danger  from 
which  it  rescued  themselves,  as  to  the  series 
of  convulsions  from  which  it  saved  their 
country.  In  a  report  from  the  committee 
of  public  safety,  which  was  adopted  by  the 
convention  in  the  sitting  of  the  5th,  it  is 
described  as,  "a  victory  gained  over  a  coali- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  IQ-J 

tion  of  royalism  and  anarchy,  the  most  glo-    Fomi795 

^  to  1 796. 

rious  of  the  revolution,  and  also  the  most 
fortunate,  as  it  was  likely  to  close  that  great 
struggle. "  As  in  spite  of  Barras's  efforts  to 
appropriate  the  credit  to  himself  it  was 
known  to  be  the  work  of  Bonaparte,  this 
report  placed  him  by  the  hands  of  the  go- 
vernment itself  before  the  eyes  of  the  nation, 
as  a  great  public  benefactor^  and  in  conse- 
quence of  the  nominal  superiority  but  real 
insignificance  of  Barras,  brought  more  clearly 
into  view  his  previous  services  at  Toulon  and 
in  the  Alps.  The  invidious  meanness  of 
Barras,  it  appears,  he  disdained  to  notice. 

On  the  9th,  Barras  having  formally  de- 
clared to  the  CO  n  vention  t  hat  public  order  and 
tranquillity  had  been  reestablished,  Bona- 
parte, with  the  officers  who  had  fought  un- 
der his  orders,  were  received  at  the  bar  of 
that  assembly.  As  his  extraordinary  au- 
thority, conferred  by  the  committee  of  pub- 
lic safety,  might  be  considered  liable  to  ter- 
minate with  the  suppression  of  the  insur> 
rection,  his  appointment,  as  second  in  com- 
mand of  the  army  of  the  interior,  upon  the 
reluctant  motion  of  Barras,  was  confirmed 
bv  the  unanimous  vote  of  the  convention, 


igS  THE    LIFE    OF 

^!?^^l7'  ^  with  ilie knowledge  that  the  chief  command, 
nominally  held  by  BarraSjWas,  in  a  few  days, 
to  be  resigned,  and,  in  the  midst  of  acclama- 
tions attending  the  avowal  that  the  conven- 
tion was  indebted  to  Bonaparte  for  its  safety 
(i3).  In  conformity  with  this  arrange- 
ment, Barras  resigned  his  nominal  com- 
mand on  the  26th  of  October,  having  held 
it,  in  conjunction  with  his  incompatible 
office  of  deputy,  for  the  short  space  of  three 
weeks. 

The  government,  loathing  the  extermin- 
ating punishment  of  the  reign  of  terror,  used 
their  victory  with  the  utmost  moderation. 
The  ringleaders  of  the  insurgents  Avere,  of 
course,  capitally  condemned,  but  Lafond 
alone  was  executed.  He  avowed  and  ex- 
ulted in  his  offence,  with  such  defiance  and 
pertinacity,  that,  although  a  disposition  to 
spare  him  was  felt,  it  could  not  be  prudently 
indulged.  A  different  sentiment  prevailed 
towards  Menou,  who  had  exhibited  weak- 
ness, and  was  accused  of  treason.  The  tri- 
umph of  his  successor,  contrasted  with  his 
failure,  exposed  his  weakness^  and  aggravated 
his  disgrace.  The  government  was  disposed, 
and  the  witnesses  were  interested,  to  sacri- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  I QQ 

fice  him.     But  the  influence  which  Bona-    From  1795 

to  1796. 

parte  had  acquired,  by  repairing  the  conse- 
quences of  Menou's  indecision,  was  gener- 
ously exerted  to  save  his  life.  He  declared 
to  the  members  of  the  court,  whom  he  as- 
sembled for  the  purpose  by  an  invitation  lo 
breakfast,  that  if  Menou  deserved  death,  the 
three  representatives  who  had  directed  the 
mihtary  operations,  and  parleyed  with  the 
insurgents,  deserved  the  same  punishment. 
This  opinion,  coming  from  the  vanquisher 
of  the  insurrection  and  the  protector  of  the 
convention,  awakened  a  sentiment  favour- 
able to  Menou.  The  members  of  the  court, 
seeing  no  reason  that  in  a  parity  of  guilt, 
death  should  be  the  lot  of  the  mihtary  offi- 
cer, and  impunity  the  privilege  of  the  cisdl 
agent,  acquitted  Menou. 

As  commander  in  chief  of  the  army  of  the 
interior,  Bonaparte  had  to  keep  down  the 
slumbering  factions,  of  which,  one  having 
root  in  the  gold  of  England  and  the  intrigues 
of  emigrants^,  and  the  other  in  the  ambition 
of  demagogues  and  traitors,  neither  mercy 
nor  severity  could  effect  the  extinction.  He 
had  also,  in  the  infancy  of  the  new  govern- 
ment, to  execute  the  rigorous  measures  of 


200  THE    LIFE    OF 

^^j^Fl^^[i^  disarming  the  obnoxious  sections^  and  of 
disbanding  and  reorganising  llie  national 
guard.  The  task,  which  required  energy 
and  address,  was  increased  in  difficulty  by 
an  extreme  scarcity  of  money  and  food,  a 
grievance  which  could  not  but  excite  discon- 
tent, and  embarrass  authority.  Nevertheless, 
he  succeeded  in  executing  the  orders  of  the 
directory,  and  maintaining  the  tranquillity 
of  the  capital.  He  was  sometimes  obliged  to 
intimidate  the  clubs,  at  others  to  harangue 
the  populace.  On  one  occasion  he  was  sur- 
rounded by  a  mob,  menacing  in  their  ges- 
tures and  language,  and  clamorous  for  bread. 
A  large  fat  woman  was  particularly  violent. 
''These  dandy  officers"  (epauletiersj,  said 
she,  "  laugh  at  us  ;  so  that  they  eat  and  get 
fat,  they  care  not  if  we  starve."  "  My  dear," 
replied  the  general,  "  look  at  me,  and  say 
which  of  us  is  the  fatter  of  the  two."  He 
was  then  so  very  slender,  that  the  striking 
contrast  and  the  seasonable  jest,  excited  the 
mirth  of  the  crowd  at  the  woman's  expense, 
and  separating  peaceably,  they  made  way 
for  Bonaparte.  In  these  collisions  with  the 
inhabitants  of  Paris,  it  was  his  own  remark, 
that  the  population  of  the  faubourg  St.  An- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  201 

toine,  composed  principally  of  the  poorer  From  1795 
people,  was  the  most  susceptible  of  reason- 
able impressions  and  generous  impulses ; 
a  fact,  which  shows  that  he  possessed  that 
true  eloquence  which,  while  it  might  be  lost 
upon  artificial  classes  of  society,  such  as 
nobles  or  priests,  fell  with  irresistible  force 
on  the  common  people,  whose  feelings  flow 
fresh  from  the  fountains  of  nature,  and  whose 
interests  are  inseparably  connected  with  the 
general  good. 

Among  the  least  unpleasant  of  his  duties 
was  that  of  securing  the  members  of  the  new 
government  from  a  repetition  of  those  out- 
rages to  which  their  predecessors  had  often 
and  recently  been  exposed.  For  this  pur- 
pose he  recomposed  and  strengthened  the 
constitutional  guard  of  the  legislature,  and 
formed  one  for  the  directory.  After  organ- 
izing the  national  guard,  which  consisted  of 
a  hundred  and  four  battalions,  and  of  the 
volunteers  who  fought  so  bravely  under 
general  Berruyer  having  created  a  legion  of 
police,  he  established  a  camp  of  discipline 
and  exercise  in  the  plain  of  Crenelle.  In 
executing  these  various  duties,  he  wasbrought 
into  intimate  relation  with   the  people  of 


202  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  V.  Paris,  who,  together  with  the  miUtary  corps 
which  he  constituted,  felt  and  retained  the 
impression  of  his  plastickhand. 

It  was  while  he  commanded  the  army  of 
the  interior,  and  some  time  after  he  had  exe- 
cuted the  decree  for  disarming  the  sections, 
that  he  formed  the  acquaintance  of  the  lady 
who  became  his  first^  his  most  amiable,  and 
his  devoted  wife.  She  was  the  widow  of  ge- 
neral Beauharnais,  one  of  the  last  victims  of 
the  guillotine.  The  incident  which  led  to  this 
acquaintance  was  marked  by  the  most  inter- 
esting emotions  of  our  nature;  and  the  ac- 
count which  Bonaparte  has  left  of  it,  shows 
how  deeply  sensible  he  was  to  their  in- 
fluence. 

"  The  measure  of  disarming  the  sections 
had  been  carried  into  execution,  when  there 
presented  himself  one  morning  at  the  head 
quarters  of  the  commander  in  chief,  a  boy, 
ten  or  twelve  years  of  age,  who  intreated  to 
have  the  sword  of  his  father  restored  to  him* 
This  boy,  was  Eugene  de  Beauharnais,  after- 
wards viceroy  of  Italy.  Napoleon,  touched 
by  the  nature  of  his  application,  and  the 
graces  of  his  youth,  granted  his  request.  On 
receiving  the  sword  of  his  father,  Eugene 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  203 

burst  into  tears.     The  general,  affected  by    From  1T95 

to  1796. 

the  emotion  of  the  son,  treated  him  with  so 
much  kindness,  that  Madam  de  Beauharnais 
felt  herself  under  an  obligation  to  wait  on 
him  the  next  day  with  the  expression  of  her 
thanks.  It  is  unnecessary  to  speak  of  the 
extreme  grace,  the  soft  and  enchanting  man- 
ners of  the  empress  Josephine.  Their  ac- 
quaintance thus  commenced,  soon  became 
intimate  and  tender,  and  resulted,  without 
much  delay,  in  marriage." 

It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  circum- 
stances more  natural,  feelings  more  affect- 
ing, or  language  more  artless,  than  are  found 
in  this  domestic  memorial ;  the  personages 
a  graceful  boy,  a  lovely  woman,  and  a  youth- 
ful hero ;  the  sentiments,  of  which  it  may  be 
said  with  truth, 

"  He  best  can  paint  them  who  shall  feel  them  most ;" 

filial  piety,  manly  benevolence,  maternal  gra- 
titude, and  generous  sensibihty.  The  altar 
of  love  never  burned  with  a  purer  flame  ; 
nor  does  ancient  poetry  furnish  anything  of 
higher  interest  than  this  scene  of  actual  life, 
which^  it  is  surprising,  the  pencil  of  modern 


204  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^.  art  has  not  yet  consigned  to  the  canvass.  (i4) 
In  producing  it,  fortune  seems  to  have  de- 
cided that  the  history  of  Bonaparte's  love 
should  be  as  simple  and  as  grand  as  the  pro- 
gress of  his  glory.  As  this  was  the  exclusive 
effect  of  his  services  and  merit,  so  that  was 
the  independent  result  of  his  taste  and  affec- 
tion; interest  and  indirection,  the  usual  in- 
struments of  successful  ambition,  havingbeen 
utter  strangers  to  his  public  advancement 
and  his  marriage-tie.  (i5) 

The  winter  passed  away^  the  capital 
was  quiet,  the  government  through  all  its 
departments,  in  unobstructed  operation, 
and  the  season  for  miUtary  operations  ap- 
proached. The  plans  of  the  directory  were 
enterprising,  and  their  project  on  the  side 
of  Italy  particularly  bold.  But  general 
Scherer,  instead  of  profiting,  as  it  was  sup- 
posed he  might  have  done,  by  the  victory 
of  Loano,  had  remained  inactive,  and  de- 
manding urgently  supplies  and  reenforce- 
ments,  expressed  apprehensions  of  retreating 
behind  the  Var  before  the  formidable  pre- 
parations of  the  alHes.  The  directory  dis- 
pleased and  disconcerted,  did  what  they  had 
done  when  they  were  members  of  the  con- 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.       205 

ventioD,  and  when  Kellerman  instead  of  From  1795 
Scherer  was  the  inefficient  general  :  they 
consulted  Bonaparte,  whose  claims  to  their 
attention ,  continued  personal  acquaint- 
ance, and  recent  events  had  strengthened. 
In  January  1 796,  he  furnished  in  writing  the 
plan  of  an  offensive  campaign  on  that  fron- 
tier, which,  added  to  their  own  conviction, 
and  the  well  known  confidence  of  the  army 
of  Italy,  in  regard  to  his  talents,  determined 
the  directory  to  trust  for  safety  and  conquest 
on  that  oft-contested  frontier  to  general 
Bonaparte.  In  the  beginning  of  March 
he  was  appointed  commander  in  chief  of 
the  army  of  Italy;  and  on  the  9th  of  that 
month  was  married  to  Madam  Beauhar- 
nais. 

This  it  may  be  supposed  was  one  of  the 
happiest  periods  of  his  life.  The  woman  of 
his  choice  was  the  wife  of  his  bosom,  and 
the  field  of  glory  in  which  he  longed  to 
shine,  was  now  expanded  to  his  enterprise. 
Around  him  were  the  pleasures  of  love; 
before  him  the  prospects  of  honour;  and 
within  him  the  impatience  of  a  martial  spirit 
fretted  with  the  reluctance  of  an  enraptured 
heart.     In  the  pauses  of  hope  and  joy,  if  he 


206  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^v.  ^  looked  back  on  the  growth  of  his  fortune, 
from  its  infancy  when  he  was  the  orphan 
scholar  of  Brienne,  to  the  vigorous  promise 
of  its  present  state,  his  reflections  must  have 
been  fraught  with  pure  and  soHd  satisfaction. 
In  a  season  of  faction,  strife,  selfishness,  sus- 
picion, and  cruelty,  he  had  passed  from 
subordination  to  eminence,  without  swerv- 
ing for  a  moment  from  the  path  of  indepen- 
dence, openness,  and  honour  :  had  con- 
descended to  no  solicitation,  stooped  to  no 
compliance,  mixed  with  no  intrigue,  con- 
tracted no  obligation,  participated  in  no 
injustice.  Persecuted  by  the  deputies,  he 
had  not  sunk  into  submission  ;  flattered  by 
the  army,  he  had  not  been  inflated  with  self 
love  :  so  that  he  escaped  the  guillotine  with- 
out propitiating  the  government,  and  more 
difEcult  still,  excelled  his  own  commanders, 
without  disobliging  them.  His  opportu- 
nities, which  were  common  to  officers  of  his 
rank,  had  in  every  instance  been  surpassed 
by  his  exploits,  while  his  advancement  always 
lagged  behind  his  services.  Conscious  of 
being  indebted  to  no  man,  he  felt  that  to  him 
generals  owed  their  fame,  armies  their  suc- 
cess, individuals  their  lives,  and  the  govern- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  lO'J 

meut  its  existence.  Such  may  well  have  From  1795 
been  his  reflections  at  this  dawning  season 
of  his  fame;  for  nothing  is  more  remarkable 
in  his  history,  than  the  direct,  unassisted, 
and  undesigning  steps,  by  which  his  eleva- 
tion was  accomplished.  (i6)  Filled  with 
such  thoughts  as  these,  and  "  snuffing  the 
battle  from  afar,^  upon  the  difficulty  of 
succeeding  wherfe  older  generals  had  failed 
being  suggested  to  him,  he  said,  ''in  one 
campaign  I  shall  be  old  or  dead ;"  meaning 
that  he  would  have  gained  immortality  or 
lost  his  life. 

A  few  fleeting  days  were  given  to  Josephine; 
when,  in  an  evil  hour  for  his  country's  foes, 
he  left  Paris,  and  paying  a  brief  visit  to  his 
mother  at  Marseilles,  proceeded  by  rapid 
journeys  to  Nice,  where  he  arrived  on  the 
20th  of  March;  and  on  the  27th  of  that 
month  took  command  of  the  army  of 
Italy.  (17) 


(      208       ) 


'^M   <,  \.  \  is  >  1^ 


'  » 


k 


CHAPTER  VI. 


^From  Marchy  1796,  fo  il/«j,  1796. 


CHAPEL  ^  Italy— Thejvalley  of  the  Po—The  states  and  forces  by 
wliich  it  was  defended — The  instructions  of  the  di- 
rectory to  Bonaparte — The  folly  of  those  instruc- 
tions— Comparative  numbers  and  condition  of  the 
hostile  armies — Sufferings  of  the  French — Their 
want  of  food,  money,  horses,  and  artillery— Bona- 
parte relieves  general  Scherer — His  appointment  ac- 
ceptable to  the  troops- — Not  so  altogether  to  Mas- 
sena  and  Augereau- — The  force  and  ascendancy 
of  his  character — Anecdote — Transfers  the  head 
quarters  to  Albenga — Mutiny  of  the  29th  regiment 
—  Royalist  emissary  —  The  mutineers  punished, 
and  the  emissary  arrested  —  Efficacious  attention 
of  Bonaparte  to  the  subsistence  of  his  troops 
—His  march  to  Albenga — Disdains  to  return  the 
cannonade  of  Nelson —Address  to  his  army — Its 
character  and  effect — His  generals  and  aides  de  camp 
— The  high  spirit  of  the  army — Bonaparte's  plan  of 
invasion — His  object  frustrated  by  the  advance  of 
general  Laharpe — Stations  of  the  several  divisions 
of  his  army — Beaulieu  opens  the  campaign — His 
activity  and  plan  of  operations — He  advances  upon 


THE    EMPEHOR    NAPOLEON.  '2O9 

Voltri — Directs  Argenteau upon  Savona — Bonaparle   From  March. 

resolves  to  detain  Beaulieu  at  Voltri,  and  to  attack         '  ^,5^> 

.  to  May, 

ArgenteaU' — Combat  of  Voltri — Of  Montehgino —         1796. 

Good  conduct  of  Cervoni — Heroism  of  Rampon — 
Battle  of  Montenotte — Defeat  of  Argenteau — iVd- 
vance  of  the  Frencli — Beaulieu  and  Nelson  discon- 
certed— Battle  of  Millesimo — Gallantry  of  Joubert 
— Surrender  of  Provera< — Passage  of  the  Bormida 
and   storming   of  Dego — Defeat  of   Beaulieu   and 
further  advance  of  the  French — Surprise  of  DegO' — 
Retaken  by  the  Austrians — Countermarch  of  Bona- 
parte— Battle  of  Dego — Heroic  conduct  and  death 
of  general  Causse — Promptness  and  activity  of  Bo- 
naparte— Gallantry  of  Lanusse  and   of  Lannes — 
Sanguinary  defeat  of  the  Austrians — Recapture  of 
Dego — Bonaparte  prudent  after  his  surprise — Sends 
to   reconnoitre  Voltri — The  Austrians  and  Sardi- 
nians   completely   separated  —  Laharpe's    division 
posted  on  the  Belho— Serrurier's  division  advanced 
against  the    Sardinians — The  action  of  the  army 
reversed — March  of  the  French  upon  Ceva — Thev 
reach  the  commanding  height  of  Montezemoto^ — 
The  plains  of  Italy  in  view- — Feelings  of  the  troops 
— Emotion  and  remark  of  Bonaparte — Attack  upon 
Ceva — The  Sardinians  driven  w^ith  loss  from  their 
intrenched  camp  — Alarm  of  the  court  of  Turin — 
The  French  pass  the  Tanaro — Their  active  pursuit — 
General  Colli  retreats  behind  the  Corsaglio^Serru- 
rier  passes  that   river — Driven  back — Bonaparte's 
dispositions   for   advancing — Directs  Augereau  to 
march  down  the  right  bank  of  the  Tanaro — With 
Serrurier  and  Massena  passes  the  Corsaglio  — Battle 
of  Mondovi'— Defeat  of  the  Sardinians — Pursued 

14 


2IO  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  by  general  Stengel  with  the  French  cavalry — His 
death  and  character — Gallantry  of  Murat — Rapid 
advance  of  the  French  army  towards  Turin — Ser- 
riirier  enters  Fossano,  Massena  Cherasco,  and 
Augereau  Alba — Bonaparte  fortifies  Cherasco — His 
preparations  for  strengthening  his  army — The  king 
of  Sardinia  sues  far  peace — His  general  proposes  a 
suspension  of  arms — Answer  and  conditions  of  Bo- 
naparte— His  frankness  and  moderation  — Armistice 
of  Cherasco — Suffering  of  the  French  troops  for 
food— Their  plundering— Discontent  of  the  officers — 
General  Laharpe  tenders  his  resignation— Firmness 
and  equity  of  Bonaparte— His  measures  to  supply 
food  to  his  troops,  to  repair  his  losses,  and  to 
strengthen  his  position— He  equips  his  cavalry  and 
prepares  a  park  of  artillery— 'His  victories  celebrated 
by  the  French  legislature — His  conduct  approved 
by  the  directory — He  resolves  to  invade  the  Italian 
possessions  of  the  house  of  Austria. 


The  country  which  general  Bonaparte  was 
about  to  invade,  naUu-e  and  time  had  ren- 
dered strong  and  magnificent.  Its  moun- 
tains, rivers,  and  lakes,  constitute  barriers  of 
formidable  opposition,  and  objects  of  the 
utmost  beauty  and  grandeur.  Its  monu- 
ments of  glory  and  taste  are  equally  great  and 
equally  enduring.  In  the  bosom  of  its  love- 
liest plains  a  foreign  despot  ruled  its  people 
with  a  leaden  sceptre.     It  was  afield  tempt- 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.       211 

iii^f  to  the  ambition  of  a  youthful  warrior,  From  March, 
who  dreAV  his  lineage  from  princes   of  the      to  May, 
land;  but  whether  for  the  purposes  of  sub-  .      ^'^^' 
jection  or  deliverance,  it  was  not  to  be  en- 
tered but  by  the  boldest  efforts  of  enterprise 
and  skill,  (i  )* 

Bonaparte  has  left  a  description  of  Italy, 
which,  as  a  specimen  of  geographical  paint' 
ing^  and  statistical  fulness  and  precision,  is 
unrivalled.  This,  it  would  be  useless  to 
transcribe, and  is  dangerous  to  abridge.  That 
portion  of  Italy^  which^  as  distinguished  from 
its  peninsular  and  insular  divisions,  he  calls 
the  continental  part,  the  great  valley  of  the 
Po,  embraced  between  the  Alps  and  the 
Appenines  and  stretching  eastward  to  the 
Adriatic  Sea,  was  to  be  the  theatre  of  his 
first  campaigns.  Through  the  centre  of  this 
vast  and  fertile  plain  rolls  the  stately  current 
of  the  Po,  increased  on  each  side  by  the  tri- 
bute of  numerous  rivers.  Those  from  the 
Appenines  are  short  and  rapid,  and^  except 
when  swollen  by  the  rains  of  winter,  are 
generally  fordable.  Those  from  the  Alps 
are  longer  and  more  copious,  spread  into 
frequent  lakes,  and  fed  by  melting  snow^s, 
are  at  their  full  in  summer.     This  charming 


212  THE    LIFE    OF 


CHAP  VI.  country,  comprehending  Piedmont,  Lom- 
bardy,  the  dutchies  of  Parma  and  Modena, 
the  Roman  Legations  and  Venetian  States, 
thus  fortified  by  mountains  and  intersected 
by  streams,  contained  many  proud  cities, 
much  wealth,  and  a  dense  population.  Sup- 
posing it  reduced  within  the  outhnes  of  a 
regular  figure,  its  extent  might  be  adequately 
defined  by  stating  its  length  from  west  to 
east  at  three  hundred  miles,  and  its  breadth 
at  eighty.  It  was  defended  against  Bona- 
parte not  only  by  its  mountain  ramparts,  but 
by  the  forces  and  fortresses  of  the  king  of 
Sardinia,  the  well  known  and  wily  porter 
of  the  Alps ;  by  a  powerful  army  under  a 
distinguished  general  of  the  emperor  of  Aus- 
tria; by  contingents  from  Naples,  Modena, 
and  Parma;  these  active  adversaries,  sup- 
ported by  the  less  direct,  but  not  less  effec- 
tual cooperation  of  the  other  states  of  Italy, 
Tuscany  excepted,  and  by  the  fleets  and 
subsidies  of  England.  (2) 

As  the  instructions  of  the  directory  to  their 
general  bear  a  date  anterior  to  his  departure 
from  Paris,  there  is  reason  from  that  fact  to 
suppose,  they  were  prepared  after  a  full  con- 
sideration of  his  own  suggestions.  This  in- 
ference, which  is  confirmed  by  his  affirma- 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.       2l3 

tioiij  (3)  arises  from  the  character  of  the  in-  From  March, 
structions  themselves.  They  are  contained  to  May 
in  a  letter  dated  the  6th  of  March,  and^  _^^ 
consist  of  a  series  of  military  subtilties  in- 
terspersed with  inconsistent  directions  and 
counteracting  exhortations  and  restraints, 
superinduced  upon  a  bold  and  sagacious 
design.  This  design  is  divided  into  two 
stages ;  the  first  comprising  a  detailed  and 
limited  plan  of  invasion;  the  second  sketch- 
ing an  extensive  and  undefined  project  of 
conquest.  The  object  of  the  immediate  and 
elaborated  plan  was,  to  compel  the  king  of 
Sardinia  to  abandon  the  coalition  against 
France,  and  to  force  Austria  to  enter  into  a 
treaty  of  peace  with  the  republic.  The  drift 
of  the  vague  and  ulterior  project  was,  to 
uproot  the  Austrian  ascendancy,  and  to  over- 
awe the  native  governments,  in  Italy. 

In  prosecuting  the  first  design,  the  general 
was  instructed  to  give  an  alternate  direction 
to  his  blows  ;  that  is,  he  was  first  to  beat  the 
Sardinians  that  he  might  aim  an  unimpeded 
stroke  at  the  Austrians ;  he  was  next  to  beat 
the  Austrians  that  he  might  detach  the  court 
of  Turin  from  the  coalition  ;  and  was  to  de- 
tach thecourt  of  Turin  from  the  coalition  that 


2l4  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  he  might  Ibllow  up  his  assaults  upon  the  Aus- 
trians  with  such  active  and  undivided  vigour, 
as  should  force  the  emperor,  notwithstanding 
the  mercenary  and  inveterate  stimulants  of 
Kngland,  (4)  t^  postpone  his  abhorrence  of 
amity  with  a  popular  government,  to  the 
prudence  of  accepting  terms  of  peace. 

In  pursuing  this  vibratory  course  of  oper- 
ations, the  general  was  recomnaended,  with 
scrupulous  emphasis,  to  limit  his  advance  in 
the  direction  of  Turin,  in  the  first  instance, 
to  the  taking  of  Ceva  and  the  observation  of 
Coni ;  then  to  operate  exclusively  by  his  right, 
and  with  such  boldness,  as  to  drive  the  Aus- 
trians  beyond  the  Po  and  disquiet  them  by 
a  serious  demonstration  against  Milan.  This 
movement,  which  is  enjoined  with  earnest 
repetition,  had  it  been  executed,  would  have 
placed  Bonaparte  between  the  Austrian  army 
under  Beaulieu,  at  least  equal  to  his  own, 
and   that  of  Colli   reenforced  by  draughts 
from  numerous  and  powerful  garrisonSjand 
by  detachments  from  the  army  of  the  duke 
of  Aoste,  who, at  the  head  of  a  superior  force, 
was  opposed  to  the  army  of  the  Alps  under 
Rellerman.     The  perilous  tendency  of  this 
attenuated   scheme,    makes    its  conception 
wonderful,  and  its  folly  plain.  (5J 


1796. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEOxN.  2l5 

The  inaccuracv  of  data,  both  political  and  FromMarchj 

'       .  .  1796 

military,  upon  which  the  directors  pro-  to  May, 
ceeded  in  developing  their  plan,  is  not  less 
remarkable,  and  shows  how  difficult  it  is  for 
a  secretary  in  his  closet,  and  more  especially 
for  a  cabinet  of  coordinate  ministers,  to  pre- 
scribe the  movements  of  an  army  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy.  For  example,  the  directory 
argued  on  the  assumption  that  Ceva  was  a 
first  rate  fortress,  whereas  it  was  a  secondary 
one,  and  that  Tortona,  a  place  of  great 
strength,  would,  if  attacked,  offer  but  slight 
resistance.  They  assumed  that  the  court  of 
Turin  was  held  in  the  coalition^  not  by  in- 
clination and  interest,  but  by  the  force  of 
Austrian  predominance  and  English  trea- 
sure, was  disposed  to  prefer  an  alliance  with 
France,  and  would  be  likely  to  embrace  that 
connection,  provided  an  equivalent  for  the 
succours  of  England,  and  protection  against 
the  power  of  Austria,  were  furnished  by 
France.  (6J  Upon  this  conclusion  they  pro- 
jected a  negotiation  with  the  king  of  Sar- 
dinia, in  virtue  of  which,  and  in  return  for 
the  promise  of  indemnity  in  the  Milanese 
territory,  they  were  not  without  hopes  that 
he  would  unite  his  forces  with  the  French 


2l6  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  Yi.  army,  and  relinquish,  by  Ireary,  all  tide  to 
the  dutchy  of  Savoy  and  the  county  of  Nice, 
which,  in  the  previous  campaigns  had  been 
wrested  from  him  by  conquest. 

Vnit  nothing  could  be  more  fallacious  than 
this  speculation  upon  the  policy  of  the  king 
of  Sardinia,  who  was  prompted  by  feehngs 
grounded  in  family  connection,  by  the  in- 
stincts of  royalty  and  self-preservation,  to  re- 
sist the  progress  of  the  French  arms,  and  to 
cut  shorttheexistenceof  the  French  republic. 
With  singular  inconsistency,  the  general 
was  directed  to  undertake  sieges  in  the  heart 
of  Piedmont  and  Mont  Ferrat,  and  in  the 
presence  of  superior  armies,  without  ex- 
posing to  the  chances  incident  to  a  revsrse, 
his  battering  cannon  ;  was  to  encourage  the 
subjects  of  Sardinia  to  form  a  political  fra- 
ternity with  the  French,  and  yet  was  to  ex- 
act from  them  heavy  contributions  to  sup- 
port his  army;  and  was  to  separate  the  court 
of  Turin  from  the  coalition,  but  was  not  to 
consent  to  a  suspension  of  arms,  without  re- 
ceiving special  authority  from  the  directory. 
These  pragmatical  instructions,  while  they 
ostensibly  sent  forth  the  general  to  gain  vic- 
tories and  conquer  dominions,  really  with* 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.       217 

held  from  him  the  power  of  can  ving  on  the  From  March, 

"  17Q6 

war,  or  of  bringing  about  a  peace.  ( 7  )  He  ^^  ^^jay^ 
was  bound^  therefore,  to  be  guided  by  the  ^  ^'^^' 
great  principles  of  military  prudence  and 
duty,  and  to  conform  to  the  cun^ent  pressure 
of  circumstances  and  the  evident  interests 
of  his  country,  rather  than  to  the  confused 
and  impracticable  commands  of  the  direc- 
tory. He  was,  in  short,  to  navigate  the  sea 
of  danger,  upon  which,  in  defending  the 
independence  of  his  country,  he  boldly 
launched,  not  upon  the  track  laid  down  in 
his  chart,  but  upon  a  course  adapted  to  the 
object  of  the  voyage,  and  to  the  force  and 
direction  of  the  winds  and  tides. 

The  state  of  his  army  was  not  more  sa- 
tisfactory than  the  nature  of  his  instruc- 
tions. His  fighting  force  did  not  exceed 
thirtv-five  thousand  men,  while  that  of  the 
enemy,  well  fed,  supplied  and  appointed, 
with  a  full  proportion  of  cavalry  and  a  train 
of  tw^o  hundred  cannon,  amounted  to  seventy 
thousand.  (8J  Rations  of  meat,  had  for 
some  time  ceased  to  be  distributed  in  the 
French  camp,  and  even  the  supply  of  bread 
was  precarious.  On  the  cold  and  snowy 
Alps,  the  republicans  had    Avintered,    half- 


2l8  THE  LIFE    OF 

CHAP^VL  clad^  ill  shod,  and  without  tents.  Hunger 
and  frost,  which  thinned  their  ranks  by  di- 
sease and  desertion,  had  forced  the  troops 
into  habits  of  plunder  and  insubordination. 
They  lived  by  a  system  of  marauding,  which 
leading  them  often  into  the  enemy's  country^ 
was  besides  its  other  inconveniences,  not 
unattended  with  danger  and  loss.  Upon 
mountains  of  rock  and  ice,  the  horses  of  the 
army  had  sunk  down  and  perished ;  so  that 
the  cavalry  consisting  of  two  thousand  four 
hundred  men,  was  for  the  greater  part  dis- 
mounted,  and  even  many  of  the  staff  officers 
were  afoot.  The  arsenals  of  Nice  and  An- 
tibes  contained  abundant  stores  of  ordnance; 
but  five  hundred  mules  which  constituted 
the  sole  means  of  transport  remaining  to  the 
army,  admitted  the  employment  of  but  thirty 
light  pieces.  The  military  chest  was  empty, 
and  the  financial  efforts  of  the  government 
had  been  able  to  supply  the  new  general 
with  no  more  than  tAVO  thousand  crowns  in 
gold,  and  one  million  of  francs  in  bills,  half 
of  which  were  protested.  So  low  in  short 
were  his  means,  and  so  desperate  the  poverty 
of  the  army,  that  when  soon  after  his  arrival, 
he  directed  a  payment,  which  distributed 


THE  EMPEKOR  NAPOLEON.      219 

according  to  rank  gave  each  general  of  di-  From  March, 
vision  three  Louis  d'or,  (9)  it  was  received  as      to  May, 
a  gratification,  while  the  proportionate  frac-  > 
tion,  paid  on  account  to  the  privates,  pro- 
duced more  surprise  than  satisfaction,  and 
more  satisfaction  than  comfort.     This  latter 
payment  he  was  enabled  to  effect  only  by 
his  personal  influence  with  a  zealous  con- 
tractor. (10) 

His  reception  by  general  Scherer  and  his 
relief  of  that  officer  seem  to  have  been  marked 
by  every  circumstance  of  propriety  on  both 
sides.  On  the  day  after  assuming  the  com- 
mand, Bonaparte  thus  expressed  himself  in  a 
letter  to  the  directory.  ''I  am  particularly 
gratified  with  my  reception  by  general 
Scherer;  who  by  his  honourable  deportment 
and  readiness  to  supply  me  with  all  useful 
information,  has  acquired  a  right  to  my  gra- 
titude, ffis  health  appears  to  be  really  some- 
what impaired.  To  great  facility  in  ex- 
pressing himself  he  unites  an  extent  of  ge- 
neral and  military  knowledge,  which  may 
probably  induce  you  to  deem  his  services 
useful  in  some  important  station.'' 

To  most  of  the  regiments  their  new  ge- 
neral had  been  known  either  at  the  siege  of 


220  THE    LIFE    OF 

ctiAP^L  ^  Toulon,  or  in  the  campaign  of  Saorgio;  and 
even  to  the  division  which  upon  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Spanish  war,  had  been  led  by 
Augereau  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Alps,  as 
they  had  fought  under  Dugommier  in  1 794, 
his  name  was  familiar.  He  was  received 
therefore  as  commander  in  chief  with  satis- 
faction by  the  army;  although  it  appears  that 
Augereau,  and  with  better  pretensions 
Massena,  at  first  regarded  his  appointment 
as  in  some  sort  derogating  from  their  own 
rank  and  reputation.  (11)  But  this  partial 
discontent  was  of  momentary  existence,  was 
suppressed  immediately  by  the  superiority 
of  his  character,  and  speedily  removed  by 
the  events  of  the  campaign;  while  its  tem- 
porary prevalence,  by  inducing  these  ge- 
nerals to  elevate  the  standard  of  their  own 
merit,  may  have  had  the  effect  of  inciting 
them  to  extraordinary  hardihood  and 
prowess. 

His  personal  appearance  was  at  this  period 
of  his  life,  very  different  from  what  it  sub- 
sequently became.  His  face  was  so  fleshless, 
that  the  chiselled  form  and  fine  expression 
of  his  features,  were  overcast  with  a  look  sa- 
turnine and  severe.  According  to  the  fashion 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.       211 

of  the  time,  his  hair  which  shaded  his  fore-  from  March, 

1 706 

head,  was  tied  behind,  and  fell  in  what  were  to  May, 
called  dog*s  ears  down  his  temples  and 
cheeks.  His  figure  was  light  and  slender; 
and  his  rounded  limbs  terminated  in  feet 
and  hands  of  such  feminine  proportion  and 
delicacy,  that  it  was  evident  his  physical 
power  of  exertion  and  endurance,  was  sup- 
plied by  the  energy  of  his  mind.  On  the 
other  hand,  his  mental  faculties  were  in  a 
great  measure  independent  of  the  influence 
which  variations  in  the  health  or  tension  of 
robust  and  muscular  frames,  frequently  exer- 
cise upon  the  intellect. 

Having  been  accustomed  to  command  even 
when  he  was  legally  subordinate,  it  was  easy 
for  him  to  control,  when  he  became  chief  in 
authority.  The  force  of  that  ascendency 
which  even  at  this  stage  of  his  career  he 
exerted  over  those  who  approached  him, 
was  exemplified  as  he  passed  through  Tou- 
lon, in  the  person  of  Decres,  his  future  mi- 
nister of  marine.  This  naval  officer,  who 
had  known  him  at  Paris  before  his  appoint- 
ment, believed  himself  on  a  footing  of  per- 
fect famiUarity  with  the  general  of  the  army 
of  Italy.     Under  this  impression,  upon  hear- 


322  THE    LIFE    OF 


CHAP.  vr.  ing  llial  Bonaparte  was  to  pass  through  Tou- 
lon, he  proposed  to  introduce  several  of  his 
brother  officers,  with  a  view  of  obliging 
them,  and  of  showing  off  the  intimacy  which 
he  enjoyed  with  a  commander  in  chief.  At- 
tended by  his  comrades,  he  hastened  to  pre- 
sent himself,  and  was  advancing,  with  the 
utmost  cordiality,  to  salute  the  general,  when 
the  attitude,  the  look,  the  voice  of  the  latter, 
stopped  him  short.  There  was  nothing  re- 
pulsive, injurious,  nor  even  stern;  but  there 
was  a  magical  something  that  prescribed  a 
limit,  which  Decres  confessed  to  a  friend,  he 
never  afterwards  dared  to  overstep. 

Upon  relieving  general  Scherer,  Bona- 
parte's first  care  was  to  break  the  attachments 
of  custom  which  held  the  head  quarters  of 
the  army  of  Italy  inveterately  stationary  at 
jNice.  They  were  ordered  to  be  transferred 
immediately  to  Albenga,  a  town  on  the  coast, 
about  seventy  miles  in  the  direction  of  Genoa, 
for  which  town  the  troops  cantoned  around 
Nice  were  directed  to  march.  To  such  a 
degree  was  the  discipline  of  the  army  on  this 
frontier  depraved  by  long  suffering,  fruitless 
combats,  and  frequent  change  of  comman- 
ders, that  certain  companies  of  the  twenty- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  223 

ninth  refused  to  obey  the  order.  With  this  in-  From  Marhc, 
subordinate  spirit,  political  malcontents  and  toMav 
royalist  intriguers,  who,  under  the  corres*^  J^^^  ^ 
ponding  direction  of  Pichegru  and  the  prince 
Conde,  were  then  in  full  activity  on  the  fron- 
tiers,  had  managed  to  infuse  into  that  corps 
a  tendency  to  Bourbonism  so  successfully, 
that  one  of  the  companies  called  itself  t//e 
company  of  the  Dauphin^  and  two  of  the 
officers  had  ventured  to  shout  long  Iwe  the 
king!  At  the  same  time,  and  as  if  in  con- 
cert with  these  dangerous  manifestations, 
a  French  emigrant  presented  himself  at  the 
advanced  posts,  in  the  character  of  a  Sar- 
dinian officer,  with  a  flag  of  truce  and  a 
communication  from  general  Colli.  From 
the  coincidence  of  these  events,  Bonaparte^ 
naturally  and  justly  apprehended  a  corre- 
spondence between  his  mutineers  and  the 
agents  of  general  Colli.  He  determined, 
therefore,  to  be  prompt  and  stern,  if  not  ri- 
gorous, in  dealing  with  this  threatening  dis- 
order. In  spite  of  Colli's  remonstrances, 
and  the  ostensible  character  of  the  Sardinian 
emissary,  he  was  detained,  (12)  while  both 
the  disobedient  and  the  royahst  officers 
were  arrested,  the  companies  disbanded,  the 


r)24  THE    LIFJE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  men  sent  into  the  rear,  and  distributed  in 
another  regiment.  This  energetic  correction 
humbled  the  mutineers,  and  contributed  to 
estabhsh  habits  of  obedience  and  the  force 
of  discipline.  These^  it  was  the  great  object 
of  the  general  to  restore,  not  by  unjust  se- 
verity, but  by  removing  the  causes  of  dis- 
order ;  for,  as  he  wrote  to  the  directory,  the 
sufferings  of  the  men  extenuated  their  mis- 
conduct; and,  ''^without  discipline,  he  could 
not  hope  for  victory." 

Looking  closely  and  severely  into  the  er- 
rors and  abuses  of  the  commissariat,  he 
commenced  at  once  a  system  of  productive 
economy,  active  control,  and  inexorable  cor- 
rection in  the  departments  of  subsistence ; 
and,  seconded  by  the  zeal  of  one  of  the  con- 
tractors, he  succeeded,  in  less  than  a  week, 
by  employing  his  limited  means  to  the  best 
advantage,  in  furnishing  the  troops  with 
salt  and  fresh  meat  alternately  every  day. 
This  addition  to  their  diet  had  as  good  an 
effect  upon  the  health  as  upon  the  temper 
of  the  army.  (i3) 

On  the  march  from  Nice,  along  the  rugged 
and  precipitous  shore  of  the  Mediterranean, 
the  head  quarters,  with  the  rear  and  baggage 
of  the  army,  were  exposed  to  the  cannonade 


THE    EMPEROh    NAPOLEON.  22 ■} 

of  Nelson's  squadron.     Their  fire,  ihoueh  From  March. 

1796, 

incessant  and  not  harmless,  Bonaparle  re-      to  May, 
ceived  with  such  bold    contempt,    that  he 
would  not  allow  the  columns  to  halt,  either 
for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  or  returning 
it.(i4) 

Arrived  at  Albenga,  he  reviewed  his 
troops,  and,  for  the  first  time,  addressed  them 
in  those  accents,  which  whether  grave  or 
animated,  never  failed  to  awaken  transports 
of  enthusiasm  in  the  soldier's  breast.  On 
this  occasion  his  words  were  few,  and  not 
flattering.  "  Soldiers  !  you  are  naked  and 
hungry ;  the  government  owes  you  much, 
but  can  pay  you  nothing.  Your  patience 
and  valour  in  the  midst  of  these  rocks  are 
admirable,  but  they  cannot  win  for  you  mar- 
tial fame.  I  propose  to  lead  you  into  the 
most  fertile  plains  on  the  globe.  Rich  pro- 
vinces, great  cities,  will  be  in  your  power; 
there  you  will  find  honour,  glory,  and 
wealth.  Soldiers  of  Italy  !  canyon  be  want- 
ing in  courage  and  perseverance  .^ " 

There  was  boldness  of  promise  in  this 
address  ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  hard  condi- 
tions, and  plain  truth.  The  soldiers  were 
told  that  they  were  to  serve  their  country 

i5 


226  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  without  food,  clothes,  or  pay,  and  were  to 
procure  these,  as  well  as  wealth  and  glory, 
only  at  the  expense  of  hardship  and  peril. 
If  they  were  to  gain  honourable  rewards, 
they  were  to  submit  to  unexampled  priva- 
tions, and  to  accomplish  prodigious  under- 
takings. 

Had  these  pro[)6sitions  been  balanced  in 
the  measured  phrases,  and  veiled  in  the 
studied  sophisms  of  a  rhetorician^  they 
would  have  produced  discouragement  and 
irritation,  rather  than  the  impulse  of  mihtary 
ardour.  Rut^  in  Bonaparte's  direct  and  sim- 
ple expressions,  there  was  a  tact  more  ex- 
quisite than  art,  which  genius  only  eould 
inspire,  and  the  firmest  valour  could  the 
best  feel.  Accordingly,  this  short  and  stern 
address,  roused  and  elevated  the  gallantry  of 
the  army,  as  the  freshening  wind  swells  and 
directs  the  billows  of  the  sea.  Impelled  by 
its  energy  and  truth,  their  courage  rose 
above  the  sense  of  suffering  and  injustice. 
The  instinct  of  the  soldiers  more  perspica- 
cious than  the  judgment  of  statesmen^  felt 
the  glorious  spirit  of  their  leader:  they  an- 
swered his  address  with  eager  acclamations, 
and  gave  liim  at  once  their  entire  confidence. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  227 

Generous  men !  they  complained  no  more  of  From  March, 
neglect,  penury,  or  want;  and  sighed  only  to  May, 
for  battle,  victory,  and  fame.  In  the  charac- 
ter and  effect  of  this  address,  when  they  are 
attentively  considered,  may  be  discovered 
the  germs  of  those  wonders  which  the  cam- 
paign unfolded.  fi5) 

The  divisions  were  commanded  by  Mas- 
sena,  Augereau,  Serrurier,  and  Laharpe;  the 
cavalry,  by  generals  Stengel  and  Rilmaine, 
and  the  artillery  such  as  it  was,  by  general 
Dujard.  Among  the  generals  of  brigade 
some  of  whom  had  served  at  Toulon  and  in 
the  campaign  of  Saorgio,  were  Victor,  Jou- 
bert,  and  St.  Hilaire,  names  soon  to  be  famed 
in  war.  Berthier,  an  officer  of  peculiar  qua- 
lifications for  the  post,  was  adjutant  general 
of  the  army.  Murat,  Muiron,  Junot,  Mar- 
mont,  Duroc,  Le  Marrais,  and  Louis  Bona- 
parte, were  aides-de-camp  to  the  commander 
in  chief.  The  regiments  had  been  trained 
in  the  best  school  for  military  virtue,  in  pe- 
nury and  hardship,  and  had  been  steeled  to 
danger  in  battles  on  the  Pyrenees  and  the 
Alps.  The  moral  feeling  or  military  tone  of 
the  army,  was  therefore  greatly  superior  to 
its  numerical  force  or  material  condition.  (i6j 


2^8  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  The  plan  of  Bonaparte's  invasion  of  Italy 
differed  from  those  of  former  conquerors, 
who  in  ancient  or  modern  times  carried 
their  victorious  arms  beyond  the  mountain 
ramparts  of  that  beautiful  country.  He  de- 
termined to  enter  Piedmont,  not  by  either  of 
the  passes  of  the  Alps,  which,  owing  to  their 
immense  altitude  are  blocked  up  with  snow 
eight  months  in  the  year,  and  are  besides 
guarded  at  their  outlets  by  numerous  and 
strong  fortresses ;  but  through  the  pass  of 
Cadibone,  where  the  chain  of  the  Alps  declines 
to  its  lowest  point,  and  the  Appennines  rise 
from  their  least  elevation.  To  use  his  own 
descriptive  phrase,  instead  of  forcing  the 
Alps,  he  resolved  to  turn  them.  The  wes- 
tern outlet  of  this  pass,  about  thirty  miles 
south  of  Albenga,  terminated  at  the  port  of 
Savona,  a  place  suitable  for  the  depot  of  the 
army;  while  to  the  eastward,  it  issued  from 
the  mountains  between  Ceva  and  Acqui,  two 
of  the  least  formidable  ef  the  enemy's  fortified 
places,  and  at  a  point  threatening  equally  the 
Austrian  and  Sardinian  camps.  (17) 

Adopting  this  line  of  invasion,  it  was  ne- 
cessary to  assemble  the  army  on  its  right. 
This  delicate  operation,  as  the  passes  of  the 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  22g 

Alps  were  yet  obstructed  by  snow,  he  counted  From  March, 
on  effecting  without  interruption  from  Colli;  to  May, 
and  as  the  positions  of  the  Austrians  were 
more  distant,  without  interference  from 
Beaulien.  To  provide  against  the  more  pro- 
bable annoyance  of  the  former,  he  strength- 
ened the  connection  between  the  left  of 
Augereau  and  the  right  of  Serrurier,  by 
occupying  with  a  detachment  of  Rusca's 
brigade,  the  position  of  La  Sotta,  which 
commanded  one  of  the  passes  in  that  quar- 
ter, and  the  importance  of  which  his  pre- 
vious acquaintance  with  that  region  of  the 
Alps,  enabled  him  at  once  to  comprehend. 
His  hope  was  to  appear  suddenly  in  the 
plains  of  Italy,  to  attack  the  Austrians  or 
Sardinians  separately ,  and  with  the  moun- 
tains in  his  rear  to  manceuvre  against  Turin 
or  Milan  as  he  should  judge  more  feasible. 

The  left  division  under  Serrurier  was 
posted  at  Ormea  and  Garessio,  on  the  eastern 
slope  of  the  Alps,  and  the  head  waters  of  the 
Tanaro,  in  observation  of  Colli;  who  with 
the  Sardinian  army  which  constituted  the 
right  wing  of  the  allied  force,  was  encamped 
and  intrenched  around  Ceva.  The  centre 
divisions  under  Mass^na  and  Augereau,  were 


!i3o  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  Stationed  at  Loano,  Finale,  and  Savona, 
towns  on  the  sea  coast.  I^aharpe  with  the 
right  division^  was  advanced  toward  Genoa, 
having  his  vanguard  under  general  Cervoni, 
pushed  forward  as  far  as  Voltri.  (i8) 

This  disposition  of  Laharpe's  corps  had 
been  made  before  Eonaparte's  arrival,  in 
concert  with  the  proceedings  of  the  French 
agent  at  Genoa ;  who  in  order  to  intimidate 
that  feeble  slate,  and  extort  from  its  fears  a 
loan  to  the  French  treasury,  had  demanded 
a  passage  for  troops  through  the  Genoese 
territory,  and  announced  that  the  French 
were  to  penetrate  into  Lombardy  by  the  pass 
of  the  Bochetta.  This  inopportune  step, 
which,  though  founded  on  the  outrage  per- 
mitted on  the  French  flag  and  the  frigate  La 
Modeste^  gave  naturally  offence  and  alarm 
to  the  Genoese^  government,  being  instantly 
communicated  to  the  Austrian  general,  in- 
duced him  to  draw  his  troops  from  their 
winter  quarters,  and  com mence  the  campaign. 

Beaulieu  though  old,  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  inactive  or,  on  this  occasion  at 
leasts  hesitating.  (19)  Conjecturing  from 
his  information,  that  the  French  commander 
was  determined  to  take  possession  of  Genoa, 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  23 1 

and  to  convert  the  resources  of  that  neutral  From  March, 
repubhc  into  means  or  carrying  on  the  war,  to  May, 
a  design  which  he  was  aware  the  alHes  had 
previously  entertained,  he  took  his  measures 
with  promptness  and  vigour.  Dividing  his 
army  into  three  corps,  he  directed ColH  with 
the  right  to  keep  Serrurier  in  check,  while 
himself  with  the  left,  and  Argenteau  with 
the  centre  were  to  push  through  the  moun- 
tains, each  by  the  pass  in  his  front,  and  unite 
their  forces  on  the  left  of  the  French,  in  the 
basin  of  Savona.  Argenteau  was  to  march 
by  the  road  of  lower  and  upper  Monte- 
notte,  (20)  and  then  to  force  his  way  by 
Monteligino,  directly  to  Savona.  Beaulieu, 
whose  headquarters  were  at  Novi,  was  to 
take  the  route  of  the  Bochetta,  interpose 
between  the  French  army  and  Genoa,  com- 
municate with  the  British  squadron  on  that 
coast,  drive  Cervoni  back  upon  Laharpe, 
Laharpe  upon  Massena,  and  forming  a  junc- 
tion with  x\rgen tea u  in  the  basin  or  plain  of 
Savona,  was  to  fall  with  overwhelming  force 
upon  the  front  and  left  flank  of  the  French 
army. 

Bonaparte  on  the  9th  transferred  his  head 
quarters  to  Savona.     Being  apprised  that 


232  THE  LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  the  Aiistrians  were  in  motion,  and  per- 
ceiving that  instead  of  issuing  unexpectedly 
upon  the  plains  of  Piedmont,  he  should  have 
to  fight  his  way  through  the  mountains,  he 
observed  vigilantly  the  bold  and  forward 
movements  of  his  adversary.  Aware  that 
he  could  overcome  his  vast  superiority  of 
means  and  numbers,  only  by  rapid  marches, 
well  directed  attacks,  and  skilful  choice  of 
ground,  he  discovered  with  pleasure,  that 
Beaulieu  by  advancing  upon  Voltri ,  while 
Argenteau  was  only  at  Montenotte,  had  in- 
terposed the  broad  ridge  of  the  Appennines 
between  his  left  and  centre,  and  that  conse- 
quently Argenteau  was  more  within  reach  of 
attack  than  of  support;  while  three  of  his 
own  divisions  being  all  on  the  same  side  of 
the  mountains,  and  in  connected  positions, 
could  be  expeditiously  collected  for  a  single 
operation.  Combining  these  perceptions 
promptly  into  a  system  of  action,  he  resolved 
to  detain  Beaulieu  by  a  detachment  at  Voltri, 
and  to  fall  with  his  principal  force  upon  Argen- 
teau. Here  at  once  may  be  seen  the  difference 
between  a  good  general  and  a  great  com* 
mander.  Upon  the  approach  of  Beaulieu's 
Ibrmidable  columns,  a  good  general  would 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  233 

have  called  in  his  detachments,  concentrated  From  March, 

1796 

his  force  in  some  strong  position,  and  risked  to  May, 
his  life  and  reputation  in  its  defence.  Defeat-  . 
ed,  he  would  have  been  compelled  to  retire ; 
victorious,  he  would  have  been  unable  to 
advance_,  against  the  still  overwhelming 
numbers  of  the  allies.  But  a  great  com- 
mander, facing  danger  with  promptness 
and  sagacity,  disables  the  giant  as  he  lifts  his 
ponderous  arm  to  strike.  Acting  upon  this 
bold  and  skilful  determination,  Bonaparte 
sent  orders  to  Cervoni  to  maintain  himself 
obstinately  atVoltri;  while  to  encourage  his 
resistance,  as  well  as  to  protect  his  retreat, 
when  it  should  become  necessary,  he  posted 
two  battalions  in  his  rear  on  the  heights  of 
Voraggio.  In  the  gorge  of  the  pass  through 
which  Argenteau  proposed  to  descend  upon 
Savona,  and  at  a  point  where  several  routes 
entering  the  mountains  from  Piedmont, 
unite,  stands  Monteligino,  a  rocky  eminence 
which  the  French  had  slightly  fortified. 
This  post  was  confided  to  Colonel  Bampon^ 
with  the  thirty-second  regiment,  consisting 
of  about  one  thousand  men,  which,  for  its 
defence  of  Monteligino,  got  the  surname  of 
the  brasfCj  and  became  as  famous  in  the  cam- 


234  THE   LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.    paigns  of  Italy  as  the  tenth  legion  was  in  the 
army  of  Caesar.      The  occupation  and  de- 
fence of  this  position,  while  it  afforded  ad- 
ditional protection  to  the  retreat  of  Cervoni, 
was  intended  to  answer  the  more  important 
purpose  of  holding  Argenteau  back,  so  that 
Bonaparte  might  execute  his  meditated  at- 
tack on  the  centre  of  Beaulieu  s  army,  while 
it  was  completely  out  of  support  from  his  left. 
These  dispositions  were   not  completed 
before    Bonaparte    foresaw    their    success. 
Confident  of  victory,  while  his  generals  were 
uneasy  and  apprehensive,  he  wrote  to  the 
directory  on  the  8th  of  April  in  the  following 
sanguine  terms — ^'  I  have  just  caused  the  im- 
portant position  of  La  Sotta  to  be  occupied. 
When  you  read  this  letter  we  shall  be  al- 
ready engaged  in  battle.     The  treasury  has 
not  kept  its  word.     Instead  of  five  hundred 
thousand  francs,  it  has  only  sent    us   three 
hundred    thousand,    and  we  have    as    yet 
no  tidings  of   the    six   hundred  thousand? 
which  sum  was  announced.      But  in  spite 
of  all    this    we    shall   advance.''      On   the 
same  day,  Massena  in  a  letter  to  the  com- 
mander in  chief,  thus  expressed  himself : — 
"  I  do  not  know  what  are  your  intentions  in 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.      235 

leaving  the  troops  (of  Cervoni)  longer  at  From  Marchj 
Voltri.  I  must  not  conceal  from  you  that  to  May, 
our  line  is  too  much  extended  to  be  defended 
with  so  small  a  force."  In  a  letter  of  the  9th 
which  general  Mesnard  addressed  to  Mas- 
sena,  informing  him  of  the  advance  of  the 
Austrian  centre,  he  observes,  "  General  Roc- 
cavina  commands  this  force.  His  design  is 
to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  our  troops  from  Vol- 
tri, and  to  make  them  prisoners." 

On  the  8th  the  advanced  parties  of  Beau- 
lieu  attacked  the  corps  of  Cervoni,  amount- 
ing to  four  thousand  five  hundred  men,  and 
were  repulsed.  On  the  loth  the  Austrians 
renewed  the  attack  with  a  force  estimated  at 
ten  thousand;  but  Cervoni,  although  his 
right  was  cannonaded  by  the  English  squad- 
ron, and  his  left  turned  by  a  division  of  Aus- 
trians, held  his  ground  manfally  the  whole 
day.  On  the  nth  he  retired  to  a  strong 
position  on  the  mountain  of  Le  Fourche, 
and  according  to  the  orders  of  Bonaparte, 
fell  back  at  night  secretly  and  rapidly  upon 
Laharpe,  at  Madona,  situated  about  four 
miles  in  front  of  Savona,  on  the  route  to 
Montenotte. 

While  Beaulieu  with  the  left  wing  of  his 


236 


THE    LIFE    OF 


CHAP.  VI.  army  was  thus  engaged  at  Voltri,  Argenteau 
with  the  centre  which  besides  a  division  in 
the  rear  connecting  it  with  the  army  of  CoHi, 
mustered  fifteen  thousand  men,  advanced 
from  lower  to  upper  Montenotte.  (21)  In 
the  forenoon  of  the  nth  his  light  column, 
two  thousand  five  hundred  strong,  under 
general  Roccavina,  attacked  the  post  of 
Monteligino,  but  was  vigourously  met  by 
Colonel  Rampon  and  repelled  with  loss.  In 
a  few  hours  Argenteau  came  up  with  the 
division,  when  a  heavier  column  of  attack 
was  formed  and  a  fresh  assault  made  upon 
Rampon.  This  also  was  repulsed.  The 
Austrians  prepared  a  still  stronger  force  for 
a  third  assault,  indignant  at  being  worsted  by 
a  corps  so  inconsiderable.  The  intrepid 
Rampon  at  the  same  time,  who  was  without 
water  food  or  ammunition,  proposed  to 
his  men  a  solemn  oath,  to  die  rather  than 
yield  their  post — ^' Let  us  die  first!"  was 
their  heroic  answer.  The  Austrians  ad- 
vanced a  third  time,  and  reached  the  breast 
work  of  the  redoubt,  when  Rampon  with 
his  self-devoted  regiment  rushed  upon  them 
with  the  bayonet,  and  with  such  deter- 
mined  courage,    as    to    drive    them   with 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.       287 

slaughter  down  the  mountain.     Upon  this  From  March, 

.  .  .  1796 

reiterated  defeat,  Argenteau  finding  his  to  May, 
men  fatigued  and  disheartened,  drew  offs^ 
and  encamped  on  upper  Montenotte,  intend- 
ing to  turn  the  position  of  Rampon  in  the 
morning,  and  to  reach  Savona  in  spite  of 
him.  But  Bonaparte  had  prepared  for  the 
ill  fated  Austrian  very  different  employ- 
ment. 

Laharpe,  already  at  Madona  de  Savona, 
was  pushed  forward   on    the  night  of  the 
I  ith,  to  support  and  supply  Rampon,  with 
whom  he  was  united  by  break  of  day.     Au- 
gereau  was  ordered  to  cross  the  Alps  from 
Loano.  in  the  direction  of  Millesimo,  so  as 
to  maintain  his  connection,  be  in  readiness 
for  ulterior  operations,  and  intercept  any 
aid  from  Colli  to  Argenteau  ;  and  Bonaparte 
in  person,  marched  at  midnight  from  Savona 
with  Massena's  division,  to  which  the  bri- 
gade of  Joubert  was  united,  and  placed  him- 
self by  the  dawn  of  day  near  upper  Monte- 
notte,  upon  the  right  and  rear  of  the  un- 
suspecting victim  of  his  celerity  and  skill. 

On  the  morning  of  the  12th,  while  Beau- 
lieu  was  victoriously  establishing  himself  at 
Voltri,  and  opening  a  communication  with 


238  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.    commoJore  Nelson ;  while  Colli  was  amused 
near  Ceva,  by  false  attacks  which  Serrurier 
was  instructed    to    make  ;    and  Argenteau 
himself  was  preparing  to  deal  with  Rampon 
alone,  he  was  at   once  assailed  in  front  by 
Laharpe  and  Rampon  united,  and  by  Mas- 
sena  in  flank   and  rear.     Notwithstanding 
the  suddeness  and  combination  of  the  French 
onset,  Argenteau  'seconded  by  Roccavina^ 
received  it  with  firmness.     On  this  trying 
occasion,  he  exhibited  intelligence  and  de- 
cision.   His  plan  was  to  act  on  the  defensive 
against  Laharpe,  and  to  extricate  himself  by 
attacking  Massena  with  his  principal  force. 
But  iie  was  not  allowed  time  nor  opportu- 
nity ;  for  Bonaparte  had  posted  himself  in 
the  centre  of  Massena's  division,  and  from  a 
commanding  height  gave  impulse  and  direc- 
tion to  his  columns.  (22)  Laharpe  was  ordered 
to  attack  the  Austrian  front  at  Monteligino, 
Massena  with  the  brigade  Mesnard  to  dis- 
lodge their  right  from  the  heights  of  Monte- 
notte,  while  Joubert  was  to  penetrate  into 
their  rear..    These  movements  nicely  com- 
bined and  vigorously  executed^  quickly  de- 
cided the  battle :  the  Austrians,  their  front 
overpowered  by  Laharpe  and  Rampon,  their 


THE    EMPEROrx    NAPOLEON.  289 

right  driven  from  Montenotle  by  Massena,  From  March, 

.  .  1796 

and  their  rear  at  the  same  time  attacked^  were  to  May, 
thrown  into  confusion,  and  in  spite  of  the  >  ^^^' 
exertions  of  Argenteau  and  Roccavina,  fled 
precipitately,  with  the  loss  of  fifteen  hundred 
men,  killed  and  wounded,  two  thousand 
prisoners,  five  field  pieces,  and  several  stand 
of  colours.  The  loss  of  the  French  was  in- 
considerable. Such,  succinctly,  was  the  bat- 
tle of  Montenotte,  famous  for  being  the  first 
of  a  long  series  of  victories,  of  which  though 
not  the  least  brilliant,  it  was  in  consequence  of 
the  want  of  cavalry  among  the  least  decisive. 
Owing  to  the  skill  of  Bonaparte's  manoeuvres, 
and  the  rapidity  of  his  onsets,  the  Austrians 
were  so  completely  routed,  that  they  must 
have  suffered  severely  had  there  been  a  rapid 
pursuit.  Of  the  fugitives,  the  greater  part 
who  were  Austrians,  retreated  upon  Dego 
in  the  direction  of  Acqui.  The  Sardinian 
detachments  with  difficulty  made  their  way 
to  Millesimo^  on  the  road  to  Ceva.  The 
former  position  while  it  defended  the  route 
towards  Milan,  was  in  the  line  of  Beaulieu's 
countermarch  from  Voltri^  and  of  the  ad- 
vance of  reenforcements  from  Lombardy. 
The  latter  connected  the  Sardinian  detach- 


24o  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.    ments  with  Colli's  left  wing,  and  command- 
ed the  road  to  Turin.  (28) 

Although  on  the  morning  of  the  12th, 
Beaulieu,  who  was  anxiously  concerting 
with  the  English  commodore,  a  plan  of  ope- 
rations against  Savona,  heard  the  distant 
sound  of  battle  upon  his  right,  it  was  not 
until  the  morning  of  the  i3th,  that  the 
overthrow  of  his  centre  was  made  known 
to  him.  This  intelligence  fell  like  a 
thunderbolt  in  his  path,  severed  his 
connection  with  Nelson's  squadron,  and 
dashed  to  pieces  their  mutual  hopes  of  vic- 
tory, invasion,  and  conquest.  He  returned 
in  haste  to  Acqui  where  he  arrived  that 
night ;  having  directed  Sebottendorf  with 
the  main  body  of  his  corps  to  retrace  his 
march  by  Sestri  and  the  Bochetta  to  Dego, 
and  Wiikassowich  Avho  had  been  pushed 
forward  with  a  division  of  grenadiers  on  the 
left  of  Cervoni,  to  take  the  more  direct  route 
for  the  same  point,  by  the  way  of  Sassello. 
But  the  route  in  one  case  was  difficult  and 
rough,  and  in  the  other  so  circuitous,  that 
Sebottendorf  s  leading  battalions  only  were 
in  time  to  participate  in  the  next  battle. 
Bonaparte  was  not  less  keen  in  prosecu-? 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  2 1^1 

ting  his  success,  than  he  had  been  bold  and  From  March, 

.  .  ...  1796 

skilful  in  gaining  it.    On  the  day  of  the  battle      to  May. 
of  Montenotte  he  advanced  his  head  quarters 
to  Carcare,  a  point  at  which  the  springs  of 
the  mountains  turn  their  waters  to  the  Po. 
Laharpe  with  the  right  division  was  ordered 
to  pursue  the  Austrians  on  the  route  towards 
Sassello,  with  a  view  of  driving  them  further 
upon  their  left,  and  of  menacing  an  Austrian 
detachment  of  four  battalions  stationed  at 
that  place.     He  was  then  suddenly  to  wheel 
to  his  left  and  march   in  the  direction  of 
Dego,  in  order  to  cooperate  with  Massena  in 
an  attack  on  that  fortified  position.     At  the 
same  time  Massena  was  directed  to  advance 
by  the  main  road  to  Dego,  while  Augereau's 
division,  which,  as  Serrurier  was  yet  sta- 
tionary at  Garessio,  now  formed  the  left  of 
the  line,  moved  upon  Millesimo.     At  this 
point  the  Piedmontese  had  been  joined  by 
Colli, with  as  manybattahons  as  hecould  ven- 
ture to  draw  from  his  camp  at  Ceva  and  his 
main  position  in  front  of  Serrurier;  and  at 
Dego,  Argenteau  was  reenforced  by  Beaulieu 
with  all  the  troops  which  had  been  able  to 
come  up  from  Voltri.     Thus  the  Austrian 
general  profiting  by  his  numbers,  notwith- 

i6 


24^  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  Standing  the  defeat  of  his  centre,  was  able  to 
oppose  to  his  adversary  more  than  an  equal 
force^  which  though  it  occupied  an  extended 
line,  rested  on  intrenchments  on  the  heights 
of  Dego,  and  was  strongly  posted  on  those 
of  Cairo  and  Millesimo.  Here,  covering  the 
two  great  roads  leading  into  Piedmont  and 
Lombardy,  he  hoped  to  maintain  himself 
until  the  arrival  of  troops  from  Milan  and 
the  return  of  all  his  divisions  from  Voltri, 
should  enable  him  to  resume  offensive  ope- 
rations, and  retrieve  the  loss  and  discredit 
sustained  by  his  lieutenant.  But  the  battle 
of  Millesimo^  which  again  disconcerted  his 
plans,  gave  Bonaparte  his  second  victory. 

The  enemy  had  strengthened  his  right  at 
Millesimo,  by  occupying  a  mountain  called 
Cossaria,  situated  between  the  two  branches 
of  the  Bormida,  and  commanding  the  valleys 
of  both.  They  had  also  availed  themselves 
judiciously  of  the  nature  of  the  ground  in 
front  of  Millesimo^  and  had  posted  a  strong 
detachment  in  a  narrow  defile,  through 
which  an  approaching  force  must  pass.  At 
daybreak  on  the  i3lh,  Bonaparte  with  his 
left  division  attacked  the  enemy  in  the  defile 
before  Millesimo.     Augereau,  who  had  not 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  2 43 

yet  been   en^aeed,  and  was  burninsf  with  From  March, 

.  .  1796, 

emulation  of  the  glories  of  Montenotte,  led  to  May, 
this  attack,  forced  ihe  pass  with  the  impe- 
tuosity of  a  torrent,  and  supported  by  the 
brigades  Joubert  and  Mesnard,  cut  off  the 
corps  of  general  Provera  from  CoUi's  main 
body, and  swiftly  surrounded  it  on  the  mount 
of  Cossaria,  The  strength  and  value  of 
his  elevated  position  being  felt  by  Provera, 
he  intrenched  himself  with  his  two  thousand 
men  in  the  extensive  ruins  of  an  ancient 
chateau  on  its  summit.  Here^  though  he 
had  little  ammunition,  and  neither  water  nor 
food,  he  resolved  to  hold  out  to  the  last,  as 
from  his  lofty  strong  hold  he  could  see  the 
Sardinian  army  preparing  to  come  to  his 
rescue. 

On  the  other  hand,  Bonaparte  whose  per- 
sonal activity  in  these  battles  was  incessant, 
had,  in  the  night,  before  he  joined  the  divi- 
sion of  Augereau,  sent  orders  to  Massena 
and  Laharpe  to  expedite  their  movement 
uponDego,  so  as  to  attack  in  the  morning. 
Consequently  he  was  under  the  impression 
that  his  brave  lieutenants  were  engaged  in  a 
struggle  for  victory, with  which  the  division  of 
Augereau  ought  to  cooperate.    He  first  there- 


2  44  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  fo''^  summoned  Provera,  and  that  proving 
ineffectual,  resolved  to  assault  him,  in  the 
hope  of  clearing  away  all  obstruction  to  an 
immediate  attack  on  the  force  under  Colli. 
But  while  the  columns  were  forming  for  this 
perilous  attempt,  a  brisk  firing  was  heard 
in  the  direction  of  Cencio,  which  drew  the 
commander  in  chief  towards  the  centre  of 
his  line,  which  was  held  by  the  brigade 
Mesnard. 

To  i\ugereau's  direction  was  consequently 
entrusted  the  assault  upon  Provera.  (24) 
I  This  officer  was  so  confident  in  the  prospect 
of  relief,  and  the  strength  of  his  post,  that 
he  would  consent  to  relinquish  it  only  upon 
condition  of  a  safe  retreat  to  his  friends,  with 
his  troops,  their  arms,  and  baggage.  As  the 
mountain,  which  was  steep  and  rocky,  pre- 
sented three  faces,  Augereau  formed  three 
columns  of  attack.  They  were  commanded 
by  generals  Banel,  Joubert,  and  Quenin^  and 
were  supported  by  a  proper  reserve.  Each 
column  ascended  a  side  of  the  mountain, 
with  a  view  of  distracting  the  fire  of  the 
enemy,  and  of  meeting,  in  an  attack,  on 
the  chateau.  The  assailants  advancing, 
with  determined  spirit,  in  the  face  of  a  con- 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  2 45 

Slant  discharge  of  musketry,  the  heads  of  the  From  March, 
columns  were  more  than  halfway  up,  when  to  May, 
Joubert  coming  to  a  depression  in  the  sur-  '  * 
face  of  the  hill,  which  afforded  a  degree  of 
shelter  from  Provera's  fire,  halted  in  order 
that  his  men  might  breathe,  and  make  their 
attack  with  collected  vigour.  Banel  and 
Quenin,  it  appears,  being  apprised  of  his  halt, 
imitated  his  example,  and  likewise  suspended 
their  progress.  This  result  of  discretion 
or  accident,  the  enemy  conceiving  to  be 
the  effect  of  fear,  took  fresh  courage,  and 
while  they  continued  their  fire,  rolled  down 
huge  stones  from  the  ruinous  walls  upon 
the  French  columns,  into  which  bounding 
rocks  and  showering  bullets  carried  over- 
throw and  slaughter.  Generals  Banel  and 
Quenin  were  among  the  first  and  bravest  of 
the  slain.  The  exertions  and  intrepidity  of 
Joubert  not  only  sustained  the  courage  of 
his  men,  but  led  them  to  the  foot  of  Pro- 
vera's intrenchment,  into  which,  with  seven 
brave  followers,  he  was  forcing  an  entrance, 
when  he  was  prostrated  by  a  stone  from  the 
walls.  (20)  He  rolled  senseless  down  the 
precipice,  and,  though  but  momentarily  dis- 
abled, was  believed  by  his  men  to  be  dead. 


2  4 6  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP  VI.  Before  so  many  obstacles,  the  columns  de- 
prived of  their  leaders,  recoiled,  the  men 
scattering,  and  sheltering  themselves,  as 
they  could,  behind  the  few  trees,  slender 
brushwood,  and  rocky  projections  of  the 
mountain,  until  night,  which  was  now  ap- 
proaching, favoured  their  retreat.  The 
loss  of  the  French  in  killed  and  wounded 
has  been  estimated  at  httle  short  of  a  thou- 
sand, in  which  number  they  lamented  two 
generals  and  other  gallant  officers  slain. 
XThus  severely  foiled,  Augereau  became  cir- 
cumspect, and  estaUislied  posts  close  around 
tliefoot  of  tlie  mountain.  These,  by  order 
of  Bonaparte,  who  returned  to  this  point  in 
the  evening,  and  was  appreliensive  that  Pro- 
vera  might  attempt  in  the  night  to  cut  a 
passage  to  the  Sardinian  army,  he  fortified, 
as  well  as  he  could,  witli  artillery,  and  pre- 
pared to  maintain,  by  directing  his  men  to 
sleep  on  their  arms. 

During  the  i3th,  Massena  finding  his 
troops  fatigued  by  a  long  march,  and  his 
numbers  insufficient  for  an  attack  on  Dego, 
had  waited  for  the  junction  of  the  brigade 
Dommartin,  and  for  the  support  of  Laharpe, 
so  that,  on  that  day,   the  cooperation  pro- 


THE  EMPEKOB  NAPOLEON.       247 

lected  between  the  two  wings  of  his  army  From  March, 

1796 

by  Bonaparte  could  not  have  taken  place,  to  xMay, 
even  had  the  assault  on  Provera  proved  suc- 
cessful. But,  in  the  course  of  the  morning 
of  the  14th,  these  accessions  reached  Mas 
sena,  and  the  two  armies  were  in  presence 
along  the  whole  line;  from  Millessimo,  where 
Augereau  and  Colli  were  confronted,  to 
Dego,  for  the  possession  of  which  Bonaparte 
and  Beaulieu  were  to  contend.  On  the  left 
the  allies,  on  the  right  the  French,  were  the 
assailants.  The  former  confided  in  their 
numbers  and  position,  the  latter  relied  on 
their  enthusiastic  courage  and  their  general's 
skill. 

Leaving  Augereau  to  deal  with  Colli, 
and  to  reduce  Provera,  Bonaparte  repaired, 
on  the  morning  of  the  i4th,  to  the  right 
of  his  line,  with  a  view  of  superintend- 
ing, in  person,  the  storming  of  Dego.  On 
his  way,  after  witnessing  the  gallantry  with 
which  Mesnard  defeated  an  attempt  of  the 
enemy  by  piercing  the  French  centre,  to  turn 
their  left  and  relieve  Provera,  he  directed  him 
to  incline  to  his  right,  so  as  to  support  the 
attack  of  Massena  and  Laharpe.  For  this 
important  operation  the  division  of  Laharpe 


2  48  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  -vvas  formed  into  three  close  columns,  under 
the  orders  of  generals  Causse,  Cervoni,  and 
Boyer;  that  of  Massena  into  two,  under 
Lasalcette  and  Monnier,  Avhich  last  column, 
destined  to  turn  the  enemv's  left,  was  at- 
tended  J3y  Massena  in  person.  The  Austrians 
w  ere  posted  in  a  grand  redoubt  on  the  com- 
manding height  of  Dego,  and  in  intrench- 
ments  on  a  chain  of  contiguous  but  less  ele- 
vated hills,  extending  to  their  right.  These 
Were  to  be  carried  by  the  division  of  La- 
harpe,  who  was  then  to  unite  with  Massena 
in  the  attack  on  Dego.  About  one  o'clock, 
the  preparations  were  completed,  and  the 
general  ordered  the  troops  to  advance.  At 
this  moment,  Junot  arrived  with  the  capitu- 
lation of  Provera,  and  with  intelligence  that 
Colh,  after  being  repulsed  by  Augereau,  in 
repeated  efforts  to  rescue  Provera,  had  been 
finally  compelled  to  retreat.  This  informa- 
tion stimulated  to  a  higher  degree  of  fervour 
the  courage  of  the  troops.  They  crossed  the 
rapid  Bormida  under  a  plunging  fire  of  ar- 
tillery; the  columns  of  Laharpe  fording  the 
torrent,  Massena  passing  on  a  rude  moun- 
tain bridge.  Moving  with  impetuosity  and 
concert,   they  soon  came  into  close  action. 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  ^49 

The  Austrians   resisted  bravely,  but  were  From  March, 

1 796 

overpowered  by  the  vigour  of  the  French,  to  May, 
So  complete  was  their  success,  that  on  the 
right,  Massena  after  taking  the  Austrian  ar- 
tillery, intercepted  their  retreat.  The  corps 
stationed  in  the  great  redoubt  of  Dego,  had 
a  prospect  not  unlike  that  of  Provera,  but  a 
different  fate.  When  attacked  in  front  by 
the  columns  of  Causse,  Cervoni,  and  Lasal- 
cette,  they  could  see  Argenteau  hastening  up 
in  the  rear  of  the  village,  with  a  reenforcc 
ment  of  four  battalions  to  their  relief.  They 
therefore  stood  firm,  when  they  might  have 
retreated  in  comparative  safety.  But  Mas- 
sena continuing  his  active  progress  on  their 
left,  opened  a  fire  on  the  flank  of  Argenteau, 
who  felt  himself  endangered  and  instantly 
retired.  At  the  same  moment,  Causse, 
Cervoni,  and  Lasalcette,  assailed  them 
in  front,  broke  into  their  works,  and  fell 
upon  them  with  the  bayonet.  The  Aus- 
trians fought  with  a  courage  worthy  of  a 
better  fate,  but  overwhelmed  by  their  ene- 
mies, and  unsupported  by  their  friends,  they 
were  cut  to  pieces.  Argenteau  was  censured 
for  having  too  readily  sacrificed  these  brave 
men  to  his  own  safety.     Thus,  from  right 


CHAP.  VI. 


aSo  THE    LIFE    OF 


to  left,  along  tlie  whole  line  from  the  heights 
of  Cossaria  to  those  of  Dego,  Beanlieu's  de- 
feat was  complete.  The  action  closed  with 
the  close  of  day.  The  vanquished  fled  to 
the  camps  they  had  left ;  the  victors  slept  on 
the  hills  they  had  won. 

The  loss  of  the  allied  army  in  prisoners, 
amounted  to  six  thousand,  among  whom 
were  one  lieutenant  general,  one  brigadier, 
I  and  twenty-four  field  officers.  Thirty  pieces 
of  artillery,  a  quantity  of  ammunition,  and 
fifteen  colours  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  con- 
queror. As  the  French  had  mounted  four 
hundred  cavalry,  and  pursued  the  imperial- 
ists hotly  from  Dego,  where  the  resistance 
was  obstinate^,  and  the  fighting  severe,  their 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  which  was  com- 
puted by  Bonaparte  at  two  thousand  five 
hundred,  was  doubtless  considerable.  The 
conduct  of  Provera,  in  surrendering  without 
a  determined  effort  to  disengage  himself, 
presents  an  obvious  and  inglorious  contrast 
with  the  heroism  of  Rampon.  In  the  hope 
of  entailing  upon  the  enemy  the  services  of  a 
general  so  inefficient,  Bonaparte,  in  releas- 
ing  Provera  on  parole,  bestowed  on  hirn 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEOiN.  25 1 

words  of  commendation,  which,  it  appears  FromMarcbj 

^  ^  1796, 

in  the  seguel,   had  the  effect  they  were  de-      to  May, 

1796. 

signed  to  produce.  ^ 

The  victory  of  Millesimo,  by  driving  Beau- 
lieu  back  upon  x\cqui^  and  forcing  Colli  to 
withdraw  to  Ceva,  completely  disjoined  the 
Austrian  and  Sardinian  armies, andeffectually 
divided  the  motives  of  the  two  command- 
ers.    Beaulieu  became  solicitous  to  protect 
Lombardy.and  Colli  anxious  to  cover  Turin. 
Not  a  moment  was  lost  in  following  up 
these  Avell-earned  advantages,  and  in  over- 
powering the  enemy  by  incessant  rapidity  as 
well  as  daring  enterprise.     With  a  view  of 
favouring  the  junction  of  Serrurier  who  had 
been  directed  to  approach  from  his  position 
at  Garessio^  Augereau  was  ordered  to  incline 
to  his  left,  and  to  take  possession  of  Mon- 
tezemoto.     Laharpe  was  to  support  Auge- 
reau, while  Massena  with  his  division,  for- 
ming the  right  of  the  line,  was  to  advance 
in  a  corresponding  direction,  and  to  coope- 
rate, by  turning  their  left,  in  dislodging  the 
Sardinians  from  their  fortified  campatCeva. 
Meanwhile,  Wukassowich,  after  a  painful 
and  devious  march  across  themountains  from 
Voltri,  by  way  of  Sassello,  arrived  at  three 


2^2  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP^^.  ^  o'clock  in  ihe  morning  of  the  iStli  in  the  rear 
of  thepostat  Dego,  where,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered he  had  been  directed  by  Beaulieu  to 
form  his  junction  with  Argenteau.  To  his 
astonishment  he  found  French  instead  of 
Austrian  troops  before  him.  Taking  counsel 
from  courage,  he  attacked  them  at  day 
break,  fatigued  with  the  toil  of  the  late 
'^  battle,  and  oppressed  with  wine  from  the 
neighbouring  village.  In  spite  of  the  exer- 
tions of  their  ofScers,  the  French  offered  but 
a  slight  resistance,  and  Wukassowich  with 
little  difficulty  took  six  hundred  prisoners, 
and  recovered  the  positions  as  well  as  the 
artillery  which  Argenteau  had  lost.  Intel- 
ligence of  his  disaster  created  great  alarm  at 
the  French  head  quarters;  for  the  surprise 
Avas  not  only  complete,  but  inexplicable,  as 
the  French  generals  it  would  seem  could 
not  conceive  the  possibility  of  an  attack  on 
Dego,  while  their  parties  on  the  roads  to 
Acqui  and  Ceva,  were  undisturbed.  Mas- 
sena  being  first  apprised  of  this  rude  assault 
upon  the  extreme  right  of  his  division, 
hastened  to  the  spot,  and  putting  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  disordered  battalions  and 
such  troops  as  were  at  hand,  attempted  to 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.      253 

drive  the  successful  Austrians   from   their  From  March, 

1706 

ground,  before  they  could  fairly  establish  to  May, 
themselves.  But  his  men,  who  had  not  re* . 
covered  from  their  consternation,  attacked 
feebly,  and  were  quickly  repulsed.  At  this 
moment^  Bonaparte  galloped  up,  leadingLa- 
harpe's  division,  whose  march  upon  Ceva 
he  had  promptly  countermanded.  Under 
his  direction  efficient  preparations  were  in- 
stantly made  for  fighting  over  the  battle  of 
the  day  before,  and  regaining  the  heights  and 
redoubts,  which  had  been  so  gallantly  won, 
and  so  suddenly  lost.  The  grand  redoubt 
ofDego  AVas  again  to  be  carried  by  assault; 
a  task  which  was  confided  to  general  Causse, 
with  the  99th  regiment.  General  Mesnard 
with  his  brigade  was  charged  with  dislodg- 
ing the  enemy  from  the  surrounding  heights, 
a  service  which  Massena,  whose  privilege  of 
rank  was  the  post  of  danger,  in  person  su- 
perintended. Causse  finding  his  column 
dreadfully  galled  in  climbing  the  hill,  placed 
himself  at  the  head  of  the  grenadiers,  and 
sprang  forward  in  hopes  by  accelerating  the 
issue^  to  diminish  the  expense  of  the  conflict. 
A  deadly  discharge  of  musketry  from  the 
redoubt,  deprived    the   assailants  of  their 


CHAP.  VI. 


254  THE    LIFE    OF 

daring  commander,  and  driving  this  party 
back  upon  the  column,  thrcAV  the  regiment 
into  disorder.  At  this  critical  moment  the 
Austrians  rushed  down  the  hill ;  attacked, 
routed,  and  pursued  the  French.  Bo- 
naparte, however,  displaying  the  Sgth, 
which  had  just  reached  the  ground  un- 
der general  Victor,  received  and  broke 
the  shock  of  the  imperiahsts;  and  directing 
the  officers  of  his  escort  to  rally  the  99th, 
with  the  united  corps,  forced  them  to  retreat 
to  their  post  on  the  hill.  The  conflict  on 
this  point  was  severe  and  doubtful.  The  ad- 
jutant general  Lanusse  took  command  of  two 
battalions  of  light  troops  and  determined  to 
repeat  the  effort  of  Causse.  The  Hungarian 
grenadiers  of  Wukassowich,  no  less  resolved 
to  renew  their  successful  charge,  met  and 
engaged  him.  Three  times  the  French  were 
forced  to  recede,  as  often  the  Hungarians 
were  compelled  to  retire.  The  last  time 
Lanusse  placed  his  hat  on  his  SAVOrd,  and 
calling  on  his  men  who  bravely  followed, 
rushed  up  the  hill  and  decided  the  action. 
In  the  meantime,  Ivlassena  had  cleared  the 
inferior  heights,  and  gained  the  front  of  the 
grand  redoubt,  while  Cervoni  was  scaling 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  255 

the  precipice  on  its  flank.   Upon  this  Wukas-  ^"^^^^g^"^' 
sowich,  his  grenadiers  discomfited,  and  his      *«  J^^ay, 

.  1111  1T96. 

post  in  danger  of  being  surrounded^  had  no 
resource  but  flight.     The  pursuit,  like  the 
battle,  was  fierce  and  bloody.     The  Austrian 
division  was  nearly  destroyed,  and  all  the 
artillery  retaken.     The  intrepid  conduct  of 
Lanusse,  which  passed  under  the  eyes  of  the 
commander  in  chief,  was  hke  that  of  Ram- 
pon  at  Monteligino,  rewarded  by  promotion 
to  the  rank  of  general  of  brigade.     Lannes, 
the  famous  Duke  of  Montebello,  who  com- 
menced the  campaign  as  a  chief  of  battalion, 
participated  in  this  glorious  struggle.      On 
the   same  ground,  the  day  before,  his  gal- 
lantry had  so  engaged  the  attention  of  Bona- 
parte^ that  he  promoted  him  on  the  field  to 
a  full  colonelcy ;  a  promotion  which  was  the 
measure  of  the  first  degree  of  that  merit 
which  afterwards  became  colossal.     These 
were  the  first  occasions  on  which  Bonaparte 
as  commander  in  chief,  enjoyed  the  congeninl 
pleasure  of  rewarding  courage  displayed  on 
the  field  of  battle.     Owing  to  the  closeness 
and  desperation  of  the  fighting,  the  French 
lost  many    officers,  among  them   generals 
Causse  and  BonneL     The  former  w^ho  fell 


256  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  wiortally  wounded,  upon  seeing  the  com- 
mander in  chief  advancing  in  the  heat  of 
the  action,  could  only  articulate,  "  Is  Dego 
retaken  ?  "  the  love  of  glory  being  the  last 
emotion  of  his  noble  heart. 

Thesurpriseof  the  FrenchatDego  although 
it   was  jDromptly   and   gallantly   retrieved, 
discovers  a  want  of  that  prudence  for  which 
their  commander  was  subsequently  distin- 
guished.  His  plan  of  operations  was  founded 
on  the  advantage  which  the  movement  of 
Beaulieu  upon  Voltri,  and  the  time  necessary 
for  that  general's  reunion  of  his  divisions, 
would  be  likely  to  give  him  over  the  Austrian 
centre.     From  his  report  of  the  victory  of 
Millesimo,  it  appears  he  was  aware  of  an 
Austrian  corps  being  stationed  at  Sassello, 
and   that   he  overrated  it   at  eight    batta- 
lions.    Yet,  with  these  pressing  reasons  for 
vigilance  in  respect  to  the  security  of  his  rear 
and  right,  he  allowed  Wukassowich,  who 
actually  marched  by  the  way   of  Sassello, 
and  united  the  troops  there  with  his  own  di- 
vision, to  reach  his  bivouacs  unobstructed, 
and  fall  upon  his  men  in  their  sleep. 

The    consequences    of  this    imprudence 
might  well  have  been  fatal.     For  had  Bo- 


THE    EMPEKOR    NAPOLEON.  2b'] 

parte's  attack  on   Deoro,  which  formed  the  From  March, 

.  1796 

leading  operation  in  the  battle  of  Millesimo,  to  May, 
been  postponed  from  the  afternoon  of  the 
14th  to  the  morning  of  the  iSth,  the  failure 
of  the  French  would  have  been  inevitable, 
and  their  expulsion  from  Piedmont  not  im- 
probable. 

If  we  censure  the  French  general,  be- 
cause in  the  hurry  of  incessant  fighting  and 
pursuit,  his  judgment  declined  for  a  moment 
from  its  comprehensive  elevation,  we  eannot 
fail  to  admire  the  active  vigour,  and  easy 
celerity,  with  which  its  equipoise  was  reco- 
vered. The  second  capture  of  Dego  was 
more  glorious  to  the  French  than  the  first ; 
and  the  personal  prowess  which  Bonaparte 
combined  with  his  militarv  skill  in  conduct- 
ing  the  operation,  shows  that,  while  he  felt 
its  critical  importance,  he  perceived  and 
employed  the  best  means  of  ensuring  its 
success. 

But  neither  the  genius  of  Bonaparte  nor 
the  spirit  of  his  troops  in  the  opening  of  this  • 
campaign,  can  be  adequately  admired,  with- 
out bearing  in  mind  that  the  first  six  days, 
from  the  combat  of  Vohri  to  the  victory  of 
Dego,  with  pauses  of  but  a  few  hours,  were 

^7 


2^8  TUE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  filled  up  Jiy  one  widely  extended  and  con- 
tinued battle,  in  which  the  French  infantry 
were  victorious,  at  all  points  and  against 
fresh  troops,  over  superiority  of  ground, 
numbers,  and  equipment. 

While  the  shattered  remains  of  Wukas- 
sowich's  division  pursued  by  the  light  troops 
of  Massena  and  the  cavalry  of  Stengel,  fled 
to   Acqui,  increasing  the   consternation  of 
their  comrades,  and  the  confusion  of  their 
general,  Bonaparte,  prompt,  victorious,  and 
persevering^  renewed  his  interrupted  move- 
ment   against   the    Sardinians.      Attentive 
to  the  great  object  rather  than  the  special 
instructions  of  the  directory,  he  determined 
to   operate   vigorously  with    his   left    and 
centre;  and   prudent   from  experience,  to 
protect  his  rear  from  a  repetition  of  surprise 
or  annoyance.      Accordingly  while  Victor 
with  one  brigade  was  posted  at  Cairo,  La- 
harpe  was  thrown   directly  in   front  with 
instructions  to  take  post  on  the  river  Belbo, 
at  the  late  Austrian  camp  of  St.  Benidetto, 
to  observe  Beaulieu,  to  restrain  his  detach- 
ments, and  hold  him  separated  from  Colli. 
General  Cervoni  also  was  despatched  to  Sa- 
Yona  to  ascertain  whether  the  enemy  had 


THE    E31PER0L     NAPOLEON.  2^)9 

completed  the  evacuation  of  Voltri.  To  From  March, 
oerrurier^  orders  were  sent  to  come  mto  ^  ^j 
connection  with  Augereau,  who  was  advanc-  '' '^^• 
ing  toward  Ceva^  and  to  cooperate  in  an  at- 
tack on  the  Sardinian  intrenchments  at  that 
place,  which  Massena,  by  a  corresponding 
movement  on  the  right  was  commanded  to 
turn.  These  combined  movements  were 
speedily  performed.  Thus  the  action  of  the 
army  was  reversed.  The  right  division 
which  hitherto  had  been  incessantly  engaged 
in  marches  or  combats,  was  now  left  sta- 
tionary on  the  Belbo,  while  the  left,  which 
as  yet  had  been  inactive  on  the  Tanaro,  was 
placed  in  advance,  and  in  close  pursuit  of  the 
enemy.  Serrurier  descending  the  left  bank 
of  the  Tanaro  with  the  main  body  of  his  di- 
vision, by  means  of  detachments  on  the  right 
bank,  cooperated  with  general  Rusca  in  dis- 
lodging a  Sardinian  corps  from  the  heights 
of  St.  Murialto,  and  in  estabhshing  the  de- 
sired connection.  The  divisions  advanced 
upon  Ceva;  Serrurier,  by  the  way  of  Batifolo, 
Bagnasco,  and  Nucetto ;  Augereau  on  the 
route  of  Montezemolo  and  Montezemoto. 
Serrurier's  light  troops  driving  in  the  out- 
posts of  Colli  reached  the  town  of  Ceva,  as 


o,6o  THE    LlfE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.    Angereau's  advance  crowned  the  summit  of 
Montezemoto. 

From  this  proud  and  airy  height  the  re- 
pubhcan  troops  enjoyed  the  wide  and  sud- 
den prospect  spread  out  before  ihem — the 
plains  of  Italy,  so  long  regarded  as  the  land 
of  promise,  glittering  with  the  domes  of  dis- 
tant cities,  shining  with  the  currents  of 
wandering  rivers^  and  waving  with  harvests 
of  abundance  and  glory.  This  scene  so  sub- 
lime and  delightful,  they  contrasted  with 
the  sterile  rocks  and  wintry  precipices  over 
which  they  had  burst  with  impetuous  con- 
quest; and  looking  round  on  the  icy  range  of 
the  Alps  that  had  ceased  as  if  by  magic  to 
forbid  their  invasion,  their  bosoms  throbbed 
with  a  sense  of  irresistible  valour  and  in- 
vigorated hope.  The  general  himself  was 
not  unmoved.  Gazing  at  the  huge  rampart 
of  mountains  he  said  to  his  officers,  "  Han- 
nibal forced  the  Alps,  but  we,  we  have 
turned  them;"  a  phrase  which  happily  de- 
picted the  grandeur,  skill,  and  success  of 
his  enterprise. 

But  the  tide  of  invasion  rolled  swiftly 
along  ;  the  political  sympathy  of  the  inhabi- 
tants adding  momentum  to  the  progress  of 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  26 1 

the  victors,  as  they  penetrated  into  Pied-  From  March, 
mont,   and    entered    hke    a    broad  wedge      to  May, 

.  1796. 

between  the  shattered  alHes.  On  Colli, 
in  his  camp  at  Ceva,  Bonaparte  now  freed 
from  the  Austrians^  directed  his  strength. 
Augereau  descending  from  the  heights,  and 
Serrurier  passing  down  the  banks  of  the 
Tanaro,  attacked  on  the  17th,  the  latter 
the  right  and  the  former  the  front  of  the 
Sardinian  intrenchments.  Massena  on  his 
side  pushed  forward  with  a  view  of  cross- 
ing the  river  below  Ceva,  and  getting  into 
the  enemy's  rear.  In  the  front  where  the 
brigades  Beyrand  and  Joubert  made  and 
repeated  vigorous  assaults  upon  his  exterior 
works,  Colli,  with  his  heavy  artillery  and  a 
disposable  division  of  eight  thousand  men, 
opposed  a  very  resolute  resistance.  But  on 
his  right  Serrurier,  whose  turn  to  court 
danger  and  distinction  was  now  come,  had 
pushed  a  brigade  as  far  as  Montbarsilico  on 
the  road  to  the  bridges  over  the  Corsaglio. 
The  Sardinian  general  finding  from  this 
movement  and  the  progress  of  Massena,  his 
position  no  longer  tenable,  and  fearing  a 
catastrophe  like  that  from  which  he  had 
been  unable  to  extricate  Provera,  was  forced 


*7 


63  THE    LIFE    OF 


CHAP.  VI.  lo  retire,  allhougli  he  thereby  increased  his 
distance  from  Beauheu.  Availing  himself 
of  the  night  to  repass  the  Tanaro,  he  gained 
the  hridges  over  the  Corsaglio,  and  selected 
a  ]>o.sition  on  tlie  left  bank  o(  that  river,  at  its 
conlluence  with  the  Tanaix).  Upon  re- 
treating from  Ceva,  he  strengthened  the 
garrison  of  that  fortress,  but  w^as  not  able 
to  bring  off  the  artillery  from  his  camp,  his 
expulsion  from  which  spread  consternation 
iimong'the  provincial  authorities,  and  alarm- 
ed the  court  of  Turin.  In  this  affair  of  Ceva 
the  Sardinians ,  besides  their  killed  and 
wounded,  lost  four  hundred  prisoners. 

Serrurier,  alreadv  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tanaro  and  reenforced  by  the  impatient  ca- 
valry of  Stengel,  pursued  closely  in  the  rear 
of  Colli.  Bonaparte  placed  himself  with 
this  division  and  established  his  head  quar- 
ters at  the  castle  of  Lesogno,  situated  near 
the  right  bank  of  the  Corsaglio  and  its  point 
of  junction  with  the  Tanaro.  Massena  who 
had  passed  the  Tanaro  lower  down,  now 
formed  the  centre  of  the  line,  and  leaving  a 
rearguard  at  ihe  bridge  of  Ceva  in  order  to 
observe  the  garrison  and  to  maintain  a  com- 
munication Avith  Victor's  brigade  at  Cairo, 


THE    liMPEKOU     NAPOLEON. 


263 


directed  his   march  for   the  ccneraTs  head  From  March, 

.  1796, 

quarters.      Aiigereaa,   on  the   right  moved      to  May, 

down  the  east  bank  of  the  Tanaro  in  the  di-  ^    , 1 

rection  of  Casteliino ;  Bey  rand's  brigade  form- 
ing  his  rear;  Ruscas  escorting  the  captured 
artillery ;  and  Joubert's  thrown  upon  the 
left,  in  order,  by  finding  a  bridge  or  effecting 
a  passage  below  the  mouth  of  the  Corsaglio, 
to  keep  open  a  communication  with  the  other 
divisions  and  to  assist  in  the  attack  on  CoUi. 
In  the  angle  formed  by  the  two  rivers  there 
was  sharp  fighting  betAveen  the  French  light 
troops  and  the  rear  of  the  Sardinians.  On 
the  I  gih,  Serrurier  forced  the  passage  of  the 
Corsaglio,  at  the  bridge  of  St.  Michel,  and, 
after  taking  several  pieces  of  artillery, 
established  the  brigade  Fiorella  in  that 
village.  But  his  troops,  who,  in  conse- 
cjuence  of  continual  movements  for  several 
days,  had  received  no  rations,  dispersed 
themselves  in  quest  of  food,  and  in  this  si- 
tuation were  suddenly  attacked  by  Colli's 
rear  guard,  and  driven,  with  loss  and  dis- 
order, out  of  the  village  and  over  the  bridge. 
On  the  same  day,  Augereau,  with  Joubert's 
brigade,  reached  the  bank  of  the  Tanaro,  a 
deep  and    rapid   stream,  which    here    aug- 


264  ^HE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  mented  by  the  Corsaglio,  andcleaving  its  way 
through  clustered  hills,  presented  in  alter- 
nate opposition  steep  and  shelving  banks, 
which  admitted  only  a  long  and  diagonal 
passage.  Parties  of  the  enemy,  who  were 
drawn  up  on  the  left  bank,  had  destroyed 
the  bridge.  Nevertheless,  in  order  to 
make  a  diversion  in  favour  of  Serrurier, 
an  effort  was  made  to  gain  the  opposite 
shore.  Joubert,  although  lately  wounded, 
urged  his  horse  into  the  river,  and,  taking 
an  oblique  direction,  succeeded  in  landing 
with  a  small  party.  But  the  current  was 
found  too  strong  and  deep  for  the  grenadiers^ 
and  Augereau  was  therefore  compelled  to 
recall  Joubert,  and  withdraw  his  brigade  out 
of  reach  of  the  enemy's  fire.  The  21st, 
the  rear  of  Massena's  division  having  come 
up  to  Lesogno,  preparations  were  made  for 
forcing  a  passage  of  the  Corsaglio  at  several 
points.  Serurrier  forming  the  left,  was 
directed  to  ascend  the  stream,  and  crossing 
at  the  bridge  of  Torre,  to  fall  upon  Colli's 
right  flank,  while  Massena  was  to  effect  a 
passage  at  the  bridge  of  St.  Michel,  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy's  batteries.  The  general 
in  chief;,  with  part  of  Massena's  division,  and 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  ^65 

With  Joubert's  brigade,  was  to  cross  by  a  From  March, 

.  1796 

ford  above,  and  a  hastily  constructed  bridge  to  May, 
below,  the  confluence  of  the  rivers.  ColU, . 
though  hoping  for  support  from  BeauHeu, 
was  intimidated  by  these  preparations,  and 
withdrew  from  his  positions  on  the  bank  of 
the  river,  to  more  elevated  and  contract- 
ed ground  immediately  under  Mondovi, 
where,  if  disappointed  in  receiving  re- 
enforcements,  he  might  have  time  to  for- 
tify himself,  and  to  remove  the  ample  ma- 
gazines of  that  important  town.  But,  on 
the  2 2d,  while  he  was  thus  employed, 
the  French,  whose  passage  of  the  river  had 
been  accelerated  by  being  unopposed,  came 
upon  him.  Serrurier  who  led  the  pursuit, 
first  came  into  action,  assailing  the  enemy's 
centre  with  the  brigades  Dommartin  and 
Fiorella,  while  the  brigade  of  Guyeux  at- 
tacked his  right.  At  the  same  time  the 
columns  of  the  commander  in  chief  and  Mas- 
sena  were  gaining  his  left  flank.  Strength- 
ened by  several  redoubts.  Colli  resisted  man- 
fully. In  the  centre  Dommartin  was  at  first 
repulsed  by  the  exertions  and  gallantry  of 
general  Dichat,  but  being  supported  by 
Serrurier  with  Fiorella's  brigade^  the  attack 


266  THK    JJIE    OF 

^^^_}^'-^  was  renewed  willi  vigour.  In  this  con- 
flict, in  which  general  Dicliat  was  mortally 
wounded,  the  struggle  was  severe,  and  the 
slaughter  dreadful.  Serrurier,  however,  suc- 
ceeded in  carrying  ihe  principal  redoubt 
which  covered  the  Sardinian  centre.  His 
success  decided  the  action.  General  Colli 
finding  his  centre  thus  exposed,  and  that 
Guyeux  who  had  driven  in  his  right  was 
on  the  point  of  entering  Mondovi,  ordered 
a  retreat  behind  the  EUero,  a  movemejit 
Avhich  soon  degenerated  into  flight.  He  lost 
three  thousand  men  killed  and  wonnded, 
fifteen  hundred  prisoners,  among  whom 
were  three  generals,  eight  pieces  of  cannon, 
and  eleven  stand  of  colours.  In  addition, 
the  fortified  town  of  Mondovi,  with  its  artil- 
lery and  magazines,  was  surrendered  to  the 
victor. 

As  the  weight  of  this  battle  had  been 
sustained  by  Serrurier,  it  resulted  that  all 
the  divisions  and  each  commander,  had 
proved  their  courage  and  conduct  in  this 
short  campaign,  of  ten  days  and  incessant 
action ;  Massena  and  Laharpe  at  Monte- 
notte  and  Dego;  Augereau  at  Millesimo, 
and  Serrurier  at  Mondovi.     Notwithstand- 


THE    EiVlPEUOB    NAPOLEO.N. 


!6r 


irig  the  roughness  of  the  ground,  it  appears  From  March, 
that  the  general's  aide-de-camp  Murat^  made     ^^  ^' 
a  successful  charge  with  the  20th  regiment  of  ^  _JZ^^_  > 
dragoons. 

General  Stengel,  a  brave  and  accomplished 
officer,  had  omitted  no  opportunity  of  secur- 
ing horses  and  mounting  his  troops,  so  that 
as  the  army  beween  Montezemoto  and  the 
Corsaglio  was  reaching  suitable  ground^  4ie 
had  thrown  his  cavalry  occasionally  in  front, 
and  was  eager  to  compete  with  the  infantry 
in  service  and  glory.  On  the  retreat  of  the 
Sardinians  from  Mondovi  he  pursued  them 
ardently  beyond  the  Ellero,  and  attacked  a 
superior  body  of  CoUi's  horse.  In  the  charge, 
which  was  not  successful,  the  French  were 
repulsed  by  the  queen's  regiment  of  dra- 
goons, and  Stengel  surrounded  and  killed. 
The  brave  Murat,  rallied  the  broken  squa- 
drons, and  putting  himself  foremost  in  a 
desperate  charge,  routed  the  Sardinians  and 
renewed  the  pursuit.  Bonaparte  deeply 
regretted  the  loss  of  Stengel,  in  whose  charac- 
ter he  said  were  united,  besides  various  ac- 
complishments, the  fire  of  youth  and  the 
judgment  of  age.  His  death  was  owing  pro- 
bably to  his  defect  of  vision,  his  breast  being 


>.68  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  reached  by  a  sword-thrust,  which  with  a 
clearer  sight  he  might  have  parried.  He 
fell  a  captive  and  a  corpse,  into  the  enemy's 
hands.  (26) 

The  French  general^  neither  stopped  by 
resistance,  nor  delayed  by  success,  advanced 
rapidly  upon  the  traces  of  Colli,  and  directly 
towards  the  heart  of  Piedmont.  Serrurier 
on  the  left  pursued  in  the  line  of  the  enemy's 
retreat,  by  the  road  of  Brealongo  upon  Fos- 
sano,  from  which  town  situated  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Stura,  after  a  sharp  cannonade 
with  Sardinian  guns,  he  compelled  Colli  to 
retire.  Bonaparte  in  the  centre  with  Mas- 
sena's  division,  marched  down  the  left  bank 
of  the  Tanaro,  and  took  possession  of  Che- 
rasco,  a  fortified  place  between  the  Stura 
and  the  Tanaro,  and  immediatly  at  their 
confluence.  Down  the  right  bank  of  the 
latter  river,  Augereau  led  his  division  by  the 
way  of  Dogliano  and  Novetta  to  Alba^  an 
important  town  on  the  Tanaro,  about  fifteen 
miles  below  Cherasco.  By  keeping  Auge- 
reau on  the  right  bank,  while  the  faculty  of 
supporting  Laharpe  in  case  of  an  attempt 
on  the  part  of  Beaulieu  to  overwhelm  him 
by  numbers,  was  maintained,  a  larger  space 


THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.        269 

for  collecting  provisions  for  the  army  was  From  March, 
commanded,  and  the   necessity  avoided  of      toMaV, 

,  .„  '  .  1796.' 

conveymg  heavy  artillery  across  a  river 
without  bridges.  These  movements  were 
so  expeditious  and  well  regulated  that  Ser- 
rurier  entered  Fossano,  Massena's  division 
took  possession  of  Cherasco,  and  Augereau 
made  himself  master  of  Alba,  all  on  the  25th 
ofx\pril. 

Thus  in  a  fortnight  after  the  commence- 
ment of  active  operations,  the  republican 
general,  having  defeated  numbers  doubling 
his  own,  reduced  the  x\ustrians  to  inaction 
and  the  Sardinians  to  despair,  and  left  the 
exterior  fortresses  of  Coni  and  Ceva  far  be- 
hind him,  had  established  his  army  in  three 
strong  positions,  embracing  eight  leagues  of 
an  important  water  course,  in  the  centre  of 
Piedmont  and  within  thirty  miles  of  its  ca- 
pital. (27) 

Meanwhile  Beaulleu,  who  had  received 
from  Colli  and  the  Sardinian  court,  urgent 
solicitations  for  assistance,  marched  from 
Acqui  with  a  part  of  his  force  to  Nizza  de 
la  Paglia,  in  a  direction  tending  to  support 
Colli,  who  had  fallen  back  behind  the  Po 
to  Carignano,  ten  miles  in  front  of  Turin. 


2'TO  Tlir.    LIFE    OF 


CHAP  VI.     Counleracling    this  movement,  which  was 
too  late  and  indecisive  to  be  useful,  Laharpe 
left  his  position  on  the   upper  Belbo,  and 
drew  down  to  Niella  with  a  view  of  keeping 
in  front  of  Beauheu^  and  in  closer  connection 
with  the  right  of  Augereau.     At  the  same 
lime^  as  intercouse  between  the  rear  of  the 
army  and  Savona  had  ceased  in  consequence 
of  the  shorter  hne  of  communication,  from 
Garessio  and  Oneille  to  Nice,  being  now  in 
possession  of  the  French,  general  Victor  was 
directed  to  break   up  from  Cairo  and  join 
Laharpe.     Orders  were  likewise  sent  to  ge- 
nerals Dallemagne  and  Macquart,  who  had 
remained  in  their  positions  on  the  extreme 
left,  with  a  few  skeletons  of  battalions,  des- 
tined to  guard  the  Col  de  Tende  and  main- 
tain a  connection  with   the   army  of   the 
Alps,  to  advance  into  Piedmont  and  in  con- 
junction with  one  of  Serrurier's  brigades,  to 
invest  Coni.      To  give  further  security  to 
his  position,  as  well  as  to  increase  his  power 
of  annihilating  the  resistance  of  Sardinia,  and 
carrying  on  the  campaign  against  Beaulieu, 
Bonaparte  requested  general  Rellerman  to 
send  forAvard  to  his  support  the  right  wing 


THE    niMPEKOR    NAPOLEOrs.  2-^1 

of  llie  army  of  the  Alps,   which  was   now  ^'Tt"' 
likelv  to  be  unemployed.  *^?i^^* 

A      ^  ^  1^96. 

Cherasco,  where  his  head  quarters  were 
established,  though  a  fortified  town,  being 
remote  from  the  frontiers,  was  indifferently 
armed  and  provided.  But  its  magazines 
contained  a  great  quantity  of  artillery,  and 
no  time  was  lost  in  putting  it  in  a  state  of 
defence.  After  this  was  effected,  the  main 
body  of  Massena  s  division  was  advanced  in 
the  direction  of  Turin  as  far  as  the  little 
town  of  Bra,  five  miles  in  front  ofCherasco, 
and  but  fifteen  from  general  CoUi's  camp. 

Thus  posted,  the  French  general  seemed 
to  be  prepared  to  strike  the  last  blow  at  the 
Sardinian  monarchy,  and  with  the  aid  of  the 
disaffected  population  around  him,  to  over- 
whelm the  king  himself  in  its  ruins. 

As  early  as  the  day  after  the  battle  of 
Mondovi,  general  Colli  had  proposed  a  ces- 
sation of  hostilities,  in  the  hope  of  suspend- 
ing the  tempest^  which,  powerless  from  de- 
feat and  unsheltered  by  Beaulieu,  he  felt 
unable  to  withstand.  The  court  of  Turin, 
alarmed  at  the  loss  of  their  intrenched  camp 
at  Geva,  had  furnished  the  occasion,  by  send- 


211  *rttE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  ing  plenipotentiaries  to  Genoa,  to  open  ne- 
gotiations with  the  French  agents  under  the 
mediation  of  Spain ;  which  court,  since  the 
treaty  of  Bale  in  July,  179?,  was  the  chosen 
intercessor  for  the  worsted  coalitionists. 
Colli  proposed  an  armistice,  to  continue 
until  the  result  of  these  negotiations  should 
be  known.  Bonaparte,  though  inexperienced 
in  diplomacy,  was  too  sagacious  not  to  dis- 
cover in  the  nakedness  of  this  proposition, 
an  indirect  appeal  to  his  mercy;  in  other 
words,  an  application  prompted  by  the  help- 
lessness and  trepidation  of  the  Sardinian 
monarch.  These  he  determined  to  turn  to 
account;  not  for  the  sake  of  wresting  exorbi- 
tant concessions  from  Victor  Amadeus,  but 
for  the  purpose  of  weakening  the  power  of 
Austria  in  Italy,  which  was  the  great  object 
of  the  campaign.  His  answer  to  general 
Coin,  considered  as  a  piece  of  diplomacy  is 
remarkable  for  being  perfectly  void  of  finesse 
or  duplicity;  and  regarded  in  reference  to 
his  situation  as  a  victorious  commander,  is 
commendable  for  delicacy  and  modera- 
tion. (28)  He  replied  that  the  directory  had 
reserved  to  itself  the  power  of  making  peace ; 
that  consequently  the  commissioners  of  the 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  2'] 3 

kine;  of  S  irdinia  would  be  under  the  neces-  From  March, 
sity  of  proceeding  to  Paris,  or  of  waiting  at      to  May, 
Genoa  for  the  arrival  of  French  plenipot en* 
tiaries;  that  considering  the  relative  situation 
of  the  two  armies,  a  simple  and  uncondi- 
tional cessation  of  hostiUties  was  out  of  the 
question ;  and  that  although  as  a  private  in- 
dividual, he  had  reason  to  beUeve  the  French 
government  would   consent   to    peace    on 
terms  honourable  to  the  king  of  Sardinia, 
he  could  not  on  the  mere  presumption,  sus- 
pend the  progress  of  his  army.     But  he  ad- 
ded, that  if  the  king  would  surrender  to  him 
two  of  the  three  fortresses,  Alexandria,  Coni, 
and  Tortona,  he  Avould  agree  to  the  desired 
suspension  of  arms.     By  this  fair  and  direct 
proceeding  he  consulted  the  main  object  of 
the  campaign,  and  the  safety  of  his  army, 
without  humiliating  the  court  of  Turin,  or 
appearing  to  remember  either  its  character- 
istic duplicity,  or  its  concern  in  the  occu- 
pation of  Toulon.     With  these  conditions 
Victor  Amadeus,  in  spite  of  the  intrigues 
and  instances  of  the  Austrian  and  English 
envoys  and  partizans,  complied  without  he- 
sitation ;  and  on  the  28th  of  April,  the  armis- 
tice of  which  they  formed   the  basis,  and 

18 


2^4  "^^^  ^^^^  ^^ 

CHAP.  VI.  which  comprehended  the  armies  of  Keller- 
man  and  the  duke  of  Aoste,  was  signed  at 
Cherasco.  (29) 

In  conformity  with  the  terms  finally  agreed 
upon,  by  virtue  of  which  the  king  of  Sardinia 
engaged  to  separate  himself  totally  from  the 
coalition,    and   to    discontinue   harbouring 
French  emigrants  of  all  ranks;    Coni  and 
Tortona,  with  the  artillery  and  magazines 
appertaining  to  them,  were  surrendered  to 
the  French ;  a  line  of  demarcation  between 
the  two  armies,  coinciding  with  the  limits 
of  their  actual    possessions,   was   defined; 
f        Geva,  situated  greatly  within  that  of  the 
French,  was  evacuated  by  the  Piedmontese 
garrison  ;  miUtary  routes  affording  a  direct 
communication   with   France  were   estab- 
lished; the  Sardinian  militia  disbanded ;  and 
the  Sardinian  army  disseminated  among  va- 
rious and  remote  stations,  so  as  to  relieve 
the  French,  of  old  acquainted  with  the  faith- 
less character  of  the  court  of  Turin,  from 
apprehensions  of  annoyance  in  their  rear. 
It  was  also  stipulated,  at  the  instance  of  Bo- 
naparte,  that  Valenza,  a  fortified  town  on 
the  Po,  above  the  mouth  of  the  Tanaro,  and 
in  the  direct  route  from  Cherasco  towards 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  2^5 

Milan,  should  be  evacuated  by  Beaulieu's  From  March. 

^ .  -^  1796, 

Neapolitan  troops,  and  surrendered  to  the  to  May. 
French  general,  to  be  held  by  him  until  he 
should  have  effected  the  passage  of  the  former 
river.  This  article,  though  apparently  of 
secondary  importance,  had  great  influence 
on  the  succeeding  operations. 

Murat,  colonel  of  cavalry  and  first  aide  de 
camp  of  the  commander  in  chief,  was  des- 
patched to  Paris  to  deliver  to  the  directory, 
w^ith  a  copy  of  the  armistice,  twenty-one 
stand  of  colours,  trophies  of  the  victories 
which  had  led  to  it;  a  mode  of  announce- 
ment as  novel  as  the  exploits  themselves  were 
then  unrivalled.  The  aide  de  camp  Junot, 
had  been  sent  from  Mellisimo  with  a  report 
of  that  important  battle,  but  being  obliged 
to  pass  by  Savona,  and  along  the  route  of 
the  Comiche^  Murat,  who  crossed  the  Alps 
at  Mont  Cenis  and  travelled  post  from 
Turin,  reached  Paris  before  him,  and  pro- 
duced consequently  greater  sensation  and 
rejoicing  in  the  capital.  The  legislative  bo- 
dies of  the  new  government,  which  at  its 
birth  in  the  previous  autumn,  Bonaparte  had 
protected  from  the  fury  of  domestic  fac- 
tions, were   now  occupied   in  solemnizing 


^.'j6  THE    LIFE    OF 

CHAP.  vr.  his  triumphs  over  foreign  foes.  Repeatedly 
during  one  week  in  April,  they  decreed  that 
the  army  of  Italji  had  deserved  well  of  their 
country.  It  need  scarcely  be  mentioned, 
that  the  victories  thus  celebrated  bear  the 
immortal  names  of  Montenotle^  Millesimo, 
Dego,  Ceva,  and  Mondovi. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  the  despatch 
of  Bonaparte,  announcing  the  armistice  of 
Cherasco,  was  dated  precisely  one  month 
after  his  first  report  from  the  head  quarters 
at  Nice.  (3o) 

The  French  general  remained  at  Cherasco 
only  three  days  after  the  signature  of  the 
armistice.  During  this  time,  besides  attend- 
ing to  the  execution  of  its  conditions,  he  was 

*'*<^  employed  in  providing    subsistence  for  his 

troops,  and  in  repressing  the  habits  of  plun- 
der into  which  they  had  relapsed.     The  ra- 
A  pidity  of  their  movements  since  the  nth  of 

April,  the  scarcity  of  money,  the  insufficient 
transport  and  mountainous  country,  had 
rendered  it  impracticable  to  furnish  a  regu- 
lar supply  of  rations.  The  consequence  was, 
that  the  men,  after  fighting  all  day  for  their 
country,  had  at  night  to  plunder  for  food. 
This,  of  course,  was  attended  always  with 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  277 

waste,  sometimes  with  license  and  cruelty.  "<^^^^rc^) 
To  the  reproaches  of  their  officers  they  an-  to  May, 
swered,  that  their  behaviour  was  better  than  ^  -^^-^^^ — 
their  fare,  and  to  threats  they  opposed  indif- 
ference or  defiance.  This  state  of  things 
was  productive  of  numerous  complaints  from 
the  field  officers  to  the  generals,  and  from 
these  to  the  commander  in  chief.  General 
Laharpe's  correspondence  teems  with  indig- 
nation at  the  conduct  of  the  men,  with  rage 
at  the  failure  of  the  contractors,  and  with 
an  inconsistent  anxiety  to  punish  both.  The 
letters  of  the  generals  exhibit  a  situation  of 
affairs,  which  under  any  other  commander 
of  the  age,  would  have  led  to  mutiny  sooner 
than  to  conquest.  In  a  letter  of  the  7th  of 
April,  general  Rusca  says,  "  I  have  but  few 
cartouches  at  Bardinetto.  You  must  for- 
ward a  supply  of  them,  as  well  as  rations  of 
brandy^  the  troops  being  in  bivouac  without  t 

blankets  or  shoes,  and  the  cold  is  severe.*' 
On  the  14th  Massena  wrote,  '^My  troops 
have  received  no  bread,  and  I  know  not 
whether  any  can  be  found  in  the  rear  at 
Vado."  Serrurier  the  same  day,  ^^  There 
are  no  provisions  in  the  magazines  of  Ormea 
and  Garessio*^  we  live  from  hand  to  mouth/' 


ay 8  THE    LIFE    OF 

ClUF.  VI.  And  Laharpe  also  on  the  i4th,  ''In  spite  of 
'  ~^  ^  your  promises,  general,  the  troops  are  still 
without  bread.  They  sink  from  fatigue  and 
inanition  ;  send  us,  at  least,  a  Uttlc  bread 
and  brandy,  for  1  fear  proving  a  prophet  of 
ill ;  yet,  if  we  are  attacked  to-morrow,  the 
men  will  behave  badly  for  the  want  of  phy- 
sical strength."  On  the  morrow  they  had 
to  fight  the  battle  of  Dego.  The  17th  Atb- 
gereau  wrote,  "  I  learn,  by  an  order  of  the 
day,  that  shoes  are  to  be  served  out  to  the 
divisions  of  generals  Massena  and  Laharpe. 
But  no  mention  is  made  of  my  division, 
which  is  in  great  Avant.  I  beg  you  to  send 
me  as  soon  as  possible,  a  supply  of  shoes,  of 
which  I  stand  in  need.  Provisions  destined 
for  my  division  are  received  with  difficulty." 
On  the  20th,  Laharpe,  after  reiterating  his 
complaints  and  declaring  that  the  69th  liad 
i  received  but  two   rations  and  a  half  in  a 

'  week,  concludes,  "  bread,  bread,  and  again 

bread."  On  the  2 2d,  this  brave  officer, 
whose  troops,  left  in  the  exhausted  country 
on  the  Belbo,  were  exposed  to  the  greatest 
suffering,  thus  expressed  himself,  "The  sol- 
diers are  culpable,  but  those  Avho  expose 
them  to  the  necessity  of  dying  of  hunger,  or 


,        THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.      279 

of  living  by  pillage,  are  much  more  so.     In  FromM|rch, 
the  name  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of  that      to  May, 

.  1796. 

liberty  which  they  are  assassinating,  come  to  «s_^ — - 
our  rehef.  Send  us  wherewithal  to  support 
our  wretched  existence,  without  committing 
crimes.  Who  would  have  believed  that  the 
brave  troops  of  the  army  of  Italy,  would  be 
rewarded  with  the  cruel  alternative  of  dying 
with  famine,  or  living  as  brigands." 

These  disorders,  so  grievous  in  them- 
selves, and  so  dangerous  in  their  conse- 
quences,  Bonaparte  saw  might  be  alleviated 
by  the  laws  of  discipline^  but  could  be  cor- 
rected effectually  only  by  the  removal  of 
their  cause.  While,  therefore,  he  denounced 
punishment  against  those  who  should  trans- 
gress the  rules  of  subordination,  or  seize 
without  authority  the  property  of  the 
inhabitants,  he  refused  to  sanction,  except 
in  one  or  two  cases  of  excessive  aggravation,  i 

the  infliction  of  capital  punishment ;  using 
at  the  same  lime,  his  utmost  exertions  to 
stimulate  the  activity  of  the  contractors,  and 
to  expedite  the  conveyance  and  delivery  of 
provisions.  For  this  object,  as  well  as  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  the  Aus- 
trians  had  completed  the  evacuation  of  Vol- 


CHAP.  VI. 


280  THE    LIFE    OF 

tri  and  might  not  repeat  the  surprise  0 
Dego,  general  Cervoni  was  sent,  after  the 
battle  of  the  i5th  toSavona,  with  directions 
to  see  that  the  supplies  for  the  army  were 
forwarded,  without  unnecessary  delay  or 
consumption   at    that    depot.       This  con- 
siderate tenderness    of  Bonaparte   for  his 
troops,  whose  irregularities  were  more  than 
compensated  by  their  sufferings  and  their 
services,  was  displeasing  to  some  of  his  offi- 
cers.    Two  field  officers  tendered  their  re- 
signations, and  the  brave  general  Laharpe, 
in  whose  character  there  appears  to  have  ex- 
isted that  sort  of  restlessness  and  inconsist- 
ency, which  a  keen  susceptibility  and  an  im- 
patient temper  are  apt  to  beget,  addressed 
to  the  general  in  chief  the  following  letter: 
"The   extravagant  disorder  to  which  the 
troops  give  themselves  up,  and  to  which  no 
remedy  can  be  applied,  since  the  authority 
to  shoot  a  rogue  is  refused  us^  hurries  us  to 
our  ruin^  covers  us  with  disgrace,  and  pre- 
pares for  us  the  most  cruel  reverses.     The 
firmness  of  my  character  not  permitting  me 
to  look  on  these  outrages,  much  less  to  toler- 
ate them,  the  only  part  left  for  me  is  to  re- 
tire; andj  therefore,  I  begof  you^  general;  to 


THE  EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  28 1 

accept  my  resignation,  and  to  send  an  officer  Ffom  March, 
to  take  the  command  with  which  I  am  en-      to  May, 
trusted,  preferring  rather  to  cultivate  the 
earth  for  bread,  than  to  remain  at  the  head 
of  a  rabble  who  are  worse  than  the  ancient 
Vandals." 

It  is  needless  to  observe  that  this  letter 
neither  altered  the  conduct  of  Bonaparte, 
nor  the  position  of  Laharpe,  although  it 
exemplifies  the  degree  of  embarrassment  to 
which^  from  this  source  of  suffering  and 
disorder,  the  former  was  exposed.  (3ij 

However,  the  halt  made  at  Gherasco,  the 
armistice  concluded  there,  and  the  establish- 
ment of  direct  routes  of  transportation  be- 
tween France  and  Piedmont,  soon  enabled 
the  general  to  apply  an  effectual  remedy  to 
these  distressing  inconveniences ;  that  is, 
to  remove  their  cause.  The  troops  being 
furnished  with  abundant  food,  ceased  to 
plunder,  and  returned  under  the  influence 
of  miUtary  rules  and  subordination,  which 
afterwards,  were  strictly  enforced.  (3^) 
Vohmteers  from  the  depots,  and  convales- 
cents from  the  hospitals,  attracted  by  news 
of  victory  and  plenty,  made  their  way  to 
his  camp  and  repaired  the  losses  which  hi 


a83  THE    LIF5    OF 

CHAP.  VI.  victories  had  cost.  Sixty  pieces  of  artillery 
were  put  in  order  for  service,  and  by  adding 
to  the  horses  taken  from  the  enemy,  those 
which  Avitli  the  consent  of  ilie  government; 
of  Sardinia,  were  purchased  in  Piedmont, 
the  greater  part  of  the  troopers  were 
mounted;  so  that  the  condition  of  the  army 
of  Italy  became  worthy  of  its  spirit  and 
prowess. 

At  Cherasco  Bonaparte  was  visited  by  the 
minister  and  the  son  of  the  king  of  Sardinia, 
who  expressed,  and  probably  felt  great  ad- 
miration for  the  young  conqueror.  The 
deUcacy  and  good  faith  of  his  proceedings  in 
relation  to  the  execution  of  the  terms  of  the 
armistice;  and  his  forbearance  to  counte- 
nance the  revolutionary  projects  of  the  in- 
habitants in  the  province  within  which  his 
principal  force  was  encamped,  gave  peculiar 
satisfaction  to  the  court  of  Turin,  and  made 
their  military  misfortunes  less  painful.  His 
moderation  in  this  instance  was  the  more 
remarkable,  as  it  was  in  opposition  to  the 
counsels  of  some  of  his  generals,  and  to  the 
letter  of  his  instructions.  (33) 

It  will  not  escape  the  reader's  observation 
that  this  was  not  the  only  point  in  regard  to 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  ^83 

which  Bonaparte  had  deviated  from  the  ^''^J^^^^'^^^ 
instructions  of  the  directory.  Instead  of  to  May, 
acting  principally  against  the  Anstrians,  he 
had  directed  his  force  chiefly  against  the  Sar- 
dinians. Instead  of  penetrating  to  the  right 
towards  Tortona;  he  had  advanced  to  the 
left  upon  Turin.  And  in  place  of  refusing 
an  armistice,  he  had  granted  one.  This  line 
of  conduct,  although  it  argued  a  fearlessness 
of  responsibility,  and  a  generous  disdain  like 
that  of  Alexander,  to  steal  a  victory^  may  at 
first  view  appear  insubordinate  and  unwar- 
rantable. To  this  conclusion  however  are 
opposed,  the  contradictory  nature  of  the 
instructions  themselves,  the  effectual  manner 
in  which  had  been  accomplished  the  success 
of  the  French  arms,  and  more  than  all,  the 
consideration,  that  in  every  position  in  which 
Bonaparte  had  been  previously  employed,  his 
ability  to  serve  his  country,  had  been  proved 
to  transcend  the  limits  of  his  authority.  At 
Toulon,  though  only  a  chief  of  battahon, 
with  the  sanction  of  Gasparin  and  the  ac- 
quiescence of  Dugommier,  he  commanded 
the  siege.  In  the  campaign  of  1794?  with 
the  approbation  of  the  deputies^  though  he 
was  only  a  brigadier  general^  he  directed  the 


284  '^^^   ^^^^   ^^ 

CHAP.  VI.  operations  of  general  Dumerblon  and  his 
whole  army.  At  Paris  in  1795,  in  the  pre- 
sence and  with  the  applause  of  the  conven- 
tion, he  treated  their  commander  in  chief  and 
their  commissaries  as  mere  nullities^  while 
he  defended  themselves  against  the  insur- 
gents. So  that  if  he  exceeded  his  instruc- 
tions in  the  campaign  of  Montenotte,  he  had 
usurped  command  in  the  insurrection  of 
Vendemaire,  in  the  campaign  of  Saorgio,  and 
at  the  siege  of  Toulon.  On  each  of  these 
occasions  he  had  overflowed  the  ordinary 
channels  of  duty  with  a  flood  of  courage,  pa- 
triotism, and  talent;  and  on  all  of  them,  an 
exuberance  of  public  good  had  sprung  from 
his  excess  of  authority.  Hitherto  this  pro- 
digality of  service,  had  been  accepted  by  the 
government  as  the  bounty  of  genius;  nor 
were  the  directory  in  the  present  instance, 
so  unjust  as  to  adopt  a  new  rule  of  construc- 
tion, and  pronounce  his  conduct  to  be  the 

encroachment  of  ambition.  (34) 

At  this  time,  as  neither  the  settled  ani- 
mosity of  factions  nor  the  organized  enmity 
of  governments,  had  breathed  mahgnant 
slanders  on  Bonaparte's  name,  his  character 
and  exploits  commanded  the  admiration  of 


THE    EMPEROR    NAPOLEON.  2S5 

t 

all  Europe.  (35)  And  having  as  we  have  From  March, 
seen,  in  the  short  space  of  fifteen  days,  shaken  to  May, 
and  upheld  one  kingdom,  humbled  and 
spared  one  monarch,  established  the  subsis- 
tence, renovated  the  discipline,  equipped  the 
cavalry,  supplied  the  artillery,  recruited  the 
strength,  and  fortified  the  rear  of  his  army, 
he  resolved  to  carry  the  war  into  the  heart 
of  Lombardy^  and  single  handed,  (36)  to 
brave  the  utmost  might  of  that  imperial 
house,  whose  hatred  was  destined  to  be  an 
instrument  of  his  elevation,  and  whose  love, 
to  be  a  cause  of  his  downfal.  (37) 


APPENDIX. 

i  T,IBTIARX  ' 


APPENDIX. 


CHAPTER  I. 


Page  2. 


(i)  From  the  manner  in  which  sir  Walter  Scott 
records  this  cardinal  event  in  his  story,  one  might 
infer  that  his  hero  was  a  foundling — for  instead  of 
establishing  the  date  of  his  birth  by  positive  affir- 
mation or  undeniable  proof,  he  settles  it  by  a  vague 
circumstantial  conjecture  (v.  iii,  p.  6).  ^^  The  sub- 
ject of  our  narrative  was  born,  according  to  the  best 
accounts  and  his  own  belief,  in  the  town  of  Ajaccio, 
upon  the  i5th  day  of  August,  1769."  This  he- 
sitating, circuitous  language,  whicli  might  be  pro- 
per to  remove  doubts  concerning  a  remote  or  un- 
certain event,  is  evidently  calculated  to  inspire  them, 
when  applied  to  a  fact  of  recent  occurrence,  signal 
notoriety,  and  infinite  attestation.  How  can  the 
birth  of  any  man,  public  or  private,  in  the  second 
half  of  the  i8th  century,  be  better  determined,  than 
Napoleon's  was,  at  the  time  the  author  of  Waver- 
ley  condescended  to  adjust  it  by  a  scale  of  loose 
probabilities ;  in  the  face  of  Napoleon's  own  state- 
ment, and  in  reach  of  the  testimony  of  his  mother, 

19 


290  APPENDIX. 

his  uncle,  and  of  the  evidence  afforded  by  the  do- 
mestic chronology  of  a  numerous  family? 

Polybius  insists  on  the  importance  of  fixing  with 
clearness  and  precision  the  commencement  of  an 
historical  narrative,  a  precept  which  common 
sense,  and  common  practice  confirms.  As  sir 
Walter  Scott  has  left  a  name  in  literature,  more 
illustrious  than  that  of  Polybius,  the  reader  may 
be  curious  to  learn  his  motive,  for  employing 
terms  on  this  occasion,  which  have  the  singular 
property  of  suggesting  doubts  which  the  author 
himself  did  not  entertain,  and  upon  a  subject, 
in  regard  to  which,  certainty  was  not  only  de- 
sirable, but  in  truth  almost  unavoidable.  That 
he  could  entertain  no  doubt  on  the  subject  is  evi- 
dent, not  only  from  its  universal  notoriety,  but 
from  the  fact  that  he  had  before  him  and  referred 
to  Benson's  Sketches  of  Corsica,  in  which  (p.  3)  the 
record  of  Napoleon's  baptism,  stating  that  he  was 
born  on  the  i5th  of  August,  1769^  is  given  jTor  the 
declared  purpose  of  clearing  up  all  doubt. 

In  the  Quarterly  Review  for  October,  i8i4^  is  an 
article  headed,  ^^  Memoirs  of  Buonaparte' s  depo- 
sition^" in  which,  among  other  points  of  invective 
and  schemes  of  detraction,  a  violent,  though  not  a 
vigorous,  effort  is  made,  to  prove  that  Napoleon 
had  falsified  the  date  of  his  birth,  his  name,  and  the 
names  of  his  family.  This  article  was  ascribed  by  the 
voice  of  literary  rumour,  to  a  distinguished  and  ob- 
sequious place-holder  under  the  British  govern- 
ment, a  prolific  if  not  a  powerful  contributor  to  the 


CHAPTER    I.  291 

review  in  question.     Of  its  temper  and  language 
the  following  passage  will  give  the  reader  a  just  idea. 

^^  It  is  worth  recording  as  characteristic  of  Buo- 
naparte and  consistent  with  his  whole  course  of 
life,  that  \\q  falsified  the  date  of  his  birth,  his  own 
Christian  and  family  names,  and  the  names  of  his 
wife  and  of  all  his  family. 

*^He  chose  to  call  himself  Napoleon  Bonaparte^ 
and  to  fix  his  birth  day  on  the  i5th  August^  1769. 

^^  His  real  names  are  Napolione  Buonaparte^ 
and  he  was  born  on  the  ^th  Fehruary^  1768. 

^^  The  change  of  name  was  evidently  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  it  somewhat  French;  and  it  was 
not  till  his  appointment  to  the  army  of  Italy,  that 
he  made  this  alteration.  Barras,  in  his  official 
account  of  the  affair  of  the  i3th  Vendemiaire,  5th 
October,  1 796,  calls  him,  He  general  Buonaporte,' 
probably  a  misprint  for  Buonaparte^  and  in  the 
contract  of  marriage  between  him  and  his  first  wife, 
still  existing  in  the  registry  of  the  second  arron- 
dissement  of  Paris,  dated  also  in  1796,  he  is  called 
by  the  notary,  Napolione  Bonaparte;  but  his  own 
signature  at  the  foot  of  the  contract,  is  written  Na- 
polione Buonaparte;  and  the  preamble  to  this  deed 
states  that  his  baptismal  register,  then  produced, 
attests  that  he  was  born  on  the  5th  February,  1768. 

^''  For  the  change  of  date  three  reasons  may  be 
assigned,  ist,  that  he  piqued  himself  on  being  the 
youngest  of  heroes,  and  was  not  sorry  to  strike  a 
year  and  a  half  from  his  real  age ;  2d,  Corsica 
was  not  annexed  to  France  till  June,  1 769,  and 


9.92  APPENDIX. 

therefore  to  make  himself  a  Frenchman^  he  was 
obliged  to  choose  a  date  subsequent  to  this  period  ^ 
3d,  the  i5th  August  was,  in  the  French  calendar, 
the  day  on  which  a  vow  of  Louis  XIII,  putting 
his  kingdom  under  the  protection  of  the  Virgin, 
was  celebrated,  and  it  therefore  appeared  a  fit 
birth  day  for  the  saviour  of  France,  as  Buonaparte 
called  himself,  and  a  convenient  niche  for  the  new 
patron  saint  Napoleon. 

^^From  the  same  contract  of  marriage  it  seems 
that  Josephine's  real  names  were  Marie  -  Joseph- 
Rose. 

^^The  names  of  the  rest  of  the  family,  as  they 
appear  in  the  act  of  guardianship  made  on  their 
father's  death,  and  now  remaining  in  the  archives 
of  the  chambre  des  comptes,  are  as  follows,  Joseph, 
Napolione,  Lucciano,  Luiggi,  Girolamo,  Mariana, 
Carletta,  Annonciada  j  in  the  last  three  persons,  our 
readers  would  have  some  difficulty  in  recognising 
their  imperial  bignesses  the  Princesses  Elise  and 
Pauline,  and  her  majesty  Queen  Caroline  of  Naples; 
but  even  this  change  did  not  satisfy  him,  for  lat- 
terly, his  court  calendar  announced  these  ladies  as 
Marie-Elise,  Marie-Pauline,  and  Marie-Caroline; 
and  even  his  old  mother  Letzia  was  new  christened 
Marie  Letitia. 

^^The  story  of  Napoleon's  having  been  baptized 
Nicholas  is  therefore  not  true ;  though  at  the  col- 
lege of  Brienne  he  may  have  substituted  this  fami- 
liar name  for  his  foreign  one  of  Napoleon." 

The  follv  and  falsehood  of  this  effusion,  are  too 


CHAPTER   I.  293 

obvious  and  contemptible  for  serious  notice  or  ex- 
posure. The  empress  wrote  her  name  Josephine^ 
when  she  was  madame  de  Beauharnais,  as  may  be 
seen,  in  her  ^  Letters  to  her  Daug^hter/  found  in  the 
coUectionpublished  by  F.  Didot.  In  composition^ 
Josephine  was  curtailed  of  its  last  syllable,  as 
Marie  Joseph-Rose.  In  regard  to  NapoUone  (Ita- 
lian) and  Napoleon  (French)  their  difference  is  im- 
putable clearly  to  the  two  languages,  as  Las  Casas 
(Spanish)  has  become  Las  Cases  (French),  and 
Henry  (English)  is  Henri  (French).  Every  body 
but  the  Quarterly  reviewer  it  seems,  knew  that 
Buonaparte  and  BuonaroUi,  and  similar  Italian 
names,  were  written  with  or  without  the  w,  at 
pleasure.  This  learned  person  seems  also  to  have 
been  ignorant,  that  Lucciano,  Luiggi,  Girolamo, 
etc.,  in  Italian,  are  equivalent  to  Lucien,  Louis, 
Jerome,  etc.,  in  French.  But  the  mother  of  Napo- 
leon, a  woman,  who  independently  of  the  wonder- 
ful man  she  gave  to  the  world,  or  of  the  eventful 
story  of  her  life,  is  respected  for  all  the  virtues  of 
her  sex,  venerable  and  venerated  for  her  age,  hap- 
pened to  have  two  names,  Marie  Letitia  (as  may 
be  seen  in  the  baptismal  register  of  her  son,  pub- 
lished by  Benson)  a  circumstance  so  offensive  and 
outrageous  to  the  Quarterly  reviewer,  that  he  as- 
serts, ^^  even  his  old  mother  Letzia  was  new 
christened  Marie-Letitia."  One  might  apprehend, 
that  some  caged  hyena,  hungry  for  human  flesh, 
had  been  inspired  with  the  art  of  writing ! 

The  Quarterly  Review  was  considered  a  vehicle 


294  APPENDIX. 

of  demi-ofFicial  wishes  and  opinions^  and  the  au- 
thor of  this  execrable  diatribe,  was  of  course  less 
the  dispenser  of  literary  fame,  than  the  orp-an  of 
ministerial  and  royal  sentiments.     This  last  consi- 
deration it  is  well  known,  Sir  Walter  Scott  was  not 
the  rude  and  rebellious  person  to  disregard.  In  these 
circumstances  may  be  discovered  the  influence  to 
which  the  great  Scotch  Novelist  was  Z»oom^,  and  the 
associations  to  which  he  winked,  upon  setting  out  to 
escort  the  mighty  name  of  Napoleon  to  posterity. 
That  this  Caledonian   courtesy  was  altogether 
different  from  mere  French  politeness,  and  exhi- 
bited a  perfect  consistency  between  the  deportment 
and  design  of  the  author,  is  evident  from  a  previous 
pass^e  of  his  work.     In  his  preliminary  history  of 
the  Frencb  revolution,  where  he  is  describing  the 
irruption  of  the  populace,  into  the  palace  of  Ver- 
sailles on  the  night  of  the  5th  and  6th  October,  and 
the  narrow  escape  of  the  queen  from  their  fury, 
he  goes  out   of  his  way  in   order  to  sooth  and 
gratify  legitimate  ears  by  imputing  to   the  hero 
of  his  book  a  gross  falsehood,  before  he  has  even 
announced  his  birth^  name,  or  parentage.     In  a 
note  (v.  i,  p.  20 r)  referring  to  a  remark  made  by 
Napoleon  near  thirty  years  subsequently  to  the 
period  of  which  he  was  writing.  Sir  Walter  Scott 
observes ; — ^'  One  of  the  most  accredited  calumnies 
against  the  unfortunate  Marie  Antoinette  pretends, 
that  she  was  on  this  occasion  surprised  in  the  arms  of 
a  paramour.    Buonaparte  is  said  to  have  mentioned 
this  as  a  fact,  upon  the  authority  of  Madame  Cam- 


CHAPTER    I.  295 

pan.     We  have  now  Madame  Campan's  own  ac- 
count, describing  the  condtict  of  the  queen  on  this 
dreadful  occasion  as  that  of  a  heroine,  and  totally  ex- 
cluding the  possibility  of  the  pretended  anecdote. 
But  let  it  be  farther  considered,  under  what  circum- 
stances the  queen  was  placed, — at  two  in  the  morn- 
ing, retired  to  a  privacy  Uable  to  be  interrupted  (as 
it  was)  not  only  by  the  irruption  of  the  furious 
banditti  who  surrounded  the  palace,  demanding  her 
life,  but  by  the  entrance  of  the  king,  or  of  others, 
in  whom  circumstances  might  have  rendered  the 
intrusion  duty  •  and  let  it  then  be  judged  whether 
the  danger  of  the  moment  and  the  risk  of  discovery, 
would  not  have  prevented  Messalina  herself  from 
choosing  such  a  time  for  an  assignation,"    The  sex, 
the  beauty,  and  the  fate  of  Marie  Antoinette,  com- 
mand for  her  memory  the  respectful  indulgence 
of  generous  minds.    But  could  these  considerations 
justify  the  Author  of  Waverley,  in  endeavouring  to 
forestall  the  equity  of  his  readers,  by  creating  an 
impression  that  the  man,  to  the  study  of  whose 
character  he  was  professing  to  conduct  them,  had 
made  a  false  assertion  in  order  to  propagate  a  cruel 
slander  ?     Unfortunately  for  the  memory  or  Marie 
Antoinette  and  for  the  Author  of  Waverley,  he  sus- 
tains this   imputation  by  a  course  of  reasoning, 
which  leads  to  a  conclusion  precisely  opposed  to 
the  consequence  he  aims  at.     He  argues,  first,  that 
considering  the  firmness  of  mind  displayed  by  the 
queen  on  this  occasion,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  she 
would  have  permitted  the  caresses  of  a  paramour 


igG  APPENDIX. 

that  night.     The  inference,  however,  is  obviously 
the  other  way,  inasmuch  as  had  she  been  (jreatly 
oppressed  with  fear^  an  access  of  love  would  have 
been  improbable.     He  next  argues  that  from  the 
circumstances  of  the  moment^  the  liability  to  inter- 
ruption from  the  populace,  or  from  the  king,   or, 
in  consequence  of  danger,  from  others,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  conceive  that  she  would  then  have  consented 
to  an  assignation.     Now  the  circumstances  of  the 
moment,  so  far  from  hearing  this  terrific  aspect, 
were  according  to  Sir  Walter's  own  account  on  the 
previous  page,  the  most  favourable  that  could  be  to 
the  alleged  interview,  as  they  were  of  a  character 
to  exclude  the  apprehension   of  disturbance.     La 
Fayette  had  arrived  with  the  civic  guard  from  Paris, 
and  after  addressing  the  mob,  having  an  audience 
of  the  king,  and  ^^  pledging  himself  to  the  national 
assembly,  for  the  safety  of  the  royal  family,  and  the 
tranquillity  of  the  night,"  had  retired  to  rest  under 
the  sincere  conviction,  that  there  was  not  the  least 
danger  of  an  attack  on  the  palace.     Was  there  then 
any  thing  in  the  appearance  of  these  circumstances, 
to  deter  the  queen  from  an  assignation  ?     Her  previ- 
ous display  of  fortitude  is  not  inconsistent  with  the 
anecdote,  for  the  mind,  after  contending  with  stern 
emotions,  is  not  unwilling  to  repose  on  those  of  a 
different  description .    With  respect  to  the  autho- 
rity of  Madame  Campan,  which  is  so  vaguely  and 
bravely  referred  to,  she  says  (t.  ii,  p.  77)  that  the 
queen  on  going  to  bed,  ^^  directed  her  attendants  to 
go  to  bed  likewise,  thinking  there  would  be  no 


CHAPTEPt    I.  297 

danger,  that  night  at  least."     So  that  Marie  An- 
toinette was  not  apprehensive  of  interruption  from 
the  populace,  nor  inclined  to  admit  it  from  her  ladies 
in  waiting.     As  to  the  king,  Madame  Campan  has 
commemorated  too  faithfully  his  unnatural  coldness 
(t.  i;  pp.  60^  88)  and  his  almost  incurable  torpor 
(p.  186),  to  render  the  anecdote  repeated  by  Na- 
poleon^ improbable,  or  the  circumstance  it  records, 
inexcusable.    Besides^  according  to  his  version,  the 
Count  de  Fersen,  well  known  before  as  the  queen's 
favourite,  had  arrived  at  Versailles  only  that  even- 
ing (O'Mear  a,  v.  ii,  p.  1 7  2),  when,  though  she  might 
not  have  been  disposed  to  form  a  new  connection, 
there  was  nothing  to  deter  the  renewal  of  an  old  one . 
It  is  to  be  observed  farther,  that  Madame  Campan 
might  very  well  relate  an  anecdote  of  the  kind  ver- 
bally, which  she  would  decline  publishing  in  a  book ; 
while  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  motive  which  would 
induce  Napoleon  to  invent  such  a  story :  and  it  may 
be  added  that  as  the  period  of  the  restoration,  un- 
der which  Madame  Campan's  Memoirs  as  well  as 
Sir  Walter's  work  appeared,  was  not  favourable  to 
the  development  of  truth  in  regard  to  this  question, 
so  the  air  of  Versailles,  the  genius  loci,  at  the  time 
the  queen  was  driven  from  her  l3ed^  was  not  propi- 
tious to  royal  chastity.     The  reader  cannot  fail  to 
perceive  that  as  Sir  Walter  is  on  this  subject  far 
from  questioning  the  veracity  of  Madame  Campan, 
or  of  O'Meara,  his  laboured  imputation  was  in- 
tended to  bear  exclusively  upon  the  memory  of  Na- 
poleon.    Had  there  been  the  least  occasion  for  it 


2()8  APPENDIX. 

— had  the  digression  into  which  it  is  shaped  been 
pertinent  in  the  remotest  degree — had  Sir  Walter 
been  writing  the  life  of  Marie  Antoinette,  this  at- 
tempt to  vindicate  her  memory,  even  at  the  risk  of 
reviving  the  recollection  of  her  frailties,  might  have 
been  pardoned  in  spite  of  its  injurious  feilure.  But 
when  it  is  obvious,  that  there  was  no  occasion  for 
it,  that  it  is  a  violent  deviation  from  his  narrative, 
an  excrescence  from  his  subject,  it  exposes  the  in- 
tention with  which  his  book  was  written  too  plain- 
ly to  admit  of  doubt  or  to  require  demonstratiou. 
All  that  remains  is  to  see  how  it  is  executed. 

Page  5. 

(2)  It  is  remarkable  that  Sir  Walter  Scott,  who 
is  so  devoutly  respectful  to  long  pedigrees  and  high 
birth,  should  express  derision  for  the  undisputed 
nobility  and  ancient  distinction  of  the  Bonaparte 
family.  Hazlitt,  a  fierce  republican,  traces  it  with 
careful  prolixity,  (v.  i,  pp.  2,  3,  l\^  5,  6)  ;  Norvins, 
(v.  i,  p.  i)  with  serious  succinctness  j  Lockhart, 
(v.  i,  p.  1)  with  studied  diminution  -,  while  Scott 
classes  it  among  minute  matters  which  might  be 
justly  regarded  (v.  i,  p.  2)  ^^  as  trivial  and  un- 
worthy of  notice."  The  electors  of  Hanover^  when 
transferred  from  a  poor  German  principality  to  the 
throne  of  Great  Britain,  by  accident  not  by  merit, 
were  proud  of  the  former  distinction  of  their  family, 
though  the  honours  of  this  kind  which  it  could 
boast,  were  not  higher  than  those  of  the  sovereign 
princes  of  Treviso,  or  of  the  Christian  emperors  of 


CHAPTER    I.  299 

Constantinople.  For  the  descent  of  the  Bonaparte 
family  see  Memorial  de  St.  Helene  (t.  i^  p.  142  et 
sequente) ;  Memoires  de  la  Duchess  d'Abrantes 
(t.  i^  ch.  3)  3  La  famille  Bonaparte^  par  M. 
Foissy,  Avocat ;  and  Zoph's  summary  of  universal 
history. 

Page  4. 

(3)  The  early  traces  of  that  disparagement  which 
pervades  Scott's  Life  of  jNapoleon^  after  he  fairly 
reaches  his  subject,  are,  as  might  be  expected  from 
so  practised  and  skilful  a  painter,  slight  and  inci- 
dental ;  disposing  the  mind  of  the  reader  to  receive 
false  impressions,  rather  than  attempting  directly 
to  convey  them.  Thus  (v.  iii,  p.  4)  it  is  gently 
intimated  that  Napoleon  possessed,  in  common 
with  his  father,,  a  sprightly  mind  and  fluency  of 
speech  — ^"^  possessed  a  talent  for  eloquence  and  a 
vivacity  of  intellect  which  he  transmitted  to  his 
son," — an  intimation  which  leaves  room  for  assign- 
ing to  extraordinary  fortune,  rather  than  to  trans- 
cendant  genius,  the  principal  events  of  his  career. 
In  the  same  style  of  design,  and  on  the  same  page, 
it  is  observed,  that  his  brother  Lucien,  who  never 
fought  a  battle,  planned  a  campaign,  prescribed  a 
peace,  dictated  a  law,  nor  administered  a  govern- 
ment, ^^was  scarce  inferior  to  Napoleon  in  talent." 
A  traveller  who  should  say  that  the  gloomy  and 
lumpish  hills  of  Scotland  ^^were  scarce  inferior"  to 
the  Andes,  would  convey  a  very  inadequate  idea  of 
the  altitude  of  Chimborazo.    As  this  over-praise  of 


3oO  APPENDIX. 

Lucien,  can  scarcely  be  attributed  to  Sir  Walter's 
partiality  for  the  Bonaparte  family,  it  must  be  con- 
sidered as  a  sly  attempt,  to  extol  one  brother,  at 
the  expense  of  the  other. 

Page  i>. 

(4)  That  a  lady  in  an  advanced  state  of  preg- 
nancy, and  surrounded  by  the  calamities  of  war,  to 
which  her  husband  as  a  chief  of  the  defeated  party 
was  peculiarly  exposed,  should  need  the  support  of 
prayer,  or  implore  the  protection  of  heaven,  can 
hardly  be  supposed  to  proceed  from  ^^a  good  con- 
stitution and  bold  character  of  mind,"  as  is  coarse- 
ly affirmed  by  Sir  Walter  (v.  iii,  p.  6).  It  must  have 
required  '^  a  forty -parson -power"  of  prejudice, 
or  of  something  worse,  to  induce  an  author  of  his 
delicacy  of  feeling  and  unrivalled  power  of  descrip- 
tion —  the  creator  of  Rebecca  —  thus  to  caricature 
and  debase  this  noble  and  touching  incident. 

'  ^  Interea  ad  templum  non  aequee  Palladis  ibant 
Crinibus  Iliades  passis,  peplumque  ferebant 
Suppliciter  tristes.'^ 

The  benevolent  and  enlightened  Addison  re- 
commends to  a  lady  in  affliction  (Spectator, 
No.  iG3.)  practices  of  devotion,  as  the  most  ef- 
fectual and  the  most  natural  means  of  relief. 

Page  6. 

(5)  This  account  of  the  birth  of  her  son,  was  com- 
municated to  me,  by  the  mother  of  Napoleon  her- 
self, at  Rome,  long  before  the  preparation  of  this 


CHAPTER    I.  3oi 

work  was  thought  of.  She  expressly  contradicted 
the  story  about  the  tapestry  of  the  apartment  being 
ornamented  with  designs  from  the  Iliad. 

Page  9. 

(G)  Madame  Mere.  In  the  interview  with  which  I 
was  honoured  by  this  venerable  lady  in  the  autumn 
of  i83o^  she  conversed  much  about  the  birth  and 
infancy  of  her  great  son ;  whose  full  length  portrait 
in  his  imperial  robes^  was  at  the  head  of  the  bed  on 
which  she  was  reclining.  The  portrait  of  her  hus- 
band representing  a  very  handsome  man  was  on 
the  right  of  her  bed.  Among  other  particulars  she 
mentioned  the  extreme  fondness  and  indulgence 
of  Napoleon's  father  j  who  often  saved  his  favourite 
from  her  correction,  and  controlled  him  frequently 
by  threatening  to  tell  her  of  his  disobedience,  saying, 
^^  Very  well,  sir,  I  shall  tell  your  mother,  and  she 
will  teach  you  to  behave  better."  She  added,  as 
well  as  I  can  remember  her  remark:  ^'  This  threat 
usually  checked  Napoleon  j  but  sometimes  I  had  to 
switch  him  well." 

Page  9. 

(7)  This  fact  mentioned  to  me  by  Madame  Mere^ 
is  repeated  on  her  authority  in  Montbel's  notice  of 
the  Life  of  the  Due  de  Reichstadt  (p.  357 .) 

Page  10. 

(8)  He  delivered  a  speech  in  that  convention, 
which  contained  the  following  noble  passage : — 


V 


302  APPENDIX. 

^^Ifj  in  order  to  be  free,  it  were  only  necessary  to 
wish  it,  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  would  be  free. 
But  we  learn  from  history  that  few  have  enjoyed  that 
blessing,  because  but  few  have  had  the  energy,  the 
courage,  and  the  virtue  necessary  to  gain  it."  This 
speech  was  addressed  to  a  people  who  had  the  will, 
but  not  the  power  to  be  free.  The  celebrated  re- 
mark of  Lafayette — "To  be  free  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  will  it,"  had  reference  to  nations  in  different 
circumstances. 

Page  H. 

(9)  Sir  Walter  Scott's  statement  of  the  circum- 
stances under  which  Napoleon  was  entered  at  the 
school  of  Brienne,  is  not  only  inexact,  but  is  unau- 
thorised, except  in  so  far  as  it  coincides  with  the 
slanders  prepared,  during  the  war,  by  English  hire- 
lings at  Paris,  and  repeated  by  historians  of  the 
same  class  in  London.  He  says  (v.  iii,  p.  9)  '^^  the 
Count  de  Marbeuf  interested  himself  so  much  in  the 
young  Napoleon,  as  to  obtain  him  an  appointment 
to  the  Royal  military  school  of  Brienne/'  and  ar- 
ranges his  dates  (v.  iii,  p.  5)  so  as  to  ante-date  the 
Corsican  deputation  three  years^andsendit  to  Louis 
XV,  whose  life  he  prolongs  to  1776  !  The  narra- 
tive in  the  text  is  the  substance  of  Napoleon's  decla- 
ration to  Las  Cases  (Memorial,  t.  i,  pp.  i54-5),  is 
confirmed  by  his  conversations  with  Antomarchi, 
which  are  adopted  byHazUtt,  and  is  countenanced 
by  the  account  of  Norvins  (v.  i,  p.  10),  while  Sir 

Walter  Scott's  statement  is  contradicted  or  rejected 


CHAPTER    I.  3o3 

by  every  author  pretending  to  respectability,  \vho 
has  written  on  the  subject,  except  Lockhart,  who, 
defying  this  body  of  authority,  adopts  the  distorted 
story  of  Sir  Walter,  even  to  the  extravagance  of  as- 
serting (v.  i,  p.  4)  that  Bonaparte  entered  the  school 
of  Brienne  when  but  seven  years  of  age.  Why  the 
patronage  of  Marbeuf  should  have  been  gratuitously 
interposed  by  both  these  authors,  is  a  question, 
which  can  hardly  be  answered,  without  reference 
to  the  first  note. 

Page  15. 

(lo)  The  slander  noticed  in  this  paragraph,  ori- 
ginated in  the  intercourse  of  kindness,  which  sub- 
sisted between  the  families  of  de  Marbeuf  and  Bona- 
parte. Napoleon's  own  positive  account  of  this 
intercourse,  as  it  was  not  controverted  by  Sir  Wal- 
ter Scott,  should  have  been  adopted  by  him  ;  for 
his  neglect  of  it  implies  a  persuasion,  that  the 
declarations  of  his  hero  deserved  neither  to  be  cre- 
dited nor  contested.  But  with  a  looseness  which 
could  hardly  be  admissible  in  the  structure  of  a 
fictitious  narrative,  he  destroys  all  the  tendencies  of 
probability,  and  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect, 
composing  the  substance  and  aspect  of  this  circum- 
stance. He  makes  Charles  Bonaparte  owe  his  de- 
putation to  Versailles  to  the  influence  of  Marbeuf  in 
Corsica,  and  represents  his  judicial  appointment  as 
a  consequence  of  this  mission  ;  deriving  both  steps 
of  advancement  from  the  favour  of  Marbeuf  (v.  iii, 
pp.  5  and  9);  whereas,  Charles  Bonaparte  received 


3o4  APPENDIX. 

the  judicial  appointment  before  he  was  deputed  to 
Versailles,  and  was  indebted  for  both  these  situa- 
tions to  facts  attested  by  Sir  Walter  himself  j  his 
popularity  as  a  patriot,  his  eloquence  as  an  advo- 
cate, and  his  consequent  consideration  among  the 
nobility  of  the  island.     This  is  his  own  account  of 
Napoleon's  father  (v.  iii,  p.  3).     ^^  Charles  Bona- 
parte was  the  principal  descendant  of  this  exiled 
family.     He  was  regularly  educated  at  Pisa,  in  the 
study  of  the  law,  and  is  stated  to  have  possessed  a 
very  handsome  person,  a  talent  for  eloquence,  and 
a  vivacity  of  intellect,  which  he  transmitted  to  his 
son.     He  was  a  patriot  also,  and  a  soldier,  and  as- 
sisted in  the  gallant  stand  made  by  Paoli  against 
the  French . "   Had  Paoli  refrained  from  emigration, 
and  become  reconciled  to  the  French  government, 
it  may  be  readily  conceived,  without  assuming  the 
instrumentality  of  Marbeuf  s  influence  (admitting 
he  possessed  this  influence)  that  Paoli  would  have 
been  offered  the  place  of  deputy  of  the  nobles.   In 
his  absence,  Charles  Bonaparte,  his  friend,  his  com- 
patriot, his  follower,  may  be  said  to  have  stood  in 
his  place.     The  truth  is,  that  Charles  Bonaparte, 
instead  of  being  indebted  to  the  influence  of  Mar- 
beuf^ actually  supported  Marbeuf  by  his  influence, 
as  is  mentioned  in  the  text,  in  conformity  with 
the  undisputed  account  of  Napoleon  himself,  with 
the  position  of  the   persons  and  with  the  order 
and  character  of  the  events  in    question.      It  is 
remarkable,  that  the  slander  which  this  confusion 
of  misstatements  would  seem  intended  to  colour, 


CHAPTER   I.  3o5 

Sir  Walter  could  not  venture   to  confirm^   nor 
Lockhart  to  repeat. 

Page  14. 

(ii)  Bourrienne  (t.  i,  p.  35),  an  author,  whose 
spirit  of  detraction  and  ingratitude,  makes  his  tes- 
timony unexceptionable,  when  favourable  to  his 
benefactor. 

Page  14. 
(i  a)  From  a  fear  of  multiplying  notes  unnecessa- 
rily, I  beg  to  observe,  that  the  account  given  in  the 
text,  of  Napoleon's  disposition,  conduct,  and  stand- 
ing, while  at  the  military  schools,  is  taken  from  his 
own  consistent  statements  to  Las  Cases,  O'Meara, 
and  Antomarchi,  the  authenticated  notes  and  say- 
ings of  the  professors,  and  the  admissions  of  Bour- 
rienne, and  Sir  Walter  Scott  himself.  This  last 
author,  however,  at  the  expense  of  his  consistency, 
takes  care  to  represent  Napoleon's  reserve,  superin- 
duced by  circumstances,  as  the  effect  of  a  charac- 
ter naturally  cold  and  unsocial — omitting  those 
causes  of  pain  to  his  sensibility  and  offence  to  his 
pride,  which,  for  a  season,  '^  chilled  the  genial 
current  of  his  soul." 

Page  20. 
(i3)  Sir  Walter  Scott  takes  a  different  view  of 
Napoleon's  intellectual  character,  and  seems  to 
think  it  was  fitted  for  scientific  studies  and  military 
employments  only  (v.  iii,  p.  12);  asserting  that 
he  never  acquired  the  art  ^^of  writing  or  spelling 
French  with  accuracy  or  correctness"  —  that 
^^  though  of  Italian  origin  he  had  not  a  decided 

20 


3o6  APPENDIX. 

taste  for  the  fine  arts" —  that  his  ^*  taste  leaned  to 
the  grotesque  and  bombastic/^  and  ^^that  his  bulle- 
tins seldom  if  ever  present  those  touches  of  subli- 
mity, which  are  founded  on  simplicity  and  dignity 
of  expression." 

The  speeches,  writings,  and  laws  of  Napoleon, 
prove,  that  he  was  as  capable  of  excelling  in  legis- 
lation as  in  war,  and  of  acquiring  elegant  attain- 
ments, as  he  was  of  gaining  abstruse  knowledge. 
The  temerity  of  the  assertion,  that  he  never  ^^ac- 
quired  the  art  of  writing  or  spelling  French  with 
correctness,"  may  be  estimated  by  reflecting,  that 
he  was  educated  from  the  age  of  ten  to  that  of  six- 
teen, by  French  instructors,  with  French  compa- 
nions, and  in  French  society,  alone;  that  he  con- 
versed in  French  only^  andthat  all  his  compositions, 
even  his  letters  to  his  parents,  were  in  French,  and 
were  submitted,  as  Sir  Walter  Scott  himself  affirms, 
to  the  inspection  and  correction  of  a  French  pro- 
fessor of  belles  lettres.  That  at  the  age  of  twenty, 
he  was  the  author  of  a  French  essay,  which  gained 
a  prize  of  the  Academy  of  Lyons  in  preference  to 
other  French  essays;  that  he  wrote  a  French  his- 
torical tract  which  obtained  the  approbation  of  the 
Abbe  Raynal,  a  French  author  of  taste  and  dis- 
tinction; that  before  he  was  twenty- four  years  of 
age,  he  had  composed  other  popular  and  admired 
writings  in  French;  that  throughout  this  susceptive 
period  of  life^  his  constant  associates  and  intimate 
friends,  were  French  gentlemen  and  ladies;  that 
he  married  a  French  lady;  commanded  French  ar- 


CHAPTER    I.  3o7 

raiesj    negotiated  French  treaties^   governed  the 
French  nation^  patronised  French  literature  j  was 
a  member  of  the  French  Institute ;  and  for  a  series 
of  years^  corresponded  with  his  generals  and  mi- 
nisters^ the  agents  of  other  governments  or  of  his 
own^  and  the  crowned  heads  of  Europe ;  and  read^ 
wrote^  and  spoke,  habitually,  for  about  forty  years, 
in  the  French  language  only.     If  with  this  educa- 
tion and  life,  he  remained  incapable  ^^  of  writing 
or  spelling  the  French  language  with  correctness," 
the  fact  woidd  constitute  a  peculiarity,  as  remark- 
able, as  any  circumstance  connected  with  his  cha- 
racter^ and  in  that  view,  should  have  been  carefully 
and  conspicuously  set  forth  by  Sir  Walter.  Where- 
as, the  unceremonious  manner  in  which  he  in- 
troduces and  dismisses  the  strange  assertion,  shews 
that  he  preferred  its  being  believed,  to  its  being 
examined.     Briefly  mentioned  in  the  beginning  of 
the  third  volume,  its  proof  is  not  attempted  until 
the  close  of  the  fifth  (p.  4^6)^   and  this  attempt 
consists  only  in  the  production  of  the  copy  of  an 
autograph    note  from  Bonaparte    to  Talleyrand, 
written,  when  the  former  was  first  consul,   and 
the  latter  (the  2)ublic  having  forgotten  as  Sir  Wal- 
ter observes  —  (v.  iv,  p.  -23'])   his   ''  scandalous" 
attempt  to  extort  a  bribe  from  the  American  com- 
missioners), was  minister  for  foreign  affairs.     The 
errors  of  this  note,  though  formally  enumerated 
and  emphatically  marked,  the  reader  will  be  sur- 
prised to  learn,  consist  precisely  of  such  mechani- 
cal lapses  in  orthography^  as  are  committed  every 


3o8  APPE^nlx. 

clay  in  the  penmanship  of  careless  or  expeditious 
-writers.     In  a  confidential  note  to  his  minister, 
INapoleon  it  seems,  did  not  take  care  to  finish  the 
words  faites  and  dites  —  omitting  the  final  and 
penultimate  letters  in  each,  so  as  to  write,  instead 
o^  faites  and  diteSyfait  and  dit.    This  error,  grave 
as  it  is,  might  perhaps  have  shocked  the  nerves  of 
a  pedagogue ;  but  that  it  can  support  the  great  cha- 
racteristical  consequence  attached  to  it,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  conceive.     It  was  evidently  more  the  fault 
of  the  quill,  than  of  the  mind,  employed  in  writing 
the  notcj  and  if  the  author  of  Waverley  was  re- 
solved to  exalt  it  into  matter  of  historical  moment, 
heshould  have  argued  ignoranceinthe  goose,  rather 
than  in  the  consul.     If  any  thing  can  be  more  con- 
temptible than  his  imputation,  or  ridiculous  than 
his  reasoning,  it  is  the  figure  which  he  assigns  to 
himself  and  his  fellow  labourers  in  this  momentous 
affah^  (v.  V,  p.  425).     ^'  This  very  singular  memo- 
randum contains  the  instructions  given  by  Napo- 
leon to  Talleyrand,  concerning  the  manner  in  which 
he  wished  him  to  receive  Lord  Whitworth,  then 
about  to  quit  Paris  under  the  immediate  prospect 
of  the  war  again  breaking  out.    He  did  not  trust,  it 
seems,  to  that  accomplished  statesman  the  slightest 
circumstance  of  the  conference;  ^^  although,"  as 
Talleyrand  himself  observed,    as  he  gave  to  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  the  interesting  document,  in 
Napoleon's  own  handwriting,  "  if  I  could  be  trust- 
ed with  any  thing,  it  must  have  been  the  mode  of 
receiving   and  negotiating  with   an  ambassador." 


CHAPTER    I.  309 

The  prince  of  diplomatists,  is  so  dexterous  as  to 
discover,  that  Napoleon  failed  on  a  certain  occasion, 
to  dot  his  i  s  and  cross  his  t  s,  and  amazes  the  hero 
of  Waterloo  by  proof  of  the  important  fact .  This, 
the  confounded  chieftain^  divulg^es  to  the  author  of 
Waverley,  who  employs  that  genius,  which  had  led 
captive  the  taste  of  nations,  in  reporting  it  to  the 
world  !  These  personages  might  have  recollected 
that  the  letters  of  Napoleon's  signature  were  often 
imperfect.  Could  it  be  thence  inferred,  that  he  had 
never  ^'^ acquired  the  art  of  writing  or  spelling  his 
name  with  accuracy  or  correctness  ?"  They  might 
also  have  referred  to  what  he  told  O'Meara.  ^^  April 
3o,  1817.  He  observed  that  formerly  he  had  some- 
times been  in  the  habit  of  writing  only  half  or 
three  quarters  of  each  word_,  and  running  them  into 
each  other  ^  that  no  person  except  one  well  acquaint- 
ed with  his  manner  of  writing  could  read  it . "  Or 
ihey  might  have  remembered  his  observation  to 
Las  Cases  (Memorial,  t.  vi,  p.  387):  '^  A  public 
man,  engaged  in  great  affairs,  a  minister  for  in- 
stance, cannot  and  should  not  write  with  ortho- 
graphical correctness.  His  thoughts  outstrip  bis 
hand  j  he  has  time  only  to  throw  out  signs ;  he 
must  put  a  word  in  a  letter  and  a  phrase  in  a  word. 
To  decypher  all  this  is  the  business  of  clerks."  In 
the  professed  romances  of  Sir  Walter  Scott,  errors 
of  composition  not  unfrequently  occur,-  yet  who 
would  undertake  to  assert  that,  born  on  the  wrong 
side  of  the  Tweed,  ^'  he  had  never  acquired  the  art 
of  writing  English  with  accuracy  or  correctness?" 


3lO  APPE^DIX. 

It  is  clear  that  in  this  business^  Talleyrand  was  not 
the  dupe.  His  diplomatic  coolness  in  propounding 
the  natural  question  if  he  could  be  trusted  with  any 
thing,  is  as  remarkable  as  the  officious  simplicity  of 
Sir  Waher  in  recording  it. 

The  next  allegation  on  this  subject  imports^  that 
INapoleon  '^  though  of  Italian  origin,  had  not  a  de- 
cided taste  for  the  fine  arts" — as  if  all  persons  of  Ita- 
lian extraction  were  expected  to  possess  a  decided 
taste  for  the  fine  arts  -,  even  those  who^happened  to 
be  born  and  bred,  who  lived  and  died  out  of  Italy. 
Are  all  men  of  Scotch  origin  supposed  to  be  gifted 
with  second  sight  ?  Or,  on  the  other  hand,  is  it 
fair  to  reproach  a  man  wdth  not  having  that  which 
he  could  not  be  expected  to  possess. 

^^  A  taste  for  the  fine  arts"  may  mean  either  the 
faculty  of  producing  or  of  appreciatingcA^j/^^cew- 
vres  in  architecture,  sculpture,  painting,  poetry  or 
music.  In  the  first  sense,  the  phrase  is  inapplica- 
ble, as  Napoleon  never  professed  nor  practised  the 
fine  arts;  in  the  second  it  is  untrue,  as  no  other 
prince  of  modern  times  patronized  the  fine  arts  with 
equal  taste  and  munificence.  Let  him  be  compared 
in  this  respect  with  his  contemporaries — with 
Francis  of  Austria,  Alexander  of  Russia,  the  Louises 
of  France,  and  the  Georges  of  England;  or  let  the 
treatment  which  Talma  received  be  contrasted  with 
that  which  Sheridan  experienced. 

After  denominating  the  rich  and  metaphorical 
style  of  Napoleon  in  his  youth,  ^^  exaggerated 
phrases,"  Sir  Walter  com  plains,  that  ^^his  bulletins 


CHAPTER    I-  3ll 

seldom  if  ever  present  those  touches  of  sublimity 
which  depend  on  dignity  and  simphcity  of  expres- 
sion." This  would  appear  to  admit  that  his  bulle- 
tins do  present  frequent  examples  of  sublimity, 
though  seldom  if  ever  of  a  particular  description. 
But  is  it  common  to  find  '  touches  of  sublimity"  of 
any  sort,  in  the  orders,  proclamations,  or  reports  of 
commanding  generals — in  those  for  examples  of 
the  Dukes  of  Marlborough,  York,  or  WeUington  ? 
It  is  evident  that  this  entire  statement  about  gram- 
mar and  taste,  would  have  the  merit  of  being  true, 
if  it  were  completely  reversed,  that  is,  if,  instead  of 
his  actual  stofy^  Sir  Walter  hid  said — Altliough 
Napoleon  Jiad  no  opportunity  in  his  youth  of  cul" 
tivating  a  taste  for  the  fine  arts,  and  was  engross- 
edj  during  the  whole  of  his  career,  hj  the  toils  of 
war  or  the  cares  of  government,  he  was  so  happilj 
endowed  bj  nature y  that  he  was  an  excellent  judge 
of  the  beauties  of  architecture ,  paintings  poetrj, 
sculpture  andmusic  yUndpatronized  their  professors 
with  a  noble  liberality — He  hady  moreover ,  such 
a  rich  vein  of  eloquence  y  that  even  in  his  military 
reports  J  numerous  examples  of  the  sublime  occur  ; 
some  indeedy  of  those  exquisite  touches,  which  de- 
pend on  dignity  and  simplicity  of  expression. 
The  pains  taken  to  expose  ihese  awkward  falsifica- 
tions, will  not  be  thought  misapplied,  when  it  is 
considered  that  absence  of  taste  in  the  constitution 
of  a  strong  character,  is  almost  equivalent  to  the 
presence  of  ferocity.  Besides  obstaprincipiisy  is  as 
sound  a  maxim  in  criticism  as  in  medicine. 


3 1 11  APPENDIX. 

Page  21. 

(i/p)  Bourrienne  (vol.  i^  p.  4o)  denies  this  anec- 
dote, and  attempts  to  discredit  it  by  saying  it  is  dated 
in  178.3,  and  that  Napoleon  was  then  at  Brienne, 
'^  where  certainly  he  never  was  in  company,  espe- 
cially in  the  company  of  ladies."     Yet  at  page  37, 
he  states  that  in  the  year  1783  the  duke  of  Orleans 
and  Madame  Montesson  came  to  Brienne — that  for 
more  than  a  month  the  magnificent  chateau  of  the 
count  de  Brienne  was  ^^a  little  Versailles/'  that 
brilliant ye/e5  were  given  in  honour  of  the  visit  of 
the  prince  and  Madame  Montesson,  who,  together 
presided  at  the  examination  of  the  pupils  of  the  royal 
school — that  Napoleon   divided  with  Bourrienne 
himself  the  mathematical  prizes,  and  that  Madame 
de  Montesson  complimented  Bourrienne's  mother 
on  the  frequency  of  her  son's  academical  triumphs. 
Now  here  was  a  company  of  ladies  to  which  Na- 
poleon was  admitted .     The  observation  was  doubt- 
less made  on  this  occasion,  and  probably  by  the 
Countess  de  Brienne,  of  whom  Napoleon  was  a  fa- 
vourite^ not  the  less,  for  having  been  recommended 
to  her,  as  the  reader  will  recollect,  by  a  dignitary 
of  the  church  and  minister  of  the  crown. 

The  Count  de  Las  Cases  also  discredits  this  anec- 
dote (though  not  on  the  emperor's  authority)  and 
for  the  same  reason  which  Bourrienne  advances ; 
that  is,  that  while  at  Brienne  Napoleon  could  not 
have  been  in  the  company  of  ladies.  Yet  the  Count 
repeats  this  conversation  of  Napoleon  (t.  vii,  pp. 
19.7-8).  <^  He  talked  while  in  bed  of  his  early  years 


CHAPTER   I.  3l3 

at  Brienne  ;  of  the  Duke  of  Orleans,  of  Madame  de 
Montesson,  whom  he  remembered  to  have  seen 
there  j  of  the  family  of  Nogent,  of  that  of  de 
Brienne,  who  were  connected  with  the  details  of 
his  boyhood^  etc."  The  reasons  for  denying  it 
being  thus  ascertained  to  be  unfounded,  the  anec- 
dote which  does  not  appear  to  have  been  the  off- 
spring of  a  malicious  purpose,  becomes  from  its  ex- 
istence highly  probable,  the  more  so  as  it  is  consis- 
tant  with  the  energy  of  Napoleon's  character,  the 
vigour  of  his  judgment,  the  vivacity  of  his  expres- 
sions, and  his  well  known  admiration  of  Turenne, 
as  a  commander,  a  sentiment  which  at  fifteen  must 
have  been  warmly  associated  with  his  professional 
pride.  In  his  letter  to  the  deputy  Buttofaco,  one 
of  his  first  productions,  he  goes  out  of  his  way  to 
speak  of  Turenne  as  the  greatest  of  captains,  so 
strong  and  insuppressible  was  the  admiration  he 
felt  for  him,  and  among  the  last  of  his  dictations  at 
St.  Helena  is  a  careful  analysis  of  Turenne's  cam- 
paigns. 

Page  22. 

(i5)  The  cause  of  Napoleon's  early  designation 
for  the  school  of  Paris,  as  explained  in  the  text,  is 
taken  from  the  account  repeated  by  Las  Cases  (Me- 
morial, t.  i,  p.  173),  in  Napoleon's  own  words. 
This  account,  adopted  by  Norvins  (t.  i,  p.  i4), 
and  by  Lockhart  (v.  i,  p.  6),  is  rejected  by  Sir 
Walter  Scott,  who  represents  the  selection  of  Na- 
poleon as  *^  a  compliment  paid  to  the  precocity  of 


3l4  APPENDIX. 

his  extraordinary  mathematical  talent,  and  the 
steadiness  of  his  appHcation"  (v.  iii,  p.  i4).  Ad- 
mitting^ that  ^^  precocity  of  talent  and  steadiness  of 
application"  are  likely  to  coexist,  it  is  to  be  noted 
that  g^enius  and  prococity  are  very  different  things, 
and  that  what  is  precocious  is  generally  thought 
shortlived  and  vvorthless.  Napoleon's  talent  for 
mathematical  reasoning,  and  the  profoundest  logic, 
is  kno^yn  to  have  been  as  lasting  as  it  was  strong. 

Page  22. 
(i6)  With  respect  to  the  date  of  this  examina- 
tion, and  consequently  the  age  of  Napoleon  at  the 
time  he  left  Brienne,  an  error  which  seems  to  have 
prevailed,  is  corrected  in  the  text .  Las  Cases,  on  his 
authority  says  (t.  i,  p.  174)  the  examination  took 
place  in  1788 — and  that  he  was  designated  by  the 
Chevalier  de  Keralio  for  the  school  of  Paris,  ^^  al- 
though perhaps  he  was  not  of  the  requisite  age." 
Now  the  customary  age  was  i5 — and  it  is  certain 
that  he  could  only  have  been  i4  in  1783 .  So  that 
it  is  probable  Napoleon  made  a  mistake  of  one  year 
in  referring  by  memory  in  18 [5,  to  this  remote 
event.  This  inference  is  strengthened  by  two  do- 
cuments quoted  at  length  by  Bourrienne  ^  one,  the 
report  of  M.  de  Keralio  to  the  king  on  the  result  of 
Napoleon's  examination^  which  is  dated  in  1784 
(v.  i,  p.  28)  the  other,  the  register  of  the  princi- 
pal of  the  school  of  Brienne,  stating  that  Napoleon 
was  born  the  i5th  of  August,  1769 — ^^  entered  the 
school  of  Brienne  the  •^3d  of  April,  1779,  and  left 
it  the  1 4th  of  October,  1784.'' 


CHAPTER  1.  3r5 

Again,  as  the  examination  was  annual,  and  as  the 
Chevalier  deKer alio  rejected  the  proposal  of  the  pro- 
fessors to  detain  him  another  year  at  Brienne^  his 
examination  could  not  have  been  a  year  earlier  than 
his  departure  from  the  school .  It  would  appear, 
therefore,  that  he  was  examined  a  little  before  he 
was  fifteen,  and  that  he  entered  the  school  of  Paris 
shortly  after  the  commencement  of  his  sixteenth 
year,  viz.  in  October,  1784. 

Since  writing  the  above  I  have  conversed  with 
the  Count  d'Hedouville,  who  was  himself  an  elei^e  of 
the  military  school  of  Paris,  as  well  as  a  comrade  of 
Napoleon  in  the  regiment  of  Grenoble.  The  CouVit 
confirms  this  correction  of  the  date,  by  the  assertion 
that  he  left  the  school  of  Paris  in  1784,  and  that 
Napoleon  entered  it  at  the  time  he,  the  Count,  quit- 
ted it. 

Page  25. 

(17)  ^^  Stimulated  by  the  enthusiam  of  military 
genius  to  take  part  in  tht  war  in  which  Great 
Britain  was  then  engaged^  he  had  pressed  so 
earnestly  to  enter  into  the  navy,  that,  at  the  age  of 
fifteen,  a  midshipman's  warrant  was  obtained  for 
him.  The  interference  of  a  timid  and  affectionate 
mother  deferred  the  commencement  and  changed 
the  direction  of  his  military  career."  (Marshal's  Life 
of  Washington,  2nd  ed.  ;  v.  i,  p.  2.) 

Page  24. 

(18).  The  24th  February,  1785. 


3l6  APPENDIX. 

Page  50. 

(19)  It  appears  that  he  was  examined  in  August, 
and  commissioned  in  September.  It  may  be  proper 
to  mention  that  the  story  referred  to,  but  not  adopt- 
ed by  Sir  Walter  Scott  (v.  iii,  p.  i5),  imputing  to 
Napoleon,  while  a  military  student,  the  quixotic 
absurdity  of  attacking  a  balloon  of  Blanchard,  the 
aeronaut,  with  his  sword,  was  false  as  to  Napo- 
leon, but  true  as  to  one  of  his  comrades,  Dupont 
deChambon. — S^q  J^ie  Politique  et  Militaire  de 
NapoleoTiy  par  A  moult  (p.  3).  This  statement 
alpout  Dupont  is  confirmed  to  me  by  the  recollec- 
tion of  the  count  Las  Cases. 


X 


(    3i7    ') 


CHAPTER  II. 

Page  54. 

(i)  After  mentioning  (v.  iii,  p.  l6)  that  Napo- 
leon was  only  in  his  seventeenth  year  when  he 
entered  into  society  at  Valence^  Sir  Walter  Scott 
adds,  that  '^  his  manners  could  scarcely  be  called 
elegant,  but  made  up  in  vivacity  and  variety  of 
expression,  and  often  in  great  spirit  and  energy, 
for  what  they  wanted  in  grace  and  polish."  Who, 
but  the  author  of  W^averley,  could  have  ventured 
to  notice,  as  a  deficiency,  the  absence  of  polish  in 
the  manners  of  a  lad  of  sixteen,  fresh  from  a  school 
of  artillery,  or  could  expect  him  to  observe  the 
rules  of  Chesterfield,  and  to  exhibit  that  ease 
which  presupposes  long  acquaintance  with  fashion- 
able society?  In  the  deportment  of  so  gifted  a 
youth,  there  was  naturally  a  spirit  and  a  charm 
which  would  have  been  lost  in  modish  ease,  and 
suppressed  by  formal  propriety. 

The  gravity  and  emphasis  with  which  Lockhart 
(vol.  i,  p.  8)  follows  up  this  absurd  abnegation 
are  amusing.  In  the  mingled  tones  of  a  witness 
and  a  judge,  this  writer  disposes  of  the  manners  of 
his  hero  by  declaring  definitively  that  ^'  courtly 
grace  and  refinementof  manners  he  never  attained." 
Let  us  suppose  this  assertion  to  be  true,  would  it 
follow  that  Napoleon  did  not  attain  a  manner  of 


3l8  APPENDIX. 

much  higher  elegance  than  courtly  grace  and  re- 
finement? The  grace  called  courtly^  means  the 
grace  of  a  courtier^  and  this  implies  a  carriage  of 
proud  submission  towards  superiors,  and  of  con- 
descending arrogance  towards  inferiors,  a  smooth 
impertinence  of  exigence  and  concession.  This 
mechanical  and  subordinate  grace^  which  excludes 
manly  independence  and  refined  simplicity,  would 
have  been  sadly  out  of  place  in  the  deportment  of 
a  man  who  never  saw  his  equal,  and  whose  man- 
ners, as  the  unstudied  expression  of  feeling,  intel- 
lect, and  power,  excited  in  the  beholder  a  degree 
of  pleasure  and  admiration  which  would  have  been 
apt  to  make  him  turn  with  disgust  from  an  exhibi- 
tion of  ^^  courtly  grace  and  refinement." 

Here  is  already  an  array  of  deficiencies,  a  list  of 
formidable  denials,  aimed  at  the  memory  of  Napo- 
leon by  his  celebrated  biographer.  ^^  Though  of 
Italian  origin,  he  had  not  a  decided  taste  for  the 
fine  arts."  His  bulletins  seldom  contained  touches 
of  ^^ simple  sublimity  of  expression."  ^^In  his 
fifteenth  year  his  taste  had  not  become  correct," 
and,  in  his  seventeenth,  ^^his  manners  could 
scarcely  be  called  elegant  and  polished."  Would 
it  not  have  been  as  instructive  and  equitable  in  Sir 
Walter  Scott  to  proclaim,  that  though  of  Greek 
descent,  Napoleon  could  not  recite  the  odes  of 
Pindar  and  Archilochus — that  all  his  battles  were 
not  as  great  as  those  of  Austerlitz  and  Wagram — 
that  in  his  fifteenth  year  he  had  not  a  long  beard 
— and,  in  his  seventeenth,  was  not  married? 


CHAPTER    II.  3 19 

Page  00. 

(2)  The  Count  d'Hedouville  takes  pleasure  in 
relating  testimonies  of  the  warm  and  effectual 
kindness  which  Napoleon,  throughout  his  career^ 
extended  to  him.  Their  political  sentiments  dif- 
fered when  young,  one  being  in  favour  of  a  limited 
constitution,  the  other  of  the  royal  prerogative. 
D'Hedouville,  following  out  his  principles,  emi- 
grated. When  Napoleon  became  first  consul,  he 
enquired  for  his  former  comrade,  and  learning  that 
he  was  vegitating  in  Spain,  sent  for  him.  On 
their  first  interview  he  offered  to  make  him  one  of 
his  aides-de-camp,  but  observed  that,  perhaps,  as 
his  comrades  of  Valence  were  now  all  generals,  he 
might  not  like  to  commence  the  career  of  arms  so 
far  below  his  former  equals,  and  offered  him  a  situ- 
ation in  the  diplomatic  corps.  D'Hedouville  pre- 
ferring this  latter  profession,  was  immediately 
attached  to  the  embassy  at  Rome,  and  subsequently 
appointed  minister  plenipotentiary  at  Frankfort. 

Page  41, 

(3)  The  author  of  Waverley,  to  give  a  mean 
and  sordid  colouring  to  the  early  life  of  his 
hero,  speaking  of  his  residence  at  Auxonne,  says, 
(v.  iii,  p.  368),  ^^M.  Joly  found  the  fugitive  em- 
peror in  a  naked  barrack  room."  ^' His  brother, 
Louis,  whom  he  was  teaching  mathematics,  lay  on 
a  wretched  mattress  in  an  adjoining  closet."  In 
answer  to  which,  Louis  Bonaparte  observes  (Re- 
ponse,  p.  28)  ;  ''  This  passage  contains  almost  as 


ioiO  APPENDIX. 

many  falsehoods  as  lines .  I  rocollect  very  well 
tbat^  on  my  account,  a  larger  and  more  commo- 
dious apartment  was  assigned  to  my  brother  than  to 
the  other  officers  of  his  rank.  The  furniture  could 
not  be  either  better  or  worse  than  that  of  his  com- 
rades, because  they  were  all  in  barracks,  and,  of 
course  lodged  and  furnished  by  the  state;  I  remem- 
ber that  I  had  a  very  good  chamber  and  an  excel- 
lent bed.  My  brother  directed  my  studies,  but  I 
had  proper  masters,  even  in  literature." 

With  respect  to  the  accident  of  Napoleon's  being 
nearly  drowned  while  bathing  in  the  Saone  at 
Auxonne,  there  is  a  difference,  in  regard  to  some 
slight  particulars,  between  the  relation  of  it  in  the 
text  and  the  recital  of  the  count  de  Las  Cases  (t.  iii, 
p.  433  ).  But  inasmuch  as  the  count's  journal  was 
seized  by  the  governor  of  St.  Helena,  before  he  had 
written  out  his  notes  of  various  conversations,  I 
have  adopted  the  account  of  the  same  incident  found 
in  the  journal  of  O'Meara  (v.  ii,  p.  227)  and  con- 
firmed by  the  recollection  of  Louis  Bonaparte  (Re- 
ponse  p.  127).  It  happens  to  be  in  more  decided 
contradiction  to  the  story  on  the  same,  subject  in- 
troduced by  Sir  Walter  Scott  (v,  iii,  p.  18),  who 
with  dramatic  dexterity,  transposes  the  accident  to 
the  city  of  Lyons  and  the  river  Rhone. 

*'  Modo  me  Thebis,  modo  poscit  Alhenis." 
Page  42. 
(4)  For  this  anecdote  I  am  indebted  to   count 
d'Hedouville.    In  the  Memoires  of  Napoleon  (Mon- 
tholon  t.  ii,  p.  207)  it  is  said  that  he  was  made 


CHAPTER    II.  321 

captain  in  1789.  This  is  an  error  either  of  himself 
or  his  amanuensis^  as  the  army  list  of  the  period 
shows  that  in  1789  he  was  a  lieutenant.  Count 
d'Hedouville  says  he  joined  the  regiment  of  Gre- 
noble as  lieutenant.  Las  Cases  (t.i^  p.  224)  dates 
his  promotion  to  a  captaincy  in  February  1792,  as 
does  INorvins  (t.  i,  p.  22). 

Page  46. 

(5)  The  decided  inclination  of  Napoleon  to  the 
popular  side  in  the  revolution^  as  mentioned  in  the 
text^  an  inclination  natural  to  his  youth^  his  inde- 
pendent and  enterprising  character,  and  his  fa- 
vourite studies^  is  attributed  by  Sir  Walter  Scott 
principally  to  the  circumstance  (v.  iii^  ?•  ^7)  of 
his  being  '  ^  a  friendless  stranger  and  adventurer,"  or 
in  Lockhart's  imitation  (v.  i,  p.  6)  ^^this  poor  solitary 
alien."  It  is  not  easy  to  conceive  that  a  young 
French  officer,  who  had  been  educated  in  a  national 
military  school  of  France^  had  there  distinguished 
himself  above  all  his  comrades ;  had  since  been  the 
object  of  applause,  caresses  and  promotion  ;  and 
who  counted  among  his  friends  Paoli  and  Raynal, 
could  have  considered  himself  Avhile  on  the  French 
soil,  and  in  the  French  army,  ^^a  friendless  stranger 
and  adventurer.  "  If  this  was  the  case  the  French 
army  must  have  been,  for  the  most  part,  composed 
of  strangers,  adventurers,  and  '^  poor  solitary 
aliens."  But  this  is  not  the  only  absurdity, 
into  which  on  this  subject  Sir  Walter  is  drawn, 
by    his   eager   spirit    of    misrepresentation    and 

21 


39.2  APPENDIX. 

(lispara(jement ;  for  in  order  to  colour  the  insi- 
nuation that  it  was  a  selfish  necessity,  not  a  li- 
beral choice,  which  made  Napoleon  a  patriot  in 
the  revolution,  a  statement,  which  the  latter  made 
at  St.  Helena  in  reference  to  this  period  of  his  life, 
is  thus  distorted  by  Sir  Walter  both  in  its  language 
and  its  date.  ^^Were  I  a  general  officer,"  he  is 
alleged  to  have  said,  ^^  I  would  have  adhered  to 
the  king,  being  a  subaltern  I  joined  the  patriots. " 
Now  his  real  words,  as  they  are  recited  in  the  text, 
and  as  they  were  uttered  at  St.  Helena  about  thirty 
years  subsequently  to  the  time  alluded  to,  are 
these,  ^^  had  I  been  a  general  officer  I  might  have 
adhered  to  the  king ;  a  young  lieutenant,  I  sided 
with  the  revolution,  "  not  so  much  describing  the 
motives  under  which  he  did  act,  as  exemplifying, 
by  a  hypothetical  reference  to  his  own  case,  those 
which  probably  operated  on  others  j  and  so  far, 
extenuating  the  error  of  individuals,  who  pursued 
a  line  of  conduct  opposite  to  his  own.  His  biogra- 
pher, however,  gives  his  language  a  direct  and  parti- 
cular meaning  instead  of  a  conditional  and  general 
one,  altering  its  terms  and  transposing  its  date, 
so  as  to  convey  the  impression,  that  Napoleon,  in- 
stead of  acting  from  that  principle  and  enthusiasm 
which  became  his  character  and  suited  his  age,  was 
by  his  own  confession,  influenced  by  personal  in- 
terest and  selfish  calculations. 

The  interpretation  here  given  to  his  expressions, 
is  not  only  borne  out  by  the  terms  themselves,  but 
corresponds  with  the  uniform  tenor  of  his  senti- 
ments and  conduct,  in  regard  to  emigration.     His 


CHAPTER  II.  323 

elevation  to  the  head  of  the  government,  opened 
the  arms  of  France  to  her  wandering  children.  In 
conversation  with  Las  Cases  on  the  voyage  to  St. 
Helena,  he  said  (Memorial,  t.  i,  p.  294)  :  ^' And  for 
myself,  can  I  affirm,  notwithstanding  my  natural 
opinions,  that  there  might  not  have  been  a  train 
of  circumstances  which  would  have  induced  me  to 
emigrate — the  vicinity  of  the  frontier^  the  ties  of 
friendship,  the  influence  of  a  commander,  etc. 
In  a  revolution,  one  can  only  be  positive  as  to  what 
one  has  already  done  j  but  it  would  not  be  wise 
to  affirm  that  one  might  not  have  pursued  very 
different  conduct.  And  on  this  subject,"  adds  Las 
Cases,  ^^  he  cited  a  singular  instance  of  the  influence 
of  chance  on  the  destinies  of  men.  Serrurier 
and  the  younger  d'Hedouville  set  off  together  to 
emigrate  into  Spain.  A  patrol  fell  in  with  them. 
D'Hedouville,  younger  and  more  active  than  his 
companion,  passed  the  frontier,  thinking  himself 
very  fortunate,  and  pursued  his  way  to  vegetate  in 
Spain.  Serrurier,  obliged  to  retrace  his  steps  into 
France,  and  quite  in  despair,  became  a  marshal." 

Page  48. 

(6)  This  interesting  anecdote,  which  shows  the 
unbounded  confidence  which  the  young  iXapoleon 
inspired  in  his  own  family.  Sir  Walter  Scott  dis- 
regards, though  he  took  the  trouble  to  pervert  the 
saying  which  is  noticed  above.  Louis  Bonaparte  in 
his  reply  to  Sir  Walter  (p.  9)  in  alluding  to  the 
ascendancy  of  Napoleon  in  his  family,  says,  ^^  I  feel 


324  APPENDIX. 

myself  obliged  to  declare  here,  as  the  brother  of 
the  emperor  Napoleon,  that  it  was  in  his  own 
family  that  he  began  to  exhibit  that  great  supe- 
riority; not  after  glory  and  power  had  elevated 
him,  but  in  his  early  youth." 

Page  49.. 

(7)  This  fact  is  stated  in  a  memorial  addressed  by 
Charles  Bonaparte  to  marshal  Segur,  minister  of 
war,  applying  for  a  place  for  a  younger  son,  in  one 
of  the  royal  military  schools.  The  memorial  is 
recited  in  Bourrienne(t.  i,  p.  20). 

Page  51. 

(8)  This  plain  interpretation  of  Napoleon's  senti- 
jnents,  founded  on  his  general  disposition  and  his 
situation  at  the  time,  did  not  occur,  it  would  seem, 
to  Sir  Walter  Scott,  who  resolves  the  language  he 
alleges  him  to  have  used,  into  a  sort  of  innate  con- 
tempt of  the  people  —  a  feeling,  perfectly  at  va- 
riance with  the  well  known  character  of  Napoleon, 
and  with  all  the  great  events  of  his  life.  But  this 
contempt,  though  eminently  arislocratical,  and 
therefore  entitled  to  the  respect  of  that  order,  and 
to  the  homage  of  its  idolater  himself,  he  proceeds 
to  represent  as  not  very  earnest,  exclaiming  (v.  iii, 
p.  19)  ^^  how  different  would  his  feelings  have 
been  had  a  seer  whispered  to  him,  that  on  the  ruins 
of  the  throne  which  the  people  were  demolishing, 
his  own  imperial  seat  was  to  be  erected. "  This  is 
certainly  more  like  ^'^demonology  and  witchcraft" 


CHAPTER    II.  325 

than  history.  It  is  as  least  the  first  time  a  man's 
character  has  been  arraigned^  for  what  he  might 
have  done  in  a  case^  which^  without  supernatural 
means,  could  not  occur.  But  Sir  Walter^  as  anx- 
ious to  avert  praise  as  to  apply  censure,  employs 
in  his  service,  when  facts  cannot  be  found,  mis- 
statement or  hypothesis,  foUowingthe  ancient  rule  of 
malice — 

"  Flectere  si  nequeo  Superos,  Acheronta  rao"vebo." 

Page  o6. 

(9)  This  statement  is  derived  from  Bourrienne, 
who  with  a  modesty  truly  heroic,  intimates  that 
by  rights,  he  ought  to  have  been  the  great  man,  in- 
stead of  his  friend  (v.  i,  p.  36).  He  further  re- 
presents (p.  49)  Napoleon  in  such  destitution, 
while  he  was  at  Paris  in  1792,  that  he  himself 
though  not  rich,  had  frequently  to  pay  for  his  din- 
ners. Even  if  this  were  the  case,  the  account 
was  so  soon  balanced,  that  these  items  might  have 
been  forgotten.  But  there  is  every  probability 
against  the  assertion  of  Bourrienne,  exclusively  of 
his  notorious  bad  faith.  Bonaparte  was  a  captain 
of  artillery,  and  was  in  the  receipt  of  full  pay.  He 
"was  the  head  of  his  mother's  familv,  and  could 
have  got  money  from  home,  had  he  needed  it.  He 
was  by  all  accounts,  destitute  neither  of  prudence 
nor  of  pride.  The  subject  is  noticed,  not  on  account 
of  any  peculiar  importance  attached  to  it,  but  for 
the  sake  of  truth  only.  For  the  same  reason,  I 
advert  to  the  interesting  Memoirs  of  the  Dutchess 
d'Abrantes,  in  which  Napoleon  is  described,  while 


3^6  APPENDIX. 

at  the  military  school  of  Paris,  as  suffering  under  a 
sense  of  dependence,  and  impatient  of  the  civilities 
offered  him  by  madame  de  Permon,  the  friend  of 
his  mother,  because  the  family  of  that  lady  was 
more  prosperous  than  his  own.  It  is  also  inti- 
mated in  the  same  entertaining  work,  that  being 
himself  an  eleve  of  the  royal  military  school  of 
Paris,  he  looked  with  chagrin  and  envy  at  the 
superior  advantages  of  young  Permon,  who  lived 
in  the  society  of  his  parents,  and  the  comforts  of 
home. 

It  is  universally  admitted  that  Napoleon  had  a 
decided  taste  for  the  profession  of  arms ;  it  is  known 
that  he  was  transferred  from  Brienne  to  Paris  under 
flattering  circumstances ;  and  that  he  was  so  much 
distinguished  for  genius  and  attainments,  as  to 
have  attracted  the  notice  of  the  Abbe  Raynal. 
His  uncle,  the  archdeacon,  was  living  at  the 
time  referred  to  by  the  dutchess,  and  the  fortune 
of  his  family,  though  impaired,  was  independent. 
It  is  not  likely  that  in  this  state  of  things,  his  self- 
love  would  have  suggested  a  painful  comparison, 
between  the  subordinate  luxury  of  a  family  in  the 
capital,  with  the  modest  circumstances  of  his 
mother  in  a  distant  province  j  or  that  the  most 
distinguished  military  student  of  the  chief  school 
of  the  kingdom,  would  envy  the  lot  of  a  young 
gentleman,  who  was  himself  unknown,  and 
whose  family  was  confessedly  neither  opulent  nor 
powerful. 

The  statements  here  noticed,  are  the  substance 


CHAPTER    II.  327 

of  a  dialogue  of  full  three  pages  (Memoires  de  la 
Duchesse  d'Abrantes  (t.  i,  pp.  78,  79,  80^  81), 
between  M.  and  Madame  de  Permon,  and  their 
son,  a  dialogue  which  would  appear  to  be  repeated 
verbatim.  The  dutchess  says  (p.  29)  she  was 
born  the  6th  of  November,  1784?  at  Mentpellier,, 
and  came  to  Paris,  or  to  use  her  own  words  (p.  69), 
•^  J^F^e  came  to  Paris  in  1785,"  and  that  her 
mother  made  immediate  enquiries  about  Napoleon 
Bonaparte  who  was  (p.  76. )  ^^  then  at  the  military 
school  of  Paris.  "  Now  as  Napoleon,  left  the  mili- 
tary school  of  Paris  to  join  his  regiment^  in  Sep- 
tember or  October,  1785,  the  dutchess  could  not 
have  been  quite  twelve  months  old,  when  these 
conversations  are  said  to  have  been  held.  If  they 
were  intrinsically  probable  therefore,  if  they  were 
not,  from  various  particulars  which  they  contain, 
incompatible  with  the  well  known  regulations  of 
the  military  school^  they  could  not  be  received  as  au- 
thentic, especially  as  they  are  not  of  a  nature  to 
authorize  the  supposition,  that  such  remarks  as 
they  consist  of,  would  have  been  recorded  at  the 
time  by  the  interlocutors. 

Page  ^8. 

(10)  The  sketch  here  given  of  Paoli's  Anglo-in- 
surrectionary proceedings,  is  a  summary  of  state- 
ments found  in  Benson's  Sketches  of  Corsica  (sec- 
tion 2),  and  in  the  Memoires  de  Napoleon  (t.  IV. 
ch.  16.) 


328  APPENDIX. 


Page  GO. 


(ii)  This  saying  of  Paoli  is  recorded  variously, 
as  addressed  directly  to  Napoleon  himself,  and  as 
addressed  to  others  respecting  him.  It  was  no 
doubt  used  both  ways.  I  have  adopted  that  version 
of  it  which  seems  most  emphatic,  and  from  the 
circumstances  under  which  it  occurred,  most  me- 
morable. It  is  found  in  Antomarchi  (t.  i,  p.  197) 
repeated  from  the  dictation  of  Napoleon,  precisely  as 
I  have  given  it.  Las  Cases,  Montholon,  Norvins, 
Hazlitt,  and  even  Lockhart,  concur  in  one  thing 
respecting  it^  in  representing  Paoli  as  impressed 
upon  personal  acquaintance,  with  the  great  and 
heroic  qualities  of  Napoleon,  the  firmness  of  his 
principles,  and  the  energy  of  his  character.  But 
the  manner  in  which  the  great  novelist  contrives 
to  nulllfj  this  dangerous  praise  of  a  personage, 
who,  according  to  his  account,  was  in  his  youth 
chiefly  remarkable  for  ^^  precocity  of  mathematical 
talent  and  steadiness  of  application,  "  is  worthy  of 
especial  notice  (v.  iii,  p.  i5).  ^^  Plutarch  was 
his  favourite  author,  upon  the  study  of  whom  he 
had  so  modelled  his  opinions  and  habits,  of 
thought,  that  Paoli  afterwards  pronounced  him  a 
young  man  of  an  antique  cast,  and  resembling  one 
of  the  classical  heroes."  Thus,  it  appears^  that  a 
young  man  of  precocious  mathematical  talent  and 
steady  application^  ^^^^Y  ^Y  closely  studying  Plu- 
tarch, cause  himself  to  be  esteemed,  by  eminent  and 
exporienrod  prrsons,  equal  in  excellence  to  a  classi- 


CHAPTER   II.  329 

cal  hero;  and  that  the  statesman  and  warrior  Paoli 
was  entrapped  by  this  sort  of  imitation,  into  the 
admiration  of  a  were  bookworm.  Yet  thisabsm^dity 
is  hazarded,  for  the  purpose  of  emasculating  the 
anecdote  referred  to,  a  device,  the  success  of  which, 
while  it  would  deprive  the  character  of  Napoleon 
of  all  essential  force,  and  intrinsic  dignity,  would 
take  from  that  of  Paoli,  the  faculty  of  common 
penetration . 

Page  65. 

(12)  The  conduct  of  Paoli  in  the  French  revo- 
lution cannot  be  justified.  After  resisting  the 
forced  incorporation  of  Corsica  with  Fran.ce,  he 
had  a  perfect  right  to  acquiesce  in  it  as  Charles 
Bonaparte  did,  or  to  abjure  it,  as  he  himself  for  a 
time  did.  But  he  had  no  right,  after  accepting 
the  amnesty  held  out  by  the  law  of  the  national 
assembly,  and  accepting  also  at  the  hands  of  the 
French  government,  an  appointment  of  high  trust 
and  honour,  to  renounce  his  allegiance  to  France, 
and  to  dismember  the  republic,  by  delivering  up 
the  province  committed  to  his  superintendence,  to 
a  rival  and  hostile  nation.  He  had  sanctioned  the 
annexation  of  Corsica  with  France,  in  the  most 
solemn  and  binding  manner ;  and  if  he  was  justi- 
fiable in  transferring  Corsica  to  England,  the  au- 
thorities of  any  other  province  of  France,  would 
have  been  blameless,  had  they  committed  the 
same  act.  Yet  more  flagrant  treason  than  they 
would  have  committed,  can  hardly  be  conceived. 
From  respect  for   Paoli's  general   character,    bi« 


330  APPENDIX. 

conduct  has  been  treated  with  indulgence  ^eti  hf 
French  authors,  and  in  that  spirit,  is  noticed  in 
the  text.  Sir  Walter  Scott  extols  it  as  nobly 
contrasted  with  the  conduct  of  that  portion  of  the 
Corsicans,  who  continued  faithful  to  their  alle- 
giance, and  really  appears  to  esteem  perjury  and 
treason  in  favour  of  England,  the  first  and  highest 
duties  of  a  French  citizen.  Alluding  to  this  part 
of  Paoli's  history,  he  holds  the  following  language 
(v.  iii,  p.  19).  ^^He  was  desirous  of  establishing 
that  freedom  which  is  the  protector  not  the  des- 
troyer of  property,  and  which  confers  practical 
happiness  instead  of  theoretical  perfection."  ^^In 
a  word  he  endeavoured  to  keep  Corsica  from  the 
prevailing  infection  of  jacobinism,  and  in  reward 
he  was  denounced  in  the  assembly."  ^^ The  in- 
fection of  jacobinism^  "  in  Corsica  consisted  simply 
in  the  ascendancy  of  the  revolutionary  government, 
and  this  it  was  the  object  of  Paoli  to  prevent.  Now 
we  learn  from  Sir  Walter  himself  (v.  i,  p.  68),  that 
one  of  the  main  grievances  that  occasioned  the 
revolution,  was  the  fact  that  the  people  had  no 
security  whatever  for  their  persons  or  their  pro- 
perty. ^^They  had  no  national  representation  of  any 
kind,  and  but  for  the  slender  barrier  offered  by  the 
courts  of  justice  or  parliaments  as  they  were  called, 
were  subject  to  unlimited  exactions  on  the  sole 
authority  of  the  sovereign.  The  properly  of  the 
nalLon  therefore  was  at  the  disposal  of  the 
crowriy  which  might  increase  the  taxes  to  any 
amount,  and  cause  them  to  be  paid  by  force,  if 
force  was  necessary.     The  personal  freedotn  of 


CHAPTER  n.  33l 

the  citizen  was  equally  exposed  to  aggressions 
hj  *  lettres  de  cachet.^  The  French  people,  in 
short,  had  neither  in  the  strict  sense,  liberty  nor 
property,  '^  So  that  Paoli  in  order  to  ^'  preserve 
the  property  and  practical  happiness"  of  his  coun- 
trymen, endeavoured  to  prevent  the  success  of 
measures,  taken  for  the  overthrow  of  a  government, 
which  deprived  them  of  both  liberty  and  property. 
And,  by  way  of  convincing  the  world  of  his  sincere 
and  tender  regard  for  these  blessings,  seized  on  the 
person  of  a  confiding  friend,  and  confiscated  the 
property  of  an  amiable  widow  and  eight  children, 
the  relict  and  offspring  of  his  departed  fellow 
soldier.  This  was  his  exemplification  of  the  rights 
of  property  and  security  of  person,  as  opposed  to 
^^  the  infection  of  jacobinism,  and  theoretical 
perfection.  " 

But  ^^the  infection  of  jacobinism, "  may  be  li- 
mited, to  mean  the  excesses  of  the  French  revolu- 
tion. Yet  Paoli  had  deliberately  and  solemnly 
made  himself  a  French  citizen.  Had  he  a  right  to 
dismember  his  country,  and  throw  himself  and  the 
province  under  his  charge,  into  the  grasp  of  its 
most  powerful  and  inveterate  foe,  on  account  of 
certain  excesses  or  errors,  not  affecting  himself  or 
his  friends,  in  the  existing  parties  or  actual  mi- 
nistry ?  If  he  had,  it  is  plain  that  Pichegru  and 
Arnold,  instead  of  being  foul  and  blotted  traitors, 
were  spotless  and  uncorrupted  patriots  ;  and 
O^Connell  would  be  justified  on  account  of  long 
misrule,  and  of  a  late  and  acknowledged  act  of 
oppression  on  the  part  of  the  British  government,  in 


332  APPENDIX. 

separating  Ireland  fromGreat  Britain,  and  in  placing 
that  island  under  the  dominion  of  France,  in  case 
of  war  between  the  two  nations.  Further,  upon 
Sir  Waller  Scott's  principles,  when  Louis  XIV 
was  endeavouring  to  force  the  Pretender  upon  the 
people  of  England,  the  officers  employed  by  the 
British  government,  ought  not  only  to  have  be- 
trayed their  country  to  France,  but  counted  on  re- 
ceiving reward  and  applause  for  so  doing.  The 
spirit  disclosed  by  Sir  Walter  in  the  passage 
here  considered,  will  be  found  to  pervade  his  entire 
work.  It  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  aim  of 
Paoli  was  not  to  establish  the  independence  of  his 
country,  but  to  transfer  its  dependence  from  France 
to  England,  from  a  catholic  to  a  protestant  go- 
vernment. 

In  the  Appendix  to  the  third  volume  of  Scott's 
Life  of  Napoleon  ( p.  364  )>  it  is  mentioned  that 
Pozzo  di  Borgo,  who  joined  the  English,  was  in- 
strumental in  procuring  Paoli's  mock  decree  of 
banishment  against  Napoleon,  and  that  owing  to 
the  vindictive  temper  of  the  latter,  Pozzo  di  Borgo 
was  chased  from  country  to  country,  as  the  arms 
and  influence  of  France  overspread  the  continent. 
The  truth  appears  to  be,  that  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  in 
the  cases  comprehended  in  this  statement,  stood  in 
the  predicament  of  a  French  citizen,  serving  or 
abetting  a  foreign  power  at  war  with  France,  and 
feh  himself,  as  such,  liable  to  be  punished  for 
treason,  if  he  fell  into  the  power  of  France,  whether 
she  was  governed  by  the  convention,  the  directory, 
tliC  consul,  or  the  emperor  ^  a  liability  from  which, 


CHAPTER    11.  333 

his  only  chance  of  escape,  would  have  been  found 
in  the  clemency  of  Napoleon.  He  very  naturally 
kept  out  of  the  way  of  his  own  countrymen^  as 
Dumouriez  and  Pichegru  did  likewise.  Can  it  be 
supposed  that  had  Arnold  been  observed  to  retire 
modestly,  at  the  approach  of  general  Washington 
and  his  army,  his  retreat  would  have  been  referred 
to  by  an  impartial  historian  as  proof,  not  of  his 
consciousness  of  guilt,  but  of  the  ^^  strong  love  of 
revenge,  ''  the  unforgiving  and  vindictive  temper 
of  the  American  commander,  supposing  general 
Washington  to  have  thought  himself  personally 
wronged  by  Arnold  ? 

In  a  strain  quite  exulting  and  equally  rational, 
Sir  Walter  proceeds — '^  But  the  fate  of  these  two 
early  acquaintances  seemed  strongly  contrasted 
and  interwoven.  As  Napoleon  began  to  lose 
ground,  the  fortunes  of  his  relative  appeared  to 
advance,  and  honours  and  emoluments  dropped 
upon  him,  in  proportion  to  Napoleon^s  descent 
from  eminence."  The  true  ground  of  contrast 
between  them  and  their  honours,  consists,  it  must 
be  allowed,  in  the  difference  between  the  friend 
and  the  enemy  of  his  country.  In  proportion  as 
France  was  agonized  and  humbled  under  the  blows 
of  the  holy  alliance,  the  fortune  of  Napoleon  de- 
clined, and  that  of  Pozzo  di  Borgo  advanced,  his 
^'  honours  and  emoluments"  being  unhappily  de- 
rived from  the  calamities  of  the  land  which  gave 
him  birth,  and  the  people  who  gave  him  honours. 
For  Pozzo  di  Borgo  was  a  member  of  the  French 


334  APPENDIX* 

legislature.  As  to  his  alleged  relationship  to 
Napoleon,  the  following  account  of  its  foundation 
and  character,  is  found  in  O'Meara's  Voice  from 
St.Helena.  ^^January,  6th.  1817.  Cipriani  informed 
me  that  Pozzo  di  Borgo  was  the  son  of  a  shepherd 
in  Corsica,  who  used  to  bring  eggs,  milk,  and  butter 
to  the  Bonaparte  family.  Being  a  smart  boy,  he 
was  noticed  by  Madame  Mere,  who  paid  for  his 
schooling.  Afterwards,  through  the  interest  of  the 
family,  he  was  chosen  deputy  to  the  legislative 
body,  as  their  sons  were  too  young  to  be  elected. 
He  returned  to  Corsica  as  procuratore  generalcy 
(or  public  prosecutor)  where  he  united  himself 
with  Peraldi,  an  implacable  enemy  of  the  Bona- 
partes,  and  consequently  became  one  himself." 
We  have  here  the  exemplification  of  AEop's  fable,  of 
the  serpent  warmed  on  the  husbandman's  hearth. 
Cipriani  was  a  Corsican,  and  maitre  d'hotel  of  the 
emperor,  a  situation  of  confidence  and  respecta- 
bility. He  died  at  St.  Helena,  and  he  is  described 
by  O'Meara  as  a  man  of  talent  and  merit.  His 
account  of  the  Russian  ambassador  has  not  been 
contradicted  as  far  as  I  know.  Louis  Bonaparte 
confirms  his  denial  of  the  relationship  of  Pozzo  di 
Borgo  with  the  Bonaparte  family  (Reponse,  p.  26). 
He  says  also,  that  there  was  no  decree  of  ba- 
nishment, and  that  Joseph,  not  Lucien  was  with 
his  brother  in  Corsica,  Lucien  being  at  Marseilles 
with  Semonville,  who  had  been  appointed  ambas- 
sador to  Constantinople.  The  decree  of  banish- 
ment, could  have  been  nothing   more  than  an 


CHAPTER    II.  335 

order  or  threat  of  Paoli.  But  such  as  it  was^  it  is 
mentioned,  emphatically  by  Norvins  (t.  i,  p.  26)  ; 
and  as  Louis  Bonaparte  was  very  young  at  the  time, 
I  have  thought  his  denial  not  equivalent  to  Norvin's 
assertion  and  the  probability  of  the  fact. 

Page  64. 

(i3)  Benson's  sketches  of  Corsica  (p.  5).  The 
account  here  given  is  adopted  by  Sir  Walter  Scott 
(v.  iii,  p.  2 1),  though  he  omits  the  material  incident 
of  Bonaparte's  eloquent  and  successful  appeal  to  the 
Corsicans,  probably,  because  it  would  not  have 
squared  with  the  bad  taste,  bombastic  and  exag- 
gerated phrases,  which  he  before  (p.  i3)  declares, 
characterized  his  effusions. 

Page  63. 

(i4)  This  statement  is  in  direct  contradiction 
with  the  following  assertion  of  Sir  Walter  Scott 
(p.  22).  ^^  INapoleon  does  not  appear  to  have  re- 
garded Corsica  with  any  feeling  of  affection.  " 

All  readers  of  English  poetry  will  remember  and 
few  be  unwilling  to  repeat,  the  stanza  in  the  ^^Lay 
of  the  Last  Minstrel,"  beginning — 

"  Breathes  there  the  man  with  soul  so  dead, 
"  Who  never  to  himself  hath  said, 
*'  This  is  my  own  my  native  land  ?"—* 

And  ending — 

"  If  such  there  breathe,  go,  mark  him  well, 
"  For  him  no  minstrel  raptures  swell, 
**  High  though  his  titles,  proud  his  name, 
*^  Boundless  his  wealth  as  wish  can  claim ; 


336  APPENDIX. 

"  Despite  his  titles,  power  and  pelf, 

"  The  wretch  concentred  all  in  self  ; 

*'  Living,  shall  forfeit  fair  renown, 

"  And,  doubly  dying,  shall  go  down 

"  To  the  vile  earth  from  whence  he  sprung, 

<'  Unwept,  unhonoured,  and  unsung." 

This  wretch  thus  devoted  to  abhorrence  and  obli- 
viori;  Sir  Waher  Scott  affirms  his  hero  to  have  been, 
in  a  work  professing  to  preserve^  for  distant  posterity, 
a  record  of  his  actions  and  a  portrait  of  his  character. 
And  this  he  does  not  only  against  all  probability, 
but  in  defiance  of  evidence  of  the  strongest  descrip- 
tion, and  staring  him  in  the  face.     He  has  himself 
stated  that  a  few  months  before  the  birth  of  Napo- 
leon, Corsica  was  by  conquest  incorporated  (v.iii, 
p.  23)  with  the  kingdom  of  France.     He  has  also 
stated  (p.  367)  that  when  Napoleon  was   in  his 
twenty-third  year  and  only  a  lieatenantof  artillery, 
he  composed  a  work  ^^  which  might  form  two  vo- 
lumes^ on  the  civil^  political  and  military  history  of 
Corsica.  "     Putting  these  two  facts  together,  let 
us  enquire  what  motive  other  than  affection   for 
Corsica^  and  respect  for  the  heroic  struggles  of  her 
sons  for  independence,  can  be  supposed  to  have 
prompted  Napoleon's  undertaking,  or  to  have  di- 
rected the  choice  of  his  subject.     In  addition  we 
learn  from  Sir  Walter  (v.  iii,  ch.  7)  that  Napoleon 
while  engaged  in    the   heat  and  pressure   of  his 
Italian  compaign  contributed  (^diS  Sir  Walter  has  it) 
to  wresting  his  native  island  from  the  possession  of 
England,   and   reannexing    it    to   France;   that 


CHAPTER    II.  337 

notwithstanding  the  great   events  which  engaged 
his   attention^  the  short   continuance^    contested 
tenure,    and  sudden  termination  of  his  power* 
notwithstanding  all  this,  we  learn  from  Sir  Wal- 
ter Scott,  that  he  had  a  marble  fountain   con- 
structed at  Ajaccio,  more  for  the  comfort  of  the  in- 
habitants,  than  the  embellishment  of  the  town. 
Besides,    as  was    known    to    Sir    Walter   Scott 
(v.  iii,  p.   224)?  among  the  latest   efforts  of  his 
mind  when  oppressed  by  disease,    insult,   exile, 
and  restraint,  is  an  admirable  geographical  and 
historical  notice  of  Corsica  j  and  his  conversations 
with  Antomarchi,  also  known  to  Sir  Walter,  are 
replete  with  expressions  of  affection  for  his  birth 
place.     How  then,  can  it  be  said  with  the  least 
possible  regard  for  truth,  that  iXapoleon  was  desti- 
tute of  affection  for  the  place  of  his  birth,  a  senti- 
ment by  the  way,  common  to  men,  strongest  in 
those  of  the  strongest  character,  and  claimed  by 
Sir  Walter,  truly  no  doubt,  for  himself? 

George  the  third  was  his  contemporary.  This 
^^ gracious  king"  ^^was  in  fact  very  near  being 
born  an  alien,  "  both  his  parents  being  native  Ger- 
mans. He  placed  ^^his  affection  for  his  birth 
place"  above  all  question,  not  by  writing  its  history, 
nor  by  rescuing  it  from  foreign  domination,  nor  by 
designs  nor  monuments  of  utility  or  munificence ; 
but  by  declaring  a  fact  which  every  body  knew, 
and  effecting  a  repetition  which  would  have  been 
as  meritorious  in  a  parrot  as  a  prince.     The  mi- 

22 


338  APPENDIX. 

nisters  of  Eng^Iand  advised  him  to  say  to  his  subjects 
tliat  he  was  ''born  a  Briton,  "  and  the  whole  Bri- 
tish nation  was  thrown  into  transports  of  loyal 
fjratitude  and  delight !  Yet  Napoleon,  had  he  con- 
descended to  repeat  the  assertion  of  a  mere  physical 
fact;  or  to  catch  at  vulgar  applause  by  reflecting  on 
his  fathers  before  him,  might  have  proclaimed  to 
France  —  ''  Born  a  Frenchman,  I  glory  in  the 
name. " 

But  Sir  Walter  asserts  not  only  that  Napoleon 
was  regardless  of  Corsica,  but  that  Corsica  was  re- 
gardless of  him  3  and  this  double  edged  imputation 
he  attempts  to  reconcile  with  verisimilitude,  by 
affirming  it  to  be  natural.  His  language  on  this 
occasion,  exemplifies  so  clearly  the  ease,  with  w^hich^ 
under  the  sanction  of  his  great  name,  absurd  con- 
jectures and  ridiculous  contradictions,  could  be  cir- 
culated in  place  of  attested  facts  and  consistent  in- 
ferences, that  it  deserves  attentive  examination 
(v.  iii,  p.  22).  '' Napoleon  never  again  revisited 
Corsica,  nor  does  he  appear  to  have  regarded  it 
with  any  feelings  of  affection."  This  sentence  is 
composed  of  two  affirmations^  the  first  positive, 
the  second  conjectural,  and  both  unfounded.  As 
to  the  first,  we  learn  from  Bourrienne  (t.  iii,  ch.  2) 
that  on  his  return  from  Egypt  Napoleon  landed  at 
Ajaccio,  and  was  received  by  the  inhabitants  with 
the  warmest  attachment  and  admiration  j  that  he 
remained  there  eight  days  in  consequence  of  un- 
favourable winds,  and    manifested  for  his  birth 


CHAPTER    II.  339 

place  a  remarkable  degree  of  affection.  Bour- 
rienne's  words  are^  ^^  He  was  overwhelmed  with 
incessant  visits^  compliments  and  solid tationsj  the 
whole  town  was  in  motion ,  every  body  insisted  on 
being  his  cousin^  and  from  the  prodigious  number  of 
god-children  who  came  to  pay  their  respects  to  their 
god-father,  one  might  have  supposed  that  Bona- 
parte had  held  one-fourth  of  the  children  of  Ajaccio 
at  the  baptismal  font.  He  w^alked  out  with  us 
very  often  in  the  environs  of  Ajaccio,  and  took  as 
much  pleasure  in  pointing  out  to  us  the  small 
domains  of  his  ancestors,  as  he  ever  afterwards 
felt  while  in  the  zenith  of  his  power,  in  numbering 
his  crowns. " 

Lavalette,  another  eye  witness  of  this  visit,  says 

(Memoires  du  comte  Lavalette,  t.  i,  p.  336)  :  ^^We 

arrived  at  Ajaccio.     This  little  town  was  the  birth 

place  of  the  general  in  chief.     He  had  left  it  eight 

(six) years  before  when  only  a  captain  of  artillery. 

At  the  sight  of  his  native  town  his  breast  was  fondly 

affected.     As  we  were  direct  from  Egypt  where 

the   plague  prevailed,    we  had   not    clean   bills 

of  health;  and  of  course  could  not  be  allowed  to 

land.     The  inhabitants  surprised  at  seeing  the  ad- 

miraPs  flag  at  our  main,  hurried  down  in  crowds 

to  the  shore.     But  when  they  learned  the  presence 

of  their  illustrious  countryman,  his  relations  and 

friends  sprang  into   the  boats,  threw  themselves 

aboard  the  ship,  and  soon  broke  the  quarantine.  In 

this,  however,  there  was  little  actual  inconvenience. 


34o  APPKNDIX. 

since  after  a  passage  of  forty  clays,  we  had  not  a 
sinn^le  man  on  the  sick  list.  In  one  of  the  boats 
which  crowded  under  the  poop  of  the  vessel,  an 
old  woman  dressed  in  black  stood  up  and  stretched 
out  her  hands  towards  the  general,  crying  out  ^my 
dear  son  ! '  for  some  time,  without  being  able  to 
catch  his  attention.  At  length  he  discovered  her, 
and  instantly  called  out  in  return,  ^  Mother! 
It  was  his  nurse. " 

So  much  for  the  assertion  of  mutual  indifference 
l)etween  Napoleon  and  the  people  of  Corsica,  as 
well  as  for  the  repeated  declaration  (v.  iv,  p.  i33) 
of  his  never  having  visited  that  island  subsquently 
to  his  expulsion  from  it  by  Paoli  and  the  English  in 
the  spring  of  1793.     But  perhaps  as  neither  the 
Memoirs  of  Bourrienne  nor  those  of  Lavallette  had 
been  published,   at  the  time  Sir  Walter  Scott's 
Avork  appeared,  the  references  just  made  may  be 
thought  not  to  render    these   statements  of  his 
inexcusable  but  only  to  make  them  incredible  and 
absurd.     Yet  Dr.  Antomarchi's  account  of  the  last 
moments  of  Napoleon  was  not  only  known  to  Sir 
Walter  but  consulted  by  him,  as  appears  from  his 
own  words,  (v.  g,  pp.  295-7).   '*'Dr.  Antomarchi's 
account  of  his  last  moments,  a  work  in  two  vo- 
lumeSj  though  less  interesting  and  showing  far  less 
acuteness  than  that  of  Las  Gases,  or  of  O'Meara,  is 
yet  useful  and  entertaining"  and  ^^  we  beg  to  refer 
to  Dr.  Antomarchi's  work,  etc."    In  this  work  Na- 
poleon himself  says  (t.  i,  pp.  221-2)  :  ^*We  arrived 


CHAPTER  II.  341 

at  Ajaccio  and  anchored  in  the  harbour.      The 
companies  of  the  town^  the  population,  hastened 
immediately  to  the  landing;  all  wished  to  see  me. 
They  invited   me  to  land.     It  was  nothing  but 
acclamations.     The  troops  were  under  arms,  but 
poor  fellows,   they  had  neither  clothes  nor  shoes. 
I  asked  what  was  become  of  their  military  chest; 
but  they  had  received  not  a  sous  for  seven  months. 
The  paymaster  was  in  advance  to  the  government, 
having  had  to  borrow  forty  thousand  francs,  which 
he  distributed  among  them  proportionably,  in  order 
to  procure  them  subsistence,  and  to  satisfy  the  tavern 
keepers  who  had  refused  their  tables  to  the  officers. 
I  was  indignant  at   this  neglect.     Collecting  all 
my  disposable  cash  I  had  their  accounts  stated  and 
paid ;  I  did  not  wish  their  uniform  to  excite  com- 
passion.    In  the  evening  there  was  a  ball  and  illu- 
mination.    In  these  demonstrations  the  poor  vied 
with  the  rich.     Brave  people   of  Ajaccio,  never 
shall  I  forget  their  reception  of  me. "     In  addition 
to  this  we  have  the  admission  of  Sir  Walter  him- 
self (v.  ix,  p.  295)  :    ^^  Dr.  Antomarchi  seems  to 
haye  been  acceptable  to  Napoleon,  and  the  rather 
that  he  was  a  native  of  Corsica.  " 

Sir  Walter  Scott  has  left  behind  him  the  reputa- 
tion of  an  amiable  man,  a  pleasing  poet,  and  a 
great  novelist,  but  does  this  reputation  justify  or 
even  excuse  this  wanton  misrepresentation  of  his 
hero's  affections,  or  this  barefaced  attempt  to  palm 
upon  his  readers  a  story,  which  he  must  have 
known  to  be  untrue? 


'54  a  APPENDIX. 


Thus  far  his  narrative.     Let  us  now  examine 
the  conjectures  and  inferences  by  which  he  endea- 
vours less  to  substantiate  than  to  colour  it.     *^One 
small  fountain  at  Ajaccio  is  pointed  out  as  the  only 
ornament  which  his  bounty  bestowed  on  his  birth 
place."     Here  we  recognize  that  ^^  canny  Scot/' 
Andrew  Fairservice  himself.     Because    Napoleon 
did  evince  his  affection  for  his  birth  place  in  a  na- 
tural and  expressive  manner,  and  the  fact  could 
not  be  denied,  it  is  masked  by  the  reproach  that 
this  was  the  only  mark,  not  of  his  affection^  which 
is  the  matter  in  controversy,  but  of  his  bounty , 
But  this  is  not  all.     The  allusion  to  the  ^^ small 
fountain/'  is    made  by  Sir  Walter  (v.    iii^   pp. 
s>2»3)  on  the  authority  of  Benson,  to  whose  Sketches 
of  Corsica  a   very   defective   reference    has  been 
already  noticed.     On  this  occasion  the  mutilation 
of   Benson   is   still  more  hazardous.     Instead  of 
saying  that  ^^  one  small  fountain  was  the  only  orna-^ 
meiit  bestowed  by  Napoleon's  bountj  on  Ajaccio," 
Benson   observes  (pp.  lo-ii)  '^  As  you   quit  the 
town,  the  first  object  that  presents  itself  is  a  little 
fountain  on  the  left,  which  except  the  pavement  of 
the  quajj  is  the  only  puhlic  work  of  Bonaparte 
for  the  place  of  his  birth."     So  that  the  fountain 
was  not  pointed  put  as  an  ornament  but  as  what  it 
was  no  doubt  designed  to  be,  a  work  of  public 
utility,  and  never  was  mentioned  as  the  onlj  work 
of  that  description  J  except  by  Sir  Walter  Scott  him- 
self, who  held  before  his  eyes  proof  that  his  asser- 
tion was  false,  and  his  reproach  unfounded. 


CHAPTER    II.  343 

As  Ajaccio  is  a  small  town;,  it  required,  one 
would  think,  a  small  fountain,  upon  those  prin- 
ciples of  proportion  and  good  taste  in  the  percep- 
tion of  which  Napoleon  is  affirmed  repeatedly,  by 
Sir  Walter,  to  have  been  deficient.  Had  he  con- 
structed a  large  fountain,  at  great  cost,  for  orua^ 
ment  rather  than  utility,  he  might  have  been 
justly  accused  of  indulging  his  own  vanity  at  the 
public  expense.  But  Sir  Walter  seems  to  argue 
ihat  thelarger  the  fountain,  the  greater  the  affec- 
tion. Yet  this  mode  of  reasoning  would  j  ustify  the 
belief,  that  the  larger  the  book,  the  greater  the 
truth,  an  inference  which  Sir  Walter  Scott's  readers 
will,  no  doubt,  earnestly  protest  against.  He  pro- 
ceeds, ^'  he  might,  perhaps,  think  it  impolitic  to  do 
anything  which  might  remind  the  country  he  ruled 
that  he\vas  not  a  child  of  her  soil ;  nay,  was,  in  fact, 
very  near  having  been  born  an  alien,  for  Corsica 
was  not  united  to,  or  made  an  integral  part  of 
France  until  June,  1769,  a  few  weeks  only  before 
Napoleon's  birth."  If  it  be  witliin  the  limited 
license  of  history  to  substitute  conjectures  and  sup- 
positions for  events  and  reasoning,  common  sense 
and  common  decency  undoubtedly  require,  that 
these  conjectures  and  suppositions  should  be  na- 
tural and  consistent.  Yet  here  Napoleon  is  repre- 
sented as  fearing  to  bring  to  recollection  a  fact 
w  hich  both  he  and  Sir  Walter  knew  never  existed, 
and  is  supposed  to  have  concealed  a  sentiment, 
which,  it  is  just  before  asserted,  he  never  enter- 
tained.     With  equal  boldness  of  language,  and 


344  APPENDIX. 

confusion  of  thoug^ht,  it  is  inferred,  that,  inasmuch 
as  he  was  born  after  Corsica  became  an  integral 
part  of  France,  he  felt  and  acted  precisely  as  if  he 
had  been  born  before  that  event,  and  knowing 
himself  to  be  a  native  of  France,  must  have  thought 
himself  an  alien  !     Again,  a  reproach  on  this  last 
point,  however  idle  or  ridiculous,  he  is  represented 
(p.  23)  to  have  felt  as  a  ^^  stigma,"  to  avoid  which, 
as  well  as  to  make  the  people  of  France  forget  the 
notorious  fact  of  his  having  been  born  in  Corsica, 
we  are  to  believe  he  fell  on  the  expedient  of  affect- 
ing indifference  to  that  island  and  its  inhabitants. 
The  mode  in  which  this   ^^  oblivious  antidote"  was 
to  operate  on  the  memory  of  the  French  nation  is 
not  stated.     Nor  is  it  easy  to  conceive  in  what 
manner  such  a   thought  suggested  itself  to  the 
author  of  Waverley,  who  knew  how  tenaciously 
the  people  of  Great  Britain  adhered  to  George  I 
and.  II,  although  they   ^^  actually  were  not  chil- 
dren of  her  soil,"  and  also  knew  how  many  of  his 
gibbeted  countrymen  fed  the  vultures  and  tainted 
the  air,  for  having  dared  to  contest  the  rights, 
and  resist  the  rule  of  those  ^^  aliens »^     The  last 
material    in  this   fabrication  is   an   exact   quota- 
tion from  Benson^  the  traveller,  whose  light  work 
has  been   already  referred  to.     This,  it  will   be 
observed,  as  Sir  Walter  positively  and  repeatedly 
asserts  that  Napoleon  never  revisited  Corsica  after 
he  was  driven  out  in  1793,  is  proceeding  upon  the 
plan  of  finding  out  a  man's  feelings  by  frequenting 
a  place  which  he  studiously  kept  aloof  from.     The 


CHAPTER    II.  345 

quotation  is  as  follows : — ^^  The  Corsicans  are  still 
highly  patriotic,   and  possess  strong  local  attach- 
ments.   In  their  opinion,  contempt  for  the  country 
of  one's  birth  is  never  to  be  redeemed  by  any  other 
qualities .  Napoleon,  therefore,  certainly  was  not  po- 
pular in  Corsica,  nor  is  his  memory  cherished  there." 
This  is  a  mixture  of   assertion  and  inference 
which  the  author  of  ^^theLayof  the  Last  Min- 
strel" should  have  been  careful  to  disentangle  and 
examine,   if  he  condescended  to  notice  it  at  all. 
He  might  have  told  his  readers  that  Benson's  is  a 
light,  hasty,  and  unpretending  work — that  he  so- 
journed in  the  island  but  six  weeks — that  his  work 
was  at  first  ^^  intended  only  as  a  private  memorial 
of  six  weeks  agreeably  passed," — and  that  it  was 
swelled  into  the  shape  of  a  book  by  the  English 
after-thoughts  of  the  author.     Besides,  in  the  pre- 
vious sentence,  carefully  omitted  by  Sir  Walter, 
Benson  says,  that,  on  Napoleon's  ^^  elevation,  the 
Corsicans  looked  for  marks  of  especial  favour,  but 
such  hopes  were  disappointed  ;"  showing  that  the 
feelings  he  observed  among  them,  or  supposed  he 
observed,  were  the  effect  of  this  disappointment, 
and  not  proofs  that  the  Corsicans  reproached  Na- 
poleon with  want  of  affection  for  the  place  of  his 
birth .    Moreover,  Benson  visited  Corsica  as  a  sort  of 
administrator  of  Paoli's  estate  in  that  island,  and  in 
the  dogstar  rage  of  the  Bourbon  ascendancy  in 
France.    His  intercourse  was  therefore  principally 
maintained  with  the  agents  of  government,  or  the 
partisans  of  the  old  English  faction  in  the   island^ 


3/\G  APPENDIX. 

with  the  disciples  of  Pozzo  di  Borgo  or  Talleyrand. 
But,  it  may  be  asked,  was  there  no  other  way  for 
Napoleon  to  manifest  feelings  of  affection  for  his 
native  island  than  that  afforded  by  the  erection  of 
large  and  costly  monuments?  Were  not  his  bene- 
factions and  patronage  to  individuals  demonstra- 
tions of  attachment  equally  useful  and  expressive? 

One  thing  which  could  neither  be  denied  nor 
misapprehended,  one  would  think,  might  have 
saved  Sir  Walter  from  plunging  into  this  confusion 
of  folly  and  injustice  about  the  Corsicans.  It  is 
this  broad  and  substantial  fact,  that  France,  instead 
of  being,  as  he  calls  it,  (p.  24)  '^the  land  of  Na- 
poleon's adoption,*'  was  the  country  of  his  birth j 
education,  settlement,  and  residence ;  and  that 
Corsica,  as  a  fractional  part  of  it,  was  benefitted  by 
whatever  favours  he  conferred  upon  France,  while 
bounties  distributed  and  ornaments  erected  in  Cor- 
sica, instead  of  being  marks  of  affection  for  the 
land  of  his  birth,  were  memorials  of  regard  for  the 
place  of  his  nativity. 

The  compliment  which  Sir  Walter  vouchsafes 
to  ^'the  high-spirited  islanders"  for  resenting  Na- 
poleon's alleged  indifference,  by  retaliating  it, 
must  appear  even  more  ridiculous  than  the  main 
body  of  the  fabrication  with  which  it  is  connected, 
when  the  reader  recurs  to  the  citations  already, 
made  from  Bourrienne^  Lavalette,  and  Antomarchi, 
and  adverts  to  the  fact,  that,  at  this  very  moment, 
the  *' high-spirited  islanders"  are  strenuously  en- 
gaged in  erecting  a  monument  to  his  memory. 


CHAPTER   II.  3/(7 

Page  Go. 

(i5)  ^'  The  great  and  well-earned  influence  pos- 
sessed by  Paoli  over  his  countrymen  became  the 
ground  of  jealousies."  ^^  Towards  the  end  of  the 
year  1 79^,  Paoli  was  informed  that  it  was  his  Ma- 
jesty's pleasure  that  he  should  immediately  leave 
the  island,  and  go  to  England.  He  did  so,  and 
arrived  in  London  towards  the  end  of  December." 
— (Benson's  Sketches,  p.  1 18).  So  that  Paoli  was 
banished  by  the  English  government,  after  having 
banished  his  friends  for  their  advantage ;  a  retri- 
bution at  once  atrocious  and  just. 

Page  G'6. 
(16.)  Paoli  died  in  England,  on  the  5th  of  Fe- 
bruary, 1807,  ^f  course,  after  the  campaigns  of 
Italy,  Egypt,  Marengo,  Austerlitz,  Jena,  the  close 
of  the  consulate,  and  the  commencement  of  the 
empire.  His  manifestations  of  melancholy  delight 
at  the  prodigies  of  his  filial  friend  were  not  ap- 
proved, it  has  been  said,  by  the  British  govern- 
ment.— (Vide  Antomarchi,  t.  i,  p.  197). 

Page  69. 

(17)  The  description  of  this  essay  of  Napoleon, 
and  the  notice  taken  of  the  previous  productions 
of  his  pen  in  the  text,  are  at  variance  with  the  ob- 
servations respecting  them,  of  Sir  Walter  Scott, 
who,  adding  to  the  weight  of  his  authority,  the  force 
of  his  contempt,  gives  but  a  sad  account  of  the  lite- 
rary efforts  of  his  hero.     Of  one  he  intimates, 


348  APPENDIX. 

(v.  iii,  p.  17)  though  he  had  never  seen  it,  that  its 
principles  were  probably  felt  as  a  reproach  to  its 
author's  practices  j  thus  projecting  a  shade  of  un- 
defined and  unfounded  censure  over  the  tract  of 
his  succeeding  narration ;  of  another,  that  it  was 
fortunately  not  executed ,  thus  pronouncing  sen- 
tence on  it  though  unborn,  and  affirming,  by  gra- 
tuitous   implication,    Napoleon's   incompetency  j 
and  of  a  third,  (the  supper  of  Beaucaire)  after  an 
erroneous  and  unvouched  summary  of  it,  alleging 
that  it  excited  its  author's   shame    so   painfully 
(v.  iii,  p.  3o)  that  he  caused  the  copies  to  be  col- 
lected   and    destroyed  with  the    utmost   rigour. 
Before  these  bold  and  empty  assertions  issued  from 
the  press,  it  appears  that  this  production,  thus  ri- 
gorously destroyed,   rose  like  a  phoenix  from  its 
ashes,  and  satisfied  Sir  Walter  Scott  that  his  ac- 
count of  it  required  correction  j  (appendix,  v.  iii, 
pp.  354-7)  t^^t^   instead  of  being  what  he  had 
declared  it  to  be  ^^  a  jacobin  pamphlet,"  it  was  an 
essay  inculcating  submission  to  the  acts  and  officers 
of  government;  that  Marat  was  not,  as  he  had 
asserted,  one  of  the  interlocutors,  and  that  the 
essay  contained  no  sentiment  which  could  affect 
an  honest  man  or  a  good  citizen  with  self-reproach. 
Disappointed,  but  not  disheartened,  the  author  of 
Waverley,  on  this  admitted  alteration  of  his  facts, 
founds  an  equivalent,  if  not  identical  imputation; 
as  if  the  confusion  arising  from  a  blunder  was  to  be 
relieved  by  perpetrating  an  injustice.    This  iraputa- 
lion  imports,    that  although  not  stung  by  self-re* 


CHAPTER    II.  349 

proach  on  looking  over  his  pamphlet,  Napoleon  was 
so  disgusted  with  ^^  the  colour  of  his  vizard,"  which 
he  had  assumed  for  the  purpose  of  allaying  the  vio- 
lence of  a  civil  war  while  a  foreign  war  was  raging, 
that  he  called  in  and  destroyed  every  copy  that  could 
be  found,  one  only  escaping,  from  which,  unfortu- 
nately for  the  congruity  of  the  body  and  appendix  of 
SirWalter  Scott's  work,  though  not  for  its  bulk,  the 
essay  was  reprinted.  ^^The  colour  of  his  vizard,'' 
we  learn,  (v.  iii,  p.  367)  '^  was  the  assumed  charac- 
ter of  a  jacobin,  with  the  friendly  intention  of 
convincing  the  girondists  that  they  were  choosing 
an  unfit  time  for  insurrection."  This,  be  it  ob- 
served, is  imputing  to  Napoleon  the  scheme  of 
recommending  himself  as  a  friend  to  the  girondists,, 
by  assuming  the  character  of  their  terrible  and 
and  mortal  foe ;  a  device  in  the  art  of  persuasion 
which  was  not  practised  by  Demosthenes,  nor  in- 
culcated by  Quintilian.  We  also  learn  from  Sir 
Walter,  that  the  soldier  in  the  dialogue  is  Bona- 
parte himself,  that  his  essay  was  ^'  free  from  all  the 
exaggerated  and  cant  language  of  the  day,  no  men- 
tion of  liberty,  equality,  or  fraternity  of  the  rights 
of  man,  no  abstract  discussion  of  political  prin- 
ciples." He  then  goes  on  with  a  degree  of  hardi- 
hood that  Rob  Roy  himself  never  equalled :  ^^  Not- 
withstanding, therefore,  what  is  said  in  the  text, 
from  erroneous  information  of  the  nature  of  this 
publication,  there  is  nothing  in  it  (that  is,  nothing 
in  what  is  said  about  the  work  in  the  text)  incon- 
sistent with  Napoleon's  own  account  of  the  origin 


35o  APPENDIX. 

of  the  work,  that  it  was  written  under  the  assumed 
character  of  a  jacobin,  with  the  friendly  intention 
of  convincing  the  girondists  that  they  were  choos- 
ing an  unfit  time  for  insurrection^  and  attempting 
it  in  a  hopeless  manner."  Now,  let  us  see  what  is 
said  in  the  text  about  this  work  (v.  iii^  p.  3o) : 
'  ^  Napoleon  had  shewn  that  his  own  opinions  were 
formed  on  the  model  of  the  times  by  a  small  jacobin 
publication  called  ^^Le  Souper  de  Beaucaire,"  a 
political  dialogue  between  Marat  and  a  federalist, 
in  which  the  latter  is  overwhelmed  and  silenced  by 
the  arguments  and  eloquence  of  the  friend  of  the 
people."  ^^It  is  whimsical  to  observe,  that,  in  the 
manuscripts  of  St.  Helena,  he  mentions  this  publi- 
cation as  one  in  which  he  assumed  the  mask  of  ja- 
cobin principles,  merely  to  convince  the  girondists 
and  royalists  that  they  were  chusing  an  unfit  time 
for  insurrection,  and  attempting  it  in  a  hopeless 
manner."  Now,  between  these  statements,  he  al- 
leges in  the  appendix,  there  is  no  inconsistency,  the 
first  asserting  that  the  jacobin  opinions  of  Marat 
were  those  which  Napoleon  really  entertained,  and 
the  second  that  he  had  merely  assumed  the  lan- 
guage of  a  jacobin,  the  better  to  convince  the  in- 
surgents that  they  were  chusing  an  unfit  time  for 
their  attempt.  Would  it  not  be  as  rational  to  say. 
Notwithstanding  that  I  told  jou  yesterday  that 
two  and  two  make  four ,  there  is  no  inconsistency 
between  what  I  then  said,  and  what  I  now  say, 
that  two  and  two  make  five !  So  far  was  Sir  Walter 
from  thinking  there  was  no  inconsistency  between 


CHAPTER    II.  35 1 

these  two  statements^  when  he  placed  them  in  his 
text,  that  he  introduced  the  latter  as  contrasted 
with  the  former,  and  as  justifying  an  insinuation 
that  it  was  on  that  account  false.  *"*  It  is  whim- 
sical to  observe,  etc.,"  that  is,  it  is  odd  that  JYa^ 
poleoriy  after  having  written  the  ^  Souper  de 
BeaucairCy  in  the  genuine  spirit  of  a  jacobiji^ 
and  with  such  sincere  extj^avagancCy  that  he  as- 
sumed the  vizard  of  Marat's  name  ;  should  have 
pretended  J  in  the  manuscripts  of  St,  Helena  ^  that 
he  never  entertained  the  exaggerated  political 
sentiments  of  the  jacobins^  but  merelj  assumed 
the  mask  of  them  for  a  moment ,  xvith  the  in- 
tention of  pacifying  an  insurrection.  The  pre- 
tence is  so  whimsically  false,  that  it  is  quite 
amusing  to  observe  it.  But  this  is  not  the  only 
inconsistency  between  the  text  and  the  appendix. 
In  the  first  Napoleon  is  ashamed  of  his  work,  be- 
cause it  was  ^^a  jacobin  publication."  In  the  se- 
cond it  is  not  a  jacobin  publication^  ^^ nothing  can 
be  more  inaccurate  than  to  say  so"  (p.  366) :  still 
he  is  ashamed  of  his  work  ! 

However,  at  last  Sir  Walter  endeavours  to  re- 
concile this  inconsistency,  by  saying  that  Napoleon 
himself  admits  in  the  St.  Helena  manuscripts,  that 
he  did  assume  the  mask  of  a  jacobin;  that  he  was 
disgusted  at  the  ^^ colour  of  his  vizard"  afterwards, 
and  therefore  as  Sir  Walter  asserts,  destroyed  his 
work.  For  this  alleged  admission  of  Napoleon,  it 
is  to  be  regretted  that  he  does  not  make  a  less  vague 
reference  to  bis  authority.     In  the  third  volume  of 


352  APPENDIX. 

these  manuscripts^  (Montholon  p.  xii)  this  is  the 
account  which  Napoleon  dictated  of  the  origin  of 
his  Souper  de  Beaucaire,  ^^  During  Napoleon's 
stay  at  Marseilles  near  the  insurgents,  having  had 
an  opportunity  of  observing  the  feebleness  and  in- 
coherence of  their  measures  and  means,  he  wrote  a 
small  pamphlet,  which  he  published  before  he  left 
that  city.  He  endeavoured  to  open  the  eyes  of 
these  madmen,  and  predicted  that  their  revolt 
would  have  no  other  result,  than  to  give  occasion 
for  the  men  of  blood,  to  sacrifice  their  leading  ci- 
tizens on  the  scaffold."  Now  this  so  far  from 
being  an  admission  that  he  had  assumed  the  mask 
of  a  jacobin  or  that  he  assumed  any  mask  whatever, 
at  any  time,  shows  the  reverse,  for  the  jacobins 
were  the  men  of  blood,  from  whose  power  and 
cruelty  he  was  endeavouring  to  screen  the  people 
of  Marseilles.  This  ^^  vizard,"  therefore,  whose 
colour  was  so  disgusting,  never  existed,  and  of 
course  could  not  have  occasioned  the  rigorous  de- 
struction of  the  pamphlet. 

It  is  easy  to  conceive  that  when  he  had  become 
the  ruler  of  France  and  the  dictator  of  Europe,  he 
might  have  desired,  from  motives  founded  in  the 
prudence  of  a  statesman  and  patriot,  but  not  from 
shame  or  disgust,  to  suppress  the  circulation  of 
this  early  essay.  It  contained  the  affirmation  of  a 
military  maxim,  the  soundness  of  which  he  had 
afterwards  reason  to  deny  (see  Memoires  de  Napo- 
leon— Montholon — t.  v,  ch.  9).  In  the  ^*  Supper 
of  Beaucaire"  the  military  speaker  says  :   ^^  It  is  an 


CFiAPTiiR    II.  35 


0^3 


axiom  in  the  military  art  that  an  army  ^Yhich  re- 
mains in  its  intrenchments  is  beaten.  Theory  and 
experience  agree  on  this  point."  This  dictum^  of 
Fouquet,  the  emperor  would  have  been  unwilling 
to  recommend  to  his  generals^  a  consideration 
which  alone  may  be  assumed  as  sufficient  to  pro- 
voke the  destruction  of  the  pamphlet.  It  might 
have  had  a  tendency  to  obstruct  the  fusion  of  par- 
ties upon  accomplishing  which  he  was  so  intent^ 
to  awaken  painful  recollections  which  had  long 
since  subsided^  or  to  cast  censure  on  the  me- 
mory of  men^  with  w^hom  those  around  him  were 
connected,  and  who  although  they  had  erred  in 
judgment,  were  many  of  them  bright  examples 
of  virtue  and  talents.  That  it  contained  nothing 
to  be  ashamed  of,  or  disgusted  with,  the  pamphlet 
itself  inconteslably  proves. 

It  is  also  easy  to  conceive,  without  reference  to 
military  opinions  or  political  considerations,  that  a 
man  of  Napoleon's  fine  taste  and  matchless  genius, 
after  he  had  performed  unrivalled  achievements  in 
war,  politics,  and  legislation,  was  actuated  by  a 
feeling  very  different  from  shame  or  self  reproach, 
wben  he  destroyed  one  of  his  early  fugitive  pro- 
ductions, by  a  discretion  or  fastidiousness,  of  which 
the  greatest  minds  are  not  alwajs  destitute.  Virgil 
directed  by  his  will^  that  the  last  six  books  of  the 
Eneid  should  be  burned,  because  he  had  not  suf- 
ficiently revised  and  polished  them.  None  of  his 
commentators  have  attributed  that  sensitiveness  to 

23 


2oll.  APPENDIX. 


shame  or  self  reproach^  on  account  of  political  sen- 
timents ill  that  immortal  poem^  althou(jh  it  does 
contain  some  which  deserve  reprobation.  Johnson 
says  of  Pope  —  '^  Most  of  his  juvenile  productions^ 
were  by  his  maturer  judgment  afterwards  de- 
stroyed." As  to  Sir  Walter  himself^  his  admirers 
cannot  fail  to  regret^  that  he  was  inattentive  to 
these  great  examples  of  delicacy  and  judgment. 
Had  it  been  otherwise,  although  his  gains  might 
have  been  less^  his  fame  would  have  been  disembar- 
rassed of  some  of  his  earlier  as  well  as  later  produc- 
tions, and  untarnished  by  the  one  which  we  are 
now  considering. 

The  letter  to  Buttafoco  is  given  at  length  in  the 
appendix  to  the  3d  volume  of  SirWalter  Scott's  Life 
of  Napoleon  with  this  preface  (v.  iii^  p.  368)  ^^  We 
have  preserved  the  composition  entire,  because^ 
though  the  matter  be  uninteresting,  the  rough  and 
vivid  style  of  invective  is  singularly  characteristic 
of  the  fiery  youth^  whose  bosom  one  of  his  teachers 
compared  to  a  volcano  surcharged  with  molten 
granite  ;  which  it  poured  forth  in  torrents^  when- 
ever his  passions  were  excited."  The  reader  will 
recognize  in  this  sentence  a  distortion  of  the  fact 
stated  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  work,  that  the 
professor  of  belles  lettres  at  the  military  school  of 
Paris  compared  Napoleon's  original  amplifications 
to  -'^blocks  of  granite  issuing  hot  from  a  volcano.  " 
The  anecdote  is  derived  from  the  Count  de  Las 
Cases;  who  thus  relates  it  (Memorial,  t.  i,  pp.  175-6 
et  7  )  '^  Being  myself  an  e/ei>e  of  the  military  school 


CHAPTER    II.  355 

of  Paris^  but  a  year  earlier  than  Napoleon,  I  had 
opportunities  of  talking  about  him  frequently  after 
my  return  from  emigration,  with  the  masters  who 
had  been  our  common  instructors.     M.  Domairon, 
our  professor  of  belles  lettres,  told  me  that  he  had 
always  been  struck  with  the  originality  of  Napo- 
leon s  amplifications  ;  he  had  called  them  from  the 
time  Napoleon  was  at  school,  granite  heated  in  a 
volcano/''     Is  there  the  slightest  reference  here  to 
the  ^^ passions"  or  ^^ bosom"  of  Napoleon^  the  least 
intimation  that  the  former  were  so  fiery  as  to  con- 
vert the  breast  they  inhabited  into  a  moral  volcano 
overboiling  with  ire  and  fury?     Rhetorical  ampli- 
fications in  the  theme  of  a  student  may  indicate  the 
turn  of  his  imagination  or  the  tendency  of  his  taste, 
but  never  have  yet  been  supposed  to  proceed  from 
the  rage  of  his  passions.     Setting  aside  the  memory 
of  Napoleon,  and  the  obligation  of  an  historian  to  his 
readers,  it  might  he  supposed  that  feelings  of  deli- 
cacy and  honour  would  have  deterred  Sir  Walter 
from  putting  a  calumny,  invented  by  himself,  into 
the  mouths  of  two  gentlemen  whose  hearts  he  knew 
must  have  abhorred  it;  one  being  the  admiring 
instructor,  the  other  the  faithful  friend  of  Napo- 
leon.    From  the  violence  of  this  departure  from 
truth,  the  suprincumbent  weight  and  ever-acting 
pressure  of  those  motives  by  which  the  author  of 
Waverley  was  influenced,  may  with  some  degree 
of  accuracy  be  inferred.     To  this  letter  he  affixes 
the  date  of  January  in  the  year  2,  which  answers  to 
January^  '79^;  when  Napoleon  was  in  Corsica,  and 


356  APPENDIX.  . 

joined  Truguet's  expedition  against  Sardinia.  The 
letter  itself  proves  it  must  have  been  written  before 
that  time,  for  this  among  other  reasons,  that  it  ap- 
peals toMirabeau  as  one  of  the  great  patriots  sitting 
in  the  assembly  with  Buttafoco,  and  Mirabeau  died 
the  2nd  of  April  1791.  As  Lockhart's  assertion  is 
the  mere  echo  of  Sir  Walter  Scott's,  it  may  be  dis- 
missed as  an  exploded  falsehood.  The  contradic- 
tion between  Norvins  and  Hazlitt,  shows  that  one  or 
the  other  must  be  wrong ,  while  an  examination  of 
the  work  itself  will  prove  that  neither  was  right. 
They  consider  the  pamphlet  as  a  theory  of  govern- 
ment^ written  by  a  politician,  whereas  it  was  an 
argument  addressed  by  an  officer  of  the  army  en- 
gaged in  the  execution  of  a  special  and  important 
duty,  to  a  body  of  disaffected  citizens,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  dissuading  them  from  impeding  the  opera- 
tions of  the  army  to  which  he  was  attached,  and 
from  resisting  the  authority  of  a  government,  which 
directed  that  army  against  a  foreign  enemy.  That 
it  was  no  apology  for  the  reign  of  terror,  but  an 
exhortation  to  a  union  of  arms  and  councils,  for 
the  purpose  of  reconciling  the  army  and  the  ci- 
tizens, and  resisting  the  common  foe,  a  perusal  of 
the  dialogue  will  convince  the  most  sceptical  reader. 
It  is  wonderful  that  any  one  could  misapprehend 
its  object,  or  perceiving  it,  fail  to  render  the  essay 
unqualified  applause. 

That  Napoleon  had  this  pamphlet  destroyed  is 
repeated  in  the  text  on  the  authority  of  Sir  Walter 
Scott  and  of  Bourrienne,  and  therefore  not  posi- 


CHAPTLR    II.  357 

lively.     Neither  Hazlitt  nor  Norvins  mentions  this 
fact. 

Page  69. 

(18)  The  accounts  given  by  other  authors^  of 
the  appearance  and  object  of  this  little  work^  are 
various.      That  dictated  by  Napoleon  himself,  as 
cited  in  the  preceding  note^  states  expressly  that  he 
wrote  the  pamphlet  while  he  was  staying  at  Mar- 
seilles^ and  published  it  before  he  left  that  town, 
Norvins,  ( t.  i^  p.  29)  asserts  that  it  was  printed  at 
Avignon  by  Sahin  Tournal.     Hazlitt  (v.  i^  p.  44) 
affirms  that  it  was  after  leaving  Marseilles^  and  on 
his  return  to  Avignon,  that  he  wrote  this  pamphlet. 
The  probability  is,  thatit  was  written  and  published 
at  Marseilles,  and  that  it  was  published  at  Avignon 
also.     In  respect  to    its    political  character,   the 
opinions  of  historians  are  still  more  discordant. 
The  absurdities  and  contradictions  of  Scott  have 
been  sufficiently  exposed.     Lockhart  (v.  i,  p.  i5) 
says  it  was  a  pamphlet  ^^in  which  the  poUtics  of 
the  jacobin  party  were  spiritedly  supported,  and  of 
which  he  was  afterwards  so  ashamed  that  he  took 
great  pains  to  suppress  it."    Hazlitt  (v.  i,  pp.  44-4^) 
represents  it  as  an  effort  to  prevent  civil  war  and 
bloodshed,  and  as  the  beginning  of  a  system  of  pru- 
dence on  that  subject,    which   he   carried   to  an 
extreme  that  made  him  as  a  statesman  ^^  hesitating, 
cautious,  and  almost  pusillanimous."     Norvins,  on 
the  contrary,  regards  it  as  ^^an  apology  for  the 
system  of  terror   which  then   governed    France" 
(t.  i,  p.  29.) 


358  APPENDIX. 

Page  70. 
(19)  It  has  been  alleged  that  Napoleon  proposed 
after  the  wedding  of  his  brother^  marrying  ma- 
demoiselle Desiree  Clary^  but  that  her  father  re- 
fused his  consent  saying  that  ^^one  Bonaparte  was 
enough  in  the  same  family. "  This  is  doubtless  an 
indention  subsequent^  for  al  St.  Helena^  Napoleon 
denied  ever  having  thought  of  this  marriage  (Las 
Cases,  t.  i,  pp.  181  2).  Hazlitt  reasserts  this  story, 
and  imputes  to  this  attachment,  his  favour  to  Ber- 
nadotte,  which  proceeded,  no  doubt,  from  the  well 
known  arts  of  Bernadotte  as  a  courtier  and  intriguer, 
from  his  connection  with  Napoleon's  family,  and 
from  the  interest  of  Joseph,  the  link  of  that  connec- 
tion. The  vanity  which  could  persuade  a  lady  to 
imagine  that  she  had  once  captivated  the  great 
conqueror,  cannot  provoke  censure  nor  excite 
surprise. 


(     359    ) 


CHAPTER  in. 

Page   7o. 

(4)  Thiers,  in  his  history  of  the  French  revo- 
lution, observes,  (t.  v,  p.  ^Sg)  that  admiral 
TrogofFwho  commanded  at  Toulon,  and  deli- 
vered  the  place  to  lord  Hood,  was  a  '*  foreigner 
whom  France  had  loaded  with  favours." 

Page  75. 

(2)  Extract  from  "the  preliminary  Declara- 
tion" of  lord  Hood  to  the  inhabitants  of  Toulon: 
"  and  whenever  peace  takes  place,  which  I  hope 
and  trust  will  be  soon,  the  port  with  all  the 
ships  in  the  harbour,  and  forts  of  Toulon,  shall 
be  restored  to  France,  with  the  stores  of  every 
kind,  agreeable  to  the  schedule  that  may  be  de- 
livered." 

Extract  from  the  proclamation  of  lord  Hood 
to  the  inhabitants  in  the  towns  and  provinces 
in  the  south  of  France — "Trust  your  hopes  to 
the  generosity  of  a  lojal,  and  free  nation. ^^ 

Extract  from  the  declaration  made  to  lord 
Hood  by  the  general  committee  of  the  sections 
of  Toulon  —  who  "having  read  the  procla- 
mation of  admiral  lord  Hood,  commander 
in  chief  of  his  B.  M.  squadron,  together  with 
his  preliminary  Declaration"  —  "would  have 
recourse  to  the  generosity  of  a  loyal  people,  who 


56a  APPLNDIX 


have  manifested  a  desire  of  protecting  all  true 
Frenchmen,  against  the  anarchists  who  wish  to 
ruin  them,  declare  to  Lord  Hood "  —  Here 
follow  various  conditions  upon  which  the  people 
of  Toulon  consent  to  deliver  up  the  place.  Of 
these,  the  5th  states  that  "  the  people  of  Toulon 
(are)  full  of  confidence  in  the  generous  offers  of 
lord  Hood" — and  the  8th,  ''that  when  peace 
shall  have  been  reestablished  in  France,  the 
ships  and  forts  which  will  be  put  into  the  hands 
of  the  English,  shall  be  restored  to  the  French 
nation,  in  the  same  state  they  were  in  when  the 
inventory  was  delivered." 

Extract  from  the  proclamation  of  lord  Hood 
on  taking  possession  of  Toulon.  "  I  do  hereby 
repeat,  what  1  have  already  declared  to  the 
people  of  the  south  of  France,  that  I  take  pos- 
session of  Toulon  and  hold  it,  in  trust  only,  for 
Louis  XVH,  until  peace  shall  be  reestablished 
in  France,  which  I  hope  and  trust  will  be  soon. 
Given  onboard  H.  B  M.  ship  Victory,  off  Ton- 
Ion,  the  28th  of  August  1 795.  " 

'   fSlgned.J  "Hood." 

"  By  command  of  the  admiral. " 

(fSlgned.J  "J.  Mc  Arthur." 

See  Annual  Register  for  1795 — State  Papers — 
pp.  171,  2,  5.  See  also  the  declaration  sent 
"  byH.  B.  Majesty^s  command  to  the  commanders 
of  his  fleets  and  armies,"  dated  the  19th  of  Octo- 
ber, 1793,  recognising  and  confirming  the  agreo- 


CHAPTER    111.  56  r 

ment  which  had  Leen  entered  into  with  the  in- 
habitants of  Toulon.  Annual  Register  for  1 795, 
State  papers,  p.  199. 

Page  74. 

(5)  This  is  the  general  estimate  of  La  Poype's 
force.  Gourgaud  in  the  Menioires  de  Napoleon 
(t.  I ,  p.  9)  states  it,  I  presume  by  mistake,  at  four 
thousand. 

Page  76. 

(4)  In  the  Annual  Register  for  1 795  (History 
of  Europe,  p.  284)>  the  allied  force  is  estimated 
at  12,000  men  "  bearing  firelocks."  This  ex- 
cludes the  cannoneers  who  must  have  been  em- 
ployed in  great  numbers.  Thiers  (t.  6,  p.  49) 
ratesthe  land  troops  of  the  allies  at  14  or  i5,ooo. 
These  antagonist  accounts  appear  to  confirm 
the  computation  of  the  emperor  :  viz. — 5, 000 
Spaniards,  I^yOOo  Neapolitans,  5, 000  English, 
and  2,000  Sardinians — in  all,  14,000.  See  Me- 
moires  de  Napoleon,  Montholon  (t.  3,  p.  8). 
Sir  Walter  Scott,  as  he  knew  his  countrymen 
were  worsted,  does  not  state  their  numbers. 

Page  77. 

(5)  Norvins  says  (t.  i,  p.  52),  that  these  ships 
conveyed  5, 000  seamen  of  Britanny,  and  that 
their  presence  at  Toulon  was  feared  by  lord 
Hood.  The  Annual  Register  for  1795  mentions 
that  the  ships  were  sent  round  to  Brest,  '*  with 
the  hope  of  effecting  a  similar  revolt  in  that  quar- 
ter."— History  of  Europe,  p.  284. 


363  APPENDIX- 

Page  70. 

(6)  Various  dates  have  been  assigned  for  this 
promotion.  Las  Cases  (t.  i,  p.  224)  makes  it 
(he  19th  October,  1795.  But  in  the  same  volume 
(p.  i94)»  ^^  says  on  the  authority  of  Napoleon, 
that  in  September,  1795,  he  was  akeady  a  chief 
ofbattalion.  In  Montholon  (t.  5,  p.  11)  Napo- 
leon states  that  he  was  chief  of  battalion  before 
he  was  appointed  lor  the  siege  of  Toulon.  The 
same  statement  he  repeated  to  Gourgaud  (t.  i, 
p  11)  which  is  adopted  or  confirmed  by  Nor- 
vins  (t.  I,  p.  55).  Scott,  with  his  usual  indiffe- 
rence to  facts,  and  contempt  of  accuracy,  asserts 
(v.  5,  p.  5o)  that  on  occasion  of  Napoleon's 
being  ordered  to  Toulon,  he  was  promoted  to 
the  rank  of  brigadier  genei^al.  Yet,  at  page  44> 
after  calling  him  "the  young  general  of  artil- 
lery," he  declares  that  in  conformity  with  the 
recommendation  of  Dugommier,  upon  the  con- 
clusion of  the  siege,  "  he  was  confirmed  in  his 
provisional  situation  of  chief  of  battalion,  and 
appointed  to  hold  that  rank  in  the  army  of  Italy." 
This  is  rewarding  by  injury,  and  promoting  by 
degradation.  Hazlitt  on  this  point  is  vague  and 
defective. 

Page  91. 

(7)  This  is  the  object  which  most  writers  (and 
Napoleon  himself  in  his  dictation  to  Gourgaud 
t.  I,  p.  16.  among  them)^  assign  for  concealing 
the  erection  and  retarding  the   fire  of  this  bat- 


CHAPTER    III.  565 

tery.  Iii  the  dictation  to  Moiitholon,  however 
(t.  5,  pp.  28,  29),  it  is  said  that  the  fire  was  not 
to  be  opened  until  the  day  after  Little  Gibraltar 
should  be  taken,  in  order  by  the  surprize  to  en- 
crease  the  confusion  of  the  allies,  who  according 
to  Napoleon's  hypothesis,  would  be  in  the  act  of 
deliberating  on  the  measures  to  be  taken  in 
consequence  of  the  loss  of  Little  Gibraltar. 

Page  91. 

(8)  Sir  Walter  Scott  says,  this  party  con- 
sisted but  of  three  thousand  men  (v.  5,  p  07). 
Norvins  (t.  i,  p.  40)  raises  the  number  to  seven 
thousand.  Napoleon  in  the  dictation  to  Mon- 
tholon  and  Gourgaud  makes  it  from  six  to  se- 
ven thousand  (t.  i,  p.  16,  and  t.  5,  p.  29),  an 
estimate  the  lower  number  of  which  is  adopted 
by  Hazlitt  (v.  i,  p.  369),  and  by  Thiers  (t. 
vi,  p.  55),  authorities  which  I  have  followed. 
The  military  career  of  General  O'Hara  would 
have  been  as  obscure  as  his  talents  were  mode- 
rate, but  for  the  remarkable  fact  of  his  having 
surrendered  to  Washington  and  to  Napoleon. 
The  anecdote  respecting  his  sullen  dignity  in 
misfortune,  is  related  by  Napoleon  himself  in  a 
letter  to  Kleber,  of  the  loth  September,  1798. 
In  a  letter  to  the  same  commander,  Napoleon 
incidentally  refers  to  his  first  efforts  against  the 
allied  squadron  at  Toulon,  in  terms  which  shew 
the  remarkable  accuracy  ofthe  account  of  the  same 
affair  dictated  at  St.  Helena;  from  which  account 


364  APPENDIX. 

that  ill  the  text  is  derived.  Encouraging  hisheiite- 
nant  to  defend  the  harbour  of  Alexandria  against 
an  apprehended  attack  from  the  victorious  Nel- 
son, he  says — "  With  six  twenty-four  pounders, 
two  furnaces  for  heating  balls,  and  forty  canno- 
neers, I  contended  for  four  days  against  the  Eng- 
lish and  Spanish  squadron,  and  after  burning 
a  frigate  and  several  bomb-ketches,  forced 
them  to   draw^  off."  (Letter  of  the  21st  August, 

1798.) 

Page  90. 

(9)  In  this  pictures  que  language  Napoleon  him- 
self describes  the  general  under  whom  he  gained 
his  first  laurels.  Yet,  Sir  Walter  Scott,  after 
denouncing  as  we  have  seen,  the  bad  taste  and 
worse  French  of  Napoleon,  retails  it  without 
ceremony  and  without  acknowledgment,  as  his 
own  (v.  iii,  p.  54),  although  by  so  doing  he 
deflowers  the  compliment  to  Dugommier's  me- 
mory, of  all  its  grace  and  spirit. 

Page  99. 

(10)  This  fact  rests  on  the  assertion  of  Napo- 
leon at  St. -Helena  (Las  Cases,  t.  i,  p.  206), 
evidence,  which  if  it  were  not  convincing,  the 
invidious  suppression  of  his  name  by  these  depu- 
ties in  their  despatches,  would  confirm.  They 
were  unjust  to  him  because  he  would  not  be  un- 
generous to  Dugommier. 

Page  102. 

(11)  It  is  in  these  terms  that  Napoleon  repre- 


CHAi-TER    III.  565 

sents  the  conduct  of  the  deputies  in  his  dictation 
to  Gourgaud  (t.  i,  p.  25),  and  that  he  repeats 
it  to  Montholon  (t.  iii^  p.  55),  emphatically  and 
expressly  contradicting  the  statements  written 
at  the  time  of  the  siege^  which  described  these 
gentlemen  as  marching  to  the  assault,  at  the 
head  of  the  columns.  Sir  Walter  Scott  gives 
the  substance  of  these  opposite  accounts  to  his 
readers,  without  adopting  either,  not  unwilling, 
under  the  appearance  of  impartiality,  to  fix  the 
suspicion  of  falsehood  on  Napoleon,  and  leave 
the  disgrace  of  poltroonery  on  the  deputies. 
Hazlitt  (v.  i,  p.  565)  and  even  Lockhart  (v.  i, 
p.  2o)  are  more  just.  Norvins  is  silent  on  this 
point;  but  what  renders  its  examination  proper, 
is,  that  Thiers,  without  referring  to  authority, 
and  with  the  air  of  a  person  who  considered  his 
narration  incontestable,  ventures  to  sanction  in 
the  most  positive  language,  the  statement  which 
Napoleon  positively  contradicts.  These  are  his 
words,  after  describing  the  assault  (t.  vi,  p.  55)  : 
*'  In  this  action,  general  Dugommier,  the  repre- 
sentatives Salicetti  and  Robespierre  the  younger, 
and  the  commandant  of  the  artillery,  Bona- 
parte, had  been  present  in  the  fire,  and  had 
inspired  the  troops  with  the  greatest  courage." 
This  is  asserting  that  Salicetti  and  Robespierre 
the  younger  bore  an  equal  part  in  the  assault  with 
Bonaparte  and  generalDugommier;  an  assertion, 
which,  if  not  intended  to  destroy  the  deliberate 
statement  of  Napoleon  altogether,  might  imply, 


566  APPENDIX. 

that  he  and  Dugommier  came    swaggering  up, 
sword  in  hand  to  the  fort,    three  hours  after  it 
had  heen  heen  wrested  from  the  enemy.     To 
avoid  this  absurdity  it  must  be  inferred  that  the 
historian,    designed   to  convey  to  the  world   a 
dow  nright  contradiction  of  a  statement,   made 
by  Napoleon    respecting    a  matter   of  fact,    of 
which   the  latter  was  an  eye  witness,    and  in 
regard  to  which,    he  could  hardly  have  com- 
mitted the  error  thus  imputed  to  him ,  without 
falsehood.     The   only  sources  of  authority   to 
which  a  writer   rejecting  the  statement  of  Na- 
poleon would  be  likely  to  resort,  are  first,  the 
despatch  of  the  deputies,  Pucord,  Freron,  and 
Robespierre  the  younger,  dated  the  28  Frimaire 
(18  December)  1795  j  second,  the  speech  ofBar- 
rere^  delivered  in  the  sitting  of  the  24  Decem- 
ber (14  Nivose)  on  the  occasion  of  reporting  this 
despatch,  in  the  name  of  the  committee  of  pub- 
lic safety,    to  the  convention;    third,    the   offi- 
cial report  of  general  Dugommier,  dated  the  29 
Frimaire  (19  December)  ^  fourth,  the  relation  of 
the  capture  of  Toulon  drawn  up  by  general  Ma- 
rescot,    who  commanded  the  engineers  of  the 
siege,  dated  the  9th  January,  1 794,  and  published 
in  his  compilation  by  Musset-Pathayin  1806;  and 
fifth,  the  history  of  the  siege  of  Toulon  found 
in  the  voluminous  work   entitled:    '^Victoires 
et  Conquetes  des  Francais."    In  the  first  of  these 
documents  these  three  deputies  say —  "Distri- 
buted among  the  columns,  we  rallied  such  of 


CHAPTER    III.  567 

the  troops  as  were  for  a  moment  daunted."  They 
speak  of  their  colleague  Barras,  as  being  em- 
ployed on  the  other  side  of  the  harbour  with  La- 
poype,  but  make  no  mention  whatever  of  Sali- 
cetti ;  so  that  if  their  own  vague  and  interested 
account  were  to  be  received  without  abatement, 
it  would  not  exactly  sustain  the  narrative  of 
Thiers. 

Passing  from  the  first  to  the  second  document, 
from  the  deputies  to  their  colleague  the  orator; 
it  appears,  that  in  the  fervour  of  rhetoric  and 
exultation,  he  thus  discoursed  to  the  conven- 
tion. "The  representatives  of  the  people  march- 
ed at  the  head  of  the  republican  columns.  Sa- 
licetti  and  Robespierre  the  younger,  with  their 
drawn  swords,  marshalled  the  first  troops  of  the 
republic  the  road  to  victory,  and  mounted  to 
the  assault.  They  set  an  example  of  intrepidity. 
Ricord  was  also  at  the  head  of  a  column."  This 
besides  being  a  second-hand  assertion,  is  in  a 
style  of  description  too  frothy  and  effervescing 
for  the  sobriety  of  historical  truth.  Moreover, 
these  deputies  were  colleagues  of  the  orator  as 
well  as  of  his  auditory,  and  one  of  them  the 
brother  of  Robespierre^  who  then  presided 
in  the  reign  of  terror.  The  esprit  du  corps  ^ 
the  nature  of  the  occasion,  and  the  interest  of 
the  orator,  all  tended  to  produce  exaggeration 
and  praise.  Barrere  includes  the  name  of  Ri- 
cord, which  Thiers  omits,  while  they  both  omit 
that  of  Freron,   one  of  the  signers  of  the  des- 


^68  APPENDIX. 

patch  which  declares — "distributed  among  the 
cohimns,  we  rallied  such  of  the  troops  as  were 
for  a  moment  daunted." 

In   the  third  document    general  Dugommier 
says — ''so  that,  in  spite  of  the  obstructions    of 
the  weather,  our   brothers   in  arms  sprang  for- 
ward in  the  path  of  glory,  as  soon  as  the  order 
was  given.     The  representatives  of  the  people, 
Robespierre,  Salicetti,  Ricord  and  Fr^ron  were 
ivith  us ;   they  set  an  example  to    onr  brethren 
of  the  most  signal  devotion."     This  account  it 
will  be  observed  places   Ricord  and  Freron  on 
the  same  ground  which  Thiers  assigns  expressly 
to  Robespierre  and  Salicetti;  and  from  which 
Barrere  excludes  Freron.     It  makes  no  mention 
of  Bonaparte   whatever;   and  does  not  describe 
the  deputies  as  mounting   to   the    assault;   but 
rather  as  being  with  the    columns,  when  the 
order  for  the  attack  was  pronounced,  and  the 
troops  rushed  forward  to  execute  it.     Consider- 
ing that  the  deputies  were  not  expected  to  lead 
columns,  or  share  in    the   danger   of  storming 
forts^  that  something  was  due  from  courtesy  to 
their  station,  that  much  was  conceded  from  in- 
terest to  their  power,  and  that  there  is  obvious 
inconsistency  between  the  affirmation  of  Thiers 
and  the  report  of  Dugommier,  it  must  be  con- 
fessed, that  the  narrative  of  the  historian  is  not 
corroborated  by  the  report  of  the  general.   Ma- 
rescotsays — "The  representatives  of  the  people, 
the  citizens   Salicetti,  Ricord,   Robespierre   the 


tHAPTER   In.  36) 

younger,  and  Freron  were  present."  But  he 
omits  the  names  of  Dugommier  and  Bonaparte, 
although  he  mentions  those  of  Laborde  and 
Victor.  His  account  is  therefore  far  from  sup- 
porting that  of  Thiers.  Nor  does  it  remove  the 
impression  that  the  presence  of  the  deputies 
was  confined  to  the  moment,  when  the  troops 
were  put  in  motion.  The  prohabihty  of  this 
having  been  the  fact  is  increased,  when  we  re- 
flect, that  of  the  five  military  gentlemen  who 
are  mentioned  as  participating  in  this  arduous 
conflict — viz,  Dugommier,  Bonaparte,  Muiron, 
Victor,  and  Laborde,  four  were  wounded,  that  is 
Bonaparte  slightly,  and  Muiron,  Victor,  and  La- 
borde, severely — whereas  of  the  four  citizen  sol- 
diers, all  escaped  untouched  Again,  men  who 
would  invidiously  refuse  praise  to  another,  would 
not  scruple  to  take  credit  unduly  to  themselves. 
Thiers  admits  (v.  6,  p.  5i)  that  the  reduction 
of  Toulon  was  due  to  *'  a  young  officer  who  com- 
manded the  artillery.  "  This  young  ofiicer  is 
not  even  mentioned  in  the  despatch  of  the  depu- 
ties, and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  puff 
of  Barrere  about  the  drawn  sword  of  Salicetti 
and  Robespierre^  was  prompted  by  those  depu- 
ties themselves.  In  addition  to  this  we  should 
remember  the  analogous  fact  that  Freron  and 
Rarras,  disavowed  their  letter,  advising  the  go~ 
vernment  to  raise  the  siege,  (See  the  Moniteur 
of  the  28th  December,  1795.) 

Nor  does  the  account  of  this  siege  in  the  P^ic- 

34 


5^0  APPENDIX. 

toires  et  Conquetes^  etc.  of  the  French  armies,  (t. 
:2,  p.  1 55)  justify  the  narrative  of  the  historian. 
It  is  there  observed  (p.  i6i)  that  the  commis- 
saires  of  the  convention,  Salicetti,  Ricord,  Robes- 
pierre the  younger,  and  Freron  passed  through 
the  ranks  and  animated  the  soldiers  to  the  attack, 
making  no  mention  of  Bonaparte,  no  distinction 
in  favour  of  Salicetti  andRobespierre,  andleaving 
untouched  the  impression  that  the  deputies 
confined  their  warlike  exertions  to  words  and 
gestures,  and  to  the  moment  when  the  troops 
were  moving  to  the  assault. 

Upon  the  whole,  therefore,  it  appears  that  this 
account  of  Thiers,  resting  on  such  unsound  and 
incoherent  vouchers,  would  be  liable  to  suspi- 
cion^ even  if  it  w  ere  uncontested.  When  op- 
posed to  the  deliberate  and  emphatic  declaration 
of  Napoleon,  as  to  a  matter  of  fact  of  which  he 
was  an  eye  witness,  it  ceases  to  possess  the  small- 
est authority.  It  may  be  observed  of  this  author, 
that  his  work^  admirable  as  it  is,  betrays  a  ge- 
neral disposition  to  extol  or  excuse  the  civil  per- 
sonages of  the  Revolution. 

In  justice  to  Gasparin,  it  ought  to  be  men- 
tioned, that  he  had  left  the  army  of  Toulon 
before  the  assault  of  Little  Gibraltar,  and  was  not 
a  party  to  the  injustice,  or  the  boasting  of  his 
colleagues. 

Page  104. 

(12)    Sir   Walter    Scott    (v.   iii,    p.    59)    as- 


CHAPTER    lil,  571 

cribes  this  bold  counsel  to  lord  Hood — and  as 
ills  statement  is  substantially  confirmed  by  Napo-i 
Icon  (t,  iii.  p.  57,  Montliolon),  I  have  adopted 
it.  It  is  perfectly  inconsistent,  however,  with  the 
relation  of  the  same  affair,  in  the  Annual  ReGfis- 
ter  for  1795  (p.  284,  History  of  Europe), 

Page  106. 

(i5)  There  are  few  passages  of  Sir  Walter's 
work  which  reveal  the  spirit  in  which  it  was 
written,  more  clearly  than  the  following  puerile 
flourish.  After  describing,  much  in  the  style  of 
scenes  to  be  found  in  Rokeby  and  Ivanhoe  (as  if 
the  tawdry  costume  which  suits  the  stage,  might 
be  worn  with  grace  or  propriety  in  private 
circles),  the  awful  but  incomplete  conflagra- 
tion perpetrated  at  Toulon,  and  the  retreat  of 
the  British  armament  from  its  calamitous  in- 
tercourse with  French  traitors,  he  adds — *'  It 
was  upon  this  night  of  terror,  conflagration, 
tears  and  blood,  that  the  star  of  Napoleon  first 
ascended  the  horizon  j  and  though  it  gleamed 
over  many  a  scene  of  horror  ere  it  set,  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  its  light  was  ever  blended 
with  those  of  one  more  dreadful. "  Now  so 
far  from  this  figurative  representation  being 
true,  the  *^  terror,  conflagration  and  tears, '' 
were  all  on  the  side  of  the  English  and  their 
motly  allies ,  while  the  star  of  Napoleon  blen- 
ded its  light  with  success,  joy,  security,  and 
triumph.     Sir  Walter  Scott  had  before  him  the 


503  APPENDIX. 

Memoirs  of  Napoleon,  in  which  (t.  iii,  p.  46)  it 
is  stated  that  the  French  government  celebrated 
the  taking  of  Toulon  by  a  national  festival,  the 
first  ceremony  of  the  kind  which  the  republic  had 
ordained.  He  refers  also  to  the  files  of  the  Moni- 
teur  in  which  the  details  of  this  celebration  are 
preserved,  and  yet  he  describes  this  leading 
triumph  of  the  republic,  as  a  '^scene  of  horror 
over  which  the  star  of  Napoleon  gleamed. '*^ 

When  Caesar  had  exterminated  the  Nervians 
in  a  great  battle,  pacified  Gaul,  and  intimida- 
ted the  barbarians  beyond  the  Rhine,  the  Ro- 
man senate  were  so  far  from  regarding  his  suc- 
cesses as  ''  scenes  of  horror,"  that  they  decreed 
a  public  thanksgiving  to  the  gods,  of  fifteen 
days.  And  the  great  captain  of  antiquity,  whose 
'*  star  was  then  ascending  the  horizon,"  so  es- 
teemed this  national  compliment,  thathenotonly 
recorded  it  in  his  memoirs,  but  carefully  men- 
tioned it,  as  an  honor  which  had  never  been 
paid  to  any  other  commander.  "  Ob  casque  res, 
ex  litteris  Caesaris,  dies  XV,  supplicatio  decreta 
est,  quod  ante  id  tempus  accidit  nulli." 

The  battle  of  the  Nile  was  the  first  of  Nelson*Sr 
great  victories.  To  his*  enemy  it  was  no  doubt 
a  night  of  "  terror,  conflagration,  tears,  and 
blood."  To  him  it  secured  the  gratitude  of  his 
country,  and  immortal  fame.  What  would  the 
people  of  England  have  said,  if  this  fair  conquest 
of  their  hero,  had  been  distorted  by  metaphori- 
cal detraction  into  "a  scene  of  horror,"  and  de- 


CHAPTER    III.  575 

precated  with  sinister  regret  as  a  night  of  * 'tears 
and  blood." 

Page  109. 

(14)  Lockbart  (v.  i,  p.  21)  says:  "  Junot  be- 
came marshal  of  France."  Even  he  ought  to 
have  known  better.  Junot  might  have  gained  a 
baton  in  181 2  at  Valentino. 

Page  H2. 
(i5)  That  this  was  the  course  of  public  feel- 
ing, no  one  who  considers  the  enormity  of  the 
crime  committed  by  the  Toulonese,  and  the  ad- 
vantage taken  of  it  by  the  English  admiral,  can 
doubt,   especially  after  examining  the  terms  of 
his  proclamations,    cited  in  a  former  note;   his 
attempt,  confessed  in   the  Annual  Register,    to 
seduce  from  their  allegiance  the  people  of  Brest 
and  Rochefort:  and  the  declaration  of  the  king 
of  Great  Britain  of  the  19th  October  179^,  en- 
couraging other  towns  of  France  to  follow  the 
example  of  Toulon.    Yet  in  defiance  of  this  mass 
of  evidence,  attesting  the  insincere  and  calami- 
tous conduct  of  the  English  government  in  this 
treason  of  Toulon,   British  writers  exhaust  all 
their  terms  of  reproach  upon  the  cruelty  of  the 
French  convention  !   Sir  Walter  Scott  calls  it 
(v.    iii,  p.   4^)   "republican   vengeance  ;"   but 
says  nothing  about  its  exciting  cause;  although 
he  seems  to  admit,  that  adequate  exertions  were 
not  made  to  retain  possession  of  Toulon,  and  of 
course,  the  power  of  protecting  its  guitly  inhab 


Sy^  APPENDIX . 

tants.     Lockhart  (v.  i,  pp.  19,    20)  is  more  un- 
just and  extravagant ;  and  the  Bourbon  ascen- 
dancy in  France,    operating  as  an  equivalent  to 
alien  feeling,    Norvins,    who  wrote  his  history 
under  the  dominion  of  the  Restoration,   talks 
with  as  much  horror  of  the  reprisals  executed 
by  the  agents  of  the  convention,  as  of  the  dange- 
rous  treason  which  provoked  it    (t.  i,   p.  45). 
And  even  Hazlitt,  after  properly  observing  (v.  i^ 
p.  562)  that  "  the  excesses  of  the  French  revo- 
lution, were   to  be  considered^  in  the  circum- 
stances of  the  time,    and  from  the  character  of 
the  people,  as  the  natural  but  deplorable  result^ 
of  the  general  and  almost  frantic  spirit  of  resis- 
tance to  the  threat  of  subjugation  and  oppression 
from  without,"  is  so  far  misled  by  this  clamour, 
as  to  denounce  more  strenuously  the  stratagem 
by  which  the  revolutionary  tribunals  entrapped 
their  victims,  than  he  does  either  the  manner 
in  which  the  people  of  Toulon  betrayed  their 
country,    or  that  in  which  they  were  themselves 
betrayed  (v.  i,  ch.  7).    Yet  what  bounds  would 
have  been  set  to  the  indignation  of  British  histo- 
rians,  had  a  French   admiral   in    the   time  of 
Louis  XIV,  after  persuading  the  people  of  Ports- 
mouth to  deliver  into  his  hands  that  important 
station  with  all  its  fleets,  arsenals  and  forts,  upon 
the  promise  of  receiving  them  "  in  trust  only  for 
the  Pretender,"  and  restoring  them  to  England 
at  the  conclusion  of  peace  between  her  domestic 
factions,  upon  finding  himself  likely  to  be  driven 


CHAPTER    III.  575 

out  of  the  place^  blown  up  the  forts,  burnt  down 
the  arsenals,  carried  off  as  prizes  all  the  ships  be 
could  get  away  with,  and  set  on  fire  the  rest  ? 

Notwithstanding  the  reproaches  of  French 
writers,  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  England  and 
France  being  at  w  ar,  the  British  admiral  was  jus- 
tified in  availing  himself  of  the  offer  of  the  Tou- 
lon ese  to  deliver  up  to  him  their  town,  their 
harbour,  and  its  contents.  But  it  is  equally 
undeniable  that  he  was  bound  upon  every  prin- 
ciple of  good  faith  to  adhere  strictly  to  the  con- 
ditions, without  consenting  to  which,  he  would 
never  have  got  possession  of  Toulon.  These,  as 
they  were  understood  by  the  Toulonese,  and 
solemnly  repeated  by  lord  Hood  himself,  im- 
ported, that  he  took  possession  of  Toulon,  and 
**  held  it  in  trust  only  for  Louis  XVll^  and  that 
the  place  and  every  thing  in  it  were  to  be  re- 
stored to  the  French  nation  when  peace  should 
be  reestablished  in  France."  The  object  of  the 
trust  which  he  accepted  being  the  interest  of 
Louis  XVn,  lord  Hood  should  have  made  the 
promotion  of  that  interest  the  main  purpose  of 
his  conduct,  while  in  the  possession  of  Toulon, 
and  should  have  acted  as  if  he  had  been  appoint- 
ed to  act  by  the  King  of  France,  and  confined 
his  agency  strictly  within  the  limits  of  his  trust. 
It  cannot  be  supposed  that  Louis  XVH,  either  as 
claimant  or  possessor  of  the  French  throne, 
was  likely  to  be  benefitted  by  the  destruction  of 
the  naval  power  of  France.     His  comparatively 


Zn6  APPENDIX . 

venial  connection  with  the  foreign  enemies  of 
France  liad  hurried  Louis  XVI  to  the  scaffold. 
It  V,  as  not  probable  that  delivering  up  the  fleets, 
iorts,  and  arsenals  of  France  to  English  posses- 
sion or  EngHsh  flames,  would  place  his  son,  who 
was  in  the  power  of  the  French  people;  upon 
the  French  throne !  Yet  lord  Hood,  the  trustee 
of  Louis  XVII,  30  disposed  of  them  to  lord 
Hood,  the  commander  of  a  British  squadron. 
Holding  this  double  character,  he  assumed  one 
aspect  to  get  possession  of  the  fleet,  and  acted  un- 
der the  other  to  destroy  or  make  prize  of  it.  Sup- 
posing it  be  to  his  intention,  and  in  his  power, 
England  and  France  being  still  at  w  ar,  to  replace 
the  ships  and  other  public  property,  at  the  re- 
establishment  of  peace  in  France,  the  injury  to 
Louis  XVII,  in  the  increased  irritation  and  dis- 
like af  the  French  people  was  irreparable.  But  it 
is  alleged  by  Thiers,  that  lord  Hood,  so  far  from 
consulting  the  interest  ol  Louis  XVII,  or  any  other 
interest  than  that  of  the  British  government  and 
his  own,  prevented  the  departure  of  a  deputation 
which  the  Toulonese  proposed  sending  to  the 
count  of  Provence,  inviting  him  to  repair  ta 
Toulon,  and  there  to  establish  himself  as  regent 
of  the  kingdom  ;  a  step  which  might  have  been 
of  infinite  service  to  the  cause  of  Louis  XVII. 
If  the  minutes  of  the  council  of  war,  w  hich  fell 
into  the  hands  of  Dugommier  are  authentic,  it 
would  appear  that  the  interest  of  Louis  XVII  was 
not  thought  of  when  the  destruction  of  the  pub- 


CHAPTER   III.  577 

lie  property  of  Toulon  was  determined  on.  The 
Spanish  government  did  not  conceive  that  the 
interest  of  Spain,  any  more  than  that  of  Louis 
XVll  was  likely  to  he  promoted  by  the  conduct 
of  lord  Hood.  In  October,  1795,  the  king  of 
Spain  issued  a  declaration  of  war  against  Great 
Britain,  in  which,  among  other  grievances  com- 
plained of,  is  a  breach  of  faith  at  Toulon,  on  the 
part  of  the  English  commanders,  "in  destroying 
all  they  could  not  carry  off,"  and  thus  leaving  the 
naval  power  of  Great  Britain  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean, unrivalled.  In  the  manifesto  of  the  Eng- 
lish government,  this  reproach  is  answered  by 
evasion  and  sophistry,  which  prove  it  to  be  irre- 
futable. "  It  is  perhaps  the  first  time  that  it 
has  been  imputed  as  a  crime  to  one  of  the  com- 
manding officers  of  two  powers,  acting  in  alli- 
ance, and  making  a  common  cause  in  war,  that 
he  did  more  than  his  proportion  of  mischief  to 
the  common  enemy."  This,  besides  evading  the 
allegation  of  Spain,  is  avowing  the  doctrine  that 
the  end  jusifies  the  means,  that  a  commander 
in  time  of  war,  is  to  pay  no  respect  to  the  laws  of 
humanity,  justice,  or  honour,  but  is  to  look  only 
to  the  utmost  degree  of  mischief  to  be  inflicted 
on  the  enemy  j  and  that  bad  faith  or  cruelty  in 
one  belligerent  in  a  combined  armament,  casts 
no  disgrace  nor  responsibility  on  the  other. 
Upon  this  principle,  the  savage  tribes  of  North 
America^  when  in  alliance  with  the  King  of  Great 
Britain,  are  exempted  by  him  from  the  restraints 


378  APPENDIX. 

of  humanity  in  war,  and  the  denunciations  of 
thatconneclion,  by  the  great  lord  Chatham,  were 
misapplied.  Lord  Hood  was  a  gallant  officer, 
and  had  many  titles  to  respect,  hut  his  conduct 
at  Toulon  was  far  below  the  dignity  of  his  cha- 
racter and  station,  greatly  unbecoming  the  se- 
cond of  Rodney,  and  the  captor  of  De  Grasse. 
He  made  a  promise^  upon  the  faith  of  which 
great  advantages  were  yielded  to  him^  and  per- 
formed it  in  a  sense  in  which  the  partj  who  con- 
fided in  him^  could  not  have  understood  it  at  the 
time  it  was  given^  nor  have  been  supposed  to  un- 
derstand it. 

With  respect  to  the  punishment  of  those  citi- 
zens of  Toulon,  who  confessed  they  had  assisted 
the  English  in  defending  the  place,  its  severe 
and  indiscriminate  infliction  cannot  be  justified. 
But  let  the  treason  of  Toulon  be  compared  with 
the  mutiny  of  the  Nore.  In  the  first  case, 
French  citizens  delivered  up  to  the  enemy  the 
largest  naval  squadron,  and  the  chief  naval  sta- 
tion of  their  country.  In  the  second,  the  Eng- 
lish seamen  rose  in  mutiny  against  their  officers 
in  time  of  war,  but  refused  to  join  the  public 
enemy.  The  British  government  could  not 
shoot  all  their  seamen — yet  not  a  single  ring- 
leader was  spared. 

Thiers  thus  describes  the  conduct  of  the  En- 
glish admiral  (t.  v,  p.  240):  "  Admiral  Hood, 
who  had  hesitated  a  long  time,  at  last  made  his 
appearance,   and  under  the   pretext  of  taking 


CHAPTER  in.  379 

possession  of  the  port  of  Toulon  in  trust  for 
Louis  X\  II,  received  it  for  the  purpose  of  burning 
and  destroying  it."  And  (t.  yi,  p.  5o)  "  The 
Spaniards  were  offended  at  the  superiority  af- 
fected by  the  English,  and  began  to  distrust 
their  intentions.  Admiral  Hood  taking  advan- 
tage of  this  disunion  declared,  that  since  they 
could  not  agree  together,  it  was  necessary  that 
for  the  moment  no  supreme  authority  should  be 
appointed.  He  even  prevented  the  departure 
of  a  deputation,  which  the  Toulonese  wished  to 
despatch  to  the  count  of  Provence,  to  invite  that 
prince  to  repair  to  Toulon  in  the  character  of 
regent.  From  this  moment  it  was  easy  to  fa- 
thom the  intentions  of  the  English,  and  to  per- 
ceive how  blind  and  guilty  had  those  French 
citizens  been^  who  had  delivered  Toulon  into  the 
hands  of  the  most  inveterate  enemies  of  the 
French  navy. " 

Page  112. 

(16)  This  fact  which  is  stated  by  Norvins^ 
(t.  i,  p.  45)  is  countenanced  by  the  positive  and 
indignant  terms  in  which  Napoleon  denied  to 
Las  Cases  (t.  i,  p.  210)  all  participation  in  the 
execution  of  these  men,  a  denial  which  he  re- 
peated to  Montholon  (t.  iii,  p.  45)-  Sir  Wal- 
ter Scott,  after  reproducing  the  slanders  thus 
denounced,  proceeds  to  assign  most  convincing 
proofs  of  their  falsehood,  (and  consequently  of 
the  impropriety  of  admitting  them  into  his  work) 
but  for  fear  they  should  make  no  impression  on 


380  APPENDIX. 

the  mind  of  the  reader,  he  adopts  a  device  of 
which  he  is  no  doubt  the  inventer.  This  con- 
trivance consists  in  stating  the  charge  hypothe- 
tically  as  true,  and  then  assigning  excuses  for  it 
which  if  admitted  to  be  just,  prove  the  imputa- 
tion in  question  to  be  actually  true.  (v.  iii,  p.  45) 
"  If  he  actually  commanded  at  this  execution,  he 
had  the  poor  apology  that  he  must  do  so  or  him- 
self perish."  Now  as  he  did  not  perish,  the 
inference  arises  that  he  actually  superintended 
the  execution. 

Page  llo. 
(17)  Had  the  designs  of  the  English  govern- 
ment, as  manifested  by  the  professions  and  con- 
duct of  Lord  Hood,  and  the  declaration  of  the 
king  of  Great  Britain,  succeeded,  it  is  evident 
that  the  whole  French  navy  might  have  been 
destroyed  by  the  cooperation  of  French  malcon- 
tents, and  the  commanders  of  the  British 
blockading  squadrons.  What  was  done  at  Tou- 
lon, was  attempted  to  be  done  at  Brest  and  Ro- 
chefort.  It  was  necessary  to  repress  this  dange- 
rous correspondence  with  the  public  enemy, 
and  the  severity  of  the  example  which  was  set  at 
Toulon,  was  doubtless  increased  by  the  evidences 
of  national  disaster  and  disgrace  which  there 
presented  themselves.  The  less  faith  the  Eng- 
lish observed  towards  the  Toulonese,  the  less 
mercy  did  the  French  extend  to  them.  Yet  the 
safety  of  these  people  seems  to  have  been  a  se- 


CHAPTER    III.  38t 

condary  consideration  with  the  '^protectors  of  all 
true  Frenchmen,"  "the  trustees  of  Louis  XVII," 
*Uhe  generous  agents  of  a  loyal  and  free  nation." 
According  to  SirWalter  Scott  (v.  iii,  p.  Sg).  ''The 
safety  of  the  unfortunate  citzens  who  had  in- 
voked their  protection,  was  not  neglected  even 
amid  the  confusion  of  the  retreat.      The  nume- 
rous merchant  vessels  and  other  craft,  offered 
means  of  transportation  to   all   who  having   to 
fear  the  resentment  of  the  republicans,  might 
be  desirous  of  quitting  Toulon/'     He  goes  on 
(p.  40)  '^li  had  been  resolved  \\\dit  the  arsenal  and 
naval  stores,   with  such  of  the  French  ships  as 
were  not  ready  for  sea,  should  be  destroyed,  and 
they  were  set    on  fire   accordingly  : "  shewing 
that  the  destruction  of  French  property  was  the 
first  object,   and  the  "safety  of  the  unfortunate 
citzens"  the  second.    Moreover  the  minutes  of 
the  council  of  war  held  by  the  allied  officers, 
at  which  the  evacuation  was  resolved  on,   as  ci- 
ted by  Montholon  (t.  iii,    p.  Sg),  confirms  this 
conclusion. — "Third  question.    Is  it  not  the  in- 
terest of  the  allies  to  abandon  the  town  at  once, 
after  setting  fire  to  every  thing  which  cannot  be 
carried  off?  Answer  :   The  council  decides  una- 
nimously for  the  evacuation  •  the  garrison  which 
might  be  left  in  Toulon,   would  be  without  re- 
treat, could  receive  no  succour,  and  would  soon 
be  in  want  of  indispensable  supplies.     Besides  a 
fortnight  sooner  or  later  it  would  be  obliged  to 
surrender,   and  forced  to  deliver  up  the  arsenal, 


38jt  APPENDIX. 

the  fleet  and  the  establishments  entire."  Here 
no  provision  is  hinted  at  or  concern  expressed  for 
*'the  safety  of  the  unfortunate  citizens."  This 
is  the  account  which  Thiers  gives  of  the  part  the 
Enghsh  tcok  in  their  behalf,  (t.  vi,  p.  56). 
"  Twenty  ships  of  the  line  or  frigates  appeared 
suddenly  in  flames  in  the  middle  of  the  road, 
exciting  despair  among  the  wretched  inhabi- 
tants, and  indignation  in  the  republicans,  who 
beheld  their  fleet  burning  to  ashes  without  being 
able  to  save  it.  Immediately  twenty  thousand 
individuals,  men  and  women,  the  aged  and  in- 
fants, carrying  with  them  whatever  they  most 
valued,  hurried  to  the  shores,  and  extending  their 
hands  towards  the  allied  squadrons,  implored 
an  asylum  which  might  shelter  them  from  the 
victorious  army.  They  consisted  of  all  the  fami- 
lies of  Provence,  who  at  Aix, Marseilles,  and  Tou- 
lon had  committed  themselves  in  this  insurrec- 
tionary movement.  Not  a  single  shallop  put  off 
to  the  assistance  of  these  imprudent  citizens,  who 
had  put  their  trust  in  foreigners,  and  had  deli- 
vered up  to  them  the  principal  naval  station  of 
their  country.  At  length  admiral  Langara,  the 
Spanish  admiral,  more  humane,  ordered  his 
boats  to  put  off  and  to  convey  aboard  the  Spa- 
nish squadron,  as  many  of  the  refugees  as  his 
ships  could  accommodate.  Admiral  Hood  dared 
not  resist  this  example,  or  the  imprecations 
which  were  showered  on  his  name.  He  gave  or- 
ders at  a  late  period,  to  receive  the  Toulonese 


CHAPTER    III.  383 

on  board.  These  unhappy  fugitives  rushed  des- 
perately into  the  boats.  In  their  confusion  some 
fell  into  the  sea,  others  were  separated  from 
their  families.  Mothers  were  seen  in  search  of 
their  infants  ,  wives  and  daughters  seeking  their 
fathers  or  husbands,  wandered  about  the  quays 
in  the  glare  of  the  conflagation."  General  Mares- 
cot  mentions  the  flight  of"  the  wretched  French 
citizens  who  remembered  too  late  how  faithless 
are  the  promises  of  an  enemy,  and  how  horrible 
is  the  fate  of  those  whom  a  blind  rage  arms 
against  their  country.  Confusion,  hurry,  and 
alarm,  prevailed  to  such  a  degree  in  this  em- 
barkation, that  numbers  of  the  fugitives  were 
drowned.  Several  of  the  boats  were  sunk  by 
the  republican  artillery,  which  began  to  fire 
from  the  opposite  shores." 

Page  113. 
(i8)  This  fact  is  reported  upon  Napoleon^s 
authority  by  Las  Cases  (t.  i,p.  25).  Bourrienne 
affects  to  contradict  it  (t.i,  p.  67)  by  affirming 
that  it  was  not  at  Toulon  that  Napoleon  selected 
Duroc  as  his  aide  de  camp ;  but  afterwards  in 
Italy.  This  might  be  true  without  bringing 
into  question  the  assertion  that  he  knew  Duroc 
at  Toulon  for  the  first  time,  there  divined  his 
merit  and  exlended  to  him  his  favour.  On  this 
point  there  is  still  farther  controversy.  The 
Dutchess  d'Abrantes  (t.  i,  ch.  i5;  says  that  Junot 
was  the  first  officer  who  was  attached  to  Napo- 


384  APPENDIX. 

leon  as  aide  de  camp.  Norvins  on  the  contrary 
(t.i,  p.  4^)  mentions  that  Muiron  and  Duroc 
were  his  first  aides  de  camp.  The  probability  is 
that  Muiron  was  his  first  aide  de  camp  and  Junot 
his  second,  in  relation  both  to  rank  and  time,  for 
they  were  both  attached  to  his  person,  Muiron 
as  adjutant,  and  Junot  as  sergeant  and  secretary,, 
at  Toulon.  In  the  campaign  of  the  next  spring 
and  at  Paris  in  1795,  Junot  was  undoubtedly  one 
of  his  aides  de  camp,  while  there  is  no  evidence 
other  than  the  assertion  of  Norvins  that  Duroc 
was.  In  1796  when  he  took  command  of  the 
army  of  Italy,  his  list  of  aides  de  camp  was  of 
course  increased,  and  in  point  of  rank,  Murat 
who  had  been  attached  to  him  during  his  com- 
mand at  Paris,  was  first.  Lavallette  relates 
(Memoires,  t.  i,  p.  188)  that  when  he  joined 
Bonaparte  as  aide  de  camp  in  Italy  shortly  after 
the  battle  of  Arcole,  Murat  having  been  pro- 
moted and  Muiron  killed,  Junot  was  the  first  aide 
de  camp,  Marmont  second,  and  Duroc  third. 


(     585     ) 
CHAPTER  IV. 

Page   122. 

(i)  "Happily  he  allowed  himself  to  be  di- 
rected entirely  by  the  young  Bonaparte''  (Thiers, 
t.  vi,  p.  288). 

Page  12o. 

(2)  The  words  of  Thiers  in  his  concise  sketch 
of  this  campaign  are  (p.  288):  "  He  was  struck 
with  an  idea  as  fortunate  as  that  which  restored 
Toulon  to  the  republic." 

Page  127. 

(5)  This  analysis  of  the  plan  is  derived  chiefly 
from  the  narrative  of  Napoleon  himself  (Mon- 
tholon,  t.  iii,  chap.  H).  A  reference  to  the  Annual 
Register  for  the  year  17945  as  well  as  the  sketch 
of  Thiers,  has  been  found  useful. 

Page  127. 

(4)  The  most  remarkable  and  successful  exhi- 
bition of  talent,  in  this  sort  of  warfare,  of  which 
military  annals  preserve  the  record,  was  fur- 
nished by  Caesar,  in  his  campaign  against 
Afranius  and  Petreius,  the  lieutenants  of  Pom- 
pey,  in  the  mountains  of  Catalonia.  Without 
lighting,  he  compelled  these  resolute  and  expe- 
rienced generals,  by  skilful  choice  of  ground 
alone,  to  surrender  at  discretion  an  army  equal 
in  numbers  to  his  own,  which  besides  a  large 
bod .  of  auxiliaries,  conlRinedJii^e Roman  legions; 
this  before   the  battle  of  Pharsalia,   and  while 

25 


386  APPENDIX. 

Pompey  was  in  the  pride  of  his  strength.  The 
great  Cond^  deemed  this  exploit  such  a  master- 
piece of  miUtary  skill,  that  he  visited  and  studied 
the  ground.      Ccesar  de  Bello  cwili^  lib.  i,  chap. 

Q^^  71,  84. — (Bossuety  Oraison  funehre  de  Louis 
de  Bourbon). 

Page  128. 

(5)  For  these  two  facts,  besides  the  Annuals 
of  the  period  see  Thiers  (t.  vi,  p.  289). 

Page    i29. 

(6)  Thiers  observes  (ibid.):  ''They  could  not 
hesitate  to  adept  the  plan  of  Bonaparte  ." 

Page  129. 

(7)  Massena  was  a  native  of  the  county  of 
Nice,  and  though  already  respected  as  a  brave 
and  promising  officer,  had  not  acquired  y«/7ze. 

Page  150. 

(8)  M^moires  de  Napoleon — Montholon,  t.  iii^ 
p.  6^ — confirmed  by  the  Annual  Register  for 
1794 — chap.  4)  History  of  Europe  . 

Page  135. 

(9)  It  would  be  difficult,  were  it  required,  to 
determine,  whether  from  carelessness  the  French, 
or  prejudice  the  English,  biographers  of  Napo- 
leon, have  given  the  more  defective  accounts  of 
these  active,  daring,  and  successful  operations  of 
their  hero, in  this  his  novitiate  as  a  general  officer. 
These  operations  evince  a  higher  degree  of  mi- 
litary talent,  than  can  be  discovered  in  the  entire 


CHAPTER    JV.  587 

career  of  Bernadotte,  Joubert,  or  even  Moreau; 
or  of  any  English   general  from  the  death  of 
Marlborough  to  the  appearance  of  Wellington . 
They  are  introductory,  too,  to  a  brilliant  series  of 
Napoleon's  subsequent  exploits,  and  their  im- 
portance unquestionably  contributed  to  save  him 
from  the  axe  of  the  revolution.       Yet  Norvins 
(t.   i,   p.   49)   assures  his  readers  that  Massena 
took  Onielle,  traversed  the  territory  of  Genoa, 
beat  the  Austrians  at  Ponte-di-Nave,  and  made 
himself  master  of  Ormea  and  Garesio.    Whereas 
it  appears  Massena  did  not  cross  the  Taggia,  or 
go  near  the  territory  of  Genoa,  but  wheeled  to 
his  left  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Vingtimilia, 
and  penetrated  into  the  rear  of  the  Sardinian 
camp  at  Saorgio.     Norvins,  Avho  professes  (see 
his  preface)  to  have  studied  the  actions  and  me- 
ditated   the   biography  of  Napoleon  for  many 
years,  merely  gives  him  credit  for  the  plan  of 
this  campaign,  and  from  the  moment  of  its  adop- 
tion, makes  him   a   cypher.      Respect  for   the 
superiority  of  Massena's  rank  could  not  justify 
this  depression  of  Napoleon,  for  on   that  prin- 
ciple general  Dumerbion  should  have  been  the 
officer  commemorated  3  as  he  was  in  fact  at  the 
time   the    events    took  place  (See  Annual  Re- 
gister 1794?  History  of  Europe,  chap.  iv).    When 
we  reflect  that  the  great  captain  himself,  in  his 
last  days,  recollected  these  early  efforts  of  his 
martial  genius,  with  interest  enough  to  dictate  a 
clear  though  brief  account  of  them,  in  his  Me- 


388  APPE^DlX. 

moirs  of  the  war  of  Italy  (Montholon,  t.  iii, 
chap.  2)  it  woiild  appear  that  his  countryman 
and  admirer  could  scarcely  think  them  unworthy 
of  recital,  without  regarding  them  as  fabulous. 
Yet  had  this  been  his  opinion,  respect  for  his 
readers  demanded  its  avowal.  So  that  in  refe- 
rence to  this  part  of  Napoleon's  life,  there  is  in 
the  work  of  Norvins,  an  unjustifiable  omission. 
It  is  true  that  Jomini  in  his  account  of  these 
operations  (t.  v,  chap.  55)  mentions  Napoleon 
only  as  the  adviser  of  the  measure,  confining  his 
details  to  the  officers  commanding  regularly  the 
division,  its  columns,  brigades,  etc.  But  he  was 
writing  a  general  history,  not  the  life  of  Na- 
poleon, and  prepared  his  work^  before  the 
Memoirs  of  Napoleon  appeared. 

Hazlitt,  whose  book  is  written  with  more 
impartiality  than  judgment,  furnishes  but  a 
meagre  account  of  these  important  successes  of 
the  column  conducted  by  Napoleon,  adopting 
the  slight  allusion  to  them,  which  concludes 
a  chapter  on  a  different  subject,  in  the  dictation 
to  Gourgaud  (t.  i,  —  chapter  on  the  siege  of 
Toulon)  in  preference  to  the  connected  narra- 
tive found  in  Montholon.  Yet  both  these  au- 
thors describe  the  plan  clearly  as  Napoleon's, 
and  as  being  bold,  ingenious,  and  original.  But 
Sir  Walter  Scott  (v.  i,  p.  46)  completes  his  ac- 
count of  this  successful  series  of  marches  and 
actions  (which  threw  the  court  of  Turin  into 
such  alarm,  that  a  levy  en  masse  of  the  inhabi- 


CHAPTER    IV.  389 

lanls  of  Piedmont  was  ordex^ed)  in  two  sentences 
and  one  short  note.  "Bonaparte  had  influence 
enough  to  recommend  with  succcess  to  the  ge- 
neral, Dumerbion,  and  the  representatives  of  the 
people,  RicordandRobespierre,  a  plan  for  driving 
the  enemy  out  of  this  position,  forcing  them  to 
retreat  beyond  the  Higher  Alps,  and  taking 
Saorgio ;  all  which  measures  succeeded  as  he 
predicted.  Saorgio  surrendered,  with  much 
stores  and  baggage,  and  the  French  army  ob- 
tained possession  of  the  Higher  Alps,  which 
being  tenable  by  defending  few  and  dilQficult 
passes,  placed  a  great  part  of  the  army  of  Italy^ 
at  disposal  for  actual  service."  The  important 
note  is  in  these  words — '*  The  Sardinians  were 
dislodged  from  the  Col  de  Tende,  7th  May  1794-" 
Here  the  reader  will  observe  Napoleon's  in- 
fluence, not  his  talent  nor  enterprise,  is  men- 
tioned. Sir  Walter  in  the  advertisement  of  his 
work  (v.i,p.5)  "  claims  credit  for  having  brought 
to  the  undertaking  a  mind  disposed  to  do  his 
subject  justice,"  Now  suppose  the  duke  of 
Marlborough,  in  his  twenty-fifth  year,  had 
planned  and  conducted  such  brilliant  and  de- 
cisive manoeuvres  and  combats  ;  would  his  bio- 
grapher be  excusable  for  contracting  them  into 
the  compass  of  a  quarter  of  a  small  page  ?  Sir 
Walter  devotes  about  twenty  times  the  space  to 
Sir  John  Stuart's  descent  upon  Calabria,  in  which 
he  defeated  an  indifierent  French  general,  and 
returned  to  the  point  from  which  he  set   out, 


SgO  APPENDIX. 

without  altering  the  general  state  of  the  war 
(v.  vi,  p.  2),  than  he  does  to  military  events  in 
the  life  and  character  ot*  his  hero,  which  the 
Annual  Register  of  the  time,  considered  likely  to 
change  the  face  of  Europe  (See  Ann.  Reg.  for 
^794 — History  of  Europe,  chap.  4).  As  to  Lock- 
hart,  it  is  sufficient  to  oliserve  that  his  account 
is  more  slight  and  imperfect  than  Scott's.  Thiers 
in  his  general  narration  (t.  \i,  chap.  5),  has  done 
more  justice  to  these  events,  than  either  of  the 
professed  biographers,  and  has  noticed  ihem  as 
fully  as,  from  the  nature  and  style  of  his  work, 
which  is  more  a  civil  than  a  military  history,  he 
could  be  expected  to  do.  It  may  be  observed 
that  he  confirms  generally  the  account  left  by 
Napoleon,  a  fact  which  has  been  thought  to 
occasion  a  special  reference  to  both,  where  they 
coincide,  unnecessary. 

Page  15G. 

(10)  This  incident  in  the  campaign,  omitted 
altogether  by  the  four  biographers  above  men  " 
tioned,  is  not  unworthy  of  notice  as  it  contributes 
to  demonstrate  Napoleon's  ascendency  in  the 
army ;  and  as  its  misrepresentation  by  Albite, 
Salicetti,  and  Laporte,  was  made  one  of  the 
pretexts  for  placing  the  general  of  artillery 
under  arrest 

Page  157. 

(11)  Thiers,  (t.  vi,  p.  271). 


CHAPTER  6gi 

Page  158. 

(12)  A  slight  allusion  to  this  project  and  the 
successful  movements  which  grew  out  of  its  adop- 
tion, may  be  found  in  Norvins  (t.  i,  pp.  62,  5), 
a  more  imperfect  one  in  Hazlitt  (v.  i,  pp.  576, 
77),  none  at  all  in  Scott,  and  none  in  Lockhart. 
The  particulars  in  the  text  are  derived  from  Na- 
poleon^s  own  account,  dictated  to  Montholon 
succinctly  (t.  ii,  p.  211),  repeated  in  detail  to  the 
same  amanuensis  (t.  iii,  ch.  2),  from  the  Moni- 
teur  and  Annual  Register  of  the  period,  that  very 
useful  work,  Bourrienne  et  ses  Erreurs  (t.  i, 
ch.  5) J  and  from  the  well  designed  sketch  of 
Thiers  (t.  vii,  p.  77), 

Page  140. 

(i3)  Thiers  (ibid.)  says  Colloredo  ''retired 
shamefully,  accusing  the  English,  who  accused 
him  in  turn." 

Page  142. 
(14)  In  the  first  volume  of  the  Memorial  de 
St.  Helene,    the  reader   will  find  this  circum- 
stance of  military  folly,    and   amorous  infatua- 
tion,  related  in  the  words  of  Napoleon  himself 
(pp.  217,   18),  with  an  ingenuousness  and  a  self 
reproach,  which  alone  would  carry  conviction  of 
their  truth.      He  says  ''  the  idea  came  suddenly 
into  his  head,"   of  entertaining  his  fair  compa- 
nion with  a  spectacle  of  war,  and  that  the  re- 
membrance of  his  folly  was  ever  after  accompa- 
nied with  regret;  shewing  that  he  acted  from  a 


5g2  APPENDIX . 

momentary  impulse,  which  had  there  been  time 
for  reflexion,  his  good  sense  and  good  feeling 
would  have  repressed.  The  existence  of  this 
lady,  her  name,  connection  with  Napoleon^ 
and  the  effects  of  it  on  his  conduct  and  fortune, 
are  all  unnoticed  it  would  appear  by  Norvins, 
Hazlitt,  Scott,  and  Lockhart. 

Page  145. 

(i  5)  Napoleon  himself  (Las  Cases,  t.  i,pp.  21 5, 
45i);  the  dutchess  d'Abrantes  (Memoires,  t.  i, 
p.  257);  and  Thiers  (t.  vi,  pp.  462,  54).  The  last 
describes  his  conduct  towards  his  brother  as  af- 
fectionate and  even  noble.  The  language  of  the 
first  does  not  imply  that  his  acquaintance  with 
this  unfortunate  man,  ever  ripened  into  friend- 
ship, but  that  Robespierre  conceived  as  was  na- 
tural,   an  enthusiastic  admiration  for  Napoleon, 

Page  140. 
{16)  Norvins  (t.  i,  p.  57), 

Page  148. 

(17)  The  dutchess  d'Abrantes  (t.  i,  p.  241  ) 
publishes  his  note  to  Junot. 

Page  147. 

(18)  The  variety  of  misrepresentation  to 
which  this  distinct  and  remarkable  fact  of  Na- 
poleon'sbeing  placed  under  arrest,  has  been  sub- 
jected, is  truly  astonishing.  Norvins  (t.  i, 
pp.  56,  7)  makes  it  happen  in  the  winter  of 
1794,  95 — and  describes  it  as  the  consequence 
of  the  plan  which  Napoleon  furnished  during 


CHAPTER    IV.  395 

that  winter  to  the  deputy  Maignier  for  fortifying 
the  magazines  of  Marseilles.  Hazlitt  (v.  i, 
pp.  576,  76)  describes  Napoleon  as  having  been 
in  great  danger  of  being  summoned  to  the  bar  of 
the  convention,  and  placed  under  temporary 
arrest,  in  the  month  of  September,  in  conse- 
quence of  this  same  plan  furnished  to  the  deputy 
Maignier,  which  plan  was  not  applied  for  until 
some  months  subsequent  to  September  •  thus  con- 
founding two  unconnected  events,  and  approxi- 
mating as  many  remote  dates.  Scott's  account  is 
almost  as  defective  and  much  more  confused. 
He  (v.  iii,  pp.  46,  47)  avers  that  while  Napoleon 
was  employed  in  directing  those  operations, 
which  forced  the  Sardinians  from  Saorgio,  and 
in  making  himself  acquainted  with  that  region 
of  the  Alps,  he  was  involved  in  the  accusation 
before  the  convention  which  grew  out  the  plan 
he  furnished  for  fortifying  the  magazines  of  Mar- 
seilles. This  is  putting  together  events  which 
were  separated  by  several  months,  and  making 
the  last  in  succession  the  cause  of  the  first.  He 
then  proceeds — -'^In  the  remainder  of  the  year 
1794,  there  was  little  service  of  consequence  in 
the  army  of  Italy,"  '*andthe9thand  lOthThermi- 
dor  of  that  year  brought  the  downfal  of  Robes- 
pierre and  threatened  unfavorable  consequences 
to  Bonaparte," — thus  not  only  annihilating  a 
number  of  important  military  events,  but  while 
apparently  carrying  forward  his  narration  from 
the  end  of  1794?  returning  without  notice  to 


^94 


APPENDIX, 


midsummer  of  lliat  year.     lie  then  affirms  that 
Bonaparte  was  in  consequence  of  his  friendship 
for  the  younger  Robespierre,   and  his  suspected 
connection  with  the  party  of  his  brother,  super- 
seded and  put  under  arrest;  and  thai  being  libe- 
rated by  the  influence  of  Salicetti  he  repaired 
to  Marseilles,  '^in  a  condition  to  give  or  to  re- 
ceive little   consolation  from  his  family,"    and 
that  he  remained  with  them  until  May,  1795, 
when  he  came  to  Paris.    Here,  not  to  notice  the 
incoherency  of  the  language,    the  arrest  in  Au- 
gust, 1794?  and  the  reorganisation  of  the  armies 
of  Italy  and  the  Alps  which  took  place  in  the 
spring  of  1795,  and  by  which  Napoleon's  service 
as  general  of  artillery  in  the  army  of  Italy  ceased, 
are  arbitrarily  brought  together ;  and  his  mili- 
tary life  from  the  beginning  of  September  until 
May,  totally  extinguished  by  the  dash  of  a  ro- 
mantic pen.     As  to  his  incapacity  to  console,  or 
be  consoled  by  his  family,  there  appears  to  have 
been  little  room  for  consolation  on  either  side.' 
Joseph  had   married  a  rich  and  most   amiable 
lady,  the  daughter  of  a  banker  of  great  wealth 
and  credit  at  Marseilles,  and  Napoleon  himself, 
after  acquiring  increase  of  fame  and  considera- 
tion, was  returned  safe  from  the  dangers  of  war 
and  proscription.  It  may  be  supposed,  therefore, 
that  while  he  himself  was  far  from  being  dejec- 
ted, his  family  was  at  this  particular  time  one  of 
the  happiest  in  France. 

In  reference  to  the  acquaintance  of  Napoleon 


CHAPTER    IV.  595 

with  the  younger  Robespierre,  Sir  Walter 
proceeds  still  farther  in  injustice  and  error. 
After  wandering  back  from  the  end  of  1794  to 
the  downfal  of  Robespierre  and  his  party  in  the 
middle  of  that  year,  he  says  without  authority, 
Napoleon  "had  been  the  friend  of  the  tyrant's 
brother,  and  was  understood  to  have  participated 
in  the  tone  of  exaggerated  patriotism  afifected 
by  his  party" — and  then  adds — (v.  iii,  p.p.  47? 
8)  :  "  He  endeavoured  to  shelter  himself  under 
his  ignorance  of  the  real  tendency  of  the  proceed- 
ings of  those  who  had  fallen;  an  apology  which 
resolves  itself  into  the  ordinary  excuse,  that  he 
found  his  late  friends  had  not  been  the  persons 
he  took  them  for.  According  to  this  line  of 
defence,  he  made  all  haste  to  disclaim  accession 
to  the  political  schemes  of  which  they  were 
accused.  '  I  am  somewhat  affected,  '  he  wrote 
to  a  correspondent,  '  at  the  fate  of  the  younger 
Robespierre,  but  had  he  been  my  brother,  I 
w ould  have  poniarded  him  with  my  own  hand, 
had  I  been  aware  that  he  w  as  formin"'  schemes 
of  tyranny. "  Now  here  is  a  charge  of  the  blackest 
complexion,  brought  forward  without  examina- 
tion or  proof,  by  an  author  professing  special  in- 
tentions to  do  justice.  It  amounts  to  this — that 
as  long  as  the  Robespicrres  were  prosperous  and 
powerful^  Bonaparte  was  their  friend  and  abet- 
tor— that  the  moment  they  were  overthrown^  exe- 
cutedy  and  decried^  he^  with  an  eager  and  treache- 
rous  pusillaniniitj y  disowned  all  knowledge  of 


5q6  ArPENDTX. 

or  participation  in  their  schemes  ;  of  which  he 
pj'ofessed  such  abhorrence^  that  he  declared  he 
could  have  willinglj  assassinated  that  one  oj'  the 
b/othei's,  of  whom  he  had  been  the  personal 
friend  I  For  this  diabolical  charge,  the  only 
authority  produced,  is  the  extract  of  a  pretended 
letter  from  Napoleon  to  a  correspondent;  which 
as  no  reference  is  made  to  its  date,  the  person  to 
whom  it  was  written,  or  the  hook  or  collection  in 
which  it  was  found,  it  may  be  safely  affirmed, 
not  only  never  was  written  by  Napoleon,  but 
was  extracted  from  a  source  so  polluted,  that 
the  author  of  Waverley  was  ashamed  to  own 
his  clandestine  reliance  upon  it. 

But,  let  us  suppose,  for  a  moment,  that  the 
letter  in  question,  in  spite  of  the  incongruity  of 
its  sentiments  with  Napoleon's  character,  was 
genuine,  would  it  authorize  the  inferences  which 
Sir  Walter  affects  to  draw  from  it  as  a  matter  of 
fair  and  obvious  deduction  ?  He  has  himself 
stated  (p.  46),  that  Ricord  and  Robespierre  the 
younger,  were  the  representatives  attached  to 
the  army  of  Italy,  to  whom  Napoleon's  plan  for 
dislodging  the  enemy  from  Saorgio  was  sub- 
mitted, and  by  whom  it  was  approved.  He  has 
also  satisfied  his  readers  that  Napoleon  had  not 
been  in  Paris  from  about  the  ist  September, 
1 795  j  that  is,  for  more  than  ten  months  pre- 
vious to  the  downfal  of  Robespierre,  and  that 
during  this  period  of  ten  months,  his  occupa- 
tions had  been  intensely  important,  and  exclu- 


CHAPTER    IV.  697 

sively  military.     These  two  facts  shew  that  he 
had  occasion  to  cultivate  the  acquaintance  of  the 
younger  Robespierre,  and  that  he  had  no  occa- 
sion  nor  opportunity  to  become  a  partizan  of 
his  brother,  or  to  obtain  any  particular  know- 
ledge of  the  atrocious  schemes  imputed  to  him. 
Napoleon    might,    therefore,    very  fairly   have 
answered,   if  reproached  with  being  an  accom- 
plice of  the  tyrant,  that  he  knew  nothing  of  his 
designs,   and  if  these  had  been  attributed  by  a 
correspondent  to  the  younger  Robespierre,  and 
had  been  described  as  particularly  enormous  and 
execrable,  he  might  have  replied,  that  if  such 
horrible    treason  was  really  meditated  by  the 
younger  Robespierre,  he  would  have  killed  him. 
himself,  sooner  than  see  it  successfully  perpe- 
trated.    It  is  evident,  that  the  signification  of 
this  part  of  the  pretended  letter  would  depend 
altogether    upon    the  nature    of   the    alleged 
schemes.    But  not  only  is  there  every  reason  to 
believe  that  the  letter  was  not  genuine,  and  that 
Sir  Walter  did  not  deem  it  to  be  genuine,  but 
that  he  did  not  believe  himself  in  the  inferences 
he  deduced  from  it.     At  page  5o,  he  says,  when 
colouring  another  misrepresentation,    "Bona- 
parte forgot  neither  benefits  nor  injuries."  Now, 
friendship,  which  he  will  have  it,    existed  be- 
tween Napoleon   and  the  younger  Roberspierre 
is  the  offspring  of  reciprocal  kindness  and  mu- 
tual benefits,  which,  in  the  case  of  Robespierre, 
the    younger,    Napoleon   must  have   forgotten. 


5gS  APPENDIX. 

Again,  in  his  conclusion  (t.  ix,  p.  Sig),  he  says, 
"Napoleon's  personal  character  was  decidedly 
amiable,  excepting  in  one  particular.  His  tem- 
per, when  he  received,  or  thought  that  he  re- 
ceived, provocation,  especially  if  of  a  personal 
character,  was  warm  and  vindictive."  It  is  not 
pretended  that  he  was  actuated  by  revenge, 
when  "  he  made  all  haste  to  disclaim  adhesion  to 
thepoHtical  schemes  of  which  the  Robespierres 
were  accused;"  so  that,  unless  denying  an  un- 
fortunate friend  at  the  expense  of  truth,  was 
considered  by  the  great  Scotch  novelist,  "  de- 
cidedly amiable ;"  he  could  not  possibly  have 
believed  that  the  insinuations  against  the  charac- 
ter of  his  hero,  which  are  here  examined,  were 
less  false  than  they  are  foul. 

Lockhart(v.  i,  p.  25)  mentions  the  facts  of  the 
arrest  andrelease  in  their  proper  places ;  but  adds, 
with  admirable  ignorance  and  effrontery,  that, 
owing  to  the  general  ill-will  of  the  deputies, 
Napoleon  was  never  afterwards  employed  in  the 
army  of  Italy.  Whereas,  from  the  letter  of  the 
deputies  who  arrested  him,  (Bourrienne  et  ses 
Erreurs,  t.i,  p.  27)  it  appears,  that  the  necessity 
of  employing  him  in  the  army  of  Italy  was  one 
of  the  causes  assigned  by  them  for  restoring 
him  to  duty;  audit  is  clear,  from  his  own  ac- 
count of  his  life,  from  the  history  of  Thiers,  and 
from  other  less  important  works,  that  he  con- 
ducted the  army  of  Italy  after  his  arrest  and 
liberation,  in  the  operations  against  Vado,  Sa- 


CHAPTER   IV.  599 

vona,  Cairo,  and  Dego.  The  license  of  Lock- 
hart  is  carried  to  the  extent  of  adding,  that,  from 
the  time  of  his  Hberation  from  arrest  to  his  com- 
ing to  Paris,  he  remained  inactive  with  his  mo- 
ther at  Marseilles,  and,  in  this  period  of  idleness 
and  depression,  fell  in  love  with  Mademoiselle 
Clary;  thus  suspending  for  an  interval  of  nine 
months  a  career  which  was  incessantly  active 
and  progressive;  and  reasserting,  without  the 
slightest  proof,  a  story  which  Napoleon  himself 
had  contradicted  (Las  Cases,  t.  i,  p.  182).  In 
the  same  strain  of  heedless  error,  he  intimates 
that  Napoleon  was  too  poor  to  marry;  forgetting, 
that  as  Madamoiselle  Clary  was  rich,  his  poverty 
would  have  formed  an  incentive;  and  that 
his  brother  Joseph,  who  was  not  a  general 
officer,  and  was  at  least  as  poor  as  IXapoleon  him- 
self, had  already  married  the  sister  of  Mademoi- 
selle Clary. 

Bourrienne,  though  he  mentions  the  fact  and 
the  date  of  the  arrest  with  sufficient  accuracy, 
is,  although  diametrically  opposed  to  Sir  Wal- 
ter Scott,  wofully  inexact  as  to  its  cause;  affirm- 
ing, that  this  had  no  reference  whatever  to  a 
supposed  complicity  of  Napoleon  with  Robes- 
pierre the  younger,  and  Ricord;  and,  alleging, 
that  had  it  not  been  for  the  downfal  of  Robes- 
pierre, the  consequences  might  have  been  fatal 
to  Napoleon.  In  the  letter  of  the  deputies, 
Albite,  Salicetti,  and  Laporte,  dated  the  6th 
August,  1794)  informing  the  committee  of  pub- 


400  APPENDIX. 

lie  safety  of  their  having  ordered  the  arrest,  this 
alleged  connection  with  Robespierre  and  Ricord 
is  expressly  enumerated  among  the  reasons  of 
that  measure  (See  Bo^rrienne  et  ses  Erreurs, 
t.  i,  p.  20 ;  also  Jomini,  Histoires  des  Guerres  de 
la  Revolution,  t,  vi.  p.  1 13).  Nor  is  Bourrienne 
less  unfortunate  in  accounting  for  his  release. 
He  asserts,  that  it  proceeded,  in  no  degree  what- 
ever, from  the  belief  of  the  deputies  that  his  ser- 
vices were  indispensable  to  the  success  of  the 
army.  These  deputies  themselves,  however, 
give  quite  a  different  account,  in  their  letter  of 
the  24th  of  August,  to  the  committee  of  public 
safety,  in  which  they  declare,  that  '*  the  talents 
of  this  officer  are,  in  the  highest  degree,  useful  j 
that  his  innocence  is  evident;  and  that,  there- 
fore^  they  have  suspended  the  arrest  until  the 
orders  of  the  committee  shall  be  received,  and 
restored  him  to  liberty"  (Bourrienne,  et  ses  Er- 
reurs, t.  i,  p.  27,  and  Jomini,  t.  vi,  p.  1 14). 

Page  149. 

(19)  Norvins  (t.  i,  p.  5);    Montholon,  t.  iii, 

p.  76). 

Page  130. 

(20)  He  himself  mentioned  (Las  Cases^  t.  i, 
p.  2 1 5)  that  he  was  outlawed  by  the  order  of 
one  of  the  deputies  with  the  army,  because  he 
would  not  allow  him  to  employ  the  artillery 
horses  in  posting;  but  neither  the  name  of  the 
deputy  nor  the  date  of  the  order  is  given;  nor 


CHAPTER    IV.  4ot 

does  the  fact  appear  to  have  led  to  any  serious 
consequence. 

Page  1S5. 

(21)  This  circumstance  in  the  life  of  Napoleon, 
which  is  so  particularly  mentioned  by  himself 
(Montholon,  t.  iii,  p.  80)  is  not  noticed  by  Nor- 
vins,  Hazlitt,  or  Lockhart.  The  ludicrous  distor- 
tion to  which  it  is  subjected  by  Scott  (v.  iii, 
p,  99),  will  be  pointed  out  hereafter.  Yet  the 
selection  of  Napoleon  for  such  critical  service, 
so  soon  after  the  accusation  to  which  he  was  ex- 
posed, and  his  influence  in  counteracting  so  in- 
judicious an  enterprise,  were  facts  honorable  to 
his  character  as  a  patriot  and  an  officer.  His  pre- 
sence at  Toulon  on  the  occasion  too,  led  to  an  act 
of  the  most  intrepid  humanity.  Thiers,  who 
thought  the  event  of  importance  enough  to  form 
a  part  of  his  great  work,  thus  records  it  (t.  vii, 
p.  458) :  "The  government  bad  projected  a  ri- 
diculous coup  de  main  against  Rome.  Anxious 
to  revenge  the  assassination  of  Basseville,  they 
had  embarked  ten  thousand  men  on  board  the 
squadron  at  Toulon,  which  had  been  entirely 
refitted  by  the  care  of  the  commitee  of  public 
safety.  It  was  designed  to  send  them  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Tiber  in  order  to  lay  a  contribution 
on  the  papal  city,  and  then  to  retire  promptly 
to  the  ships.  Fortunately  a  naval  action  with 
admiral  Hotham,  from  which  both  squadrons 
retired  equal  suflferers,  prevented  the  execution 
of  this  project." 

26 


4o2  APPENDIX. 

Page  ISS. 
(22)  There  are  few  indisputable  events  in  the 
life  of  Napoleon ,  which  have  suffered  more  di- 
versified and  wanton  mutilation,  than  this  rescue 
of  two  representatives  of  the  people  and  a  family 
of  unfortunate  emigrants  from  a  mob.     It  is  re- 
lated by  himself  (Montholon,  t.  iii,  p.  86)  in  a 
narrative  as  distinct  and  graphical  as  any  part 
Caesar's   Commentaries,    and   is    mentioned   to 
have  taken  place  in  March,  1796,  when  he  had 
been  called  to  Toulon  by  this  projected  expedi- 
tion against  Rome.     On  another  occasion  he  in- 
troduced it  by  way  of  ilkistration  in  a  conversa- 
tion with  the  faithful  Las  Cases  (t.  i,  p.  210), 
mentioning  the  gratitude  of  the  persons  whom 
he  saved,    and  though  not  proposing  to  fix  its 
date,  referring  it  incidentally  to  a  period  con- 
siderably posterior  to  the  siege  of  Toulon.     Las 
Cases  adds  of  his  own  accord  (p.  211)  that  after 
Napoleon's  death  the  Chabrillant  family,  who 
had  preserved  as  a  precious  relic  the  order  for 
their  embarkation,    bore  grateful  testimony  in 
an  interview  he  had  with  them,  to  this  noble 
act  of  humanity  5  adding  a  number  of  touching 
details  of  Napoleon's  generosity   on   the  occa- 
sion, which  he  himself  had  forgotten,  or  neg- 
lected to  relate.      Yet    in   spite  of  the  inter- 
esting nature  of  the  fact  itself,  and  of  the  in- 
contestable evidence  of  its  date  and  reality,   Sir 
Walter  Scott   thus  transposes,  transforms,  and 
degrades  it,  in  the  close  of  his  account  of  the 


CHAPTER    ly.  4<^D 

siege  of  Toulon  (v.  iii,  p.  44)  •  '^Bonaparte 
lias  besides  affirmed,  that,  far  from  desiring  to 
sharpen  the  vengeance  of  the  jacobins,  or  act 
as  their  agent,  he  hazarded  the  displeasure  of 
those  whose  frown  was  death,  by  interposing 
his  protection  to  save  the  unfortunate  family 
of  Chabrillant ,  emigrants  and  aristocrats , 
who  being  thrown  by  a  storm  on  the  coast  of 
France,  shortly  after  the  siege  of  Toulon,  be- 
came liable  to  punishment  by  the  guillotine,  but 
w  hom  he  saved  by  procuring  them  the  means  of 
escape  by  sea."  Now  here  the  fact  is  deformed 
and  diminished  in  all  its  ingredients.  The  Cha- 
brillants  were  not  saved  from  the  guillotine  of 
the  convention,  but  from  the  murderous  fury  of 
a  bloodthirsty  mob — iheir  rescue  did  not  take 
place  soon  after  the  siege  of  Toulon,  but  more 
than  a  }  ear  after.  Nor  was  his  interposition 
likely  to  irritate  the  government,  "whose 
frown  was  death, "  but  the  mob  whose  rage 
was  destruction.  So  far  from  it,  he  was  likely 
to  gain  credit  with  the  convention,  as  he  saved 
at  the  same  time  two  of  its  members.  Again,  its 
authority  does  not  rest  on  the  affirmation  of  Na- 
poleon alone,  but  concurrently  on  the  acknow- 
ledgment of  the  emigrants  themselves,  to  count 
Las  Cases.  Norvins  (t.  i,  p.  58)  mixes  this  fact 
up  with  the  charge  which  had  been  previously 
made,  against  Napoleon,  for  furnishing  a  plan 
of  defence  for  the  magazines  of  Marseilles,  and 
fiiiakes  it  one  of  the  causes  which  moved  the  con- 


4o4  APPENDIX. 

yention  to  summon  him  to  its  bar.  Whereas, 
putting  the  difference  of  time  out  of  the  question, 
his  saving  the  deputies  on  the  same  occasion, 
shows  that  the  events  were  in  character  per- 
fectly incongruous. 

The  inaccuracy  ofHazlitt  is  still  more  remark- 
able (v.  i,  p.  36g).     In  reference  to  the  execu- 
tions which  were  committed  immediately  after 
the  capture  of  Toulon,  he  says — "  It  was  during 
his  stay  at  Toulon  at  this  period  that  Bonaparte 
saved  the  Chabrillant  family,  who  were  brought 
into  the  harbour  on  board  a  Spanish  prize ,  from 
the  fury  of  the  mob.     It  was  just  after  the  fall  of 
Robespierre." — Now  Toulon  was  taken  in  De- 
cember 1795;  and  Robespierre's   downfal  hap- 
pened in  July  1794?  so  that  according  to  this  ac- 
count, Napoleon  who,  from  his  entrance  at  the 
school  of  Brienne  until  his  first  abdication,  ap- 
pears never  to  have  passed  an  idle  week,   must 
have  lingered  at  Toulon  in  perfect   inactivity 
about  seven  months.   But  Hazlitt  himself  records 
(p.  527)  that  he  joined  the  army  of  Italy  in  March 
1794,  and  was  immediately  after  engaged  in  the 
campaign  of  general  Dumerbion.     This  confu- 
sion of  dates  is  not  the  only  defect  of  his  account. 
By  placing  the  rescue  of  the  Chabrillants  in  con- 
nection with  the  siege  of  Toulon,  he  diminishes 
the  danger  which,  in  the  cause  of  humanity.  Na- 
poleon so  successfully  braved.    Immediately  after 
the  siege  of  Toulon  when  the  troops  who  had 
taken  it  were  present,  he  could  with  very  little 


CHAPTER    IV.  4^5 

difficulty  have  dispersed  a  mob,  and  would  have 
incurred  no  other  danger,  than  that  of  incensing 
the  government,  from  which  at  the  worst,  he 
might  have  escaped  by  emigration.  But  when 
the  rescue  was  actually  effected,  it  was  not  the 
frown  of  a  distant  government,  but  the  fury  of 
an  encompassing  mob,  which  he  had  to  defy,  and 
at  the  risk  of  being  torn  limb  from  limb  on  the 
spot.  Lockhart's  account  of  the  affair  (v.  i,  p.  20) 
being  a  bold  and  careless  compendium  of  most  of 
the  errors  of  his  predecessors,  may  be  silently 
despised. 

From  the  despatch  of  the  deputies Mariette  and 
Cambon,  dated  the  27th  Ventose  (17th  March), 
it  appears  there  had  been  a  succession  of  tumults 
for  several  days,  which  reached  their  utmost  vio- 
lence on  the  22nd  Ventose  (i 2th  March).  It  also 
appears  that  several  emigrants  had  been  mur- 
dered in  the  course  of  the  first  outrages;  and  that 
the  twenty  emigrants  who  were  rescued  by  Na- 
poleon, had  been  lying  in  prison  under  an  order 
of  the  deputy  Jean  Bon  St.-Andr^,  about  a 
month.  They  do  not  mention  the  name  of  Nar- 
poleon,  though  they  do  mention  that  of  general 
Bazanet,  who  commanded  the  garrison  of  Tou- 
lon. They  state  however  that  they  proceeded 
to  the  arsenal  and  addressed  the  crowd  "sur- 
rounded by  a  feeble  escort  composed  of  the  ge- 
nerals of  the  expedition  and  some  citizens" — and 
that  when  they  withdrew  from  the  arsenal,  they 
walked  arm  in  arm  with  general  Bazanet,  who 


4o6  appendix:. 

■was  more  than  once  struck  by  a  stone  while  thus? 
escorting  them ;  a  fact  which  shews  they  were 
far  from  being  protected  by  his  influence.  They 
also  mention  that  the  emigrants  in  the  prison 
were  saved  from  immediate  massacre  by  the  cou- 
rageous resistance  which  a  soldier,  whose  name 
ihey  could  not  learn,  offered  to  the  mob.  This 
soldier  was,  no  doubt,  one  of  Napoleon's  can- 
noneers. They  describe  themselves  to  have 
been  in  the  utmost  danger,  and  their  letter 
evinces  that  they  felt  it  in  its  full  force. 

Page  io8. 
(^5)  This  is  theprogress,  and  this  the  date, which 
Napoleon  himself  assigns  to  his  journey  to  Paris y 
making  his  arrival  at  the  capital  very  distinctly 
subsequent   to   the   insurrection  of  the  first   of 
Prairial  (Montholon,  t.  iii,  p.  88) .     Neither  Scott 
nor  Hazlitt  mention  whether  he  reached   Paris 
before  or  after  that  event,  both  saying  (v.  iii,  p, 
49,  and  V.  i,  p.   379)  that  he  arrived  there  in 
May  1795.     Norvins,  however,  dates  his  arrival 
before  the  ist  Prairial  (t.  i,  p.  61);  while  Lock- 
hart  with  his  usual  confidence  in   error,  asserts 
positively  (v.  i,  p.  23)  that  '^  before  the  end  of 
the  year  (1794)  ^^  came  to  Paris  to  solicit  em- 
ployment. " 

Bourrienne  (t.  i,  p,  71)  not  only  places  him  in 
Paris  before  the  ist  Prairial,  but  implicates  him 
remotely  in  the  defeated  conspiracy  of  that  day, 
for  the  sake  of  Avhich  calumny,  he  probably 
ventured  on  the  anachronism.     That  it  is  one* 


CHAPTER    IV.  4^7 

additional  evidence  is  found  in  the  despatch  of 
the  deputies  Mariette  and  Cambon,  of  the  17th 
March,  ^vhich  has  been  already  referred  to.     In 
a  postscript  they  mention  that  they  had  just  seen 
the  English  prize  ship  (the  Berwick)  come  into 
the  harbour,  and  that  they  forward  to  the  con- 
vention the   despatches  of  their  colleague  Le- 
tourneur.  NowLetourneur  accompanied  admiral 
Martin  in  his  cruise,  and  the  Berwick  was  taken 
off  Corsica  by  the  squadron  soon  after  it  sailed 
from  Toulon.     The  fleets  came  in  sight  several 
days  subsequently;  the  chase,  the  action^,  which 
took  place  the  14th  of  March,  the  return  into 
port,    and  the  abandonment  of  the  expedition 
against    Rome,  all  happening  successively  after 
the  capture  of  the  Berwick.     So  that  Bonaparte 
could  not   have  returned  from  Toulon  to  the 
army  of  Italy,  sooner  than   the  last  of  March. 
While  there,  Aubry's  offensive  and  unjust  mea- 
sures were  adopted  (Thiers,  t.  vii,  p.  4^7)5  upon 
learning  and  feeling  Vv^hich,  he  set   off  for  Paris 
early  in  May,  where   he  arrived  purposely  after 
the    I  St  Prairial.     Kellerman,  whom  Napoleon 
met  at  Marseilles,  as  the  former  was  on  his  w ay 
to  take  command  of  the  army  of  Italy,  was  not 
appointed  until  the   last  of  April,  and  did  not 
reach  Nice  until  the  9th  May  (Jomini,  t.  vii,  pp. 
81,  82).     All   these  facts  taken  together  shew 
that  as  late  as  least,   as   the    first  week  of  May, 
Napoleon  could  not  have  been  nearer  to  Paris 
than  Marseilles,  and  he  asserts  positively  that  on 


4o8  APPENDIX, 

the  20th  of  May  and  some  days  afterwards  he 
was  not  nearer  than  Chatillon-sur-Seine.  The 
Dutchess  d'Abrantes  (t.  i,  chap.  i5,  14,  i5,  et 
16)  falls  into  yet  greater  errors  in  regard  to  this 
fact,  which,  considering  her  tender  years  at  the 
epoch  of  which  she  treats,  is  not  surprising. 
She  dates  the  arrival  of  Napoleon  at  Paris,  not 
only  before  the  ist  Prairial  (  20th  May)  1795, 
but  before  the  ist  Germinal  (21st  March)  of 
that  year  (t.  i,  pp.  246,  57).  She  says  too  that 
he  had  but  one  aide  de  camp  (Junot)  with  him, 
whereas  he  himself  mentions  expressly  Marmont, 
and  Marmontonly,  who  would  hardly  have  re- 
mained sonear  the  capital  as  Chatillon-sur-Seine. 
Madame  Bourrienne  mentions  Louis  Bonaparte 
(t.i,p.8o).  This  account  Louis  Bonaparte  inciden- 
tally confirms  in  his  reply  to  Sir  Walter  Scott,  in 
which  he  says,  his  brother  was  accompanied  on 
his  arrival  at  Paris  by  three  aides  de  camp — ''  Ju- 
not, Marmont  and  myself"  (Reponse  de  Louis 
Bonaparte  a  Sir  Walter  Scott — p.  16).  Unless 
the  reader  should  prefer  on  a  subject  of  this 
kind,  the  recollection  of  a  "Miss  not  in  her 
teens"  (the  Dutchess  was  not  then  1 1  years  of  age) 
to  the  grave  assertion  of  Napoleon,  in  making 
which  he  could  not  have  been  actuated  by  vanity 
nor  heated  by  controversy,  fortified  by  the  cir- 
cumstantial mention  of  his  delay  at  Chatillon 
and  the  object  of  that  delay;  confirmed  by  the 
collateral  statement  of  Louis  Bonaparte  in  an 
effort   to   establish   another   point,   and  by  the 


CHAPTER  IV.  409 

letter  of  the  deputies  Mariette  and  Cambon  to 
the  convention,  the  picturesque  details  furnished 
by  the  Dutchess,  respecting  Napoleon's  constant 
visits  to  the  house  of  Madame  Permon,  and  fre- 
quent conversations  ^vith  that  lady,  her  son,  and 
her  various  guests,  before  the  ist  Prairial,  as  they 
are  made  to  spring  out  of  the  current  events  of 
the  day,  must  be  received  as  the  errors  of  a  me- 
mory too  severely  tasked.    The  Dutchess  appears 
to  have  misconceived  other  particulars  respect- 
ing this  memorable  ist  of  Prairial.     She  makes 
Salicetti  take  refuge  in  her  mother^s  house,   as 
an  outlaw,  on  the  evening  of  the  2d  Prairial,  and 
while   Napoleon  was   there    (t.    i,   pp.  3o2-5). 
Whereas  Salicetti  was  not  accused,  or  proceeded 
against  by  the  convention  until  the  8th  of  Prai- 
rial  (Thiers,  t.  7,  p.  4^5)5  and  then  in  conse- 
quence of  intelligence  which  was  that  day  receiv- 
ed from  Toulon.    The  historian,  when  speaking 
of  this   intelligence,  says,    "■  It  could   not  fail 
to  provoke  new  violence  against  the  partizans  of 
the  mountain  and  the  patriots.     It  was  alleged, 
that  the  events  at  Paris  and  Toulon  were  con- 
certed ;  they  accused  the  members  of  the  moun- 
tain of  having  secretly  organized  these  proceed- 
ings, and  attacked  them  with  fresh  exasperation. 
They  instantly  decreed  the  arrest  of  Charbon- 
nier,  Escudier,  Ricord,  and  Salicetti,  charging 
all  four  with  having  agitated  the  south."     This 
shews  that  Salicetti^  instead  of  being  outlawed 
On  the  2d  Prairial;  was  not  even  accused  until 


^10  APPENDIX. 

the  8th  of  that  month,  and  then  on  a  charge  not 
thought  of  before,  and  but  remotely  connected 
with  the  insurrection  at  Paris.     In  the  Moniteur 
of  the  gth  Prairial,  the  account  given  by  Thiers 
is  confirmed.     It  is  there  officially  stated,  that 
the  letters  of  the  representatives  of  the  people 
at  Marseilles  had  confirmed  the  rumour  of  the 
terrorists  having  got  possession  of  the  arsenal  of 
Toulon  in  the  course  of  a  revolt,  in  w^hich  their 
colleague,  Brunei,  lost  his  life;    that  the  con- 
vention had  decreed  that  the  members  who  were 
arrested  on  the  night  of  the  ist  Prairial  should 
be  brought  back  to  Paris,  and  tried  by  a  military 
commission  (that  is,  Romme,  Goujon,  etc.,  who 
killed  themselves),  and  that  the  convention  had, 
on  the  same  day,  ordered  the  arrest  of  Ricord, 
Salicetti,  etc.     It  is  not  easy  to  conceive,  that  a 
man  would  be  first  outlawed,  and  next  accused. 

With  regard  to  this  journey  of  Napoleon,  and 
the  time  of  his  arrival  at  Paris,  there  exists  yet 
another  error,  which,  from  the  high  authority 
of  the  work  that  contains  it,  would  be  likely,  if 
uncorrected,  to  deprive  my  own  narrative  of  the 
reader's  confidence,  and  to  leave  this  particular 
subject  involved  in  confusion.     In  the  Memorial 
deSt.  Helene(t.V\\,  pp.  582,85),  it  is  mentioned, 
on   the  authority  of  Napoleon,   that  in  return- 
ing from    Nice  to  Paris   in    1794?   ^^    stopped 
at  the  chateau  of  Marmont's  father,  and  that  it 
was  in  the  month  of  July  or  August.     This  is  a 
mistake,  as  to  the  year  and  the  month,  either  of 


CHAPTER   IV.  4l  I 

ilie  emperor's  memory,  or  of  the  record  of  his 
friend,  and  probably  of  the  latter.     For,  on  all 
other  occasions,    Napoleon   refers  this  visit  to 
Paris  and  sojourn  at  the  house  of  Marmont  the 
elder,   to  the  month  of  May,  1795  (Montholon, 
t.  ii,  p.  9.12,  and  t.  iii,  p.  88),  a  date  which  all 
authorities  of  weight,  except  the  one  in  ques- 
tion^ and  circumstances  of  application,  confirm. 
Throughout  the  3  ear  1794*  as  the  reader  must 
be  aware,  Napoleon  was  employed  either  in  for- 
tifying the  coast  of  Provence,   or  in  conducting 
the  campaign    of  Dumerbion  in   the  maritime 
Alps,  except  apart  of  the  month  of  August  (sec 
note    18   of  this    appendix),   when  he  was  ar- 
rested upon  returning  from  a  mission  to  Genoa, 
which  he  had  performed  under  instructions  from 
Ricord,  the  deputy,   dated  the  i3th  July,    1794 
(See  the  instructions  copied  in  Bourrienne,  t.  i, 
p.  56).     It  is,  therefore,  as  impossible  to  con- 
ceive that  he  could  have  been  at  Chatillon-sur- 
Seine  in  July  or  August,  1794?  as  it  is  difficult  to 
doubt  that  he  was  there  in  May,  1795.     This, 
and  similar  errors,  in  the  work  of  count  de  las 
Cases,    although  they  may  mislead  inattentive 
readers,   and  colour  the  misrepresentations  of 
unfaithful  writers,  are  invaluable  as  guarantees 
of  the  fidelity  of  his  journal.     Had  it  been  com- 
posed^ prepared  to  bolster  up  a  reputation,  to 
support  a  party,  or  to  sustain  a  cause,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  such  mistakes  would  not  have  existed. 
Actual  error  in  this  case,  is  the  highest  evidence 
of  intentional  truth. 


4l2 


APPENDIX. 


Page  138. 

(24).  Hazlitt  (v.  i,  p. 879)  affirms,  that  Aubry 
was  a  secret  friend  to  the  Bourbons.  He  was 
implicated  as  one  of  the  chief  conspirators  in 
the  counter-revohitionary  attempt  of  the  i8th 
Fructidor^  and  banished  with  Pichegru  and 
others  to  French  Guiana;  but,  according  to 
Thiers  (t.  ix,  p.5i6),  as  a  promoter  of  political 
reaction,  not  as  a  royalist. 

Page  ISO. 

(25)  This  fact  is  asserted  by  himself  (Montho- 
Ion,  t.  iii,  p.  89)  very  emphatically,  and  is  made 
the  cause  of  his  tendering  his  resignation.  In 
that  excellent  work  (Bourrienne  et  ses  Erreurs) 
the  author  of  a  most  conclusive  refutation  of 
Bourrienne's  misstatements  on  this  part  of  Napo- 
leon's life,  after  proving  that  he  was  never  ca- 
shiered, says,  he  was  not  ordered  to  the  army 
of  the  west  as  general  of  infant jy  (t.  i,  p.  5o), 
but  as  "commander  in  chief  of  the  artillery  of 
the  army  of  the  west."  This  last  assertion  is 
proved  to  be  accurate  by  an  order  of  general 
Hoche  mentioning  the  fact,  but  it  does  not  dis- 
prove the  positive  assertion  of  Napoleon  himself, 
that  he  previously  received  an  order  to  join  the 
army  of  the  west,  and  take  the  command  of  a 
brigade  of  infantry.  If  this  assertion  could  leave 
any  doubt  on  the  mind,  it  would  be  removed  by 
referring  to  a  speech  of  Freron  in  the  conven- 


CHAPTER    IV.  2J.l5 

tion  on  the  1 8th  Vend^miaire,  when,  remonstra- 
ting against  the  proceedings  of  Aubry,  he  said, 
that  ''general  Bonaparte  had  been  withdrawn 
from  his  appropriate  line  of  service,  in  order  to 
be   put  into  the  infantry.''      Louis   Bonaparte 
misapprehends,    in    some   degree,    this    aflfair. 
(Reponse,  p.  i5).   He  represents  his  brother  as 
having  received  his  appointment  to  the  army  of 
the  west,  as  general  of  artillery,  while  he  was 
attached  to  the   army  of  Italy,  and  as  having 
visited  Paris  purposely  to  get  that  destination 
changed.     But  Napoleon  himself  expressly  says 
(Montholon,  t.  iii,  pp.  88,  9),  that  he  was  placed 
on  the  list  of  generals  of  infantry  to  be  employed 
in  the  artillery  when  a  vacancy  should  occur  : 
and  that  after  this  interview  with  Aubry,  he  was 
positively  ordered  to  join  the  army  of  the  west  as 
a    general  of  infantry  :    assertions   which    the 
speech    of  Freron  confirms. 

Page  162. 

(26)  Thiers  states  (t.  vii,  p.  4^9),  that  Kellen- 
man,  although  the  corps  of  ten  thousand  men 
which  had  been  destined  to  embark  at  Toulon 
for  Rome  was  restored  to  his  army,  was  so  weak- 
ened by  detachments  employed  in  suppressing 
the  renewed  insurrections  of  Toulon  and  Lyons, 
that  he  could  not  resist  the  attack  of  the  Aus- 
trians  and  Sardinians.  But,  it  is  evident,  from 
the  instructions  drawn  up  by  Napoleon,  and 
despatched  to  Kellerman  by  the  committee  of 


AjA  APPENDIX. 

public  safety,  that  he  did  not  comprehend  the 
nature  and  advantages  of  his  position,  ^vhich 
was  taken  for  oflfensive,  not  defensive  purposes^ 
for  falhng  upon  the  enemy  the  moment  he 
placed  his  foot  on  the  narrow  tract  of  Geneose 
territory  between  the  Alps  and  the  sea ;  and  not 
with  a  view  of  waiting  the  maturity  of  his  pre- 
parations, and  receiving  his  attack.  It  is  fair  to 
observe,  that  Jomini's  account  is  totally  at  va- 
riance with  this  view  of  the  subject.  He  alleges 
that  the  defensive  was  not  only  judicious  on  the 
part  of  Kellerman,  but  sanctioned  by  the  com- 
mittee of  public  safety  (t.vii,  pp.  81,82).  The 
operations  he  relates  are  rather  inconsistent  with 
this  allegation,  which  is  in  direct  contradiction 
to  the  statement  of  Napoleon,  and  the  extract 
which  he  produces  of  the  despatch  written  by 
himself,  and  after  being  signed  by  the  com- 
mittee, forwarded  to  Kellerman  (Montholon, 
t.iii,  p.  93).  In  this  despatch  the  absurdity  of 
acting  on  the  defensive  is  thus  forcibly  demon- 
strated. "  The  committee  observed  to  Keller- 
man, that  the  army  was  not  extended  in  1704 
beyond  the  heights  of  the  Tanaro,  and  had  not 
prolonged  its  right  byBardinetto,  Melogno,  and 
St.  Jacques,  except  for  the  purpose  of  prevent- 
ing the  Austrian  army  connecting  itself  with  the 
English  squadron,  and  of  being  in  a  situation  to 
advance  to  the  succour  of  Genoa,  if  the  enemy 
should  attack  that  city,  either  by  sea  or  by  the 
pass  of  the  Bochetta.      That  the  army  did  not 


CHAPTER    lY.  4^5 

occupy  Vado  as  a  defensive  position,  but  an  of- 
fensive one,  and  to  be  able  to  fall  upon   the 
enemy  if  he  should  shew  himself  on  the  narrow 
tract  between  the  Alps  and  the  sea  (la  riviere). 
That  the  moment  the  Austrians  had  set  foot  at 
Savona,he  ought  to  have  attacked  them,  in  order 
to  prevent  their  getting  possession  of  that  place, 
and  thereby  cutting  off  his  communication  with 
Genoa  3  but   since  he    had  failed  to  do   these 
things,    nothing  was  left  but  to  evacuate  Vado^ 
etc."    It  is  true,  that  Kellerman  was  weakened, 
for  a  moment,  by  the  necessity  of  suppressing 
the  revolts  at  Lyons  and  Toulon ;    but  at  the 
end  of  his  campaign,  after  all  his  losses  by  war, 
desertion^    and  disease^,   his  force  in  the  field 
amounted  to  06,950  men,  exclusive  of  4^000  at 
and  near  Nice,  6,000  at  Toulon  and  the  neigh- 
bouring towns,  and  10,000  marching  to  join  him 
under  Augereau — (See  the  table  in  Jomini,  t.  vii, 
p.  298).     So  that  his  army  was  not  weaker  than 
Dumerbion's,  with  which,  in  1794?  Bonaparte, 
as  we  have  seen,   had  dislodged  the  Sardinians, 
beaten  the  Austrians,  driven  away  the  English, 
seized  the  coast,  and  occupied  the  whole  chain 
of  the  maritime  Alps,  in  the  course  of  a  few  days. 
Thiers,   after    representing,    on   this  occasion, 
Kellerman's  occupation  of  the  line  of  the  Bor- 
ghetto  as  a  decision  of  his  own  judgment,  in  his 
succeeding  volume  (t.  viii.  i55),  admits,  that  it 
had  been  traced  out  for  him  by  Napoleon.     He 
is  right  in  saying  it  had  been  traced  out  in  1794) 


4.16  APPENDIX. 

but  he  omits  remarking,  that  it  was  retraced  in 
the  instructions  of  the  committee  in  the  last  of 
June  or  first  of  July,  1 796.  Napoleon's  character 
of  general  Kellerman  is^  no  doubt,  perfectly  fair 
(Montholon,  t.  iii,  p.  92) :  "  Kellerman  was  brave, 
extremely  active,  and  endowed  with  many  ex- 
cellent qualities  j  but  he  was  perfectly  destitute 
of  those  talents  which  qualify  a  man  for  the  chief 
command  of  an  army.  In  conducting  this  war 
in  the  Alps,  he  committed  nothing  but  faults." 

Page  165. 

(27).  This  fact  is  substantiated  by  the  follow- 
ing order  of  general  Hoche,  commander  of  the 
army  of  the  west,  dated  the  first  complimentary 
day  of  1 795  ( 1 8th  September) .  '  *  The  committee 
of  public  safety  having  called  to  its  bureau  (^"pres 
de  lui^^^  the  general  of  brigade,  Bonaparte,  I 
hereby  cause  him  to  be  replaced  by  the  chief  of 
brigade  Dutol,  whom  I  have  directed  to  take 
command  of  the  artillery,  which  had  been  con- 
fided to  that  general''  (See  Bourrienne  et  ses 
Erreurs,  t.i,  p.  5o). 

Page  164. 
(28)  As  the  word  of  Bourrienne  was  much  less 
faithful  than  the  memory  of  Napoleon,  the  as- 
sertion of  the  former  that  Napoleon  applied  for 
leave  to  be  employed  in  the  Turkish  service 
(t.  i,  p.  74)  is  less  to  be  relied  on  than  the  denial 
repeated  as  coming  from  Napoleon  by  O'Meara 
(v.  i,  p.25o). 


CHAPTER    IV.  4*7 

PaG3  16o. 

(39)  Of  this  annoyance  the  degree  may  be  as- 
certained by  reference   to   these   well  attested 
facts  :  I ,  that  at  this  very  time  JNapoleon  received 
three  thousand  francs  for  a  coach  he  sold  to  Sa- 
licetti  (Bourrienne,  t.  i,  p.  71);  2,  that  he  sold  a 
valuable  collection  of  books  (Norvins,  t.i,  p.  60); 
5,  that  he  was  in  the  receipt  of  his  pay  as  a  ge- 
neral officer  (Montholon,  t.  ii,  p.  211,  et  Bour- 
rienne et  ses  Erreurs,  t.  i,  pp.  5i,  52);   and  4, 
that  at  the  period  in  question  he  fixed  his  brother 
Louis  at  the  artillery  school  of  Chalons  at  his 
own  expense  (Reponse  par  Louis  Bonaparte,    a 
Sir  Walter  Scott,  p.  16).     These  facts  are  well 
attested,  because  the  first  is  asserted  by  Bour- 
rienne in  support  of  a  calumny  distinct  from  this 
alleged   indigence — and  he  does  resort  to   the 
truth  in  endeavouring  to  propagate  falsehood , 
because  the  second  is  positively  stated  by  Nor- 
vins a  respectable  writer,   though  a  false  infer- 
ence is    drawn   from  it;  because   the  third   is 
vouched  by  the  declaration  of  Napoleon,  and  de- 
monstrated by   the    essay  referred  to  in  Bour- 
rienjie  et  ses  Ejreurs ;  and  because  the  fourth  is 
proved  by  the  undisputed  acknowledgment  of 
Louis  Bonaparte  himself,  who  for  a  reason  to 
be  found  in  Napoleon's  will,   cannot  be  suspec- 
ted of  undue  affection  for  his  brother's  memory. 

In  misrepresenting  this  momentary  halt  in  the 
forward  march  of  Napoleon's  career,  the  princi- 

27 


4l8  APPENDIX. 

pal  English  and  French  authors  whose  works  1 
have  consulted,  seem  to  have  written  from  mo- 
tives originating  in  different  feelings,  coinciding 
as  to  one  object,   and  diverging  with  respect  to 
others.  Thus  Sir  Walter  Scott,  and  his  disciple, 
Lockhart,  unobservant  of  that  Roman  dignity  of 
mind  which  makes  well  supported  poverty  sub- 
lime,  appear  to  be  of  opinion  that  by  repre- 
senting Napoleon  as  poor,  they  detract  from  his 
greatness.     In  this  liberal  spirit  the  first  abso- 
lutely affirms  (v.  iii,  p.  49):  "He  found  himself  un- 
friended and  indigent  in  the  city  of  which  he 
was  at  no  distant  period  to  be  the  ruler.    Some 
individuals   however  assisted  him,    and  among 
others   the  celebrated   performer  Talma,  who 
had  known  him  while  at  the  military  school,  and 
even  then  entertained  high  expectations  of  the 
part  in  life  which  was  to  be  played  by  "  le petit 
Bonaparte^*  (In  a  note  to  this  French  phrase  he 
adds)  ;   *^0n  the  authority  of  the  late  John  Philip 
Kemble.  "     Sir  Walter  Scott  it  is  known  visited 
Paris  ostensibly  in  search    of  materials  for  his 
work,    when  Talma  was  a  living  actor,  and  he 
made  this  assertion  when  Kemble  was  a  dead  one 
(Talma  died  at  Paris  igth  October,  1826).  The 
former  could  have  given  him  original  and  direct 
testimony  on  this  point ;  the  latter  could  at  best 
have  furnished  only  second  hand  information  in 
regard  to  it.     Yet  he  preferred  as  a  witness  the 
dead  Englishman  to  the  living  Frenchman,   and 
a  hearsay  story  to  direct  testimony,  as  authority 
for  reaflirming  an   assertion  which   the  hero  of 


€HAPTFR    IV.  4*9 

his  book  had  positively  contradicted,  in  Talma's 
lifetime,  and  to  all  appearance,  with  Talma's 
acquiescence  (O'Meara,  v.  ii,  p-  296).  This  pro- 
ceeding it  must  be  confessed  shews  as  little  ten- 
derness for  truth,  as  consideration  for  the  cha- 
racter of  the  man  whose  memory  the  great  no- 
velist was  prelending  to  embalm.  Leaving 
"the  late  John  Philip  Kemble"  in  his  grave, 
let  us  suppose  Talma  had  really  asserted  that 
in  the  summer  of  1 796,  he  found  Napoleon 
in  Paris  '*  unfriended"  and  so  "indigent*'  that 
he  himself  aflforded  him  pecuniary  assistance ; 
could  any  general  in  the  French  or  in  the 
British  service  believe  him,  even  if  the  story 
had  not  been  contradicted  by  Napoleon  himself, 
seeing  that  he  was  a  general  officer  at  the  time 
and  in  receipt  of  his  pay  as  such?  Inregardto  this 
appearance  of  Talma  on  the  stage.  Sir  Walter 
thus  proceeds  in  error  and  defamation  (v.  iii, 
p.  5o).  "Bonaparte  had  something  of  his  native 
country  in  his  disposition,  he  forgot  neither  bene- 
fits nor  injuries.  He  was  always  during  the  height 
of  his  grandeur  particularly  kind  to  Talma,  and 
even  honoured  him  with  a  degree  of  his  inti- 
macy. As  for  Aubry  being  amongst  those  belong- 
ing to  Pich^egru's  party  who  were  banished  to 
Cayenne,  he  caused  him  to  be  excepted  from 
the  decree  which  permitted  the  return  of  those 
unfortunate  exiles,  and  Aubry  died  atDemarara.'* 
In  the  first  place,  as  Napoleon  neither  needed  nor 
received  the  benefits  in  question  from  Talma,  the 


420  APP.NDIX. 

counterbalancing  fabrication  conslriicted  on 
"  tbe  disposition  of  bis  native  country,"  falls  to 
tbe  Ground.  If  bis  contradiction  of  tbe  storv 
needed  support  it  \\  ould  be  found  in  tbe  fact  tbat 
neitber  Bourrienne,  his  wife,  nor  tbe  dutcbess 
d'Abrant^s ,  wbo  all  undertake  to  furnisb  such 
minute  details  about  Napoleon's  intimates  at  tbis 
time  of  bis  life,  mentions  Talma  among  them. 
So  tbat  tbis  fact  only  remains  out  of  Sir  Wal- 
ter's story,  tbat  Napoleon  was  particularly  kind 
and  munificent  to  tbe  Frencb  Roscius,  not  from 
gratitude,  br.t  from  taste  and  generosity.  Again, 
if  an  indir;ent  man  is  unfriended,  be  will  be  apt 
to  steal  or  starve.  If  a  man  in  want  meets  witb  an 
old  acquaintance  wbo  relieves  bim,  it  would  be 
botb  false  and  ungrateful  in  bim  to  say  tbat  be 
bad  been  unfriended,  for,  a  "friend  in  need  is 
a  friend  indeed."  Yet  Sir  Walter  says  Napoleon 
came  to  Paris  in  1795  in  perfect  indigence,  met 
witb  an  old  acquaintance  wbo  assisted  bim,  and 
was  yet  unfriended,  and  tbat  altbougb  he  was 
tbus  unfriended,  be  was  ever  after  grateful  to 
tbis  acquaintance.  Tbus  it  appears  tbat  witbout 
reference  to  otber  accounts  or  circumstances,  Sir 
Walter's  romance  of  Talma  is  one  of  tbose  in- 
genious inventions,  of  wbicb  the  parts  will  not 
bold  togetber.  As  to  tbe  never  to  be  forgotten 
''injuries"  of  Aubry,  tbey  bappen  to  be  scarcely 
more  real  and  not  more  important  tban  tbe  re- 
membered ''benefits"  of  Talma.  Aubry  bad  in- 
cluded Napoleon  in  an  arrangement  of  officers, 
favourable  to  ibe  class  of  wbicb  be  himself  was 


CHAPTER   IV  42  i 

• 

an  individual,  and  unfavourable  to  the  class  to 
which  Napoleon  belonged.  In  their  conference 
on  this  subject,  Aubry's  injustice  had  been  protes- 
ted against,  and  his  impertinence  severely  retor- 
ted and  rebuked.  The  indignant,  but  unac- 
cepted tender  of  Napoleon's  resignation  followed; 
of  which,  the  correction  of  Aubry's  procedure, 
the  restoration  of  Napoleon  to  his  appropriate 
line  of  service,  and  his  elevation  to  a  situation  of 
higher  trust  and  greater  consequence  than  he 
had  as  yet  held,  were  the  speedy  consequences. 
In  all  likelihood  therefore,  he  regarded  Aubry 
as  the  involuntary  promoter  of  his  fortune,  and 
so  far  from  remembering,  after  a  lapse  of  great 
events  and  much  time,  the  poor  exile  of  Cayenne 
with  vindictiveness,  the  probability  is,  he  forgot 
him  altogether.  His  correspondence  at  the  time, 
and  his  Memoirs  (Montholon,  t.  iv,p.256),  shew, 
that  he  was  far  from  approving  the  measure  of 
punishment  inflicted  by  the  directory,  and 
spoke  of  the  banishment  of  citizens,  who  w  ere 
not  convicted  of  treason,  in  the  strongest  terms 
of  reprobation.  Besides  the  decree  which  per- 
mitted the  return  of  certain  exiles  from  Cayenne, 
was  not  a  repeal  of  the  decree  of  banishment, 
but  an  act  of  exception  to  it.  So  that  Napoleon, 
instead  of  causing  Aubry,  as  Sir  Walter  asserts, 
to  be  excepted  from  this  act,  at  the  utmost,  only 
failed  to  except  him  from  the  operation  of  the 
former  decree.  In  this  there  was  no  favour,  but 
does  it  follow  there  was  revenge  or  even  injus- 


^22  APPEIfDIX, 

tice.  Was  any  plea  of  palliation  or  innocence 
urged  in  favour  of  Aubry,  as  there  was  in  favour 
of  others?  According  to  Sir  Walter  Scott,  it 
would  appear,  there  was  none.  While  the  un- 
disputed fact  remained  against  Aubry,  that  he 
conspired  with  Pichegni,  to  betray  his  country. 
Further,  the  restoration  of  banished  persons  — 
even  of  honorable  and  conscientious  emigrants — 
was  a  gradual  process,  which  was  of  necessity  re- 
gulated very  much  by  the  state  of  public  feeling. 
If  Aubry  died  before  liis  guilt  was  forgotten,  or 
could  be  excused,  it  was  neither  the  eflfect  nor 
proof  of  vindictiveness  in  the  character  of  Napo- 
leon. After  this,  to  quote  the  following  passage^ 
is  to  expose  its  contradiction  and  refute  its  leading 
assertion  (v.  iii,  p,  5i).  '*  Meantime  his  situation 
becoming  daily  more  unpleasant,  Bonaparte  soli- 
cited Barras  and  Freron,  who  as  thermidorien& 
had  preserved  their  credit,  for  occupation  in  al- 
most any  line  of  his  profession  "  — ''  He  was  of- 
fered a  command  in  La  Vendee  which  he  declined 
to  accept.  '^ 

Lockhart's  misrepresentations  on  this  point, 
are  principally  the  repetition  of  Sir  Walter's,  and 
require  no  notice.  But  he  had  access  to  a  reser- 
voir of  slander,  which  happily  for  the  admirers 
of  Sir  Walter's  invention,  had  not  been  prepared 
when  he  compounded  his  life  of  Napoleon, 
Bourrienne  in  his  Memoires  says  (t.  i,  p.  71)  that 
Napoleon  when  thus  oppressed  by  poverty  and 
neglect  *' envied"  his  brother  Joseph's  good  for- 


CHAPTER    IV.  4^5 

lune  in  marrying  the  rich  Mademoiselle  Clary, 
and  would  exclaim,  "How  fortunate  is  that  iv^ue 
Joseph."  Admitting  that  the  exclamation  was 
really  made  and  was  fairly  repeated,  the  word 
coquin  (rogue),  was  evidently  used  in  a  favour- 
able and  even  a  fond  sense,  as  a  man  says  of  his 
child  '*  you  dear  little  rogue,"  or  of  his  friend, 
"what  a  lucky  dog."  Yet  Bourrienne,  who 
was  engaged  in  a  very  laborious  and  incongruous 
chapter  of  calumny  ,  headed  it,  in  reference  to 
this  anecdote  awkwardly  enough  (ch.  vi),  ^'-Bona- 
parte  is  jealous  of  his  bivther.^^  Out  of  these 
clumsy  materials  Lockhart,  with  less  felicity 
than  assurance,  contrives  an  original  slander  of 
his  own,  which  has  the  advantage  of  belying 
both  brothers  at  once.  Referring  indefinitely  to 
Bourrienne,  this  faithful  translator  says  (v.  i, 
p.  24)  "How  fortunate,"  Napoleon  would  exclaim 
"How  fortunate  is  that^ooZ  Joseph!"  As  this 
author's  volumes  were  prepared  for  the  volumi- 
nous English  work  entitled  :  "The  Family  Libra- 
ry j"  from  the  references  already  made  to  them, 
the  reader  will  perceive  that  their  principal  use 
consists  in  shewing,  with  what  perilous  care,  he 
thought  historical  truth  ought  to  be  excluded, 
from  the  intellectual  nourishment  of  Enijlish  fa- 
milies. 

Hazlitt  (v.  i,  p.  58 1-2)  describes  Napoleon  as 
retired  and  studious,  but  says  nothing  of  his 
poverty,  farther  than  relating  one  version   of 


/j.24  APPE.NDIX. 

the  Talma  story,  and  also  Napoleon's  contradic- 
tion of  it. 

Coming  to  the  French  authors  who  profess  to 
afford  particular  instruction  on  the  subjects 
now  under  examination,  it  will  be  found  that, 
while  ihey  agree  with  the  author  of  Waverley 
in  regard  to  the  '*  indigence,"  they  disagree  with 
him  altogether  as  to  the  ''unfriended"  state  of 
his  hero.  Both  classes  sink  him  into  abject  po- 
verty; but  while  the  first  desire  to  have  him 
rescued  by  the  pitiful  machinery  of  accidental 
assistance,  the  second  insist  on  relieving  him  by 
their  own  or  their  friends'  sagacious  liberality. 
According  to  these  authorities,  few  men  ever  had 
so  many  or  such  generous  friends.  Bourrienne, 
his  wife,  and  brother,  were  especially  kind  to 
him,  and  entertained  him  at  dinner  and  in  the 
evening  "very  often."  Bourrienne  visited  him 
every  morning,  and  found  in  his  apartment  many 
distinguished  persons  (t.  i,  pp.  70,  71).  Al- 
though the  husband  says  he  was  in  great 
want  of  money,  the  wife  avers  he  accompanied 
them  very  often  to  the  theatres  (p.  80).  The 
Dutchess  d'Abrantes  declares  (t.i,p.  276),  that 
"he  came  regularly  every  day  to  her  mother's 
house,"  and  often  dined  there ;  that  he  was 
miserably  poor,  but  had  Junot  for  a  banker,  who 
not  only  gave  him  three-fourths  of  the  money 
sent  him  by  his  parents,  but  more  than  half  of 
what  he  won  with  the  remaining  fourth  (p.  277). 
Taking  into  consideration  that  the  account  fur- 


CHAPTER    IV.  4^5 

nished  by  the  dutchess  embraces  a  period  of 
time  anterior  to  the  12th  Germinal,  when  Napo- 
leon was  at  Toulon,  or  somewhere  in  the  mari- 
time Alps,  it  is  appropriate  to  the  present  sub- 
ject only,  so  far  as  it  shews,  that  had  he  been  in 
Paris y  he  would  have  found  friends  and  a  wel- 
come, if  nowhere  else,  in  the  house  of  Madame 
Permon.  Norvins,  though  free  from  the  malice 
of  Bourrienne,  and  less  entertaining  than  the 
Dutchess  d'Abrantes,  is  not  less  inexact  than 
either.  He  represents  Napoleon  (t.  i,  p.  62)  as 
deprived  of  his  pay,  and  in  the  greatest  distress, 
and  likely  to  starve,  but  for  the  timely  recol- 
lection of  the  deputy,  Doulcet  de  Ponte-Cou- 
lant,  that  there  was  such  an  officer  in  Paris  as 
general  Bonaparte.  He  has  it,  that  this  bene- 
volent person  having  succeeded  Aubry  in  the  war 
department,  called  Napoleon  to  a  situation  near 
him  before  the  defeat  of  Kellerman  was  heard 
of.  This  is  contradicted  not  only  by  the  re- 
peated declaration  of  Napoleon  himself,  but  by 
the  essay  which  has  already  been  referred  to  in 
Bourrienne  el  ses Erreurs  (t.  i,  pp.  5o,  5i),  de- 
monstrating that  he  never  was  without  his  pay, 
and.  that  it  was  in  consequence  of  the  disaster  of 
Kellerman  that  he  was  consulted  and  employed 
by  ihe  committee  of  public  safety  (Gourgaud 
t.  i,  p.  48  et  Montholon  t.  ii  p.  211,  et  t.  iii, 
p.  90).  In  regard  to  the  gratitude  which 
this  respectable  author,  and  Hazlitt  after  him 
(v.  i,   pp.  379,  80)   allege    that   Napoleon  felt 


/^26  APPENDIX. 

for  the  kindness  of  Pont^-Coulant,  both  the 
sentiment  and  its  cause  appear  to  be  imaginary. 
The  proceeding  of  the  committee  of  which 
Pont(5-Coulant  was  a  member  was  this — Upon 
being  alarmed  by  the  disaster  of  Kellerman, 
they  convened  and  consulted  those  members  of 
the  convention  who  had  been  on  mission  to  the 
army  of  Italy,  who,  to  a  man,  told  them  that  the 
best  thing  they  could  do  was  to  take  the  advice 
of  Napoleon.  He  gave  them  advice  j  extricated 
their  army  from  the  peril  in  which  it  was 
placed ;  and  then  Pont^  Coulant,  in  order  to  se- 
cure his  future  assistance,  got  a  decree  passed, 
attaching  Napoleon  to  the  bureau  of  which  he 
himself  was  the  chief.  Now,  in  this  affair,  ac- 
cording to  the  ordinary  course  of  human  feel- 
ings, the  gratitude,  if  such  a  sentiment  was  ex- 
cited, could  not  have  been  on  the  side  of  Napo- 
leon. But,  supposing  he  could  have  felt  grati- 
tude on  the  occasion,  he  would  have  been  grate- 
ful to  the  deputies  who  pointed  him  out  to  the 
committee,  rather  than  to  the  committee  who 
obtained  his  aid,  or  to  Pont^  Coulant,  who,  after 
making  trial  of  it,  profited  by  his  sagacity. 

The  reader  will  observe,  that  almost  exclusive 
possession  of  him  is  claimed  by  the  different 
parties,  the  Bourriennes  and  Permons  j  and  that 
all  these  writers  appear  to  have  known  where 
he  was  in  the  months  of  April  and  May,  179^, 
better  than  he  did  himself. 

It  is  surprising  that  Thiers,  whose  narrative 


CHAPTER    IV.  427 

is  generally  so  clear  and  philosophical,  should 
have  countenanced  these  errors  of  fancy,  me- 
mory, and  malice.  In  his  account  of  the  insur- 
rection of  the  sections,  4th  October,  1796,  and 
of  the  agency  of  Napoleon  in  quelling  it,  it  is 
observed  retrospectively  (t.  viii,  p.  41):  "  Bar- 
ras  had  near  him  an  officer  very  capable  of  com- 
manding the  troops.  All  the  deputies  who  had 
been  sent  on  mission  to  the  army  of  Italy  knew 
the  young  officer  of  artillery  who  had  decided 
the  capture  of  Toulon,  caused  the  fallof  Saorgio, 
and  of  the  lines  of  the  Roya.  This  young  officer, 
become  general  of  brigade,  had  been  deprived 
of  his  commission  fdestitue)  by  Aubry,  and  now 
found  himself  in  Paris  out  of  employment,  and 
almost  reduced  to  indigence.  He  had  been  in- 
troduced to  Madame  Tallien,  who  received  him 
with  her  accustomed  benignity,  and  who  even 
solicited  in  his  behalf "  The  most  that  can  be 
said  in  favour  of  this  passage,  is,  that  it  does  not 
contain  as  many  errors  as  words.  It  is  now  need- 
less to  repeat  either  on  the  authority  of  Napoleon 
himself,  his  brother  Louis,  or  the  order  of  ge- 
neral Hoche  attesting  his  appointment  to  the 
command  of  the  artillery  in  the  army  of  the 
west,  that  Napoleon  never  was  deprived  of  his 
commission,  nor  in  a  state  approaching  to  indi- 
gence. The  assertion  that  he  was  in  a  connec- 
tion of  particular  intimacy  or  favour  with  Bar- 
ras  f'^  B arras  avait  aupres  de  lu^J  at  the  time 
here  spoken  of  is  altogether  erroneous.  They  had 


428  APPENDIX. 

met  at  the  siege  of  Toulon  in  1795,  bat  being 
employed  on  dift'erent  sides  of  the  harbour,  had 
not  formed  an  acquaintance.  Napoleon's  first 
particular  connection  with  Barras,  which  was 
not  at  the  instance  of  that  deputy,  took  place  on 
the  evening  of  the  12th  Vendemiaire,  when  the 
nominal  command  of  the  troops  of  the  conven- 
tion was  conferred  on  Barras,  and  the  real  com- 
mand entrusted  to  Napoleon  (O'Meara  v.  ii, 
p.  225;  Montholon  t.  ii,  p.  21 1).  As  to  the  be- 
nignant reception  and  patronizing  smiles  of 
Madame  Tallien,  it  is  probable  that,  previously 
to  the  1 5th  Vendemiaire,  they  had  not  been  be- 
stowed on  Napoleon.  That  interesting  lady  and 
Madame  Beauharnais  were  on  the  most  intimate 
terms  ^  and  if  Napoleon  frequented  the  salons  of 
Madame  Tallien,  before  the  1 5th  Vendemiaire, 
he  must  have  formed  the  acquaintance  of  her 
bosom  friend  and  constant  visitor,  Madame  Beau- 
harnais, also  before  that  event.  But  his  own 
and  other  accounts  agree  in  representing  his 
first  acquaintance  with  Madame  Beauharnais  as 
occurring  subsequently  to  the  1 5th Vendemiaire, 
and  while  he  commanded  the  army  of  the  in- 
terior. The  occasion  of  that  acquaintance — the 
application  of  Eugene  for  the  sword  of  his  fa- 
ther— his  emotion  on  receiving  it — the  impres- 
sion he  made  on  the  general,  and  the  visit  of  his 
grateful  and  graceful  mother  to  acknowledge  the 
kindness  which  had  been  extended  to  her  son,  are 
facts  too  well  ascertained  to  be  denied  or  insisted 


CHAPTER    IV.  4^9 

Upon  (Montholon,   t.  iii,  p,  119.    Las  Cases^  t. 
i,  p.  222 — O'Meara,  v.  i,  p.  179 — Constant,  t.  i, 
p.  1 5).      So  that  Madame   Tallien   cannot  be 
added  to  the  number  of  persons — Tahna,  Junot, 
the  Bourriennes,  the  Permons,  etc.,   who   be- 
friended this  "unfriended"  and  indigent  officer, 
before  the  i5th  Vendemiaire.     But  the  fanciful 
texture  of  the  historian's  language  becomes  ap- 
parent, when   it  is  connected  with  his  previous 
and  subsequent  expressions  in  relation  to  Napo- 
leon.    He  first  mentions  the  name  of  Bonaparte 
at  the  siege  of  Toulon  (t.  vi,  p.  5i),  and   thus 
introduces  him.      "  In  the  council  of  war,  there 
w  as  SLjoung  officer,  who  commanded  the  artil- 
lery in  the   absence  of  the  chief  of  that  corps. 
His  name  was  Bonaparte,  and  he  was  a  native  of 
Corsica."      This  was  in  the    autumn    of  1793. 
He  next  notices  him  in  the  spring  of  1794?  in 
the  camp  before  Saorgio  (t.  vi,  p.  288).     "  Hap- 
pily general  Dumerbion   allowed  himself  to  be 
directed    entirely    by    the  joujig  Bonaparte." 
The  third  time  he  accords  this  distinction  to  the 
hero  of   Toulon  and  Saorgio,  is  in  the  summer 
of  1794,  when  in  accounting   for  the  inactivity 
of  the  armies  of  Italy  and  the  Alps,  he  observes 
(t.  vii,  p.  96):  "  Thejoz^^z^  Bonaparte  was  even 
accused  of  being  an  accomplice  of  Robespierre, 
by  reason  of  the  confidence  with  which  his  ta- 
lents  and   his  plans  had  inspired  the  younger 
of  these  brothers."     The  fourth  time,  in  the  au- 
tumn of  1 795,  when  it  appears  he  is  again  com- 
memorated  as  the    "•  young  officer  of  arlillery 


450  APPENDIX. 

who  was  known  to  all  the  deputies  who  had 
been  on  mission  to  the  army  of  Italy,  and  who 
had  decided  the  taking  of  Toulon,  caused  the 
fallof  Saorgio,  and  the  linesof  the  Roya."  Af- 
terwards when  the  directorial  government  had 
got  into  operation,  he  is  called  (t.  viii,  p.  124)  : 
*'  The  young  Bonaparte  who  had  figured  on  the 
i5th  Vendemiaire."  And  in  March,  1796,  after 
his  marriage  and  appointment  to  the  command 
of  the  army  of  Italy,  it  is  solemnly  recorded 
that  (t.  viii,  p.  224):  ''  Thirty  thousand  fa- 
mished soldiers  were  confided  to  a  young  man, 
unknown  but  daring."  So  that  according  to 
Thiers,  Napoleon  was  not  only  in  the  enjoyment 
of  perpetual  youth,  but  as  epithets  acquire  force 
by  regular  repetition,  was  actually  younger  in 
the  spring  of  1796,  than  he  had  been  in  the  au- 
tumn of  1795.  Again — on  the  1 5th  Vendemiaire, 
that  is  the  4th  October  1796,  he  is  the  young 
general  well  known  to  the  convention,  as  the 
captor  of  Toulon,  of  Saorgio,  and  of  the  lines  of 
the  Roya;  in  March  1796,  after  having  added 
to  these  distinctions,  the  victory  of  Vendemiaire 
under  the  eyes  of  the  government  itself,  and  the 
successful  command  during  a  critical  season  of 
the  army  of  the  interior,  he  is  reduced  to  "a 
young  man  unknown.'^  Now  the  fact  is  that 
Napoleon  was  not  only  two  years  and  a  half  older 
as  a  man  in  March  1 796,  than  he  w  as  at  the  siege 
of  Toulon,  but  as  an  officer,  as  he  intimated  to 
Aubry,  was  growing  old  in  the  field  of  battle — 
was   a  general    of  distinction   and    experience, 


CHAPTER    IV.  ^Sl 

versed  in  the  arts  of  love   and  warj   and  at  the 
time  of  ^Yhich  we  are  now  treating,  was  more 
likely  and  more   disposed  to  confer  than  to  re- 
ceive benefactior.s;  as  may  be  gathered  from  his 
interference  to  save  Menoufrom  condemnation, 
and   to  liberate  Bourrienne  from  arrest  (^Bour- 
rienne,  t,  i,  p.  84).       It  is  true  that  Napoleon 
speaks  of  himself  in  the  spring  of  1796  (Montho- 
Ion,  t.  iii,  p.  120)  as  "  a  young  man."     But  it  is 
in  reference  to  the  situation  he  held  as  a  com- 
mander in  the  centre  of  the  republic,  when  the 
government  was   safe  and  powerful,  while   the 
Italian  frontier  was  menaced  with  invasion;  and 
in  contrast  with  general  Hatry,  a  veteran  from 
the  army  of  the  Sambre    and  the  Meuse,  who 
was  ordered  to   Paris  to   succeed  him.     In  the 
same  relative  manner  he   described  himself  in 
September  1795,  as  *'  an  ancient  officer  of  artil- 
lery;"   (Montholon,  t.  iii,  p.  11);  but  this  had 
allusion  to  his  regular  education  and   length   of 
service  in  the  artillery;  and  was  in  opposition  to 
officers  who  without  a  military  education,  had 
entered  that   corps  since  the  commencement  of 
the  revolution,    such  as   those  whom  he  found 
attached  to  Cartaux.     In  this  language,  there  is 
the  simplicity  of  truth;  in  that  of  Thiers,  the 
romance  of  history.     The  desire   of  effect,    of 
displaying    vivid    and    theatrical    contrasts,    of 
raising  Napoleon  by  the  sudden  magic  of  a  fan- 
tastic phrase,  from  perfect  obscurity  to  glittering 
distinction,  probably  betrayed  this  elegant  his- 
torian inio   ihese  mawkish   misrepresentations; 


452  APPE^.DIX. 

which  besides  being  in  very  bad  taste,  discover 
a  forgetfubiess  of  the  claims  of  common  sense, 
the  dignity  of  history,  and  the  sacredness  of 
truth.  In  short,  Thiers  seems  not  to  perceive 
that  an  attempt  to  patronize  the  fame  of  Napo- 
leon, is  an  attempt  to  degrade  it. 

It  is  ridiculous  to  pretend  that  Napoleon  is  re- 
markable among  great  generals  for  his  youth. 
Alexander  had  overturned  the  Persian  empire 
before  he  was  twenty-six.  At  that  age  Hannibal 
had  conquered  Spain,  traversed  Gaul,  passed 
the  Alps,  and  invaded  Italy.  Scipio  commanded 
in  Spain,  and  took  New  Carthage,  before  he 
was  twenty-four.  At  the  age  of  twenty- three, 
Pompey  had  acquired  the  title  oi  imperator  and 
that  of  the  great  at  twenty-five.  Yet  we  do  not 
find  Plutarch  perpetually  repeating  the  young 
Pompey y  the  young  Alexander ^  nor  Polybius 
and  Livy,  declaring  that  when  Hannibal  pre- 
pared to  scale  the  Alps,  he  was  a  young  man 
unknown  hut  daring.  The  great  Conde  was 
not  twenty-two  when  he  gained  the  battle  of 
Rocroy^  and  before  he  was  twenty-four,  had 
added  to  that  exploit  the  capture  of  Thionville, 
the  taking  of  Philipsburg,  and  the  victory  of 
Nordlingen.  Turenne  was  a  major-general  at 
twenty-three  years  of  age.  Charles  Xll  fought 
the  battle  of  Narva,  and  raised  the  siege  of  that 
place  andof  Riga  in  his  nineteenth  year.  Hoche 
had  distinguished  himself,  and  commanded  the 
united   armies    of  the   Pthine  and  the  Moselle, 


CHAPTER   IV.  433 

when  he  was  but  twenty-five.  Napoleon's  ex- 
cellence above  other  great  men,  was  not  in 
the  prematurity  of  his  genius,  but  in  its  force. 
.  Out  of  the  contradictory  tales  of  error^  va- 
nity, detraction,  or  malice,  which  have  here 
been  noticed  the  strong,  and  simple  fact  arises. 
that  Napoleon  was  indebted,  for  fortune  and  for 
fame,  up  to  this  period  of  his  life  at  least,  to  his 
own  character  and  services  alone. 


28 


(    434    ) 


CHAPTER  V. 


Page  170. 


(i)  This  is  evident  not  only  from  the  state  of 
public  sentiment  disclosed  by  the  votes  on  this  oc- 
casion^ but  from  the  fact^  that  after  the  i8th  Bru- 
maire,  when  the  nation  had  become  disgusted  with 
the  directory^  it  was  thought  necessary  to  appoint 
three  consuls.  Sir  Walter  Scott  (v.  iii,  pp.  5[, 
6i)  expends  a  profusion  of  loose  and  rambling  so- 
phistry^ to  prove,  that  there  existed  at  this  time  in 
the  body  of  tlie  French  nation,  a  ^^  general  ten- 
dency "  in  favour  of  the  restoration  of  the  Bour- 
bons, and  a  strong  though  reluctant  admiration  of 
the  British  constitution ;  with  all  the  abuses  by 
which  it  was  then  infected.  Arguing,  however, 
with  that  freedom  from  the  restraints  of  reason  and 
consistency,  which  is  natural  and  becoming  in  a 
writer  of  romances,  he  demonstrates  the  very  re- 
verse of  what  he  undertakes  to  prove ;  showing 
conclusively  (pp.  60-61)  that  the  nation  generally 
abhorred  both  the  persons  and  the  power  of  the 
Bourbons,  and  that  monarchy  itself  was  so  odious, 
that  although  princes  who  were  not  personally 
detested,  such  as  the  dukes  of  Orleans  and  York 


CHAPTER  V.  435 

were  menllonetl^  their    names  received   not  tlie 
slig^htest  support.     It  is  scarcely  worth  while  to 
observe,  that  Lockhart  adopts  with  implicit  defe- 
rence the  absurdites  of  Scott^  infringing  with  con- 
stancy and  courage  the  moral  of  the  old  saying  — 
amicus  Plato,  sed  magis  amicus  Veritas.      For 
a  just  representation  of  the  state  of  public  feeling 
in  France  at  this  period,  the  reader  who  may  have 
forgotten  the  fate  of  the  expedition  to  Quiberon  in 
the  summer  of  1795,  is  referred  to  the  ist  Chapter 
of  the  8th  volume  of  Thiers.     This  is  the  account 
he  gives  of  the  friends   of  the  Bourbons  (p.  3). 
^^The  royalists  concealed  themselves  behind  (his 
mass  of  malcontents.     They    consisted   of  a  few 
emigrants,  and  returned  priests,  some  creatures  of 
the  ancient  court  who  had  lost  their  places,  and 
many  indifferent  and  dastardly  persons  who  dreaded 
a  stormy  freedom. " 

Page  170. 

(2)Norvins  (t.  i,  p.  10)  observes  ^^a  third  de- 
cree submitted  these  two  dispositions  to  the  accep- 
tation of  the  people,  as  inseparable  from  the  new 
constitution." 

Page  171. 

(3)  In  the  exposition  of  this  supplementary 
provision  of  the  constitution  of  the  year  3, 
there  appears  to  have  prevailed  a  remarkable  indis- 
tinctness of  expression.  Thiers  states  (t.  viii, 
p.  i7)^nhat  the  new  legislative  body  was  to  be 


43G  APPENDIX. 

composed  oi  Iwo-tbiicls  of  the  convention." 
Scott  expounds  them  in  the  same  manner  (v.  iii, 
p.  G7)  ^^  the  first  (decree)  ordaining;  the  electoral 
bodies  of  France  to  choose  as  representatives  to  the 
two  councils  under  the  new  constitution  at  least 
two-thirds  of  the  members  presently  sitting  in  con- 
vention ,*"  language  which  is  adopted  by  Lockhart 
(v.  i,  p.  27).  Napoleon  ( Montholon^  t.  iii,  p.  io3) 
explains  the  provision  more  accurately — ^^  The  con- 
vention attached  to  the  constitution  two  additional 
laws^  by  which  they  prescribed  that  two-thirds  of  the 
new  legislature  should  he  composed  ofmemhers  of 
iheconventionr  ]Norvins(t.  i,  p.  70)  gives  a  third 
interpretation  :  ^^  By  one  of  these  additional  laws, 
the  convention  formed  two-thirds  of  the  legislature^ '' 
pliraseology  which  leaves  it  uncertain  whether  they 
were  to  be  composed  of  the  members  of  the  con- 
vention, or  of  persons  chosen  by  the  conven- 
tion. Even  if  the  numbers  of  the  convention  and 
of  the  new  legislature  were  equal,  the  statement 
of  Napoleon  is  the  more  clear,  and  is  therefore  fol- 
lowed in  the  text. 

Page  175. 

(4)  On  this  subject  Thiers  expresses  himself  as 
follows  (t.  viii,  pp.  iG-i7):  ^^Such  was  the  con- 
stitution by  which  it  was  hoped  to  maintain  a  re- 
public in  France.  It  presented  one  important 
question  ;  the  constituent  assembly,  by  an  ostenta- 
tion of  disinterestedness,  had  excluded  itself  from 
the  legislative  assembly  by  which  it  was  to  be  re- 
placed ^  should  the  convention  do  the  same?     It 


CHAPTER    V.  437 

must  be  confessed  that  such  a  determination  would 
have  been  a  g^reat  imprudence.  Among  an  incon- 
stant people,  who,  after  having  lived  fourteen  cen- 
turies under  a  monarchy^  had  in  a  moment  of  en- 
thusiasm overthrown  it,  the  republic  was  not  so 
fixed  in  their  manners,  that  its  establishment  could 
be  trusted  to  the  course  of  things.  The  revolution 
could  only  be  effectually  defended  by  its  founders. 
The  convention  was  composed  for  the  greater  part, 
of  members  of  the  constituent  and  legislative  assem- 
blies j  it  united  in  itself  the  men,  who  on  the  i4th 
of  July  and  the  4th  of  August,  1789,  had  abolished 
the  ancient  feudalgovernment,  had  overturned  the 
throne  on  the  loth  of  August,  had  on  the  21st  of 
January  immolated  the  chief  of  the  Bourbon 
dynasty ;  and  who  for  the  space  of  three  years,  had 
made  unheard-of  efforts  to  sustain  their  work 
against  all  Europe.  These  men  alone  were  capable 
of  defending  the  revolution  which  was  consecrated 
in  the  directorial  constitution.  Therefore,  not 
pluming  themselves  upon  a  vain  disinterestedness, 
they  decreed  on  the  2 2d  of  August  that  the  new 
legislative  body  should  be  composed  of  two-thirds 
of  the  convention^  and  that  but  one-third  should 
be  chosen  by  general  election.  Norvins  says(t.  i, 
p.  G9),  ^^The  failure  of  the  constitution  of  1791, 
had  been  justly  attributed  to  the  decree  of  the  con- 
stituent assembly  which  excluded  all  its  members 
from  the  succeeding  legislature. "  —  ^^  At  a  moment 
of  equal  danger,  the  convention  reflected  on  the 
fault  of  its  predecessors,  and  added  two  additional 


/|38  APPENDIX.     , 

laws  lo  the  social  compact."     Napoleon,  too,  ob- 
serves (Montholon,  t.  iii,  p.  io3):    ^^It  was  the 
general  opinion    that  the  short  duration  of  the 
constitution   of    179I3    was   to  be    attributed   to 
tlie  law  of  the  constituent  assembly  excluding  its 
members  from  the  legislature."  Even  Jomini,  aide- 
de-camp  of  the  emperor  of  Russia,  admits  (t.  vii, 
p.  2i3):  ^^That  in  truth,  these  dispositions  (the 
additional  acts )  which    caused  so   much  alarm, 
were,  although  contrary  to  the  principles  of  the 
new  constitution,  really  founded   in  the  interest 
of  the    republican    party."     And   Hazlitt  (v.  i, 
p.  399)  declares,  in  speaking  of  these  decrees,  that 
^^this  prompt  and  seasonable  step  had  for  its  object 
to  save  the  country  from  the  return  of  anarchy,  or 
a  counter  revolution."     These  authors  of  different 
nations  and  various  opinions,  wall  be  found  to  con- 
cur in  regard  to  the  prudence  of  the  convention  in 
passing  the  additional  acts;  and  therefore  to  justify 
the  expressions  on  this  subject  in  the  text.     Sir 
Walter  Scott's    exposition    of   these  enactments, 
however,  is  altogether  opposed  to  that  of  the  authors 
above  cited,  and  is  too  characteristic  of  the  poli- 
tical sentiments  pervading  the  body  of  his  work, 
and  too  much  at  variance  with  justice,  to  be  passed 
without  examination.     It  is  in  these  words  (v.  iii, 
p.  66)  :  ^'  But  the  constitution  of  the  year  3,  with 
all  its  defects,  would  have  been  wiHingly  received 
by  the  nation  in  general,  as  affording  some  security 
from  the  revolutionary  storm,  had  it  not  been  for 
a  selfish  and  usurping  decree  of  the  thermidoriens 
to  mutilate  and  render  it  nugatory  at  the  very 


CHAPTER  V.  439 

outset^  by  engfrafung;  on  it  the  means  of  continuing 
the  exercise  of  their  own  arbitrary  authority.  It 
must  never  be  forgotten^  that  these  conquerors  of 
Robespierre  had  shared  all  the  excesses  of  his  party, 
before  they  became  his  personal  enemies ;  and  that 
when  deprived  of  their  official  situations  and  in- 
fluence, which  they  were  likely  to  be  by  a  repre- 
sentative body  freely  and  fairly  elected,  they  were 
certain  to  be  exposed  to  great  individual  dan- 
ger. Determined,  therefore,  to  retain  the  power 
in  their  own  hands,  the  thermidoriens  suffered 
with  an  indifference  amounting  almost  to  con- 
tempt, the  constitution  to  pass  through,  and  to  be 
approved  of  by,  the  convention.  But  under  pre- 
tence that  it  would  be  highly  impolitic  to  deprive 
the  nation  of  the  services  of  men  accustomed  to 
public  business,  they  procured  two  decrees  to  be  pass- 
ed^ the  first  ordaining  the  electoral  bodies  of  France 
to  choose  as  representatives  to  the  tw^o  councils 
under  the  new  constitution,  at  least  two-thirds  of 
the  members  presently  sitting  in  convention^  and 
the  second  decJaring,  that  in  default  of  a  return  of 
two-thirds  of  the  present  deputies,  as  prescribed,  the 
convention  themselves  should  fill  up  the  vacancies 
out  of  their  ow^n  body-  in  other  words,  should 
name  a  large  proportion  of  themselves  their  own 
successors  in  legislative  power.  Tiiese  decrees 
were  sent  down  to  the  primary  assemblies  and 
every  art  was  used  to  render  them  acceptable. 

^  ^  But  the  nation, and  particularly  the  city  of  Paris, 
generally  revolted  at  this  stretch  of  arbitrary  autho- 
rity.    They  recollected  that  all  the  members  who 


44o  APPENDIX. 

had  sat  in  the  first  national  assemhly,  so  remark- 
able for  talent,  had  been  declared  ineligible,  on  that 
single  account,  for  the  second  legislative  body;  and 
now,  men  so  infinitely  the  inferiors  of  those 
-who  were  the  colleagues  of  Mirabeau,  Mounier, 
and  other  great  names,  presumed  not  only  to 
declare  themselves  eligible  by  reelection,  but 
dared  to  establish  two-thirds  of  their  number  as 
indispensable  ingredients  of  the  legislative  assem- 
blies, which,  according  to  the  words  alike  and  the 
spirit  of  the  constitution,  ought  to  be  chosen  by  the 
free  voice  of  the  people.  The  electors,  and  parti- 
cularly those  of  the  sections  of  Paris,  angrily  de- 
manded to  know,  upon  what  services  the  deputies 
of  the  convention  founded  their  title  to  a  privilege 
so  unjust  and  anomalous.  Among  the  more  active 
part  of  them,  to  whom  the  measure  was  chiefly  to 
be  ascribed,  they  saw  but  a  few  reformed  terrorists, 
who  wished  to  retain  the  power  of  tyranny,  though 
disposed  to  exercise  it  with  some  degree  of  modera- 
tion, and  the  loss  of  whose  places  might  be  possibly 
followed  by  that  of  their  heads;  in  the  other 
they  only  beheld  a  flock  of  timid  and  discounte- 
nanced helots,  willing  to  purchase  personal  security 
at  the  sacrifice  of  personal  honour  and  duty  to  the 
public;  while,  in  the  convention,  as  a  body,  who 
pronounced  so  large  a  proportion  of  their  number 
as  indispensable  to  the  service  of  the  state,  judging, 
from  their  conduct  hitherto,  they  could  but  discover 
an  image  composed  partly  of  iron,  partly  of  clay, 
deluged  with  the  blood  of  many  thousand  victims — 
a  pageant  without  a  will  of  its  own;,  and  which  had 


CHAPTER  V.  44 1 

been  capable  of  giving  its  countenance  to  the  worst 
of  actions,  at  the  instigation  of  the  worst  of  men  -, — 
a  sort  of  Moloch,  whose  name  had  been  used  by  its 
priests,  to  compel  the  most  barbarous  sacrifices.  To 
sum  up  the  whole,  these  experienced  men  of  public 
business,  without  whose  intermediation,  it  was 
pretended,  the  national  affairs  could  not  be  carried 
on,  could  only  shelter  themselves  from  the  charge 
of  unbounded  wickedness,  by  pleading  their  un- 
limited cowardice,  and  by  poorly  alleging  that, 
for  two  years,  they  had  sat,  voted,  and  deliberated 
under  a  system  of  compulsion  and  terror.  So  much 
meanness  rendered  those  who  were  degraded  by  it 
unfit,  not  merely  to  rule,  but  to  live ;  and  yet  two- 
thirds  of  their  number  were^,  according  to  their  own 
decrees,  to  be  intruded  on  the  nation  as  an  indis- 
pensable portion  of  its  representatives.  Such  was 
the  language  held  in  the  assemblies  of  the  sections 
of  Paris,  who  were  the  more  irritated  against  the 
domineering  and  engrossing  spirit  exhibited  in 
these  usurping  enactments,  because  it  was  impos- 
sible to  forget  that  it  was  their  interference,  and 
the  protection  afforded  by  the  national  guard, 
which  had  saved  the  convention  from  massacre  on 
more  occasions  than  one." 

Looking  at  the  mere  exterior  of  this  disquisition 
of  the  great  novelist,  it  will  be  observed,  that  with 
a  view  either  of  dividing  the  responsibility  of  its 
misrepresentation,  or  of  adding  some  degree  of 
sanction  to  its  folly,  after  exhibiting  it,  in  the  first 
instance,  as  the  effusion   of  his  own  opinions,  he 


442  APPENDIX. 

ascribes  it  at  last  to  thcpcople  of  Paris. — ^^  Such  was 
ihelan^jLiage  held  in  the  assemblies  of  the  people  of 
Paris."  But  this  expedient,  for  whichsoever  of 
these  purposes  it  may  have  been  used,  is,  indepen- 
dently of  its  insincerity  and  confusion,  signally 
abortive.  For,  even  if  it  were  true^  that  these 
hackneyed  metaphors  and  obvious  contradictions 
had  ever  been  hazarded  by  any  one  but  the  author 
of  Waverley  himself,  the  fact  which  on  that  hypo- 
thesis would  arise,  viz.  that  he  had  adopted  the  heat- 
ed extravagance  of  sentiment  and  language  proper  to 
a  paroxysm  of  party  violence — would  shew  a  temper 
of  mind  incompatible  with  the  equity  of  an  histo- 
rian. To  admit  therefore  the  assertion  which  he 
employs  to  enforce  his  reprobation  of  this  measure 
and  its  authors,  is  an  effectual  way  of  exposing  his 
injustice.  Another  remark  obviously  suggested  by 
this  passage,  is,  that,  throughout,  Sir  Walter  sup- 
presses the  important  fact,  that  the  operation  of 
these  additional  acts  was  expressly  limited,  at  the 
utmost,  to  two  years,  after  which  the  right  of  elec- 
tion, as  defined  by  the  constitution,  was  to  revert 
fully  to  the  people.  When  this  fact  is  attended  to, 
in  connection  with  the  delicacy  and  danger  of 
effecting  a  transition  from  one  set  of  fundamental 
institutions  to  another,  in  time  of  unextinguished 
civil  faction,  and  of  uncompromising  foreign  war, 
the  unfairness  of  Sir  Walter  Scott  (who  knew 
that  at  Quiberon  immediately  before,  and  at  the 
He  Dieu  during  this  period,  his  own  government, 
at  an  immense  expense  of  gold  and  honour,  had 


CHAPTER   V.  443 

kindled  civil  war  in  France)  in  imputing  to  selfish- 
ness a  proceeding  which  was  clearly  attributable  to 
patriotic  discretion^  will  appear  the  more  inex- 
cusable. He  had  already  objected  (p.  65)  to  this 
constitution  that  '^  it  was  new/' — ^^  a  mere  experi- 
ment in  politics."  Without  stopping  to  inquire 
whether  it  would  have  been  honest  or  wise  in  the 
convention  to  reestablish  the  old  constitution  of 
France,  which  Sir  Walter  confesses  (v.  i,  p. 68) 
afforded  security  neither  to  property  nor  person^ 
and  which  was  so  utterly  corrupt  as  to  be  deemed 
unsusceptible  of  improvement  or  regeneration,  it 
may  be  affirmed  that  the  fact  of  the  newness  of  the 
constitution  of  the  year  3,  of  its  being  ^^  an  experi- 
ment," or  to  use  the  language  of  Thiers,  a  system 
not  yet  ^^  fixed  in  the  manners  of  the  people," 
rendered  it  the  duty  of  the  representatives  to  adopt 
such  measures,  as,  without  being  inconsistent  with 
morality^  should  appear  likely  to  engraft  the  new 
institutions  firmly  in  the  habits  of  the  nation,  and 
protect  them  from  the  assaults  of  foreign,  and  the 
sap  of  domestic  foes. 

There  is  yet  another  observation  suggested  by 
a  general  view  of  the  strictures  of  Sir  Weaker 
Scott^  on  these  additional  acts  of  the  convention. 
The  very  ardent  zeal  with  which  he  seems  suddenly 
inspired  in  favour  of  a  ^^representative  body  freely 
and  fairly  elected ;" — ^^a  legislative  assembly  chosen 
by  the  free  voice  of  the  people,"  must  attract  the 
notice  of  every  reader.  Throughout  his  work,  he 
holds  up  the  British  constitution,  in  its  unreiormed 


444  APPENDIX. 

State,  as  a  model  of  perfection  in  government,  as 
v.i,  p.  73)  ^^thcnoblesystem  of  masculine  freedom 
which  had  been  consolidated  by  the  successive 
efforts  of  so  many  patriots  in  so  many  ages."  Yet, 
so  far  was  this  ^^noblesystem  of  masculine  freedom" 
from  admitting  of  ^'  a.  representative  body  chosen 
by  the  free  voice  of  the  people,"  that  seats  in  one  of 
the  branches  of  its  legislature,  were,  and  are  held, 
Hke  land  and  houses,  by  hereditary  tenure,  and 
a  large  proportion  of  places  in  the  other,  were  fill- 
ed without  regard  to  the  voice  of  the  people,  upon 
the  avowed  principle  of  introducing  and  continu- 
ing in  the  legislature,  men  of  political  talent  and 
of  experience  in  public  business.  So  that,  while 
an  inveterate  violation  of  the  freedom  of  popular 
election  of  England  is,  in  the  scales  of  this  writer's 
historical  balance,  the  essence  of  *^  masculine  free- 
dom," a  temporary  encroachment  on  it  in  France, 
at  a  moment  of  the  greatest  danger,  is  a  selfish 
^^stretch  of  arbitrary  authority,"  ^^  an  unjust  and 
anomalous  privilege,"  ^^an  act  of  domineering  and 
engrossing  usurpation,"  of  ^^unbounded  wickedness 
or  unlimited  cowardice,"  which  rendered  its  au- 
thors ^^ unfit,  not  merely  to  rule^  but  to  live." 

Regarding,  with  closer  attention,  this  tirade 
against  the  convention  and  their  work,  it  is  dis- 
coverable that  Sir  Walter  attributes  the  additional 
acts  to  inconsistent  motives  ;  that  is,  to  the  cow- 
ardice of  the  convention  in  the  first  instance,  and 
to  their  ambition  in  the  second — to  an  excessive 
love  of  life,  and  an  inordinate  love  of  power.  Now, 


CHAPTER   V.  445 

if  it  be  true  that  they  passed  the  additional  acts, 
because  they  feared  that,  upon  losing  their  places, 
they  would  lose  their  heads,  it  cannot  be  true  that 
they  enacted  these  laws,  because  they  ^^  wished  to 
retain  the  power   of  tyranny,"   and  ^^  dared  to 
establish  two-thirds  of  their  number"  in  the  new 
legislature  from  a   ^^  domineering  and  engrossing 
spirit."     These  motives  being  antagonist,  and  each 
sufficient,  the  admission  of  either  is  the  exclusion 
of  the  other.      While,   therefore,    considered  as 
causes,  they  cannot  be  connected  with  the  conduct 
of  the  convention  in  passing  the  additional  acts, 
and  leave  those  salutary  regulations  to  be  drawn 
from  the  motives  of  patriotism  and  prudence,  from 
which    they  have    been   justly  deduced  by  the 
authors  already  referred  to  ^  considered  as  effects, 
they  are  to  be  traced  distinctly  to  causes  existing 
in  the  character  and  disposition  of  Sir  Walter 
Scott,  the  consciousness  of  which  should  have  de- 
terred him  from  undertaking  a  work  touching  the 
honour  of  France,  or  the  glory  of  Napoleon.  These 
causes,   excluding  some  which  have  been  alluded 
to,  are,  first,  the  most  contracted  prejudice  against 
the  nation  and  the  hero ;  second,  the  grossest  infa- 
tuation  in  favour  of  that  line  of  pretenders,  whose 
claims  and  reputation  were  equally  wounded  by 
the  freedom  of  the  French  people,  and  the  renown 
of  their  emperor  -,  and  third,  the  habit  of  turning 
history  into  romance,  and  romance  into  history. 

The  absurdity  of  imputing  want  of  courage  and 
capacity  to  such  men  as  Carnot,  Sieyes,  Louvet^ 


44G  APPENDIX. 

Legendre,  Delacloi,  Tallien,  Freron,  Boissy  d'An- 
glas^  Thibeaudeau,  Cambaceres,  Rewbell,  etc., — 
men  who  had  overthrown  the  tyranny  of  Bour- 
bons and  priests,  of  Robespierre  and  the  jacobins, 
and  had  at  the  same  time  defended  their  devoted 
country  against  the  force  of  more  than  half  of  Eu- 
rope, aided  by  the  mercenary  influence  of  England 
and  the  machinations  of  the  exiled  princes^  is, 
besides  its  injustice,  as  ridiculous  as  the  pretext 
assigned  for  it ;  which  is,  that  they  did  not  over- 
throw Robespierre  sooner.     In  specificating  this 
charge,  Sir  Walter's  words  are  (v.  iii,  p.  52),  ^^If 
they  had  shown  proper  firmness,  the  revolution  of 
thegth  Thermidor  might  as  well  have  been  achieved 
at  the  beginning  of  that  frightful  anarchy  (that  is, 
the  reign  of  terror)  as  after  that  long  period  of  un- 
heard-of suffering."     So  that  Brutus  and  Cassius 
were  cowards  because  they  did  not  kill  Caesar  as 
soon  as  he  crossed  the  Rubicon,  instead  .of  waiting 
until  he  had  fought  the  battles  of  Pharsalia,  Thap- 
sus,  and  Munda ;  had  destroyed  Pompey  and  his 
sons,  Scipio  and  Cato ;  and  fixed  his  power  so  firm- 
ly, that  it  was  perpetuated  by  his  nephew.     But, 
unfortunately,  SirWalter,  in  the  previous  volume, 
in  which  he  was  not  quite  so  intent  upon  depre- 
ciating the  character  of  Napoleon,  had  been  at  the 
pains  to  show  that  the  overthrow  of  Robespierre, 
when  it  was  accomplished,  was  attended  by  the 
greatest  difficulty  and  danger.      In  relating  the 
commencement  of  the  struggle  which  ended  in  that 
fortunate  catastrophe,  he  avers  (v.  ii,  p.  35i)  that, 


CHAPTER  V.  44; 

^^had  Robespierre  possessed  military  talents,  or  even 
decided  courage,  there  was  nothing  to  have  pre- 
vented him  from  placing  himself  that  very  night 
(the  night  previous  to  his  downfal)  at  the  head  of 
a  desperate  insurrection  of  the  jacobins  and  their 
followers.     Payan  actually  proposed  that  the  ja- 
cobins should  instantly  march  against    the  two 
committees — surprise  their  handful  of  guards,  and 
stifle  the  civil  war  that  was  menaced,  even  in  the 
very  cradle.    This  plan  was  deemed  too  hazardous 
to  be  adopted,  though  it  was  one  of  those  sudden 
and  masterstrokes  of  policy  which  Machiavel  would 
have  recommended."     Now,  a   stroke  of  policy 
which  was   not  likely  to  succeed,   could  not  be 
called  a   ^^  masterstroke  ;'^    and,    as  Robespierre 
proved  destitute  of  courage,  it  would  seem  accord- 
ing to  Sir  Walter,  that  both  parties  in  this  despe- 
rate struggle  were  poltroons  !     At  a  later  moment 
of  the  contest  he  describes  the  scenes  in  the  con- 
vention (p.  356)  as  ^^ dreadful,"  and  asks  (p.  35'j), 
^'  who  was  it  that  for  two  years  had  lived  on  other 
terms  than  under  Robespierre's  permission  ?"    This 
is  the  formidable  power  which  he  likens  to  the 
crushing  coils  and  devouring  throat  of  ^^  the  huge 
Anaconda"  (p.  34^)  that  might  have  been  so  easily 
overturned.     At  a  stage  still  later,  he  says,  ^^  The 
fate  of  France,  perhaps,  depended  on  the  presence 
of  mind  and  courage"    of  Henriot — who  turned 
out  to  be  '^  stupid  and  cowardly" — and  continues 
(p.  36i)—^^  Fortune^  or  the  demon  which  he  had 
served,  afforded  Robespierre  another  chance  for 


448  APPENDIX. 

safely,  perhaps  for  empire."  The  extreme  diffi- 
culty of  mastering  the  tyrant  and  his  creatures  thus 
confessed  by  Sir  Walter,  is  confirmed  by  other 
accounts,  particularly  by  that  of  Thiers  j  wherein 
(t.  vi,  ch.  7)  the  reader  may  see  the  various  fluc- 
tuations and  breathless  chances  of  the  struggle  vi- 
vidly pictured.  These  observations  show  that  the 
allegation  of  cowardice  and  incapacity  against  the 
convention,  is  not  only  inconsistent  with  truth,  but 
irreconcilable  with  the  previous  statements  of  Sir 
Walter  himself.  The  digression  into  which  they 
have  run  is  no  deviation  from  the  subject,  for  the 
plain  tendency  and  probable  object  of  this  vilifica- 
tion of  the  convention,  its  motives  and  labours,  are, 
as  their  triumph  on  the  i3th  Vendemiaire  was  in- 
disputably owing  to  Napoleon,  to  reflect  upon  him 
the  discredit  of  having  protected  a  pack  of  unprin- 
cipled usurpers,  and  of  having  volunteered  his  ef- 
forts to  rivet  upon  France,  the  chains  of  their  selfish 
domination . 

Forbearing  to  notice  other  less  flagrant  falsifica- 
tions of  actual  fact  or  natural  inference,  these  gross 
misstatements  remain  to  be  exposed  (v.  iii,  p.  68). 
^^  These  decrees  were  sent  down  to  the  primary  as- 
semblies of  the  people,  and  every  art  was  used  to 
render  them  acceptable.  But  the  nation,  and  par- 
ticularly the  city  of  Paris,  generally  revolted  at  this 
slretch  of  arbitrary  power."  One  would  think, 
that  a  writer,  styling  himself  with  pompous  em- 
phasis (v.  ii,  p.  358),  ^^  a  British  historian,"  would 
have  produced  some  colour  of  authority  for  such 


CHAPTER   V.  449 

l)road  and  positive    assertions.      The    author   of 
Waverley,  however^  seems  to  be  independent  of 
evidence  as  well  as  of  fact.     So  far  from  truth  is 
the  assertion^  that  every  art  was  used  by  the  govern- 
ment to  render  the  decrees  acceptable,  or  to  in- 
fluence the  votes  of  the  people  on  the  occasion, 
that  according  to  the  best  authority,  the  very  re- 
verse was  the  fact.     Thiers  in  describing  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  votes  were  taken  in  Paris,  says, 
(t.  viii;,  pp.  23,  a4) :  ^^  The  sections  commenced 
taking  the  votes  on  the  constitution  and  the  de- 
crees, by  driving  off  without  the  least  ceremony, 
the  patriots  who  came  to  vote  at  their  polls.     In 
some  sections  they  turned  them  out  of  doors;  in 
others,  they  signified  to  them  by  handbills  that  they 
would  have  to  stay  at  home ,   for  if  they  came  to 
the  polls  they  would  be  insulted  and  driven  away. 
Many   individuals    were   thus  deprived   of  their 
rights  -y  they  hastened  to  the  convention  to  reclaim 
against  the  violence  done  to  them.     The  conven- 
tion disapproved  the  proceeding  of  the  sections^ 
hut  refused  to  interfere y  in  order  to  ai^oid  the  ap~ 
pearance  even^  of  recruiting  votes y  and  that  the 
abuse  itself  might  prove  the  freedom  of  the  delibe- 
ration,^^    He  relates  other  facts  to  prove  the  per- 
fect liberty  which  was  allowed  to  the  popular  mind 
— that  in  some  few  departments  there  were  strong 
minorities — and  that  individuals  here  and  there 
proposed  a  king. 

The  assertion  that  ^^  the  nation  generally"  as  well 
as  the  city  of  Paris,  revolted  against  this  measure 

29 


45o  APPENDIX. 

of  llie  g;overnnient,  is  so  bold  a  departure  from 
fact,  that  it  amazes  as  much  as  it  disgusts  the  reader. 
Thiers  affirms  (t.  viii,  p.  27)  '^  The  constitution 
^vas  accepted  ahnost  unanimously,  and  the  decrees 
hy  an  immense  majority  j"  and  (p.  28)  says  that 
llie  malcontents  doubting  or  disputing  this  fact, 
demanded  an  inspection  of  the  registers,  scrutinized 
them,  and  casting  up  the  enumeration  of  votes 
which  had  been  proclaimed  by  the  convention, 
'^  found  it  exact." 

It  is  well  known  that  Lemaitre,  the  royalist 
agent,  and  other  factious  leaders^  used  every  exer- 
tion to  excite  opposition  in  the  departments,  and 
succeeded,  after  days  of  labour,  only  in  provoking 
some  slight  movements  at  Orleans,  Chartres,  Dreux, 
Verneuil,  and  Nonancourt  (Thiers,  t.  viii,  p.  3o). 
But  if  the  nation  at  large  as  well  as  the  capital  was 
hostile  to  the  constitution,  why  did  not  reenforce- 
ments  pour  into  Paris  to  assist  the  sections?  why 
did  the  armies,  who  were  the  e'Z/Ve  of  the  nation, 
not  recruits,  accept  the  constitution  and  decrees 
by  acclamation  j  and  how  could  the  cowardlj  con- 
i^cTz/Zo/z  have  dared  to  resist  ^^a  general  revolt  of 
the  nation  and  of  Paris?" 

That  the  reader  may  be  the  better  able  to  com- 
prehend the  full  extent  of  Sir  Walter  Scott's  teme- 
rity and  injustice,  on  the  subject  of  the  members  of 
the  French  convention  who  formed  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  year  3,  and  passed  the  additional  acts, 
and  whom  the  author  of  Waverley  describes  as 
^^  Molochs,"  and  ^^  Helots," — ^^men  unfit  to  ruleor 


CHAPTER   V.  4^1 

to  live  j"  the  following  observations  in  regard  to 
them  from  the  Annual  Register  of  1795,  is  submit- 
ted to  his  attention  : — ^^  The  majority  of  the  mem- 
bers were  chosen  on  account  of  the  moderation  of 
their  character  and  principles.  Some  were  noted 
for  their  preference  of  a  private  to  a  public  life^  and 
none  were  suspected  of  intending  to  avail  them- 
selves of  this  opportunity  of  rising  to  power.  It 
is  more  probable,  therefore,  that  they  sought  to 
please  the  nation  than  to  gratify  their  personal 
ends''  (History  of  Europe,  p.  98). 

Page  178. 

(5)  This  last  term  was  afterwards  shortened  to 
the  27th  October. — Thiers — (t.  viii,  p.  73.) 

Page  182. 

(6)  Napoleon  says  (Montholon,  t.  iii,  p.  109) 
that  Mariette,  one  of  the  deputies  he  had  rescued 
from  the  mob  at  Toulon,  and  who  was  at  this 
time  a  member  of  the  executive  committee,  recom- 
mended his  appointment  on  this  occasion;  and  he 
told  Las  Cases  (t.  i,  p.  216)  that  the  husband  of 
Madame  Thurreau  was  also  in  favour  of  his  ap- 
pointment, a  fact  which  shows  the  imminence  of 
the  danger^  the  vivacity  witli  which  it  was  felt,  and 
the  confidence  which  the  talents  of  Bonaparle 
already  commanded. 

Page  185. 
(7)  The  course  of  his  reflections  is  sketched  in 
the  most  lively  colours  by  himself — (Las  Cases, 
t.  ii,  p.  246). 


4^2  APPENDIX. 

Page  184. 

(8)  This  account  of  the  manner  in  which  Napo- 
leon came  to  be  placed  in  command  of  the  forces 
of  the  convention  on  the  i3th  Vendemiaire,  is  de- 
rived from  his  own  relation  of  that  event  (Mon- 
tholon  t.  iii^  ch.  3),  from  the  files  of  the  Moniteiir 
of  that  period  (folio  for  the  last  six  months  of  the 
year  1795),  and  from  the  proces-verbal  of  the  con- 
vention (t.  Ixxi,  p.  282,  et  t.  Ixxii,  p.  16).  The 
narrative  of  Sir  Walter  Scott^  in  reference  to  this 
subject,  has  evidently  been  constructed  of  very 
different  materials.  It  is  as  follows  (v.  iii,  p.  74): 
^^  The  general  management  of  affairs,  and  the  di- 
rection of  the  conventional  forces"  (says  this  in- 
ventive historian)  '^  was  then  committed  to  Bar- 
ras ;  but  the  utmost  anxiety  prevailed  among  the 
members  of  the  committee  by  whom  government 
was  administered^  to  find  a  general  of  nerve  and 
decision  enough  to  act  under  Barras  in  the  actual 
command  of  the  military  force,  in  a  season  so  de- 
licate, and  times  so  menacing.  It  was  then  that  a 
few  words  from  Barras,  addressed  to  his  colleagues 
Garnot  and  Tallien,  decided  the  fate  of  Europe  for 
well  nigh  twenty  years.  ^  I  have  the  man,'  he 
said,  ^  whom  you  want ;  a  little  Corsican  officer, 
who  will  not  stand  upon  ceremony.'  The  ac- 
quaintance of  Barras  and  Bonaparte  had  been,  as 
we  have  already  said,  formed  at  the  siege  of  Tou- 
lon."— ^^  On  the  recommendation  of  Barras,  Bona- 
parte was  sent  for."  It  is  needless  to  insist  on  the 
direct  contradiction  to  which  this  fabrication  is 


CHAPTER    V.  45 


J 


exposed  by  the  declaration  of  Napoleon,  that  he 
had  no  acquaintance  with  Barras  at  Toulon,  and 
that  he  went,  of  his  own  accord,  to  the  com- 
mittee ;  because  there  is  one  fact  which  ought  to 
have  satisfied  Sir  Walter  that  his  story,  whether 
formed  by  his  own  fancy,  or  furnislied  by  some  un- 
mentionable slanderer,  cotdd  not  be  believed  by  any 
person  of  common  sense.  It  is,  that  Carnot  and  Tal- 
lien,  with  the  knowledge  of  Barras,  were  members  of 
the  committee,  with  which,  for  many  weeks.  Napo- 
leon had  been  in  official  and  constant  communica- 
tion. It  is  impossible,  therefore,  that  to  men  thus 
situated,  Barras  could  have  ejaculated  the  sudden 
discovery  here  ascribed  to  him,  respecting  the  birth, 
stature,  or  character  of  Napoleon,  or  that,  had  he 
done  so,  Carnot  and  Tallien  would  have  committed 
the  safety  of  themselves,  their  families,  their  friends, 
and  government,  when  they  were  under  ^^  the  ut- 
most anxiety,"  to  an  obscure  officer,  thus  suddenly 
and  (jueerly  remembered.  What  renders  the  re- 
mark more  incredible,  is,  that  Napoleon,  instead 
of  being  an  obscure  ^^  little  Corsican  officer,"  |was 
personally  known  to  a  number  of  the  leading  mem- 
bers of  the  convention,  as  the  most  distinguished 
officer  of  his  rank  in  the  army.  Norvins  (t.  i,  p. 
78)  gives  a  fair,  but  not  an  exact  representation  of 
this  matter.  Hazlitt  (v.  i,  p.  4o2,  et  s.  viii)  copies, 
without  acknowledgment,  the  narrative  of  Napo- 
leon, while,  as  the  reader  may  suppose,  Lockhart 
(v.  i,  p.  29)  republishes  the  ridiculous  fabrication 
of  Scott,  to  which,  with  surprise  and  sorrow  be  }*, 


454  APPENDIX. 

said^  the  account  of  Thiers^  to  be  examined  here- 
after_,  bears  too  close  a  resemblance. 

Page  188. 

(9)  Thiers  (t.viii^  p.  4?)  expresses  an  opinion 
that  the  best  plan  for  Bonaparte  would  have  been 
to  act  on  the  offensive,  and  disperse  the  insurgettt^ 
by  a  brisk  attack,  without  waiting  for  their  aggres- 
sion. This  idea  does  not  seem  warranted  by  the 
relative  condition  of  the  parties,  either  in  a  political 
or  military  point  of  view.  First,  it  was  an  object 
with  the  convention  to  keep  their  adversaries  in 
the  wrongs  second,  the  danger  of  commencing 
the  attack,  and  pursuing  different  detachments  of 
insurgents  through  long  and  separated  streets,  was 
exemplified  then  by  Menou,  and  has  since  been 
more  fully  by  Marmont,  in  the  revolution  of  July. 
Instead  of  eight  thousand  men,  five  thousand  re- 
gular troops,  and  three  thousand  volunteers  and 
police^,  Marmont  had  twelve  thousand,  all  regular 
troops,  including  five  thousand  of  the  royal  guard. 
But,  instead  of  keeping  these  troops  concentred, 
lie  left  but  feeble  detachments  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  Tuileries,  sent  one  column  from  the 
rue  Royal  up  the  boulevards  ,•  another  by  the  quays 
along  the  river  to  the  place  de  Greve^  a  third  to 
the  Marche  des  Innocens,  and  a  fourth  up  the 
rue  Riclilieu  and  the  boulevards  to  the  place  de  la 
Bastille,  and  thence  down  to  the  place  de  Greve, 
while  the  1 5th  regiment  was  stationed  beyond  the 
river  in  three  delachments,  at  the  palace  of  Justice, 


CHAPTER   V.  4^5 

the  Pantheon^  and  the  Hotel  des  Invalids.  The 
result  of  this  dissemination  of  his  force  in  order  to 
act  on  the  offensive^  to  attack  and  disperse  crowds, 
was,  that  some  of  his  detachments  were  over- 
powered by  the  populace,  and  some  seduced  j  that 
others  could  not  reach  the  points  to  which  they 
were  directed,  form  the  junctions  which  were  pre- 
. scribed,  or  even  return  by  the  streets  through 
which  they  had  penetrated ;  and  that  while  one 
column  attacked  the  people  with  determined 
spirit,  another  refused  to  fire  on  them.  It  has  been 
observed,  that  after  affairs  became  desperate,  and 
all  offensive  plans  had  failed,  Marmont^  when  it 
was  too  late,  collected  his  troops  upon  the  same 
points  which  the  eye  of  Napoleon  had  at  once  fixed 
on.  As  he  was  probably  with  Napoleon  on  the 
1 3th  Vendemiaire,  and  was  a  man  of  military  ta- 
lents and  experience,  his  error  is  remarkable.  Per- 
haps a  secret  repugnance  to  follow  the  example  of 
a  chief  whose  standard  he  had  deserted,  turned  his 
view  from  the  path  of  judgment.  Perhaps  he 
wanders  an  outcast  from  his  country,  because  he 
proved  a  traitor  to  his  friend. 

Page  190. 

(ro)  This  comparative  estimate  of  the  force  on 
either  side,  differs  from  that  of  Sir  Walter  Scott, 
who,  although  he  admits  that  Napoleon*  had  but 
about  eight  thousand  men,  represents  his  force  as 
formidable  and  imposing.  To  colour  this  misre- 
presentation, he  describes  the  insurgents  as  feeble^ 


456  APPENDIX. 

thou(jli  numerous^  aud  says  (v.  iii,  p.  ^5)  that  Na- 
poleon had  "  two  hundred  pieces  of  cannon ."  Now, 
the  fact  is,  that  the  sections  had  at  their  disposal 
forty  thousand  national  guards,  who  had  been  in 
reij'ular  training  ever  since  Angust,  1794^  and  Na- 
poleon, as  he  asserts  (Montholon  t.  iii,  p.  no  ;   Las 
Cases  t.  ii_,  p.  248  j  see  also  Norvins  t.  i,  p.  74)  had 
but  about  forty  pieces  of  cannon^  which  were  how- 
ever all-sufficient  for  his  eight  thousand  men,  if 
he  meant  to  use  musketry  or  bayonets  at  all.   Lock- 
hart,  not  wilhng  to  sanction  the  statement  of  Na- 
poleon, nor  daring  to  repeat  the  huge  exaggeration 
of  Sir  Walter,  asserts  (v.  i,  p.  3o),  that  the  artil- 
lery of  the  camp  of  Sablons,  for  which  Murat  was 
despatched,  consisted  of  ^^  fifty  great  guns."     This 
fabrication,  though  amid  such  a  number  of  grosser 
and  more  artful  ones,  it  might  appear  unworthy  of 
notice,  is  deserving  of  attention,  because  it  is  ob- 
viously the  design  of  both  the  Scotch  biographers 
to  discredit  the  word  of  Napoleon,  by  contradic- 
tions on  immaterial  points,  so  that  when  they  come 
to  examine  important  subjects,  or  to  advance  fa- 
vourite calumnies,  the  reader  may  be  disposed  to 
consider  his    assertion    as    entitled  to  even    less 
weight  than  their  own . 

Page  192. 

(11)  Sir  WaUer  Scott,  it  is  evident,  was  almost 
as  well  qualified  to  command  an  army,  as  to  canon- 
ize the  virtues  of  a  French  hero.  He  insists  upon 
it,  that  the  best  policy  for  the  insurgents  was  to 


CHAPTER  V.  4^7 

barricade  the  streets,  block  up  Bonaparte  and  his 
troops  within  the  circuit  of  his  posts,  and  wait  the 
effect  of  famine.  As  an  army  of  two  hundred 
thousand  men,  and  a  population  of  several  mil- 
lions, might  be  daily  expected  in  such  a  conjunc- 
ture, to  pour  their  strength  into  Paris,  this  would 
belike  advising  a  pack  of  sheep-stealers  to  surround 
the  fold,  and  wait  quietly  until  the  shepherds  with 
their  dogs,  should  come  upon  them  in  the  morning. 
It  is  singular  that  Thiers,  who  asserts  so  emphatically 
what  Sir  Walter  attempts  to  conceal,  the  favourable 
disposition  of  the  great  majority  of  the  nation,  and 
the  enthusiastic  acquiescence  of  the  army  in  the 
proposed  constitution  and  the  decrees,  should  have 
adopted  the  idea  (t.  vii,  p.  49)  that  Bonaparte,  after 
having  provided  for  a  retreat  to  Meudon,  would  suf- 
fer himself  to  be  shut  up  in  the  Tuileries,  while  his 
cannon  commanded  the  bridges,  the  Champs  Ely- 
sees,  and  the  plain  of  Grenelle;  or  that  there  would 
havebeen  time  to  reduce  him  by  famine  in  the  cen- 
tre of  a  country,  of  which  the  army  and  a  vast  ma- 
jority of  the  people  were  on  his  side.  Danican  and 
Lafonde,  knowing  the  state  of  public  feeling,  and  the 
natural  tendency  of  the  turbulent  passions  to  sub- 
side, saw  that  delay  would  to  them  be  ruin. 

Page  19o. 

(12)  It  will  be  remembered  that,  on  witnessing 
the  violence  of  the  populace   on  the  20th  June, 
1792,  he  said,  if  the  king  had,  at  the  beginning, 
swept  off  a  few  hundreds  of  the  rioters  with  can^ 
non,  '^  the  rest  would  be  running  now<'^ 


458  APPENDIX. 

Page  198. 

( 1 3  )  Different  accounts  exist  of  this  appointment 
by  the  convention^  but  that  given  by  Napoleon  (Las 
Cases,  t.  ii^  p.  255;  Montholon  t.  iii,  p.  r  i6)  isadopt- 
C(l  in  the  text.  The  narrations  of  the  biographers 
and  historians^  whose  works  I  have  consulted  on  this 
subject^  are  as  various  almost  as  their  names.  Scott 
(v.  iii^  p.  78)  says,  *'But  a  separate  triumph  was 
destined  to  Bonaparte  as  the  hero  of  the  day.  Five 
days  after  the  battle,  Barras  solicited  the  attention 
of  the  convention  to  the  young  officer^  by  whose 
prompt  and  skilful  dispositions,  the  Tuileries  had 
been  protected  on  the  i3th  Vendemiaire^  and  pr6'- 
posed  that  they  should  approve  of  general  Bona- 
parte's appointment  as  second  in  command  of  the 
army  of  the  interior,  Barras  himself  still  remaining 
commander  in  chief.  The  proposal  was  adopted 
by  acclamation."  Lockhart  (v.  i,  p.  3i)  says, 
^^  This  eminent  service  secured  the  triumph  of  the 
conventionalists,  who  now  assuming  new  names, 
continued,  in  effect,  to  discharge  their  old  func- 
tions. Barras  took  his  place  at  the  head  of  the 
directory,  having  Sieyes,  Carnot,  and  other  less 
celebrated  persons  for  his  colleagues ;  and  the  first 
director  took  care  to  reward  the  hand  to  which  he 
owed  his  elevation.  Within  five  days  from  the 
daj  of  the  sections,  Bonaparte  was  named  second 
in  command  of  the  army  of  the  interior;  and, 
shortly  afterwards,  Barras  finding  his  duties  as  di- 
rector sufficient  to  occupy  his  time,  gave  up  the 
command  in  chief  of  the  same  army  to  his  ^^  little 


CHAPTER   V.  4^9 

Corsican  officer."  Hazlitt  (v.  i,  p.  409)  copies, 
without  acknowledgment  or  explanation,  the  ac- 
count of  Napoleon,  stating  that  he  was  chosen  com- 
mander in  chief  j  while  Norvins  (t.i,  p.  76)  asserts, 
that  ^^  the  convention  confirmed  his  nomination  as 
second  in  command  of  the  army  of  the  interior." 
It  will  be  perceived,  that  these  accounts  disagree 
with  each  other,  while  all  but  the  blind  transla- 
tion of  Hazlitt  are  at  variance  with  the  relation  of 
Napoleon  himself.  As  this  juxtaposition  demon- 
strates that  but  one  of  the  four  narratives  can  pos- 
sibly be  right,  a  slight  analysis  will  prove  that  each 
of  them  is  wrong.  Scott  and  Lockhart  however 
agree  in  one  favourite  point,  in  representing  Na- 
poleon as  the  protege  of  Barras.  The  first  affirms 
that  ^^  Barras  solicited  the  attention  of  the  conven- 
tion  to  the  joung  ojficer^''  and  ^^  proposed  that 
they  should  approve  of  general  Bonaparte's  ap- 
pointment as  second  in  command  of  the  army  of 
the  interior,  Barras  himself  still  remaining  com- 
mander in  chief."  According  to  Scott,  therefore, 
Bonaparte  must  have  been  indebted  to  Barras,  not 
only  for  his  first  employment  on  the  night  of  the 
1 2th  Vendemaire  as  second  in  command  of  the 
conventional  forces  (see  note  8  of  this  appendix), 
but  for  being  confirmed  in  this  command  after  the 
struggle  of  the  1 3th  was  over.  Lockhart  makes 
Napoleon  equally  the  creature  of  Barras,  represent- 
ing the  latter  with  remarkable  ignorance  of  French 
history,  as  the  colleague  of  Sieyes  at  this  time,  and 
as  resigning  his  command  after  he  became  direc- 


46o  APPENDIX. 

tor  to  his  ^Mittle  Corsican  officer,"  It  might  be 
difficult  to  determine  whether  Sieyes,  having  been 
elected  a  director  on  the  first  occasion  (thoup-h  he 
refused  the  place,  which  was  actually  filled  by  Car- 
not;  see  His  Loire  de  France  depuis  1789,  par 
Toulongeoji,  t.  iii^  p.  2!23),  or  his  having  served  as 
successor  to  Rewbell  four  years  subsequently  (see 
Thiers  t.x^  p.  284),  misled  Lockhart  into  the  ab- 
surdity of  furnishing  a  directory  of  five  members 
with  six  persons,  either  circumstance,  however 
light,  being  cause  sufficient  for  an  effect  so  trivial. 
Bat,  however  this  may  be,  if  these  writers  are  to  be 
credited,  the  inference  would  arise,  that  inasmuch 
as  Napoleon,  in  his  repeated  narratives  of  this  part 
of  his  life,  attributes  no  agency  and  confesses  no 
obligation  to  Barras,  he  v>^antonIy  misstated  a 
fact,  and  meanly  suppressed  the  acknowledgment 
of  a  favour.  As  this  miscreated  inference  has  an 
obvious  tendency  to  discredit  his  Memoirs,  and  to 
disparage  his  character,  it  is  to  be  regretted  that 
the  narrative  of  Thiers  should  be  found  to  enforce 
it.  Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  slight- 
ing and  defamatory  neglect  and  contradiction  to 
which  the  biographers  of  Napoleon,  whether  ca- 
lumnious like  Scott,  impartial  like  Hazlitt,  or  lau- 
datory like  Norvins,  subject  statements,  however 
earnest  and  positive,  in  his  account  of  his 
own  life,  and  one  or  two  instances  of  simi- 
lar unfairness  have  been  noticed  on  the  part  of 
the  best  historian  of  the  French  revolution.  Af- 
firmations which  Napoleon  made  in  relation  to 
facts  of  ^hich  he  himself  was  the  agent  or  ^itne??'^ 


CHAPTER    V. 


46  E 


these  writers  virtually  deny,  or  captiously  contra- 
dict, Avithout  pretending  to  the  slightest  personal 
knowledge  of  the  subject,  or  condescending  to  as- 
sign the  smallest  reason  for  this  modest  valuation, 
indulged  in  by  each  of  his  own  authority.  The 
injustice  of  this  proceeding,  both  in  regard  to  the 
memory  of  Napoleon,  and  the  confidence  of  their 
readers,  need  not  Le  enlarged  upon,  inasmuch  as 
every  mind  attentive  to  the  matter,  must  at  once 
discover  the  labyrinth  of  doubt  and  confusion,  both 
as  to  character  and  events,  into  which  these  con- 
flicting statements  and  arbitrary  insinuations  lead. 
With  a  view  of  sustaining  my  own  narrative,  and 
of  enabling  the  reader  to  determine  to  which  side 
the  balance  of  truth  inclines,  between  the  statements 
of  Napoleon  and  the  asseverations  of  these  writers, 
I  shall  select  the  account  of  Thiers,  as  being  the 
latest  and  the  fullest  among  them,  and,  from  the 
nature  and  spirit  of  his  work,  the  most  free  from 
partiality  or  prejudice.  And  in  order  to  render 
the  examination  more  clear  and  complete,  I  shall 
place  the  adverse  statements  in  relation  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  of  the  interior;  in  opposite  co- 
lumns. 


Napoleon's  was  dictated  al- 
mo't  word  for  word  at  difl'e- 
rent  times  to  Las  Cases  and  to 
Monlholon.  Tlie  transcript  of 
the  latter,  beginning-  with  tlie 
first  appointment,  is  here  quo- 
ted (t.  iii,  pp.  1 08,  109  et  10}. 
"  Each  member  proposed,  as 
successor  to  Menou,  the  gene- 
ral who  enjoyed  his  particular 
confidence  ;    the    Tncrmido  - 


Thiers  after  mentioning  the 
agitation  of  the  coHvention, 
says  (t.  viii,  p.  ^o),  "  At  this 
moment,  wnich  recalled  all 
the  dangers  of  Thermidor, 
they  thought  of  the  deputy 
Barras,  who  in  his  character 
of  general  of  brigade,  had  been 
clothed  with  the  command  on 
that  memorable  day,  and  had 
acquitted  himself  with  all  the 


462 


APPENDIX. 


riens  proposed  Barras  ;  but 
he  was  liltle  acceptable  to  the 
other  parties.  Those  who  had 
been  at  Toulon,  with  ihs  army 
of  Italy,  and  the  members  of 
the  committee  of  public  safety 
who  had  daily  intercourse 
with  Napoleon,  proposed  him 
as  the  person  most  capable 
of  extricating  the  convention 
from  their  dangerous  position, 
by  the  quickness  of  his  coup 
ct'ceil,  the  energy  and  modera- 
tion of  his  character.  Mari- 
elte,  who  belonged  to  the  mo- 
derate party,  and  was  one  of 
the  most  influential  members 
of  the  committee  of  forty,  ap- 
jjroved  this  choice.  Napoleon 
who  heard  all  this  from  the 
midst  of  the  crowd,  deliberated 
nearly  ahalf  an  hour  with  him- 
self on  the  step  which  it  was 
proper  for  him  to  take.  At 
length  he  decided,  and  re- 
paired to  the  committee,  to 
whom  he  described  in  a  lively 
manner  the  impossibility  of  his 
being  able  to  direct  so  impor- 
tant an  operation  with  three 
representatives  who  actually 
exercised  the  power  and  con- 
trolled the  conduct  of  the  com- 
manding general ;  he  added, 
that  he  had  witnessed  the 
event  in  the  rue  Yivienuej 
where  the  commissaries  had 
been  the  most  to  blame,  al- 
though they  had  presented 
themselves  in  the  convention  as 
triumphant  accusers  of  Me- 
nou."  "Struck  by  Napoleon's 
reasons,  but  not  having  the 
power  to  annul  the  authority 
of  the  commissaries  of  the  con- 
vention without  a  long  de- 
bate in  that  assembly  ;  the 
committee,  in  order  to  recon- 
cile all  their  objects,  for  there 
was  no  time  to  lose,  deter- 
mined to  propose  Barras  for 
general  in  chief,  giving  Napo- 
leon at  the  same  time  the  place 
of  second  in  command.     By 


energy  that  was  desirable,  (p. 
40  They  appointed  him  ge- 
neral of  the  army  of  the  in- 
terior, and  gave  him  as  ad- 
joints  the  three  representatives 
who  had  been  charged  before 
his  appointment  with  the  di- 
rection of  the  armed  force. 
One  circumstance  rendered 
this  choice  very  fortunate.  Bar- 
ras had  near  him  an  officer 
(Bonaparte)  very  capable  of 
commanding^  and  he  would 
not  have  had  the  littleness  of 
mind  to  exclude  a  man  more 
able  than  himself."  (p.  l^i) 
"  Barras  thought  of  him  the 
1 2th  Vendemiaire  in  the  night ; 
and  requested  that  he  should 
be  appointed  his  second  in 
command,  which  request  was 
granted.  The  two  selections, 
submitted  to  the  convention 
during  the  same  night,  were 
instantly  approved.  Barras 
confided  the  care  of  the  mi- 
litary dispositions  to  the  young 
general ,  who  immediately 
charged  himself  with  them 
all."  (p.  55)  "  The  conven- 
tion accorded  a  brilliant  re- 
ception to  Barras  and  Bona- 
parte. Barras,  already  cele- 
brated since  the  yth  Thermi- 
dor,  became  still  more  so  by 
the  day  of  Vendemiaire.  To 
him  was  attributed  the  safety 
of  the  convention.  Neverthe- 
less he  did  not  fear  to  assign 
a  portion  of  his  glory  to  his 
young  lieutenant.  '  It  is 
general  Bonaparte,'  said  he, 
'  whose  prompt  and  skilful 
dispositions  have  saved  this 
assembly  {enceinte).^  These 
words  were  applauded.  The 
command  of  the  army  of  the 
interior  was  confirmed  to  Bar- 
ras, and  the  second  in  com- 
mand to  Bonaparte." 


CHAPTER    V. 


463 


th'S  expedient,  the  three  com- 
missaries were  got  rid  of, 
•\yilhout  having  any  cause  of 
complaint.  As  soon  as  Napo- 
leon found  himself  charged 
with  the  command  of  the 
forces  which  were  to  protect 
the  convention,  he  repaired  to 
an  apartment  of  the  Tuileries 
in  which  was  Menou,  etc."  (p. 
ii6).  "  When,  after  this  great 
event,  the  oflicers  of  the  army 
of  the  interior  were  presented 
in  a  body  to  the  convention, 
that  assembly  declared  Napo- 
leon by  acclamation  general  in 
chief  of  the  army  of  the  inte- 
rior, Barras  not  being  able 
longer  to  combine  the  title  of 
representative  with  military 
functions." 


Previously  to  entering  into  a  comparative  analy- 
sis of  these  disagreeing  recitals^  it  may  be  well  to 
observe,  that  Napoleon's  was  prior  in  point  of  time, 
was  dictated  originally,  without  the  advantage  of 
reference  to  other  accounts,  was  prepared  in  a  situa- 
tion not  convenient  for  research  nor  conducive 
to  meditation,  and  having  once  passed  from  his 
possession,  was  never  afterwards  in  his  power  j 
while  that  of  Thiers,  subsequent  in  date,  purports 
to  be  the  product  of  extensive  reference  and  indus- 
trious collation,  and  was  composed  in  a  position 
in  the  highest  degree  favourable  to  the  detection  of 
error  and  the  discovery  of  truth.  As  far  as  regards 
the  influence  of  predisposing  circumstances,  the 
record  of  the  sedate  historian  would  seem  to  prefer 
a  stronger  claim  to  belief  than  is  presented  by  the 
statement  of  the  personal  narrator.  But  let  us 
see.     luthe  first  place,  Thiers  affirms  that  Barras 


464  APPENDIX. 

was  appointed  (general  in  chief  on  this  ur(jcnt  oc- 
casion, in  consequence  of  his  special  quaUfications, 
and  creates  the  unavoidable    inference,    that  he 
was  thought  capable  of  meeting  the  crisis.     This, 
however,  is  altogether  improbable,  inasmuch,  as  if 
Barras  had  been  thought  competent  for  the  emer- 
p-ency,  why  should  the  committee  themselves  have 
appointed  a  second  in  command?      Was  it  the 
custom  of  the  French  government  at  the  time, 
not  only  to  furnish  a  commanding  general  with 
three  deputies  as  commissaries  or  adjoints,  but  also 
with  a  designated  second  in  command?     Was  it 
the  case  with  respect  to  Pichegru,  Jourdan,  Moreau, 
or  Hoche  ?     Again,  if  the  committee  had  full  con- 
fidence in  Barras,  they  could  have  no  more  in  Bo- 
naparte, and  therefore  his  appointment  as  second 
in  command  would  have  been   a  useless,  if  not 
offensive  innovation,  at  a  moment  of  extreme  and 
immediate  danger.      If  it  was  not  a  superfluous 
formality  involving  unseasonable  delay,  and  per- 
haps fatal  embarrassment,  it  was  the  effect  of  a  less 
degree  of  confidence  being  felt  by  the  committee 
in  the  qualifications  of  Barras  than  in  those  of  Bo- 
naparte, which  establishes  a  conclusion  subversive 
of  the  statement  of  Thiers  j  that  is,  it  proves  that 
Barras  was  not  appointed  in  consequence  of  his 
supposed  capacity  for  the  command,  but  for  some 
other  reason.     This  other  reason  is  found  in  the 
statement  of  Napoleon.     Barras  was  nominated  by 
some  members  of  the  convention,  in  consideration 
of  his  activity  on  the  gth  Thermidor^  Bonaparte 


CHAPTER   V.  465 

•was  proposed  by  Mariette,  and  other  members,  on 
account  of  his  military  talents^  of  -which  they  had 
witnessed  the  display,  and  of  his  firm  and  moderate 
character,  with  which  Mariette  was   particularly 
acquainted.     The  compromise  between  these  two 
opinions,  and  the  necessity  of  employing  decided 
military  abilities,  as  well  as  of  getting  rid  of  the  in- 
cumbrance of  the  commissaries,  who  were  protested 
against  by  Bonaparte,  induced  the  committee,  in 
all  probability  with  the  concurrence  of  Barras,  to 
give  Barras  the  nominal  command,  in  order  that 
he  might  engross  the  attendance  of  the  commis- 
saries ;  and  to  confer  on  Bonaparte  the  real  com- 
mand, in  order  that  he  might  meet  and  repel  the 
insurgents.     With  respect  to  the  next  assertion, 
that  Barras  requested  the  committee  to  appoint 
Bonaparte  his  second  in  command  before  he  con- 
fided the  direction  of  the  military  dispositions  to 
Bonaparte,  the  absurdity  of  the  idea  renders  the 
statement  incredible^  for  the  moment  Barras  was 
appointed  general  in  chief,  he  would  have  pos- 
sessed, not  only  from  the  nature  of  his  office,  but 
from  the  letter  of  his  commission,  had  his  command 
been  real,  ample  authority  to  appoint  Bonaparte 
his  second  in  command  without  the  agency  of  the 
committee.     The  decree  conferring  the  appoint- 
ment on  Barras  was  prepared  by  the  executive  com- 
mittee, and  runs    thus :  —  ^'  The   national    con- 
vention decrees,  that  the  general  of  brigade,  Bar- 
ras, representative  of  the  people,  is  appointed  ge- 
neral in  chief  of  the  armed  force  of  Paris,  and  of 

3o 


466  APPENDIX. 

the  army  of  the  interior,  and  that  all  aiUlwriUes, 
civil  and  military ^  are  required  to  acknowledge 
and  ohej  him  as  suchJ"  With  this  absolute  autho- 
rity, it  is  impossible  to  conceive,  that  (had  it  been 
more  than  nominal)  Barras^  in  a  moment  of  such 
critical  peril,  would  have  taken  the  trouble,  time, 
or  risk,  of  applying  to  a  committee  pf  forty  mem- 
bers, to  make  an  appointment  which  he  himself 
had  singly  the  power  to  make.  If  he  could  have 
committed  so  dangerous  a  blunder,  he  certainly 
was  totally  unfit  to  hold  more  than  the  qualified 
and  negative  trust  which  was  really  confided  to  him, 
and  which  from  its  nature,  renders  the  idea  of  his 
application  for  Bonaparte's  appointment  inconsistent 
and  absurd.  From  these  considerations,  it  must  be 
concluded,  that  Bonaparte's  employment  on  this 
occasion,  instead  of  being  in  compliance  with  a  re- 
quest of  Barras,  was  the  effect  of  his  own  reputation, 
the  danger  of  the  moment,  and  the  impression  he 
made  on  the  committee.  Thiers  proceeds  to  declare, 
that  these  two  appointments  having  been  agreed 
on  by  the  committee,  were  submitted  to  the  con- 
vention the  same  night,  and  instantly  sanctioned. 
It  is  impossible  for  me  to  judge  of  the  weight  of 
his  authority  for  this  naked  assertion,  as  he  refers 
to  no  document  or  writer  in  support  of  it,  nor  pro- 
fesses to  have  been  a  witness,  as  Napoleon  says  he 
was,  of  the  events  in  question.  This  much,  how- 
ever, I  can  venture  to  slate,  that  it  is  at  variance 
with  the  account  of  the  matter  furnished  by  the 
contemporaneous   report    of  the   debates  of  the 


CHAPTER    V.  4^7 

convention  in  the  Moniteur,  and  in  the  collection 
of  documents  entitled,  Proces-vephal  de  la  Con" 
ventioti  rationale.  From  these  official  papers,  it 
appears,  that  at  half-past  four  in  the  night  session 
of  the  1 2th  Vendemiaire,  Merlin  de  Douai,  on 
the  part  of  the  committee,  proposed  to  the  con- 
vention a  decree  appointing  Barras  general  in 
chief,  which  proposition  was  proposed  and  adopted 
in  the  words  already  recited  j  and  that  immedi- 
ately afterwards  three  deputies  were  appointed  as 
his  adjoints,  according  to  the  invariable  rule  in 
such  cases.  It  further  appears  that  on  this  oc- 
casion^ not  a  word  was  said  of  Bonaparte,  his 
name  not  being  submitted  to  the  convention. 
This  fact,  while  it  conflicts  with  the  assertion  of 
Thiers,  confirms  to  the  letter  the  statement  of  Na- 
poleon, who  says,  that  his  appointment  was  the 
work  of  the  committee  alone.  Moreover,  from  the 
late  hour  at  which  Merlin  de  Douai  proposed  the 
decree,  half-past  four  a.m.,  it  is  evident,  that  in 
this  crisis  of  the  public  distemper,  Barras  was  ex- 
hibited by  tlie  executive  committee  as  an  absorbent 
to  take  up  the  annoyance  of  the  superintending  de- 
puties. For  Bonaparte  had  been  on  duty,  and  exer- 
cising the  real  command  long  before^  as  at  one  o'clock 
he  had  sent  off  Murat  to  the  camp  of  Sablons  in  time 
to  complete  the  conveyance  of  forty  pieces  of  artil- 
lery to  the  Tuileries,  within  less  than  an  hour  after 
the  proposition  of  Merlin  was  made.  So  much  for 
the  first  appointment.  With  regard  to  the  circum- 
stances and  character  of  the  second,  Thiers  will  be 


4G8  APPENDIX. 

found  to  be  still  more  egreg^iously  mistaken.  He 
asserts  that  Barras,  already  celebrated  on  account 
of  the  Qth  of  Thermidor,  gained  an  accession  of 
glory  by  the  day  of  Vendemiaire,  and  adds  posi- 
tively, in  reference  to  tlie  occasion  of  this  second 
appointment,  ^^  to  him  was  attributed  the  safety 
of  the  convention."  (0/^  lui  attrihiia  le  salut  de  la 
coiwention).  Here  again  I  am  forced  to  disclaim  all 
acquaintance  with  his  authority,  and,  of  conse- 
quence, the  ability  of  estimating  its  value.  If 
however,  the  journals  of  the  debates  in  the  Moni- 
tcur,  and  the  prochs-vevhal,  one  record  corrobo- 
rating the  other,  are  to  be  relied  on,  it  would 
appear  that  the  invention  of  the  historian,  had  it 
been  exerted  in  emulation  of  sir  W.  Scott,  could 
hardly  have  contrived  a  statement  more  remote 
from  the  truth  than  this  is. 

According  to  these  official  documents,  on  the 
1 8th  Vendemiaire,  Freron,  a  distinguished  member 
of  the  convention,  in  a  speech  urging  the  propriety 
of  correcting  the  arrangement  which  Aubry,  while 
at  the  head  ot  the  war  department,  had  adopted 
respecting  the  employment  of  general  officers,  said, 
^^  Forget  not  (riouhliez,  pas)  that  the  general  of 
artillery,  Bonaparte,  appointed  in  the  night  of  the 
J  2th  to  replace  general  Menou,  and  who  only  had 
to  the  morning  of  the  i3th  to  make  the  skilful  dis- 
positions of  which  you  have  seen  the  happy  effects, 
was  taken  from  his  own  line  of  service  to  be  put  in 
the  infantry."  This  pregnant  sentence  shews  how 
far  the  convention  was  from  attributing  their  safety 


CHAPTER   V,  469 

to  Barras.  Freron  speaks  of  two  facts  connected 
by  their  relation  to  Napoleon.  One  he  recalls  to 
the  memory  of  his  hearers ;  the  other  he  mentions 
as  dwelling  in  their  minds  and  obvious  to  their 
judgment.  The  first  was,  that  Bonaparte  had  been 
unfairly  treated  by  Aubry ;  the  second,  that  as 
successor  to  Menou,  or  real  commander  in  chief, 
he  had  saved  the  convention.  The  speech  in  ques- 
tion contains  not  the  remotest  allusion  to  Barras. 
It  produced  a  motion  of  reference  from  Letourneur, 
a  member  of  the  committee  which  had  concerted 
the  two  appointments,  who  by  his  silence  con- 
firmed the  agency  assigned  by  Freron  to  Bonaparte, 
and  the  nullity  implied  against  Barras. 

The  reader  will  not  fail  to  observe,  that  although 
the  members  of  the  convention  generally  were  igno- 
rant of  the  appointment  of  Napoleon  at  the  time  it 
was  made  by  the  committee,  they  could  not  remain 
so  many  days  afterwards  ^  and  had  no  doubt  come 
to  a  full  knowledge  of  his  services  at  the  time  Fre- 
ron made  his  speech. 

But  Thiers  assigns  to  Barras  as  large  a  portion  of 
magnanimity  as  of  glory.  He  says  ^^  He  did  not 
fear  to  transfer  a  portion  of  his  glory  to  his  young 
lieutenant.  ^  It  is  general  Bonaparte,'  said  he, 
^  whose  prompt  and  skilful  dispositions  have  saved 
this  assembly.'  These  words  were  applauded. 
Barras'  appointment  as  commander  in  chief  of  the 
army  of  the  interior  was  confirmed,  and  that  of 
Bonaparte  as  second  in  command  also." 

If  we  trust  to  the  journals  of  the  convention, 


470  APPENDIX. 

every  allegation  of  which  this  statement  is  com- 
posed, except  the  very  last,  is  unfounded.  At  half 
past  nine  on  the  evening  of  the  i3th,  Barras  en- 
tered the  hall  of  the  convention,  and  gave  an  ac- 
count of  the  operations  and  success  of  the  day,  all 
in  the  first  person,  without  the  slightest  allusion  to 
Napoleon,  and  in  a  strain  so  egoistical,  that  had 
Barras  really  achieved  the  defeat  of  the  insurgents, 
it  w^ould  have  been  unbecoming.  On  the  i4th,  he 
spoke  on  the  same  subject,  and  in  the  same  strain^ 
saying  not  a  word  of  Napoleon,  although  he  men- 
tioned his  own  colleague,  Talot.  On  the  17th,  he 
spoke  three  times  in  relation  to  the  conflict  with 
the  sections,  altogether  omitting  his  nominal  se- 
cond in  command.  Finally,  when  Bonaparte  and 
the  other  officers  were  introduced,  he  declined  an 
opportunity  that  was  afforded  by  another  member^ 
to  draw  the  slightest  distinction  in  his  favour. 
For  when  Baraillon  proposed  that  a  set  of  arms 
should  be  presented  to  the  officers  who  most  dis- 
tinguished themselves,  Barras  said,  '^  they  all  had 
distinguished  themselves— it  was  impossible  to  dis- 
criminate j "  slighting  at  once  the  associated  rank 
which  Bonaparte  held,  and  the  committee  who 
had  conferred  it.  Does  this  seem  like  not  fearing 
to  allow  a  fair  share  of  gloij  to  his  joung  lieute" 
nant  ?  However,  after  Bonaparte  and  the  other 
officers  had  retired^  and  when  Freron  in  debating 
another  subject,  mentioned  incidentally  and  by 
way  of  illustration,  the  real  command  and  emi- 
nent and  admitted  services  of  Napoleon,    ''  the 


CHAPTER  V.  471 

happy   effects  of  whose    skilful    dispositions,  as 
successor    to    general  Menou,  you   have   seen  3" 
then,   when   silence   could    no    longer  serve   his 
purposes,  Barras  spoke  out  —  although  the  sub- 
ject did  not  require  it — and  attempting  a  tran- 
sition from  selfishness  to  liberality,  from  jealousy 
ta  patronage,  said, — '^  I  will  call  the  attention  of 
the  national  convention  to  general  Bonaparte  ^  it 
is  to  him,  it  is  to  his  skilful  dispositions  that  we  are 
indebted  for  the  defence  of  this  hall  around  which 
he  had  distributed  the  posts  with  great  ability.      I 
move  that  the  convention  confirm  the  nomination 
of  Bonaparte  to  the  place  of  second  in  command  of 
of  the  array  of  the  interior."     This  restricted  praise 
might  have  been  aptly  added  to  the  observation 
which  Barras  had  made  respecting  the  officers  ge- 
nerally, on  the  occasion  of  Baraillon's  motion,  and 
though  it  would  not  have  been  an  evidence  of  mag- 
nanimity, it  would  have  been  an  act  approaching 
to  justice.     But  when  it  is  considered  that  on  all 
appropriate  occasions  Barras  had  not  permitted  the 
name  of  Bonaparte  to  escape  his  lips,  and  uttered 
it  only  after  the  positive  and  uncontradicted  as- 
sertion of  an  eminent  member  had  rent  asunder 
the  veil  of  his  concealment,  and  by  an  implied  and 
sarcastic  rebuke,  forced  him  either  to  confess  his 
injustice  or  to  seem  to  repair  it,  it  is  difficult  lo 
form  any  other  opinion  respecting  his  conduct  on 
the  occasion,  than  that  so  far  from  its  being  that  of 
a  liberal  patron  to  his   ''  little  Corsican  officer,"  it 
was  an  ungenerous  and  mean  attempt  to  appro- 


472  APPENDIX. 

priate  to  his  own  possession,  credit  which  was  due 
to  a  distinguished  and  successful  general. 

Another    of   the  incredible   assertions   in    this 
statement  of  the  historian  is,  that  the  appointments 
of  Barras  and  Bonaparte,   as  first  and  second  in 
command  of  the  army  of  the  interior,  were  on  this 
occasion  of  singular  magnanimity  in  the  life  of  the 
former,  confirmed  by  the  convention.     He  has  be- 
fore declared  (p.  4^)  that  these  same  appointments 
were  submitted  to  the  convention  on  the  night  of 
the  1 2th,  and  then  confirmed.     Yet  he  will  have 
his  readers  believe  that  they  were  again  confirmed 
on  the  1 8th.     That  man  must  entertain  a  singular 
conception  of  legislative  power,  who  will  assert  or 
believe  that  a  law,  perfect  in  its  character,  and  un- 
limited as  to  time,  must  be  re-enacted  every  six 
days  by  the  authority  from  which  it  emanated,  in 
order  to  preserve  its  force.     The  decree  of  the  con- 
vention, which  had  not  been  repealed,  was  com- 
plete and  effectual  in  the  first  instance,  and  could 
not  be  made  more  so  by  repetition.     Approxima- 
ting these  two  assertions  of  Thiers,  it  appears  that 
one  inevitably  falsifies  the  other*     But  comparing 
them  with  the  facts  attested  by  the  journals  of  the 
convention,  it  results  that  half  of  each  is  true,  and 
half  false— making  the  amount  of  error  detected  by 
either  process  the  same,  but  the  disposition  of  it 
different.     Thus,  it  is  true  that  the  appointment 
of  Barras  was  confirmed  on  the  night  of  the  12th, 
and  that  of  Bonaparte  on  the  day  of  the  i8th.     It 
is  not  true  that  Bonaparte's  appointment  was  con- 


CHAPTER  V.  473 

firmed  on  the  night  of  the  12th,  nor  that  Barras's 
was  on  the  day  of  the  i8th.     The  first  member  of 
this  negative  proposition  has  been  demonstrated  al- 
ready by  reference  to  the  proceedings  of  the  con- 
vention on  the  night  of  the  1 2th,  in  the  official 
record  of  which,  neither  the  name  nor  the  appoint- 
ment of  Bonaparte   occurs.      The   same    record 
establishes  the  second,  by  showing  that  on  the  i8th, 
not  a  word  was  said  respecting  the  appointment  of 
Barras ;  while  upon  his  constrained  and  ungracious 
motion,  that  of  Bonaparte  was  confirmed.     "  The 
national  convention  confirms  the  nomination  made 
by  the  committee  of  public  safety,  of  general  Bona- 
parte to  the  place  of  second  in  command  of  the  ar- 
my of  the  interior." — (Proces-verbal  de  la  Conven- 
tion national,  t.  Ixxi,  p.  26).  This  part  of  the  great 
history  of  Thiers,  can  afford  but  little  insight  into 
the  character  of  Barras,  or  the  life  of  Napoleon ; 
yet,  considering  this  edition  was  published  in  i832, 
the  author  announcing  himself  ^^  minister  of  state, 
and  a  deputy,"  it  will  be  apt  to  inspire  foreigners 
with  strange  ideas  of  the  legislative   wisdom    of 
France.     According  to  this  accomplished  author 
and  practised  statesman,  an  appointment  made  by 
the  executive,  and  confirmed  by  the  legislature  in 
one  week,  is,  in  the  regular  course  of  proceedings, 
to  be  confirmed  over  again  by  the  same  legislature 
the  next  week,  in  order  to  keep  it  in  force ;  and 
that  too,  in  cases  where  it  is  known  to  the  legisla- 
ture that  the  nature  of  the  office  is  temporary,  and 
that  it  is  the  intention,  as  well  as  the  interest  of  the 


474  APPET?DIXi 

incumbent,  to  resign  it  witlitn  a  fe\v  days.  TKat 
this  much  was  known  to  the  legislature  in  respect 
to  Barras,  is  evident  from  the  fact,  that  in  sixteen 
days  after  this  alleged  second  corifirmatron,  he  did 
resign,  and  with  symptoms  of  impatience,  his 
appointment  as  provisional  general  of  the  Sii'riiy 
of  the  interior  (Proces-verbal,  t.  Ixxii,  p.  ^oy)-, 
and  also  from  the  fact  that  he  was  then  a  cati- 
didate  for  a  seat  in  the  directory,  into  which,  as 
we  learn  from  Thiers  himself  (t.  viii,  p.  80)  strongs 
objections  were  entertained  against  admitting  mili- 
tary commanders.  Now,  although  Barras  did  not 
rank  among  the  distinguished  generals,  he  was  not 
popular  enough  to  risk  the  objection,  as,  after 
getting  rid  of  his  military  appointment,  and  mak- 
ing all  the  advantage  lie  could,  both  by  concealing 
and  confessing  with  equal  fraud,  the  services  and 
glory  of  '^  his  young  lieutenant,"  he  obtained  the 
smallest  number  of  votes  of  the  five  persons  who 
were  elected  directors.  Out  of  the  218  votes  that 
were  given,  Larevelliere-Lepaux  got  216,  while 
Barras  received  but  129  ;  the  other  three  numbers 
being  respectively  189,  176,  and  ifj6. 

While  these  remarks  satisfy  the  reader  as  to  the 
fitness  of  Barras  to  the  cliief  command  of  the  con- 
ventional forces,  and  his  magnanimity  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  tlie  glory  of  Vendemiaire,  they  will 
also  sliow  some  of  the  errors  into  which  Thiers  en- 
tangled his  narrative,  by  allowing  his  nimble  inven- 
tion, or  fastidious  taste,  to  deviate  from  the  plain, 
firm,  and  consistent  account,  left  by  the  principal 
actor  in  the  scene  he  was  describing. 


CHAPTER  V.  4^5 

Returning  to  the  simple  narrative  of  Napoleon, 
it  will  be  easy  to  prove  that  it  is  true  in   every 
respect.     It  has  already  been  shown,   by  explain- 
ing the  nature   of  the   appointment    itself,    and 
the  circumstances  in  which  it  was  made,  as  well  as 
by  the  uncontradicted  assertion  of  Freron,  that  Na- 
poleon was  placed  by  the  committee  in  nominal 
subordination  to  Barras,  in  order  to  render  him 
really  independent  of  the  commissaries  or  adjoints. 
It  has  also  been  shown  that  the  convention,  with 
the  knowledge  of  this  antecedent  fact,  and  of  the 
prospective  one,  that  Barras  was  soon  to  resign  even 
his  nominal  superiority,  confirmed  this  appoint- 
ment made  by  the  committee.     When  a  govern- 
ment appoints  a  man  second  in  command  of  an 
army,  knowing  that  the  first  in  command  is  never 
to  exercise  his  nominal  authority,  and  is  in  a  few 
days  to  resign  it,  it  is  equivalent  to  conferring  on 
this  man  the  command  in  chief.     In  the  particular 
case  in  (question,  it  was  more  emphatically  so,  inas- 
much as  Barras  was  from  the  first  the  scape-goat 
to  carry  off  the  sins  of  the  adjoints,  and  by  that 
means  to  increase  the  power  of  Napoleon  j  facts, 
avowed  by  Freron,  when  he  said  that  Bonaparte, 
notwithstanding  Barras'   appointment,   was    the 
successor  of  general  Menou,  who  had  just  before 
been  commander  in  chief.     It  is  to  be  observed 
further,  that  while  the  appoihtment  of  Napoleon, 
formally  as  well  as  really,  to  the  command  in  chief, 
would  have  been  a  harsh  extrusion  of  Barras  from 
his  nominal  rank,  it  would  have  subjected  his  sue- 


476  APPENDIX. 

cesser  to  the  control  of  the  commissaries  before  the 
danger  of  the  crisis  was  entirely  over  —  conse- 
quences, of  which  the  first  would  have  been  unne- 
cessary, and  the  second  inconvenient.     These  ob- 
servations, it  is  hoped,  will  be  received  as  conclu- 
sive that  Napoleon  confined  his  narration  strictly 
within  the  limits  of  truth,  when  he  described  him- 
self as  the  actual  commander  in  chief,  from  the 
time  that,  under  his  own  conditions,  he  was  ap- 
pointed by  the  executive  committee;  and  as  the 
acknowledged  commander  in  chief,  from  the  mo- 
ment the  appointment  of  the  committee,  under  the 
circumstances  which  are  here  explained,  was  con- 
firmed by  the  unanimous  vote  of  the  convention, 
the  highest  authority  of  the  state.     The  only  re- 
maining point  of  his  narrative  to  be  considered, 
is  that  in  which  he  affirms,  that,  on  being  pre- 
sented with  the  other  officers  to  the  convention, 
he  was  ^^  named  bj  acclamation  commander  in 
chief  of  the  army  of  the  interior*"     This  would 
seem  to   have  been  rather  a  spontaneous  move- 
ment of  the  members,  upon  seeing  the  man  whom 
they  had  by  this  time  learned  was  their  real  de- 
liverer, than  a  formal  act  of  the  legislative  body, 
and  can  be  more  readily  conceived  to  have  hap- 
pened, from  the  fact,  that  on  the  evening  of  the 
1 3th,  and  the  next  morning,  when  the  great  mass 
of  the  convention  supposed  Barras  was  the  saviour 
of  the  state,  they  hailed  his  appearance  uniformly 
with  acclamations.     Besides,  Thiers  himself  says, 
that  Barras'  proposition  that  the  appointment  of 


CHAPTER   V.  477 

Bonaparte  should  be  confirmed,  ^^  was  applauded." 
So  that,  while  there  are  many  circumstances  of 
probability  in  favour  of  this  statement,  besides 
the  weight  of  Napoleon's  word,  there  is  not  one 
against  it. 

An  assertion,  which  is  confined  neither  to  sir 
Walter  Scot  I,  nor  to  the  English  language,  has 
been  hazarded,  imputing  to  Napoleon  that  gross  and 
disordered  self-love  which  could  induce  him  deli- 
berately to  misstate  facts,  and  falsify  events,  in 
order  to  aggrandize  his  glory  in  the  view  of  poste- 
rity. As  a  general  charge,  this  general  answer  to 
it  readily  presents  itself^  that  a  man,  conscious  of 
possessing  such  substantial  titles  to  renown  as  he 
must  have  been,  would  not  be  apt  to  desire  or  risk 
a  reliance  on  false  pretensions.  Were  this  the 
proper  place  in  the  present  work  to  investigate  the 
grounds  of  this  charge,  it  might  be  alleged,  that 
the  comparison  which  has  just  been  made  between 
the  easy  narrative  of  Napoleon,  and  the  elaborate 
history  of  Thiers,  does  not  invalidate  the  authority 
which  the  name  of  the  former  is  likely  to  confer  on 
his  words.  It  might  too  be  pertinently  added, 
that  another  and  a  similar  statement  of  his,  which 
has  been  relied  on  in  the  text,  and  which,  if  unsup- 
ported, would  be  obnoxious  to  this  odious  charge, 
is  fortified  by  the  short  but  pregnant  speech  of 
Freron,  that  has  proved  so  fatal  to  the  fictions  of 
Thiers,  and  which  attests  so  fully  the  veracity  of 
Napoleon.  In  relating  his  difficulties  with  Aubry, 
the  emperor  says  (Montholon,  t.iii,  p.  89),  that  the 


4^8  APPENDIX. 

Other  officers  of  artillery,  who  were  discontented 
with  Aubry's  arrangements,  referred  to  his  case 
as  the  most  glaring  example  of  Aubry  s  injustice. 
If  this  assertion  were  disputed,  which,  with  the 
generous  confidence  of  truth  he  made  on  his  own 
authority  alone,  although  it  is  of  a  nature  to  be  al- 
most unsusceptible  of  direct  proof,  the  observation 
qf  Freron  in  his  speech  would  suffice  to  confirm 
it,  since  he  referred  with  the  silent  but  virtual 
acquiescence  of  his  colleagues,  to  Bonaparte's  case, 
in  addressing  the  convention,  as  the  most  flagrant 
instance  of  Aubry's  injustice.  For  the  naked  as- 
sertions of  the  authors  of  these  invidious  charges,  it 
is  not  likely  that  such  apt  and  corroborating  au- 
thority will  often  be  found. 

The  failure  of  Thiers,  as  well  as  the  four  biogra- 
phers of  Napoleon,  to  notice  his  striking  boldness 
in  insisting  on  being  freed  from  the  encumbrance 
of  adjoints,  that  he  might  meet  the  danger  and 
responsibility  of  the  crisis  singly;  a  proposition 
which  no  other  man  in  France  would  have  made, 
shows  that  Thiers  comprehended  very  imperfectly, 
both  the  peril  of  the  occasion,  and  the  spirit  of  Na- 
poleon. From  the  hollow  and  blustering  character 
of  Barras,  it  is  evident  that  at  such  a  moment  he 
would  have  deemed  a  crowd  of  commissaries  the 
surest  means  of  safety  and  of  strength. 

It  is  remarkable  that,  althougli  Norvins  states 
correctly  the  act  of  the  convention  confirming  Na- 
poleon's appointment  as  second  in  command,  and 
Hazlitt  copies  literally  the  assertion  of  Napoleon, 


CHAPTER  .V.  479 

that  the  convention  appointed  him  general  in  chief, 
they  should  both  be  wrong  ;  neither  apprehending 
tJicfijcts  correctly,  nor  enabling  their  readers  to  do 
so.  Najjoleon's  statement,  essentially  true  when 
he  made  it,  ceased  to  convey  the  truth  after  it  had 
been  contradicted  in  various  ways  by  different  au- 
thors, and  especially  after  Norvins  asserted  that  his 
nomination  was  confirmed  by  the  convention,  not 
as  general  in  chief,  but  as  '^  second  in  cammand." 
So  that  as  Hazlitt  did  not  explain  and  substantiate 
the  laconic  affirmation  of  INapoleon,  by  repeating 
it,  he  conveyed  less  than  the  truth,  less  than  Napo- 
leon intended  to  impart.  On  the  other  hand, 
Norvins,  by  simply  retailing  the  literal  import  of 
the  decree  of  the  convention,  without  explaining 
those  circumstances  which  made  the  appointment 
of  second  in  command  equivalent,  at  the  least,  to 
tlie  command  in  chief,  exposes  his  own  text  to  con 
tradiction  with  the  declaration  of  Napoleon,  leaves 
his  readers  destitute  of  a  distinct  knowledge  of  facts, 
and  embarrassed  with  an  unpleasant  doubt  as  to 
the  comparative  value  of  the  statementts  of  Norvins 
himself  and  of  his  hero. 

To  recur  to,  enumerate,  and  demolish,  the 
frontless,  and  contradictory  misstatements  of 
Scott  and  Lockhart  j  both  representing  Barras  as 
the  maker  of  Napoleon's  fortune,  and  the  latter 
declaring  that  he  resigned  his  office  in  Napoleon's 
favour,  after  he,  Barras,  became  director,  cannot, 
the  imposing  assertions  of  Thiers  having  been  dis- 
posed of,  be  worth  half  the  time  it  would  require. 


48o  APPENDIX. 

Page  204. 

(i4)  The  parting  of  Hector  and  Andromache 
notwithstanding  its  tender  and  picturesque  cir- 
cumstances, is  hardly  more  interesting  than  the 
meeting  of  Napoleon  and  Josephine.  If  the  Trojan 
infant,  terrified  at  the  crested  glitter  of  his  father's 
helmet,  touches  every  heart,  the  tears  of  the  Gallic 
boy  on  receiving  the  sword  of  his  murdered  sire, 
swell  with  sympathy  every  generous  breast.  If 
the  fete  foreboded  of  the  Trojan  princess,  con- 
demned to  suffer  the  taunts  or  loves  of  a  barbarian 
victor,  fills  the  mind  with  indignant  melancholy ; 
the  doom  of  the  French  empress,  forced  to  endure 
the  cruelty  of  Austrian  scorn  and  Muscovite  pity, 
awakens  the  deepest  sorrow.  If  the  Dardan  hero, 
overpowered  by  treachery  and  force — but  the  pa- 
rallel is  too  mournful  to  be  pursued. 

Page  204. 

(i5)  In  the  pile  of  defamatory  ordure,  which 
the  British  press  and  the  Bourbon  coteries,  created 
respecting  Napoleon's  life  and  character,  one  of 
the  foulest  materials  was  that  which  derived  this 
appointment  from  the  prostitution  of  his  wife  when 
she  was  madam  Beauharnais.  Considering  the  va- 
lue which  was  attached  to  this  literary  filth  during 
the  war,  in  England,  and  after  the  restoration,  in 
France^  neither  its  quantity  nor  fetidness  can  oc- 
casion surprise.  Perishable  as  it  was  putrescent, 
the  light  shed  on  the  personal  history  of  Napoleon, 


CHAPTER   V.  4^1 

first  by  Las  Cases,  and  next  by  O'Meara^  quickened 
the  natural  process  of  its  destruction,  and  it  would 
have  long  since  disappeared  entirely  from  the  face 
of  the  earth,  but  for  the  delicate  researches  and  vi- 
vifying genius  of  the  author  of  Waverley.  From 
this  steaming  mass,  he  occasionally  condescended 
to  extract  materials  in  order  to  variegate,  enlarge, 
and  finish  the  biographical  patchwork,  with  which, 
to  fulfil  a  profitable  contract,  and  to  please  the 
taste  of  lordly  ministers  and  legitimate  kings,  he 
had  undertaken  to  shroud  the  memory  of  Na- 
poleon . 

The  calumny  in  question,  as  far  as  its  outlines  can 
now  be  traced,  imports  that  madam  Beauharnais 
was,  at  the  time  Napoleon  married  her,  the  mistress 
of  Barras,  and  that  Napoleon  agreed  to  take  her 
off  the  hands  of  the   director  and  make  her  his 
wife,  upon  Barras  engaging  to  procure  for  him  the 
command  in  chief  of  the  army  of  Italy — or,  as  sir 
Walter  furtively  intimates — make  that  appoint- 
ment ^^  the  dowry  of  the  bride."     This  aspersion, 
which  makes  Josephine  more  infamous  than  Barras, 
and  Napoleon  than  Josephine,  was  too  enormous 
and  offensive  for  sir  Walter  to  touch  without  he- 
sitation.    Accordingly  after  approaching  it  in  the 
first  instance,  with  no  little  caution,  he  avoids  the 
contaminating  contact  by  saying  (v.  iii,  p.  84)  : 
^^  Madame  Tallien  and  her  friend  formed  the  soul 
of  these  assemblies,"  at  the  apartments  of  Barras, 
^''  and  it  was  supposed  that  Barras  was  not  insen- 
sible to  the  charms  of  madame  Beauharnais — a  ru- 

3i 


482  APPENDIX. 

mour  which  VA-as  likely  to  arise,  whether  with  or 
without  foundation."  This  allusion^  slight  as  it 
is,  is  discountenanced  in  the  next  paragraph,  in 
which  he  says  Josephine  was  in  the  bloom  of 
beauty,  and  there  was  '^  no  reason  to  doubt  that 
Napoleon  was  induced  by  the  effect  solely  of  her 
personal  charms  to  offer  her  his  hand,  his  heart 
and  his  fortunes."  This  however  was  going  loo 
far,  as  it  would  suppress  the  slander  altogether, 
and  therefore,  on  the  next  page,  the  allusion  is  re- 
vived in  the  shape  of  a  strong  implication.  '^  The 
marrj'ing  madame  Beauharnais,  was  a  mean  of 
uniting  his  fortunes  with  those  of  Barras  and  Tal- 
lien,  the  first  of  whom  -governed  France  as  one  of 
the  directors,"  etc.  On  the  next  page,  this  impli- 
cation is  reen4^orced  by  the  assertion  already  quoted, 
that  the  command  of  the  army  of  Italy,  or,  as  sir 
Walter  with  euphonic  boldness  says,  '^  of  the 
Italian  armies,"  was  ''^  the  dowry  of  the  bride." 
Thus  it  is  impossible  for  the  reader  to  shake  from 
his  mind  the  impression  that  the  rumour  in  ques- 
tion had,  in  the  opinion  of  the  author  of  Waverley, 
foundation  in  truth.  For  how  else  could  the  mar- 
rying madam  Beauharnais  unite  the  fortune  of  Na- 
poleon with  that  of  the  director  Barras  ?  Did  sir 
Walter  unite  his  fortune  by  marriage,  with  every 
gentleman  on  terms  of  acquaintance  with  lady 
Scott?  With  Tallien,  the  friendship  existing  be- 
tween his  wife  and  Josephine  formed  the  bond  of 
the  alleged  union ;  but  Barras  was  a  bachelor  and 
a  libertine.     And  why  else  was  the  command  of 


CHAPTER  V.  483 

the  ^'Italian  armies,"  at  the  disposal  of  the  direc- 
tor, ^^who  governed  France,"  to  be  ^^the  dowry 
of  ihe  bride  ?"  As  this  slander  is  effectually  though 
slyly  sanctioned  by  sir  Walter^  and  is  connected 
with  his  previous  efforts  to  make  Napoleon,  on  the 
1 3th    Vendemiaire,    an   obscure  ^^  little  Corsican 
officer,"  indebted  for  notice  and  distinction  to  the 
patronage  of  this  same  Barras,  it  will  not  be  im- 
proper to  expose  its  undeniable  falsehood.     In  the 
first  place,  madam  Beauharnais  is  represented  to 
have  been  ^^  in  the  full  bloom  of  beauty"  and  ex- 
tremely agreeable  in  her  manners.     Can  it  be  sup- 
posed that  Barras,  in  possession  of  such  a  woman, 
would,  not  only  transfer  her  to  another  man,  but 
pay  this  other  man  for  accepting  her.     Beauty  and 
grace  and  social  charms  were  never  so  disposed  of 
before.    Achilles  did  not  bribe  Agamemnon  to  force 
Briseis  from  his  tent.     But  it  may  be  said  that  as 
Bonaparte  agreed  to  marry  her,  and  Barras  did  not 
wish  to  form  that  sort  of  connection,  Josephine 
preferred  becoming  the  general's  wife  to  remaining 
the  director's  mistress.     Had  that  been  the  case,  it 
cannot  well  be  supposed  that  Barras  would  have 
rewarded  Bonaparte  for  depriving  him  of  his  mis- 
tress, or  would  have  endowed  her  liberally  to  in- 
duce her  to  desert  him.    If  she  preferred  Bonaparte 
to  Barras,  the  latter  would  not  have  recompensed 
her  that  she  might  gratify  both  the  love  and  am- 
bition of  his  successful  rival.     If  she  did  not  prefer 
Bonaparte,  but  married  him  for  convenience,  and 
at  the  intance  of  Barras,  admitting  that  so  proud 


484  APPENDIX. 

and  promising  a  general  as  Bonaparte  is  said  to 
have  been  would  accept  as  his  wife  the  mistress  of 
another  man^  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  that, 
loving  Josephine  as  sir  Walter  declares  Bonaparte 
did,  with  excessive  ardour  and  '^peculiar  affec- 
tion," he  would  have  left  her  a  few  days  after  their 
marriage,  at  Paris,  in  the  society  of  her  old  pro- 
tector, and  hastened  away  to  a  distant  frontier. 
Thus,  without  reference  to  the  damning  origin  of 
this  slander,  allowing  it  all  the  importance  and 
plausibility  which  the  tact  and  name  of  the  author 
of  Waverley  impress  it  with,  human  nature  her- 
self stamps  it  with  the  seal  of  refutation  and  con- 
tempt. It  may  be  added  that  had  Josephine  been 
the  mistress  of  Barras,  the  sword  of  Beauharnais 
Avould  not  have  been  found  by  Eugene  in  posses- 
sion of  Bonaparte. 

As  to  the  appointment,  supposing  that  Barras, 
the  least  able  and  the  least  respectable  of  the  di- 
rectors, ^^  governed  France,"  it  is  difficult  to  con- 
ceive what  other  general  he  could  have  selected  for 
this  frontier,  who  could  be  spared  from  some  other 
station,  and  possessed  adequate  qualifications.  Pi- 
chegru  had  become  justly  suspected  of  treason,  and 
was  replaced  by  Moreau  in  Holland.  Hoche  was 
fully  and  honourably  employed  against  the  Anglo- 
royalists  and  brigands  in  the  west ;  and  Jourdan 
had  the  more  important  command  on  the  Rhine. 
Moreau  had  served  all  along  in  the  north  ;  Hoche 
was  successfully  completing  the  suppression  of  the 
civil  war  in  the  west ;  and  the  command  on  the 


CHAPTER    V.  4^5 

Rhine  was  the  highest  military  appointment  which 
the  directory  could  bestow.  Bonaparte  was  at 
least  next  in  distinction  to  these  generals^  and  was 
especially  acquainted  with  the  troops  and  the 
ground  on  the  Italian  frontier.  Here  are  abun- 
dant motives  for  the  appointment.  So  that  unless 
we  suppose  more  than  plain  and  sufficient  motives 
were  required  to  induce  the  directory  to  entrust 
him  with  this  command ;  and  also  suppose^  not 
only  that  Napoleon  and  Josephine  were  vicious — 
unfeeling  in  the  grossest  possible  degree  —  but 
that  the  human  passions  in  Barras  and  Bonaparte 
deviated  from  their  uniform  direction^  it  is  utterly 
impossible  to  regard  otherwise  than  with  incredu- 
lity and  abhorrence  the  story  by  which  sir  Walter 
attempts  to  degrade  the  memory  of  his  hero.  The 
contrast  between  his  readiness  to  calumniate  Jo- 
sephine and  to  vindicate  Marie  Antoinette,  with 
equal  feebleness  and  absurdity  in  both  cases,  de- 
serves to  be  attended  to. 

The  timorous  and  clandestine  manner  in  which 
the  author  of  Waverley  dips  his  pen  into  the  name- 
less and  noisome  receptacle  whence  he  derived 
this  slander,  has  been  already  noticed.  Lockhart, 
if  not  more  honest,  is  at  least  more  bold.  Instead 
of  circling  and  hesitating  like  sir  Walter,  he, 
^^  with  all  the  might  of  gravitation  blessed"  in 
stories  like  these,  plunges  in  at  once  up  to  the 
knees  (v.  i,  p.  33).  ^^  It  was  commonly  said,  indeed 
itwas  universallj  beliei^ed^  that  Josephine,  whose 
character  was  in  some  respects  indifferent^  pos- 
sessed more  than  legitimate  influence  over  tJie first 


/jSG  APPENDIX. 

director.      Bonaparte,    however,   offered  her  his 
hand,  she,  after  some  hesitation,  accepted  it,  and 
the  young;  (jeneral  by  this  marriage  cemented  his 
connection  with  the  society  of  the  Luxembourg, 
and  in  particular  with  Barras  andTallien,  at  that 
moment  the  most  powerful  men  in  France"  (p.  34). 
^  Bonaparte  was  appointed  to  the  splendid  com- 
mand.    It  is  acknowledged  in  one  of  Josephine's 
Jetters,  that  Barras  had  promised  to  procure  it  for 
him  before  their  marriage  took  place.     ^  Advance 
this  man,'  said  this  personage  to  the  other  directors, 
or,  he  will  advance  himself  without  you.' "     The 
words  of  this  extract  which  I  have  underscored, 
convey  the  calumny  in  all  its  dimensions — the  more 
than  legitimate  iirfluencej  and  the  indifferent  cha- 
racter of  Josephine.     Bonaparte's   hand   offered, 
however,  and  his  connection  with  Barras  the  li- 
bertine,   cemented  by   the  marriage;    and  Jose- 
phine acknowledging,  not  mentioning,  that  the 
appointment  had  been  promised,  make  up  in  a  re- 
solute but   insidious   form,  the  allegations — that 
Barras  kept  Josephine  at  the  time  Bonaparte  of- 
fered her  his  hand — that  Bonaparte  believed  in  the 
existence  of  this  concubinage,  but  nevertheless  of- 
fered to  marry  her — that  by  taking  to  wife  Barras' 
cast-off  mistress,  he  cemented  his  connection  with 
that  director ;  and  as  Josephine  herself  confessed, 
obtained  the  promise  of  commanding  the  army  of 
Italy. 

However  these  cruel  and  unfounded  insinua- 
tions, put  forward  with  pretensions  to  historical 
truth,  must  excite  the  reader's  indignation,  the  last 


CHAPTER  V.  487 

part  of  the  falsehood  by  its  ludicrous  absurdity, 
may  ^vell  compose  his  temper  completely.  Everj 
body  believed,  and  most  people  said  that  Barras 
had  bribed  Bonaparte  to  marry  his  cast-off  mistress^ 
by  procuring  him  the  command  of  the  army  of 
Italy,  and  of  course  the  other  directors,  who  were 
at  the  head  of  the  society  of  the  Luxembourg,  must 
have  believed  and  spoken  of  it.  Yet,  to  these  di- 
rectors— the  virtuous  Larevelliere,  the  stoical  Car- 
not,  and  the  tenacious  Rewbell — (Thiers,  t.  viii, 
ch.  2.  — Montholon^  t.  iii,  ch.  3),  Barras  very 
coolly  said,  ^^  I  have  got  Bonaparte  to  marry  my 
mistress,  and  therefore  you  must  give  him  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  of  Italy!  !"  And  more  won- 
derful, still,  these  directors  obeyed  the  dictation, 
and  became  parties  to  the  contract ;  although  ex- 
cept Carnot,  they  were  all  more  popular  than  Bar- 
ras, and  Carnot  was  infinitely  more  respected. 
Now,  to  believe  this  slander,  we  must  not  only 
believe  all  the  inconsistencies  required  by  sir 
Walter's  story,  but  must  conceive  it  possible  that 
this  scene  and  transaction  between  Barras  and  his 
colleagues,  actually  took  place  !  But  Lockhart  (at 
p.  32)  says,  that  Bonaparte,  holding  the  chief 
command  of  the  army  of  the  interior,  ^^  had  now 
passed  into  the  order  of  marked  and  distinguished 
men."  Could  it  be  supposed  that  such  a  man 
would  have  united  his  destiny  with  the  cast-off 
mistress  of  Barras,  from  a  motive  of  ambition  ,*  the 
alleged  fact  that  Josephine's  connection  with  Bar- 
ras was  believed  by  every  one,  would  have  des- 
troyed that  motive;  as  it  would  have  discredited 


488  APPENDIX. 

him  necessarily  with  the  other  directors.  On  the 
other  hand^  if  we  impute  it  to  the  madness  of 
love,  that  love  v^ould  never  have  allowed  Bona- 
parte to  leave  his  new  wife  a  few  days  after  his 
marriage,  in  company  with  her  old  protector^ 
while  he  was  campaigning  beyond  the  Alps.  To 
make  up  his  version  of  the  slander,  Lockhart  puts 
into  the  mouth  of  Barras  the  remark  of  Dugom- 
mier,  to  the  committee  of  public  safety,  after  the 
siege  of  Toulon  -,  the  least  culpable  falsification,  by 
the  way,  in  his  blundering  fiction.  He  calls  it,  too, 
'^  a  splendid  command"  to  make  the  alleged  degra- 
dation of  Napoleon  the  more  probable.  The  fact 
is,  it  was  an  appointment  which  hitherto  had 
yielded  to  the  French  generals  more  disgrace  than 
glory ;  for  although  Anselmn,  Byron,  Brunet,  Du- 
gommier,  Dumerbion,  Kellerman^  and  Scherer,  had 
been  appointed  and  removed  in  succession,  the 
head  quarters  had  never  advanced  beyond  Nice, 
and  the  army  was  now^  after  much  starving  and 
slaughter,  likely  to  be  driven  within  the  French 
frontier. 

The  plea  of  ignorance,  to  the  benefit  of  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  Lockhart  is  occasionally  entitled, 
cannot  be  urged  in  his  behalf  in  this  instance,  for  it 
is  probable,  from  his  own  words,  that  while  he  was 
endeavouring  to  impress  his  readers  with  a  belief  in 
this  story,  he  himself  was  convinced  of  its  falsehood. 
Speaking  of  Josephine,  and  in  allusion  to  her  di- 
vorce, he  says  on  the  same  page, — ^^Her  subse- 
quent fate  will  always  form  one  of  the  darkest  pages 
In  the  history  of  her  lord/'     Now  if  she  had  been 


CHAPTER   V.  4^9 

the  mistress  of  Barras^  and  had  been  transferred  as 
a  mere  instrument  of  pleasure,  of  which  one  was 
sated  and  the  other  desirous^  surely  no  one  could 
reproach  Napoleon  with  excessive  cruelty^  in  se- 
parating himself  from  such  a  wife  ;  considering 
that^  according  to  Lockhart's  insinuation,  he  found 
her  a  deserted  concubine^  and  actually  left  her  a 
crowned  empress.  It  is  needless  to  point  out  other 
claims  to  incredibility  with  which  this  part  of 
Lockhart's  work  abounds.  Jomini,  who  deserted 
Napoleon's  colours,  is  more  just  to  his  memory  than 
the  Scotch  novelist  or  critic.  He  treats  the  slander 
with  contempt ,  says  that  Bonaparte  owed  the  ap- 
pointment to  his  signal  services  under  Dumerbion, 
and  adds  (t.  viii,  p.  49) '  ^^  History  will  vindicate 
this  great  captain  from  the  calumnies  retailed  by 
envy,  ignorance,  and  party  hatred."  In  justice  to 
Hazlitt  and  Norvins,  it  is  proper  to  mention  that 
neither  of  them  countenances  the  silly  and  malig- 
nant tale.  The  latter,  however,  is  grossly  inexact 
in  saying  (t.  i,  p.  83)  :  ^^  Bonaparte  received  the 
command  in  chief  of  the  army  of  the  interior, 
left  vacant  by  the  election  of  Barras  to  the  directory. 
A  few  days  after ^  married  to  Madame  de  Beauhar- 
nais,  he  was  appointed  general  in  chief  of  the  army 
of  Italy."  The  two  appointments  were  separated 
by  near  half  a  year. 

Page  207. 

(16)  He  said  to  O'Meara  (v.  i,  p.  2^0)^  ^^  No- 
thing has  been  more  simple  than  my  elevation.    It 


49^  APPENDIX. 

was  not  the  result  of  intrigue  or  crime.  It  was 
owing  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  times, 
and  because  I  fought  successfully  against  the  ene- 
mies of  my  country." 

Page  207. 

(17)  Sir  Walter  Scott  says  (v.  iii,  p.  86)  Napo- 
leon left  Paris  for  the  army  the  fourth  day  after  his 
marriage. 

There  is  a  diversity  of  dates  as  to  this  event. 
The  marriage  register  proves  that  he  was  married  at 
Paris  on  the  9th  of  March.  Yet  Norvins  asserts 
(t.  i,  p.  8  >),  that  he  left  Paris  on  the  23rd  of  Feb- 
ruary !  In  tfie  Memoirs  of  Napoleon  (Montholon, 
t.  iii^  p.  120)^  his  departure  from  Paris  is  dated 
the  4th  of  March,  a  typographical  error  probably, 
and  only  less  extravagant  than  that  of  Norvins. 
Hazlitt,  attempting,  it  would  seem,  a  conjectural 
correction  of  this  error,  says  (v.  i,  p.  44);  he  left 
Paris  on  the  i4th  of  March.  Lockhart's  account 
is  (v.  i,  pp.  33,  3j),  that  he  was  married  on  the 
9th  of  March,  and  left  Paris  ten  days  afterwards. 
Bourrienne  (t.  i,  pp.  10 r,  io3)  dates  his  marriage 
the  9th  of  March,  and  his  departure  the  nist.  I 
know  not  sir  Walter's  authority  for  asserting  that 
he  quitted  Paris  and  his  new  bride  the  fourth  day 
after  his  marriage ;  but  if  design  may  be  inferred 
of  a  misstatement,  from  the  fact  of  its  being  em- 
ployed to  promote  a  favourite,  though  not  a  lauda- 
ble object  of  its  author,  the  reader  will  be  apt  to 
conclude  that  this  apparent  mistake  is  really  one  of 
the  most  artful  and  deliberate  fictions  ever  con- 


CHAPTER   V.  49  J^ 

Irived  by  the  great  novelist.  These  are  his  words: 
^^  Bonaparte  remained  with  his  wife  only  three 
days  after  his  marriage,  hastened  to  see  his  family, 
who  were  still  at  Marseilles,  and,  having  enjoyed 
the  pleasure  of  exhibiting  himself  as  a  favourite 
of  fortune  in  that  city  which  he  had  lately  left  in  the 
capacity  of  an  indigent  adventurer,  proceeded 
rapidly  to  commence  the  career  to  which  fate 
called  him,  by  placing  himself  at  the  head  of  the 
Italian  army." 

Now,  without  this  early  date  for  his  departure 
from  Paris^  the  old  figment  about  ^^  indigence  y^  and 
^^  adventurer^''  could  not  have  been  reproduced 
with  any  speciousness,  nor  could  the  new  aspersion 
respecting  the  pleasure  of  exhibiting  himself  at 
Marseilles  have  been  hazarded.  For,  as  Nice  is 
at  least  six  hundred  miles  from  Paris,  there  would 
have  been  no  time  for  this  contemptible  display. 
But  this  is  not  the  only  shaft  of  defamation  which 
sir  Walter  was  enabled  to  aim  by  this  simple  con- 
trivance. By  means  of  it  he  makes  Napoleon  prefer 
the  idle  exhibition  of  his  uniform  and  retinue  at 
Marseilles,  to  the  society  of  his  wife,  or  to  the  com- 
mand of  his  army.  In  this  point  of  view,  sir 
Walter's  artifice  is  more  to  be  admired  than  his 
hero  ,*  for  it  would  be  impossible  to  conceive  a 
character  more  deserving  of  contempt  than  Napo- 
leon's would  be  if  his  biographer  were,  even  in  this 
single  instance,  deserving  of  credit.  But  if  dates 
did  not  destroy  this  fabrication,  and  if  the  consis- 
tency of  character  did  not  expose  to  the  reader's 
scorn  the  attempted  imposition,  sir  Walter  him- 


492  APPENDIX. 

self  would  render  it  perfectly  ineffectual ;  for  he 
says^  as  we  have  seen,  that  Napoleon  loved  his  wife 
with  peculiar  affection^  reproaches  him,  as  we  shall 
see,  with  the  expression  of  excessive  ardour,  and  at 
page  89,  says  he  advanced  with  all  imaginable  de- 
light to  this  **•  independent  field  of  glory  and  con- 
quest j"  and  that  his  ^^  proud  heart  throbbed  to 
meet  danger  on  such  terms."  So  that  if  he  loved 
Josephine,  and  longed  to  reach  the  army  he  com- 
manded, he  must  have  been  more  stupid  and 
beastly  than  the  ass  between  two  bundles  of  hay, 
in  stopping  eight  or  ten  days  to  display  himself  at 
Marseilles. 

Here  the  reader  will  not  fail  to  notice  the  un- 
sparing nature,  as  well  as  the  high  degree,  of  sir 
Walter's  injustice.  As  Napoleon,  who  was  the 
testamentary  and  acknowledged  head  of  his  family, 
stopped  a  few  hours  at  Marseilles  to  see  his  widowed 
mother,  he  is  reproached  with  the  childish  vanity 
of  loitering  in  that  seaport  to  display  himself  and 
his  good  fortune  j  yet  as  sir  Walter  has  already 
upbraided  his  memory  with  a  want  of  affection  for 
the  place  of  his  birth,  if  on  this  occasion  Napoleon 
had  passed  through  or  near  Marseilles  without 
stopping  to  see  his  mother,  he  would  unquestionably 
not  have  omitted  to  accuse  him  of  want  of  natural 
feeling  and  proper  respect  for  his  parent.  The  fact 
is,  according  to  his  biographical  scheme,  the  ac- 
tions of  his  hero  are  uniformly  reprehensible,  either 
in  their  motives  or  consequences — and  generally 
in  both. 

But  there  was  yet  a  further  object  to  be  gained 


CHAPTER   V.  49'3 

by  this  well-calculated  mistake.     By  insisting  that 
he  was  but  the  other  day  an  ^^  indigent  adven- 
turer/' hanging  loose  upon  the  society  of  a  secon- 
dary seaport,  and  representing  him  now  as  exult- 
ing in  the  astonishment  of  cits  and  brokers  at  the 
sudden  change  in  his  condition,  such  a  degree  of 
littleness  and  contempt  is  impressed  upon  the  cha- 
racter of  JNapoleon,  tliat  sir  Walter  is  enabled  to 
forestall  the  dignity  of  his  approaching  exploits,  by 
assigning  them  before  hand  \.o  fate — by  calling  his 
career  of  conquest,  that  ^'  to  which  fate  had  called 
him/'  a  course  of  success  which  a  perverse  destiny 
had  prepared  for  him.     Thus  the  reader  is  predis- 
posed to  receive  without  surprise  or  question,  every 
future  disparagement  with   which  chance  or  in- 
dustry may  supply  sir  Walter.     It  may  be  worth 
while  to  observe  that  admitting  the  date  assumed 
by  sir  Walter,  and  supposing  consequently  that 
INapoleon  left  Paris  on  the  1 3th  of  March,  it  is  very 
clear  from  his  first  letter  to  the  directory  from  Nice, 
dated  the  28th  of  March,  that  he  could  have  had 
no  time  for  idle  display  at  Marseilles,  had  he  been 
inclined  to  make  so  contemptible  a  figure.    In  this 
letter  (Correspondance  inedite,  t.  i,  p.  i)  he  says: 
^^  I  have  been  for  several  days  within  the  canton- 
ments (enceinte)  of  this  army,  of  which  I  took  the 
command  yesterday."  He  then  gives  a  minute  ac- 
count of  the  army,  his  means  and  plans,  of  a  mu- 
tiny which  he  had  suppressed,  and  other  matters 
showing  that  he  must  have  been  some  time  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Nice.     Now  Nice  is  six  hundred 
miles  from  PariS;  so  that  even  if  he  left  Paris  on  the 


494  APPENDIX. 

i3tli,  which  is  not  probable^  and  reached  the  army 
several  days  before  he  took  command  of  it,  which 
is  certain,  he  could  have  had  no  time  for  assisting 
in  the  disgusting  display  invented  for  him  by  the 
^'British  historian."  It  may  here  be  added  that 
in  the  Victoires  et  ConqueLes  (t.  v,  p.  169)  it  is 
expressly  and  carefully  asserted  that  Bonaparte  ar- 
rived at  Nice  the  20th  of  March,  the  date  which  I 
have  adopted. 

The  felicity  with  which  the  word  adventurer 
is  here  used  by  the  author  of  Waverley,  may  be 
estimated  by  reference  to  a  former  note  (appendix, 
ch.  4)  note  29),  and  by  comparing  its  signification 
with  the  long  service,  the  professional  rank,  and 
military  distinction  of  Napoleon,  when  on  his  way 
to  the  capital  of  his  native  country,  and  attended 
by  his  aides  de  camp,  Junot  and  Marmont,  he  passed 
through  Marseilles  in  May,  1795. 

Thus  much  for  this  defamation  on  the  score  of 
his  vanity.  On  the  same  page,  the  author  of 
Waverley  furnishes  a  slander  equally  gross  and 
easy  of  exposure,  respecting  his  temper.  Speaking 
of  the  character  of  Josephine,  he  says — ^'  She  had 
at  all  times  the  art  of  mitigating  his  temper,  and 
turning  aside  the  hasty  determinations  of  his  angry 
moments,  not  by  directly  opposing,  but  by  gra- 
dually parrying  and  disarming  them."  If  there  was 
any  doubt  about  the  meaning  of  this — that  it  was 
intended  to  assure  the  reader  that  Napoleon's  tem- 
per was  sudden,  fierce,  and  boisterous — the  imita- 
tion of  Lockhart  would  remove  it.  His  version 
of  it,  which  proves  that  a  stream  of  falsehood;  like 


. CHAPTER  V.  49^ 

any  other  stream,  gathers  impetus  when  it  flows  in 
a  declining  channel,  that  is,  descends  from  a  great 
author  to  a  little  one,  is  in  these  words  (v.  i,  p.  34) : 
''She,  and  she  alone,   could  overrule  by  gentle- 
ness, the  excesses  of  passion  to  which  he  was  liable  ; 
and  her  subsequent  fate  will  always  form  one  of 
the  darkest  pages  in  the  history  of  her  lord."    Now, 
in  regard  to  tliis  angry  and  impetuous  temper,  it 
is  somewhat  surprising  that  both  these  authors  have 
pretended  to  conduct  Napoleon  from  his  birth  to 
his  twenty-seventli  year,  through  the  competitions 
of  schools,  the  emulation  of  subalterns^  the  rival- 
ship  of  generals;  the  contrarieties  of  stupid  and 
the  confidence  of  sensible  commanders — the  pre- 
dilection of  one  set  of  deputies,  the  proscription  of 
another  set,  and  the  contention  and  blood  of  a  ci- 
vil conflict — and  yet  not  a  single  instance,  not  a 
solitary  outburst  of  this  quick  and  furious  temper 
appears  !     Cartaux's  imbecility  he  dexterously  ma- 
naged; Dugommier's  confidence  he  faithfully  an- 
swered ;  Aubry's  impertinence  he  coolly  retorted ; 
Barras'    illiberality   he    proudly  overlooked ;    his 
flying  countrymen  he  mercifully  spared;  Menou's 
life  he  generously  shielded;  and  Eugene's  tears  he  in- 
stantly felt.     Does  this  look  like  a  fierce  and  angry 
disposition?    Ferocity  '-should  be  made  of  sterner 
stuff;"  and   had  it  inhabited  Napoleon's    breast, 
would  hardly  have  waited  to  show  itself  until  he 
married  a  lovely,  tender,  and  compassionate  wo- 
man .     It  would  seem  from  these  a  uthors  t li  at  if  the 
indignation  and  resentment  of  a  man,  melt  away 


496  APPENDIX. 

before  the  softness  and  blandishments  of  the  sex  to 
which  nature  had  assigned  the  offices  of  pity  and 
intercession,  his  temper  must  necessarily  be  irrasci- 
ble  and  violent.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Josephine 
was  a  willing,  active,  and  indiscriminate  petitioner 
for  mercy ;  and  that  from  the  generous  and  forgiv- 
ing temper  of  Napoleon,  she  was  almost  always  a 
successful  one.  This  interesting  truth,  which  re- 
flects so  much  honour  on  the  memory  of  the  em- 
press and  ^^  her  lord,"  the  boasted  equityof  ^^British 
historians"  (v.  ii,  p.  368),  converts  into  a  foul 
imputation  against  the  latter. 

The  prospective  and  criminating  allusion  of 
Lockhart  to  Josephine's  divorce,  and  the  use  of  the 
words  ^^  her  subsequent  fate,"  and  ^^  darkest  pages 
in  the  history  of  her  lord,"  forming,  as  they  do, 
the  grossest  caricature  of  the  open,  respectful,  and 
affectionate  proceeding  of  Napoleon,  and  a  just 
picture  of  tiie  foul,  sinister,  and  mysterious  attempt 
of  George  IV  against  the  crown,  and  the  reputation, 
if  not  against  the  life  of  his  queen,  the  mother  of 
his  child^  and  of  the  heiress  to  the  British  throne, 
forces  upon  the  memory  by  so  strong  a  contrast,  the 
Milan  spy,  the  noji  mi  ricordo  witness,  the  scuffle 
about  the  coronation,  his  subservient  ministers,  and 
her  mysterious  fate — that  one  might  suppose  this 
historical  instructor  of  the  families  of  England^  was 
slyly  endeavouring  to  stigmatize  the  memory  of 
his  '^  gracious  sovereign,"  without  incurring  the 
guilt  of  disloyalty. 


(     497     ) 


CHAPTER  VL 


Page  211. 


(i)  Sir  Walter  Scott,  infusing  into  his  misre- 
presentations more  and  more  boldness,  as  the 
events  in  his  hero's  life  increase  in  number  and 
importance,  prefaces  the  immortal  campaign  of 
1796,  by  representing  the  invasion  of  Italy  as 
unjust  (v.  iii,  p.  88).  *'  The  French  nation,  in 
the  times  of  which  ^ve  treat,  spoke  indeed  of 
the  Alps  as  a  natural  boundary,  so  far  as  to  au- 
thorise them  to  claim  all  Avhich  lay  on  the  west- 
ern side  of  those  mountains,  as  naturally  per- 
taining to  their  dominions ;  but  they  never 
deigned  to  respect  them  as  such,  when  the 
question  respecting  their  invading  on  their  own 
part  the  territories  of  other  states,  which  lay 
on  or  beyond  the  formidable  frontier.  They 
assumed  the  law  of  natural  limits  as  an  unchal- 
lengeable rule  when  it  made  in  favour  of  France, 
but  never  allowed  it  to  be  quoted  against  her 
interest."  But  for  the  eager  injustice  of  this 
passage  it  might  be  deemed  the  scribbling  of  a 
school  boy,  who  was  attempting  a  disquisition 
above  the  reach  of  his  mind.  Does  a  nation,  by 
claiming  a  river  or  a  range  of  mountains  as  a  na- 
tural boundary,  especially  after  having  extended 
its  conquests  to  this  limit,  renounce  the  right  of 

32 


yj.Q8  APPENDIX. 

passing  that  boundary  in  time  of  war  ?    The  St. 
Lawrence  is  claimed  by  the  United  States  along 
many  miles  of  its  course  as  a  natural  boundary  ; 
but  no  interdiction  to  the  invasion  of  Canada, 
in  case  of  war,  would  arise  out  of  that  claim. 
The  Pyrenees  are  admitted  to  be  one  of  the  na- 
tural boundaries  of  Spain  ;  yet  Lord  Wellington 
with  his  Spanish  and  Portuguese  allies,  did  not 
feel  scrupulous  in  pushing  his  bold  invasion  into 
France  on  that  side.     In  the  particular  case  al- 
luded to  by  Sir  Walter  Scott,  it  happened  that 
the  coalition  itself  had  been  endeavouring  to 
invade  the  French  frontier  from  the  time  lord 
Hood  got  possession  of  Toulon. 

When  a  nation  claims  a  chain  of  mountains 
or  other  natural  limit,  in  time  of  war,  as  its 
boundary,  it  can  only  be  understood  as  declaring 
its  intention  not  to  make  peace  without  esta- 
blishing this  claim  ;  as  France  had  done  in  re- 
ference to  the  countries  conquered  on  her  side 
of  the  Alps  and  the  Rhine.  It  neither  denies  to 
its  enemy  nor  renounces  for  itself,  the  right,  in 
time  of  war  of  passing  this  boundary  in  martial 
array.  Danger  and  difficulty  are  then  the  only 
obstacles. 

In  order  to  counteract  completely  the  spirit 
of  Sir  Walter's  observations,  it  may  be  proper 
to  state  that  the  war  in  prosecuting  which  Na- 
poleon was  then  engaged,  was  on  the  part  of 
France,  a  defensive  one.  Now,  that  the  cloud 
of  political  falsehood  and  imposture  which  the 


CHAPTER    VI.  499 

British  press  had  spread  over  the  civilized  world, 
has  been  dispelled  by  the  French  revolution  of 
July  and  the  English  parliamentary  reform,  no 
publicist  of  reputation  or  writer  of  common 
sense  will  venture  to  deny  this  position.  In 
support  of  it,  concurring  authorities  of  both  na- 
tions may  be  referred  to.  Thiers  (t.  ii,  p.  82) 
says  :  "It  must  be  confessed  that  this  cruel  war, 
which  so  long  lacerated  Europe,  was  not  pro- 
voked by  France,  but  by  the  foreign  powers. 
France  in  declaring  war,  did  no  more  than  re- 
cognize by  a  decree  the  state  in  which  they  had 
placed  her."  Colonel  Napier  begins  his  manly 
and  luminous  work  by  asserting  that  (v.  i,  p.  i) 
"  up  to  the  treaty  of  Tilsit  the  wars  of  France 
were  essentially  defensive."  It  is  true  on  the 
other  hand,  that  Washington's  famous  procla- 
mation of  neutrality,  by  which  he  avoided  the 
obligation  of  reciprocal  guarantee  in  the  treaty 
of  1778  between  France  and  the  United  States, 
w  as  founded  on  the  assumption  that  France  was 
the  offensive  party  in  the  war  with  England 
(See  Marshall's  Life  of  Washington^  v.  ii,  ch.  8, 
2d  edit.).  But  this  decision  of  the  American  go- 
vernment, admitting  that  its  justice  was  as  evi- 
dent as  its  prudence,  had  no  reference  to  any 
other  branch  of  the  conflict,  than  that  between 
France  and  Great  Britain  5  while  the  campaign 
of  Italy  was  directed  chiefly  against  Austria  and 
Sardinia. 


500  APPENDIX. 

As  Napier's  history  is  a  work  not  to  be  men- 
tioned without  a  sentiment  of  respect  for  its 
author,  less  cannot  justly  be  said  in  his  com- 
mendation, than  that  in  all  the  substantial  qua- 
lities of  an  historian,  clearness  of  narration, 
dignity  of  sentiment,  respect  for  truth,  and 
sympathy  for  human  virtues,  he  is  the  very  op- 
posite of  Scott  and  Lockhart. 

Page  212. 

(2)  Sir  Walter  Scott,  in  his  catalogue  of  the 
forces  opposed  to  Napoleon  in  the  opening  of 
this  campaign,  not  only  omits  enumerating 
among  the  members  of  the  coalition,  the  Dukes 
of  Parma  and  Modena,  an  error  which,  as  we 
shall  see,  is  not  accidental,  but  also  excludes 
from  the  list  the  English  fleet,  although  the 
cooperating  squadron  was  commanded  by  Nel- 
son (Southey's  Life  of  Nelson,  ch.  iv.).  Ac- 
cording to  his  account  (v.  iii,  pp.  88-9),  Napo- 
leon was  to  contend  only  **  with  an  Austro-Sar- 
dinian  army,  and  a  strong  Neapolitan  force 
which  was  to  be  added,  so  that  in  general  num- 
bers their  opponents  were  much  superior  to  the 
French,  but  a  great  part  of  this  force  was 
cooped  up  in  garrisons  which  could  not  be  aban- 
doned.'' If  any  thing  like  an  estimate  of  the 
allied,  force  can  be  made  out  of  this  see-saw  of 
assertions  and  qualifications,  it  is,  that  it  would 
have  been  superior  to  that  of  the  French  but  for 
the  number   of  troops   required    for  garrisons 


CHAPTER  VI.  OOI 

wliich  were  to  have  no  direct  concern  in  the 
warj  but  that  in  consequence  of  such  garrisons, 
they  were  not  superior.  Under  his  representa- 
tion of  the  matter  too  the  fortresses  of  Piedmont, 
were  a  positive  disadvantage  to  the  allies  and 
consequently  an  advantage  to  the  French !  In 
stating  the  numher  of  troops  in  the  French  army 
this  restrained  and  hesitating  style  is  exchanged 
for  one  absolute,  ample,  and  swelling  (v.  iii,  p. 
gS) :  "  The  forces  which  Bonaparte  had  under 
his  command,  were  between  fifty  and  sixty 
thousand  good  troops,  having  been  many  of 
them  brought  from  the  Spanish  campaign,  in 
consequence  of  the  peace  with  that  country." 
"With  these  statements  alone  for  his  guidance, 
the  reader  would  be  led  to  conclude  that  taking 
quality  and  numbers  together,  the  French  fight- 
ing force  was  superior  to  that  of  the  allies, 
which  in  reality  doubled  it. 

Page  215. 

(5)  This  affirmation  is  contained  in  one  of  the 
notes  made  in  pencil  by  Napoleon  while  at  St. 
Helena,  at  the  foot  of  the  letter  of  instruction  of 
the  6th  of  March.  It  appears,  that  in  dictating 
his  campaigns  of  Italy,  he  made  use  of  two  vo- 
lumes containing  this  letter  of  instruction,  one  of 
which  J  fell  into  the  possession  of  Montholon, 
and  the  other  was  preserved  by  Marchand.  The 
notes  attached  to  that  of  Montholon  are  published 
in  his  fourth  volume  (p.  596).  Of  those  preserved 


5o*Jl  APPEND  IX. 

by  Marchand,  a  copy  has  been  taken  by  gene- 
ral baron  Pelet,  the  officer  so  w  ell  known  for  his 
merit  in  letters  and  in  arms,  and  who  is  at  the 
head  of  the  depot  s^eneral  cle  la  guerre.  The 
liberality  of  general  Pelet,  has  enabled  me  to 
compare  the  two  copies  thus  preserved,  and  1 
discover  that  they  are  almost  identical,  excepting 
that  the  first  note  of  the  copy  of  general  Pelet  is 
omitted  in  that  of  Montholon.  It  contains  the 
affirmation  in  question,  and  is^  when  translated, 
as  follows  \' — *'  This  instruction  is  an  indifferent 
amplification^  full  of  contradiction  and  absurdity, 
of  a  luminous  and  original  memoir,  which  Napo- 
leon had  presented  to  the  directory  in  January, 
1796."  The  memoir  here  alluded  to  was  dated 
January  19th,  1796,  and  was  addressed  to  gene- 
ral Clarck,  the  secretary  to  the  directory.  Con- 
sidering the  mind  from  which  it  sprung,  military 
men  will  agree  that  I  can  do  no  less  than  avail 
myself  of  general  Pelct's  permission  to  lay  it 
before  the  public.  To  the  memoir  of  the  19th 
of  January  is  attached  a  paper  which  appears  to 
have  been  previously  prepared,  and  to  have  par- 
ticular reference  to  the  inaction  of  general 
Scherer  after  his  success  in  November.  The 
existence  and  date  of  this  memoir  add  to  the 
many  evidences  which  prove  the  accuracy  of 
Napoleon's  statements  of  fact  in  regard  to  his 
own  history.  The  reader  will  perceive  that 
the  importance  which  he  attached  to  the  posi- 
tion of  La  Sotta,  in  his  letter  to  the  directory  of 


CHAPTER    VI.  5o5 

the  8th  of  April,  was  founded  on  his  previous 
acquaintance  with  the  military  points  of  this 
region  of  the  Alps.  In  the  printed  copy  of  his 
letter  of  the  8th  April  (Correspondance  inedite, 
t.  i,  p.  12),  a  blank  is  left  where  La  Sotta  should 
have  been  inserted,  as  I  discovered  by  reference 
to  the  original  despatch  in  the  archives  of  the 
d'pot  general  de  la  guerre. 


'*  Head  Quarters,  Paris,  igth  January,  1796. 

Buonaparte^  general  in  chief  of  the  army  of 
the  Interior^  to  general  Clarck, 


cc 


''I  transmit  to  you,  my  dear  general,  the  note 
which  you  requested  of  me.  I  will  avail  myself 
of  the  earliest  opportunity  of  calling  at  your 
office. 

{SignedJ  "  Buonaparte." 


*'  Note,  on  the  army  of  Italy. 

'^  19th  January,  1796. 

"  If  the  army  of  Italy  suffers  the  month  of 
February  to  pass  without  doing  anything,  as  it 
has  allowed  the  month  of  January  to  pass,  the 
campaign  of  Italy  may  be  considered  to  have  to- 
tally failed.  It  is  necessary  to  be  well  convinced 
that  great  successes  can  be  obtained  in  Italy 
only  during  the  winter  season. 

"  Supposing  that  the  army  of  Italy  were  put 


5o4  APPENDIX. 

in  motion  immediately^  it  might  march  upon 
Ceva,  and  force  the  intrenched  camp  at  that 
place,  before  the  Austrians,  who  are  quartered 
at  Acqui,  would  be  able  to  join  the  Piedmontese. 

''  If,  upon  discovering  the  preparations  made 
by  the  French,  the  Austrians  by  moving  along 
behind  the  Tanaro  should  come  into  junction 
with  the  Piedmontese,  it  would  be  necessary  for 
our  army  to  make  two  marches  upon  Acqui;  that 
is  to  say,  that  it  march  first  to  Cairo,  and  then 
to  Spigno.  It  may  be  safely  assumed  that  upon 
this  the  Austrians  will  hasten  to  return,  in  order 
to  defend  their  communications  with  the  Mi- 
lanesCc 

''  The  operations  to  be  undertaken  are  in 
fact  simple.  If  the  Piedmontese  are  alone, 
march  upon  them  directly  by  the  way  of  Ga- 
ressio,  Bagnasco,  La  Sotta,  Casteleroso,  Monte- 
zumo,  and  having  beaten  them,  and  forced  their 
intrenched  camp,  lay  siege  to  Ceva — an  operation 
preliminary  to  any  other,  whatever  course  may 
be  then  determined  on. 

"  Should  the  Austrians  have  the  prudence  to 
unite  with  the  Piedmontese  at  Montezumo,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  separate  them  ;  and  for  that 
purpose,  to  march  upon  Alexandria,  and  ma- 
noeuvre so  as  to  gain  twenty  four  hours,  in  order 
the  moment  their  separation  is  effected,  to  re- 
turn and  force  the  intrenched  camp  of  Ceva. 

"  The  intrenched  camp  of  Ceva  being  in  our 
possession,  it  will  require  a  force  double   our 


CHAPTER    VI.  5o5 

own  to  compel  iis  to  raise  the  siege  of  that 
fortress.  The  artillery  of  the  siege  will  be  landed 
at  Vado  ;  a  want  of  carriages  need  not  be  ap- 
prehended, the  Pays  des  Langes  abounding  in 
means  of  transport,  and  the  siege  of  Ceva  not 
requiring  more  than  24  or  5o  pieces. 

"  Masters  of  Ceva,  not  a  moment  should  be  lost 
to  advance  the  division  which  guards  the  Col  de 
Tende,  the  Briga,  and  the  heights  of  the  county 
of  Nice  as  far  as  Borgo.  Its  junction  with  the 
main  army  should  be  effected  by  the  route  of  Mon- 
dovi  •  and  then  the  whole  force  should  march 
direct  upon  Turin.  The  king  of  Sardinia  would 
then  make  propositions  for  peace.  In  that  case, 
the  general  should  reply  that  he  has  not  the 
right  to  make  peace,  and  that  a  courier  must  be 
sent  to  Paris  j  and,  during  this  interval,  in  order 
to  hasten  a  peace,  the  king  of  Sardinia  will  be 
obliged  to  make  such  proposals  as  cannot  be 
refused,  and  as  v^ill  completely  fulfil  the  views 
of  the  government.  If  not,  Turin  may  be  laid 
in  ashes  without  caring  about  the  citadel. 

"  For  the  rest,  as  the  war  in  Italy  depends  al- 
together on  the  season,  each  month  requires  a 
new  plan  5  it  will  therefore  be  necessary  that 
the  government  place  entire  confidence  in  Iheir 
general,  leaving  him  a  latitude  of  discretion, 
and  pointing  out  only  their  great  object  j  for  it 
will  require  a  month  to  get  an  answer  to  a  des- 
patch coming  from  Savon  a,  during  which  time 
the  face  of  affairs  may  have  changed  altogether. 


5o6  APPENDIX. 

"  When  we  shall  have  taken  Turin,  the  siege 
of  Alexandria  and  Tortona  will  be  useless,  and 
we  may  enter  the  Milanese  without  difficulty. 

"  The  government  should  direct  that  the 
bridge  equipages  and  pontons  for  the  Mincio  and 
the  Osflio,  which  I  had  caused  to  be  prepared, 
be  completed.  Every  thing  necessary  for  bridges 
over  the  Po,  the  Adige,  the  Ticin,  and  the  Ta° 
naro,  will  be  found  in  Italy,  where  also  will  be 
obtained  transportation,  clothing,  and  subsist- 
ence for  the  heroic  army  which  shall  make 
themselves  masters  of  the  plains  of  Piedmont 
and  of  the  Milanese. 

fSignedJ  "  Buonaparte." 

Attached  to  the  above,  and  apparently  of  a 
date^  by  some  weeks  earlier,  is  the  following  :  — 

^^  Note^  on  the  direction  which  should  he  given 

to  the  armj  of  Italj. 

"  An  essential  fault  was  committed  in  not 
forcing  the  intrenched  camp  of  Ceva,  while  the 
Austrian s  after  their  defeat  were  retired  to  a 
point  on  the  other  side  of  Acqui,  and  the  whole 
of  our  armv  was  left  disposable  for  attacking 
Ceva.  Our  success  could  not  have  been  doubt- 
ful, since  we  should  have  had  a  force  of  thirty 
thousand  men  to  attack  from  sixteen  to  twenty 
thousand  Piedmontese. 

"  Why  did  not  the  division  of  general  Serru- 
rier,  which  on  the  5d  was  at  Garessio  and  St. 


CliAPTER    VI.  507 

Jacomi,  that  is  to  sav,  in  less  than  four  hours' 
march  of  Ceva,  and  the  division  of  general  Mas- 
sena,  which  advanced  as  far  as  Cairo,  within 
about  the  same  distance  of  Ceva,  profit  by  their 
victory  ?  It  was  impossible  not  to  comprehend, 
that  the  capture  of  Ceva,  putting  in  our  power 
a  district  of  Piedmont,  would  procure  for  the 
army  supplies  of  shoes,  clothing,  subsistence, 
and  means  of  transport.  The  taking  of  Ceva, 
alone,  would  secure  to  the  army  healthy  canton- 
ments, and  would  terminate  that  perpetual  game 
of  prisoners  base,  which,  for  several  years  our 
army  has  been  playing  on  the  peaks  of  the  Alps 
and  x\ppennines. 

"  The  capture  of  Ceva,  and  the  concentration 
of  our  army  around  that  fortress,  are  operations 
of  such  great  importance,  that  they  would  deter- 
mine the  court  of  Turin  to  make  peace,  and 
would  diminish  very  perceptibly  the  enormous 
expense  of  the  army  of  Italy.  The  Austrians,  in 
falling  back  to  Alexandria,  have  abandoned  the 
Piedmontese  ;  an  error  of  which  they  ought  to 
think  better,  if  they  have  not  done  so  already. 
We  should  march  without  delay  upon  Ceva,  by 
way  of  Miiessimo,  Montezumo,  and  St.  Jacomi, 
while  a  division  should  be  pushed  beyond  Bati- 
folo.  Masters  of  the  intrenched  camp  of  Ceva, 
the  heavy  artillery  for  a  siege  must  be  sent  for- 
ward, and  the  carriages  of  transport,  which  are 
in  abundance   in   the  neighbourhood  of  Ceva, 


5o8  APPENDIX. 

should  be  secured,  and  employed  for  the  con- 
veyance of  balls  and  shells. 

*  •  Ceva  being  once  taken,  and  our  army  assem- 
bled there,  we  should  find  ourselves  masters  of 
a  part  of  Piedmont,  and  threaten  at  the  same 
time  Coni,  Turin,  and  Alexandria. 

"  The  division  which  now  guards  the  Col  de 
Tende,  the  Briga,  and  the  intermediate  passes, 
will  then  invest  Coni,  or  at  least  establish  itself 
at  Borgo,  so  as  to  observe  the  movements  of  the 
garrison  of  Coni. 

"  The  united  army,  reenforced  by  the  detach- 
ments expected  from  the  Pyrenees,  should  march 
upon  Turin  in  February .  A  division  of  the  army 
of  the  Alps,  four  or  five  thousand  strong,  should 
pass  by  Mont  Geneve,  and  reenforce  the  army  of 
Italy,  under  the  walls  of  Turin.  The  snows 
which  block  up  the  passes  of  the  Alps,  oppose 
but  slight  obstruction  to  the  march  of  a  column, 
when  it  is  sure  of  finding  friends  and  succour  on 
the  other  side  of  the  mountains. 

CSignrdJ  "  Buonaparte." 

Page  214. 

(4)  In  the  debate  in  the  house  of  commons 
on  the  address  in  answer  to  the  king's  speech  in 
October,  1796, Mr.  Fox  said — ■''  It  was  ridiculous 
to  insist  upon  danger  from  treating  with  France, 
because  they  had  subverted  their  former,  and 
adopted  a  new,  constitution  j  the  permanence  of 
a  treaty  depending  on  its  equitableness..  r;nd  cor- 


CHAPTER    VI.  5o9 

respondence  with  the  reciprocal  interests  of  the 
contracting  parties.  It  was  become  nugatory  to 
talk  of  our  allies  j  we  had,  indeed,  mercenaries 
in  our  pay,  w^hom  we  could  only  retain  by  ex- 
cessive bribes,  and  who  were  every  moment, 
hesitating  whether  to  accept  of  them,  or  of  the 
terms  proffered  by  our  enemies,  to  detach  them 
from  this  country."  (See  Annual  Register  for 
1796.     History  of  Europe,  p.  11). 

These  assertions  of  the  parliamentary  luminary 
of  his  country,  which  the  course  of  events  more 
than  the  lapse  of  time  have  inscribed  on  the  tab- 
lets of  history  as  the  irreversible  judgments  of 
wisdom,  were  then  scouted  by  a  great  majority 
in  the  house  of  Commons;  while  the  sentiments 
and  policy  of  his  successful  rival,  Mr.  Pitt,  not- 
withstanding the  splendour  of  his  talents,  the 
greatness  of  his  character,  and  the  authority  of 
his  name,  if  proposed  to  the  house  of  Commons 
at  this  time,  when  the  legitimate  King  of  France 
is  again  expelled  from  his  throne  by  a  revolution, 
would  be  received  as  the  ravings  of  a  political 
bedlamite.  So  vast  is  the  difference  between 
the  influence  of  the  crown  and  the  privileged 
classes  in  Great  Britain  at  the  present  day,  and 
their  influence  at  the  close  of  the  last  century. 
So  perishable  are  the  works  of  statesmen  who 
build  on  temporary  passions  and  factitious  inte- 
rests, and  so  steadfast  the  creations  of  minds, 
which  employ  the  solid  materials  of  reason,  truth, 
and  justice.     In  relation  to  these  subsidies,  la- 


5lO  APPENDIX. 

vished  by  the  British  government  on  the  conti- 
nental despots,  it  is  certain  that  with  half  their 
amount  lord  Wellington  or  lord  Grey  might 
have  purchased  as  large  a  quantity  of  war  and 
slander  against  the  French  nation  and  govern- 
ment, since  July,  i85o,  as  Mr.  Pitt  and  his  dis- 
ciples had  done  before  that  epoch. 

Page  214. 

(5)  Norvins  appears  to  have  misconceived  the 
plan  of  the  directory.  He  says  (t.  i,  p.  85)  "The 
directory  prescribed  to  their  general,  as  a  pre- 
liminary operation,  the  conquest  of  Piedmont, 
the  object  of  which  was  to  be  to  force  the  Aus- 
trians  to  evacuate  that  country,  and  defend 
themselves  in  their  own  territory.''  This  was 
the  plan  Napoleon  adopted,  not  that  which  the 
directory  prescribed;  for  they  instructed  the 
general  not  to  pass  the  exterior  garrisons  of  Pied- 
mont, to  mask  them,  and  pursue  the  Austrians 
into  Lombardy,  in  order  that  the  King  of  Sardi- 
nia, left  to  his  natural  inclinations,  might  enter 
into  an  alliance  with  France  against  Austria ; 
or  if  unnaturally  inclined  to  adhere  to  the  coali- 
tion, might  be  forced  to  abandon  it.  Jomini,  in 
speaking  of  these  instructions  (t.  viii,  p.  Sg)  says, 
"  They  form  one  among  the  most  remarkable 
documents  in  the  history  of  this  war."  The  am- 
biguity of  this  language  is  to  be  lamented,  when 
the  admitted  ability  of  the  writer  is  taken  into 
consideration,     especially    as    at    a    subsequent 


CHAPTER    VI.  5l  I 

page  (p.  88)  in  speaking  of  Bonaparte's  advance 
upon  Ce\a  he  says  :  "  The  conquest  of  this  flou- 
rishing country  (Italy)  depended  then  in  the  first 
place  on  success  against  the  Sardinian  army;  and 
the  general  in  chief,  more  wise  than  the  direc- 
tory, who  had  enjoined  him  not  to  operate 
upon  his  left,  resolved  to  direct  the  greater  part 
of  his  army  against  Colli." 

Page  21o. 

(6)  In  reference  to  this  clause  of  the  instruc- 
tions Napoleon  in  one  of  his  crayon  notes,  oh- 
served,  "  The  first  interest  of  the  court  of  Tu- 
rin was  to  stifle  revolutionary  sentiments,  and  to 
oppose  the  success  of  the  French  republicans. — 
How  stupid  this  is!"  And  the  directory  in  their 
reasoning  having  asked  the  question,"  why, since 
it  is  the  interest  of  the  Piedmontese  to  join  with 
the  French  in  driving  the  Austrians  out  of  Italy, 
does  not  the  court  of  Turin  hasten  to  unite  its 
forces  with  those  of  the  republic  for  that  pur- 
pose."— Napoleon  answers  in  a  note,  "In  order 
not  to  be  guillotined  —  The  directors  reasoned 
just  as  Louis  XM  might  have  done." 

Page  217. 

(7)  Napoleon's  concluding  remark  on  the  in- 
structions is — "It  may  be  seen  from  these  stu- 
pid instructions  that  if  Napoleon  was  victorious, 
it  was  in  spite  and  in  defiance  of  the  instructions 
of  the  government."  These  instructions  are  said 
to  be  the  work  of  Carnot  (Thiers,  t.  viii,  p.  256). 


5 12  APPENDIX. 

If  SO,  they  demonstrate  the  truth  of  Napoleon's 
description  of  Carnot's  vaunted  capacity  as  mi- 
nister of  war  (iMontliolon,  t.  iii,  p.  i25).  "In  the 
committee  of  public  safety,  he  directed  the  mi- 
litary operations,  and  was  useful,  without  me- 
riting the  praise  bestowed  on  him.  He  had  no 
military  experience,  and  his  opinions  were  false, 
upon  every  part  of  the  art  of  war,"  etc. 

Page  217. 

(8)  This  estimate  of  the  strength  of  the  two 
armies  it  must  be  confessed,  is  only  a  conjectural 
one.  The  numbers  given  by  various  respectable 
authorities  range  through  many  degrees  of  enu- 
meration. Napoleon  states  his  own  fighting 
force  fit  for  duty  (Las  Cases,  t.  ii,  p.  2663  INIon- 
tholon,  t.  iii,  p.  176)  at  about  thirty  thousand 
men  and  that  of  the  allies  at  eighty  thousand.  This 
estimate  Avhich  is  no  doubt  correct  as  to  his  own 
army,  may  have  overrated  that  of  the  allies. 
It  is  however  adopted  by  Norvins  and  Hazlitt 
(t.  i,  p.  87;  V.  i,  p.  417).  Thiers  in  stating  the 
strength  of  the  French  army  gives  different 
numbers,  as  if  they  were  matters  of  caprice,  not 
of  calculation.  First  he  says  (t.  viii,  p.  224)  it 
amounted  to  thirty  thousand  men,  next  (p.  227) 
to  "  thirty-six  thousand  at  most,"  and  concludes 
by  stating  that  the  enemy  opposed  about  sixty 
thousand  men  to  the  thirty  thousand  of  Bona- 
parte. Jomini  (t.  viii,  p.  69)  rates  the  French 
iorce  at  forty-two  thousand,  four  hundred.    But 


CHAPTER  Vl.  5l5 

m  liis  enumeration  he  includes  the  detach- 
ments under  generals  Macquart  and  Garnier  or 
d'Alniagne  amounting  to  six  thousand  nine  hun- 
dred, which  were  in  garrison  on  the  coast,  or 
posted  at  the  passes  of  the  Alps  on  Bonaparte's 
left,  and  no  part  of  which  entered  Italy  until 
after  the  occupation  of  Cherasco.  This  would 
leave  for  the  army  of  Italy  thirty-five  thousand, 
five  hundred  men.  Deducting  the  sick,  the  ac- 
tive force  would  not  exceed  thirty  thousand 
men.  The  strength  of  the  allied  army  Jomini 
puts  at  fifty-two  thousand,  an  estimate  lower 
than  is  to  be  found  in  any  other  writer,  and  in- 
consistent with  probability  from  the  inference 
that,  considering  it  was  an  allied  force,  its  small 
superiority  of  numbers  would  not  have  made 
it  an  overmatch  for  the  French  estimated  by 
him  at  forty-two  thousand  four  hundred.  Con- 
sequently the  victories  of  Bonaparte,  instead  of 
being  the  effects  of  his  great  military  genius  and 
the  incapacity  of  Beaulieu,  as  Jomini  himself 
describes  them  to  be  (t.  viii,  ch.  56)  would 
have  been  nothing  more  than  the  ordinary  re- 
sults of  a  contest  between  combined  forces  on 
one  side,  and  an  army  of  one  nation  on  the 
other.  It  is  possible  that  Jomini  gave  the 
mmiber  actually  in  the  field  excluding  the  nu- 
merous garrisons.  But  these  garrisons  fur- 
nished detachments  to  increase  the  field  force, 
^nd  were  recalled  as  the  French  advance  me- 
Placed  the  fortresses.      Thus  Colli,  upon  aban- 

55 


5l4  APPENDIX. 

doning  his  intrenched  camp  at  Ceva,  threw  a 
detachment  into  that  fortress.  Of  these  incon- 
sistent estimates  I  have  adopted  a  medium  as  the 
nearest  approximation  to  truth  in  my  power. 

In  the  work  entitled  Victoires  et  Conquetes 
des  Francais^  (t.  v,  pp.  i65  et  164)  the  effective 
force  of  the  French  army  is  estimated  at  thirty- 
four  thousand  men,  upon  the  authority  of  a  spe- 
cific return  signed  by  Berthier.  With  regard  to 
this  voluminous  work  the  account  it  contains  of 
this  first  campaign  of  Italy  is  so  very  defective, 
conjectural,  and  confused,  that  very  little  in- 
struction can  be  derived  from  it.  It  was  pre- 
pared, it  would  seem,  before  the  Memoirs  of 
Napoleon,  or  the  Memorial  of  St. -Helena  were 
published. 

Page  219. 

(9)  This  fact,  mentioned  by  Napoleon  in  his 
dictation  to  Las  Cases  (t.  ii,  p.  285)  and  to  Mon- 
tholon  (t.  iii,  p.  192)  a  fact  so  honourable  to  the 
Spartan  patriotism  and  courage  of  the  French 
army,  is  strangely  caricatured  by  sir  Walter 
Scott  (v.  iii,  pp.  95,  96).  "Berthier  preserved, 
as  a  curiosity  an  order  dated  on  the  day  of  the 
victory  of  Albenga,  which  munificently  con- 
ferred a  gratuity  of  three  louis  dor  upon  every 
general  of  division.  Among  the  generals  to 
whom  this  donation  was  rendered  acceptable  by 
their  wants,  were,  or  might  have  been,  many 
whose  names  became  afterwards  the  praise  and 


CHAPTER    VI.  5l5 

dread  of  war.  Augereau,  Massena,  Serrurier, 
Joubert,  Lannes,  and  Murat,  all  generals  of  the 
first  consideration,  served  under  Bonaparte  in 
the  Italian  campaign,"  ^In  a  note  he  adds :  "This 
piece  of  generosity  reminds  us  of  the  liberality 
of  the  kings  of  Brentford  to  their  Knightsbridge 
forces : 

'-*•'-  First  king.  Here,  take  five  guineas  to  these  warlike 
men. 

'■'•'' Second  king.    And  here,  five   more,    which   makes 
the  sum  just  ten, 

'  '•  '■  Herald.   We  liave  not  seen  so  much  the  Lord  knows 
when  I'" 

As  to  the  assertions  of  fact  contained  in  this 
passage,  it  may  be  observed  that  "the  victory  of 
Albenga"   never  was  beard  of  before,  being  a 
later  discovery  than  the  sea  coast  of  Bohemia. 
ISapoleon's  peacefal  phrase  (Montholon,    t.  iii^ 
p.  192,  and  Las  Cases,  t.  ii,  p.  285):  "  Un  ordre 
du  jour  d'x\lbenga,  an  order  of  the  daj  of  Al- 
benga^' that  is,  dated  at  Albenga,  this  roman- 
tic historian  has  heroically  translated,  **an  order 
dated  on  the  day  of  the  victory  of  Albenga" — 
making  the  harmless  words,   "  day  of  Albenga," 
equivalent  to  day  of  Marengo^  day  of  Austerlitz^ 
phrases  familiar  in  the  annuals  of  French  glory. 
His  next  assertion,   that  a  'donation"  ol  three 
loiiis  d'or,  which  he  mentions  and  ridicules  as 
"apiece  of  generosity,"  is  a  misrepresentation 
of   another  phrase  of  Napoleon,   whose  words 


^5;f 


5l6  APPEISDIX. 

are,    *'  a  gratification  of  three   loiiis  d'or,"  that 
is,  pieces  of  gold,    ''  was  granted  to  each  general 
of  division,"     No  one  in  his  senses  can  under- 
stand this  to  mean,  that  tie  commander  in  chief, 
made  presents,  or  that  lieutenant  generals  re- 
ceived presents,  of  three  pieces  of  gold ;  the  anec- 
dote was  introduced  to  shew  penury  instead  of 
'^munificence ;"   the    destitution    of  pecuniary 
resources  existing  in  the  army ;  the  emptiness  of 
the  military  chest  5  and  although  sir  Waller  in- 
timates that  this  gold  was  given  hy  Napoleon  to 
reward  his  generals  for  "the  victory  of  Alhenga, 
the   gratification   really  consisted  in  Napoleon 
advancing  to  the  generals  of  division  a  small  part 
of  their  pay  or  expenses  in  gold,  in  louis  d'or, 
at  a  time  when  that  coin  was  extremely  scarce 
and  valuable,  and  when  their  pay  was  generally 
received  in  a  description  of  currency  of  little 
Talue  out  of  France  5  at  a  time  too,  when  Napo- 
leon said  to  the  army —  "the  country  owes  you 
much,  hut  can  pay  you  nothing."  These  pieces 
of  gold  were  public  money,   spared  out  of  a  fund 
which,    small  as  it  was,    was  all  that    the  go- 
vernment could  furnish  for  the  use  of  the  com- 
mander in  chief,  for  gaining  intelligence,    etc., 
in  tlie  enemy's  country;    and  therefore  the  ad- 
vancing these  few  pieces  of  gold  was  deemed 
"according  a   gratification."     That  this  is  the 
meaning  of  the  phrase  is  evident  not  only  from 
the  rank^  character,  and  relation  of  the  parties, 
two  of  the  generals  at  least  having  pretensions 


CHAPTER    VI.  5l7 

to  the  chief  command — but  from  the  fact  of  the 
advance  being  mentioned  in  an  order  of  the 
day,  shevv^ing  that  it  was  an  official  transaction. 
It  is  so  understood  by  Thiers,  who  says  (t.  viii, 
p.  228)  * 'He  procured  for  his  sokliers  apart  of  the 
pay  which  was  due  to  them.  He  distributed  to 
each  of  hisgeneralsybwr  Louis  in  gold."  Showing 
by  the  word  distj^ibuted  that  he  deemed  it  an 
advance  of  so  much  pubUc  money  on  account  to 
these  officers ;  and  by  the  substitution  of  the  word 
Jour  for  tliree^  either  that  Thiers  had  seen  the 
order  of  the  day,  and  found  that  Napoleon's  re- 
collection was  so  far  inaccurate,  which  is  not 
probable;  or  that  he  himself  had  wantonly  dis- 
dained accuracy  in  so  small  a  matter,  which  is 
probable.  Jomini,  in  order  to  describe  the  state 
of  pecuniary  distress  under  which  the  comman- 
der in  chief  laboured  even  after  his  entrance  into 
the  plains  of  Piedmont,  says(t.  viii,  p.  96),  ''An 
idea  of  the  penury  of  the  army  maybe  collected 
from  the  correspondence  of  the  commander  in 
chief,  who  sent  Massena  twenty-four  francs  in 
gold  to  provide  for  his  official  expenses."  In  the 
fac  simile  of  general  Washington's  accompts, 
which  has  been  lately  published^  there  appears 
the  following  item — "19th  of  April,  1777,  to 
specie"  (or  hard  money,  contrasted  with  de- 
preciated paper)  "to  major  general  Greene  for 
secret  services,  5/."  being  about  the  same  amount 
which,  in  similar  circumstances,  Napoleon  ad- 
vanced for  similar  objets  to  the  generals  next  to 


jlS  APPENDIX. 

him  in  command,  and,  like  Washington,  on  pub- 
lic account.     The    third  of  sir  Walter's  asser- 
tions in  the  above  cited  passage  is,  that  Lannes 
and  Murat  were   among  the   generals    of  this 
time.     He  tells  us  himself,  further  on  (p.  126), 
that  the  first  was  "colonel  Lannes,"  and  it  is 
very  certain  that  at  the  time  of  "  the  victory  of 
Albenga,"  he  was  only  a  chief  of  battalion,  and 
Murat  but  a  colonel.     So  much  for  sir  Walter's 
facts  ;   his  ridicule,  borowed  from  The  Rehear- 
sal and  aimed  at  the  fortitude  and  patriotism  of 
the  French  officers,  is  below  all  contempt,  and 
of  course  beneath  further  notice. — The  manner 
in  which  the  next  bold  '*  British  historian"  re- 
lates this  matter  of  the  louis  d'or  is  worthy  of 
attention    on  two    accounts;    one    as  verifying 
Aristotle's  famous  definition — ''Man  is  an  imita- 
tive animal;"  the  other,  as  shewing  that  on  this 
occasion  Lockhart  did  not  adopt  all  the  errors 
and  illiberality  which  he  found  in  Scott.    These 
famous  louis  d'or  he  thus  commemorates,  for 
the  special  instruction  of  English  families  (v.  i, 
p.  55):  "Berthier  used  to  keep,  as  a  curiosity,  a  ge- 
neral order,  by  which  three  louis  d'or  were  grant- 
ed as  a  great  supply  to  each  general  of  divi.sion 
dated  on  the  very  day  of  the  victory  of  Albenga. 
Here  is  nothing  about,  "donation"  or  '•  genero- 
sity," nor  is  there  the  least  sneering  at  the  des- 
titution and  hardships  of  the  French  army.  But 
the  reader  cannot  fail  to  notice  the  tone  of  inti- 
macy, of  familiar  and  particular  knowledge,  af- 


7 
>? 


CHAPTER    VI.  5l 


9 


fected  by  Lockhart  respecting  this  order  of  the 
day,  and  "the  victory  of  Albenga."  "Berthier 
used  to  heep/^  that  is  wheji  I  knew  him  he  used 
to  keep  this  order  of  the  day  as  a  curiosity.  And 
it  was  "  dated  the  very  dij  of  the  victory  of  Al- 
benga," that  is,  what  is  more  remarkable  I  have 
discovered  that  this  order  was  dated  "the  very 
day  of  the  victory  of  Albenga."  Now  what  boy 
or  girl,  or  what  gentleman  or  lady  in  England, 
reading  for  the  sake  of  easy  instruction  or 
agreeable  study,  would  not  suppress  instantly 
any  doubt  that  might  suggest  itself  in  regard  to 
this  unheard  of  victory,  upon  observing  the  spe- 
cial, emphatic,  and  circumstantial  manner  in 
which  the  editor  of  the  Quarterly  Review  had 
taken  care  to  mention  it.  Let  us  suppose  that 
two  American  historians  had  successively  men- 
tioned, the  battle  of  Brighton ^  or  the  victory  of 
IVindsor^  and  to  make  their  ignorance  and  im- 
posture plausible  had  affected  to  know  the  very 
day.,  on  which  it  took  place — wliat  measure 
would  there  have  been  to  the  sneers,  the  scorn, 
the  scoffs,  and  taunts,  of  this  very  Mr.  Lockhart, 
and  his  kindred  reviewers  j  not  excepting  the 
quaint  and  eloquent  editor  of  Blackwood's  Ma- 
gazine, who  commends  this  work  of  Lockhart, 
for  "generous  candour,"  and  "solid  informa- 
tion :"  tlie  "generous  candour"  evinced  in  the 
stratagem  by  which  Napoleon  is  made  to  call  his 
brother  "  that  fool  Joseph;"  and  the  "solid  in- 
formation "    displayed  in  the   ever  memorable 


SsO  APPENDIX. 

*'  victory  of  Albenga.  "  This  commendatiodf^ 
however  monstrous,  can  hardly  be  ironical,  since 
it  is  prefixed  as  a  puff  to  Lockhart's  book.  If  the 
intrinsic  faults  of  sir  Walter's  work,  did  not 
ren  ler  its  non-existence  desirable,  its  evident 
tendency  to  encourage  the  production  of  histori- 
cal nonsense  and  critical  deception  would  justify 
the  most  earnest  efforts  to  expunge  it  from  the 
tablets  of  English  literature. 

Hazlitt  (v.  i,  p.  4il)  represents  this  advance  of 
three  louis  d'or,  as  "an  extraordinary  gratifi- 
cation," adding  the  word  extraordinarj,  to  those 
of  Napoleon,  and  so  far  obscuring  the  sense. 
But  my  reason  for  referring  to  his  work,  which 
is  informed  with  an  impartial  spirit,  and  con- 
tains many  striking  reflections,  is  to  mention, 
not  without  regret^  that  Hazlitt's  account  of  the 
campaigns  of  Italy  is  almost  a  literal  transla- 
tion of  Napoleon's  own  narrative,  of  which  pa- 
ragraphs are  here  and  there  transposed;  a  fact 
which  considering  the  character  and  position 
of  the  two  men,  may  be  said  to  constitute  the 
most  stupendous  and  most  barefaced  literary 
fraud,  that  was  ever  committed.  Shall  we  live 
to  see  a  translation  of  Caesar's  CommentaireSy 
published  in  England  as  an  original  work  ? 

1»AGE   219. 

(lo)  Thisfact  which  is  stated  by  Thiers  (t.  viiiy 
p.  228)  and  Jomini  (t.  viii,  p.  61)  will  recall  to 
the  mind  of  the  American  reader  the  patriotic 


CHAPTER    VI.  521 

conduct  of  general  Jackson  during  the  last  war 
between  the  United  States  and  England. 

Page  220. 

(ii)  The  existence  of  this  natural  feeling  has 
been  often  mentioned  by  w  ell  informed  French 
writers.  Thiers  (t.  viii,  p.  228)  says:  ^'Massena 
bore  him  ill  willfor  having  exerted  an  ascendancy 
over  the  mindof  Dumerbion  in  1794."  Traces 
of  this  sensibility  may  be  discovered  in  the  an- 
swers both  of  Massena  and  Augereau  to  Napo- 
leon's letter's  from  Nice,  announcing  to  them  his 
assuming  the  command.  The  first  says,  under 
date  of  the  29th  March:  "I  have  received,  ge- 
neral, your  letter  of  yesterday.  I  make  you  my 
very  sincere  compliments  on  the  command  in 
chief  of  the  army  of  Italy,  which  has  been  con- 
ferred on  you.  You  have  known  for  a  long  time 
the  justice  I  have  done  to  your  military  talents." 
Shewing  that  his  acquiescence  was  not  uncondi- 
tional, was  in  consequence  of  his  having  long 
admitted  Napoleon's  military  talents.  Augereau's 
expressions  reveal  a  similar  state  of  mind.  "I 
have  received  your  letter  of  the  8th  of  this 
month,  by  which  I  learn  that  you  have  taken 
the  command  in  chief  of  the  army.  I  congratu- 
late myself  on  being  under  your  orders,  hnowiiig 
your  patriotism  aucl  military  talents.  I  will  do 
my  best  to  fulfil  your  instructions  in  whatever 
orders  you  may  give  me  ;  and  you  may  count  on 
my  zeal,  my  activity,  and  devotion^  in  the  pub- 


522  APPENDIX. 

lie  cause.'''  Sensibility  so  natural,  and  founded  in 
military  pride,  is  far  above  censure.  But  when 
we  think  of  the  future  career  of  the  men  and  of 
the  long  existing  relations  between  the  comman- 
der in  chief,  and  these  condescending  lieute- 
nants, it  is  interesting  to  notice  with  some  atten- 
tion the  point  at  which  their  connection  com- 
menced.  Hazlitt  (v.  i,  p.  4^^)  seems  to  have 
misunderstood  these  letters  of  Massena  and  Au- 
gereau.  Both  their  letters  throw  a  ludicrous 
light  on  the  assertion  of  Thiers  that  at  this  time. 
Napoleon  was  *'a  young  man  unknown.^' 

Page  225. 

(12)  General  Colli  in  sending  an  emigrant 
Frenchman  in  the  character  of  a  Sardinian  offi- 
cer, and  under  the  protection  of  a  flag  of  truce, 
abused  the  privilege  attached  to  messengers  of 
peace  in  time  of  war,  inasmuch  as  France  could 
not  be  at  war  with  her  own  citizens.  Napoleon 
was  justified  on  general  principles,  and  a  for- 
tiori, by  reference  to  the  mutiny  in  his  army,  in 
detaining  Moulin.  His  letter  to  the  directory  of 
the  8th  of  April  announcing  this  fact,  shows  that 
he  was  not  disposed  to  enforce  the  law  against 
this  imprudent  Frenchman,  whose  punishment 
it  appears  consisted  only  in  temporary  confine- 
ment. For  a  full  account  of  the  object  and  in- 
trigues of  the  conspiracy  carried  on  between  Pi- 
chegru  on  one  side,  and  the  Prince  of  Conde, 
the  Austrian     general  Klin  gin,   and  the  British 


CHAPTER  VI.  523 

envoy  at  Berne,  Wickham,  on  the  other,  see 
the  vohimes  entitled  ;  "  Correspondance  trouvee 
d  Offenboiirg  "  —  and  the  corroborating  docu- 
ments in  the   '•''Alliance  des  Jdcobins  avec  les 

■i 

An^^lais'"' 

(J 

Page  224. 

(i5)  See  Napoleon's  order  of  the  5oth  of  March 
(Correspondance  inedite,  t.  i,  p.  7). 

Page  22o. 

(r4)  Thiers  (t.  viii,  p.  329),  Jomini,  t.  viii, 
p.  62).  An  English  officer  who  was  then  a  lieu- 
tenant in  Nelson's  squadron,  mentioned  the  fact 
to  me  as  it  is  here  related.  It  is  not  alluded  to 
hy  Scott  or  Lockhart. 

Page  227. 

(i5)  Sir  Walter  Scott  furnishes  a  translation 
of  this  address,  which  under  the  appearance  of 
carelessness,  conceals  much  art.  He  intersperses 
touches  of  his  magical  pencil  for  the  purpose 
of  bringing  Napoleon's  sentiments  into  harmony 
with  the  dark  colours  in  which  he  proposes  to 
portray  his  character.  For  these  plain  expres- 
sions in  the  address,  "  rich  provinces,  great 
cities  will  be  in  your  power — you  will  there  find 
honour,  glory,  and  wealth,"  sir  Walter  adroitly 
substitutes — "rich  provinces,  opulent  towns, 
honor,  glory,  wealth,  all  shall  be  at  your  dispo- 
sal." The  reader  will  here  perceive  the  diffe- 
rence between   '^  will  be  in  your  power,''    and 


524  APPENDIX. 

^*' shall  be  at  ^owv  disposal ,  "the  absolute  meaning 
of  shall  and  the  licentions  force  of  disposal. 
Towns  ^vith  their  inhabitants  and  property  are 
in  the  power  of  a  victorious  army;  but  they  are 
at  the  disposal  of  the  general,  who  is  bound  to 
obey  the  laws  of  war,  to  consult  the  principles 
of  justice,  and  to  listen  to  the  dictates  of  huma- 
nity. Again,  when  Napoleon  asks  with  vigo- 
rous simplicity.  "  Can  you  be  wanting  in  cou- 
rage and  perseverance"  —  the  author  of  Waver- 
ley  makes  him  exclaim,  "with  such  a  prospect 
before  you,  can  you  fail  in  courage  and  con- 
stancy"— that  is,  w  ith  the  sure  prospect  of  hav- 
ing the  wealth  and  beauty  of  these  fertile  plains 
and  populous  cities  at  your  absolute  disposal,  can 
you  fail  in  courage  and  constancy  ?  It  may  be 
observed  that  the  desire  of  misrepresentation 
leads  Sir  Walter  into  the  absurdity  of  placing 
honour  and  glorj  under  the  action  of  the  same 
verb^  with  towns  and  provinces  —  "  all  shall  be 
at  your  disposal, '  as  if  honour  and  glory  were 
material  substances,  or  commodities  of  purchase 
and  transfer.  Napoleon  says,  "provinces  and 
cities  will  be  in  your  power  "  —  "  You  willy/zz^ 
(or  gain)  honour,  glory  and  wealth;"  by  con- 
necting wealth  with  honour  and  glory  evidently, 
excluding  the  ideas  of  plunder  and  licence, 
which  sir  Walter's  version  studiously  holds  forth 
as  the  leading  sentiment  of  the  general  and  the 
ruling  motive  of  his  army.  By  these  swift  and 
shadowy  stratagems  of  version,  the  min  1  of  the 


CHAPTER    VI.  5^5 

reader  is  prepared  to  receive  unconditionally  the 
animated  illustration  of  the  following  remark  — 
^'  This  was  shewing  the  deer  to  the  hound  when 
the  leash  is  about  to  be  slipped."  This  is  one 
instance  of  the  easy  omnipotence  of  that  pen 
which  has  so  often  enchanted  mankind-  of  the 
art  possessed  by  sir  Walter  of  introducing  false 
impressions  into  the  reader's  mind  under  the  en- 
velope of  a  metaphor.  By  representing  the  al- 
lied force  as  a  deer,  a  timid  inojQPensive  animal, 
their  hostile  intents,  their  desire  to  invade  and 
subjugate  France,  their  great  superiority  of 
numbers,  of  cavalry,  artillery,  supplies,  and 
equipments;  their  numerous  fortresses,  the  coo- 
perating English  fleet,  the  rocky  Appennines, 
the  snowy  Alps,  all  disappear  like  frost  work 
before  the  rays  of  the  sun,  from  the  contempla- 
tion of  the  reader ;  who,  acquainted  with  the 
event  of  the  campaign,  looks  upon  Beaulieu, 
his  army  and  allies,  as  innocent,  defenceless 
beings,  about  to  be  cruelly  overmatched  and 
destroyed.  On  the  other  hand,  by  exhibiting  the 
French  general  and  an  army  under  the  figures 
of  a  huntsman  and  staghound,  an  impression  of 
their  strength  and  rapacity,  of  their  power  and 
will  to  overtake  and  devour,  is  created,  which 
excludes  from  the  mind,  their  war  of  self-de- 
fence, their  inferiority  of  numbers,  their  suffer- 
ing and  unfurnished  condition,  the  exhaustless 
patriotism  of  the  troops,  and  the  matchless  ge- 
nius and  enterprise  of  their-  leader,  in  meeting 


526  APPENDIX. 

and  overcoming  with  such  odds  against  them, 
the  forces  of  the  coaUtion.     This  art  of  predis- 
posing the  reader  to  accept  ficti  )n  for  truth,   of 
employing  his  fancy  to  deceive,  or  if  need  he,  to 
debauch  his  judgment,  no  writer  in  the  English 
language  ever  possessed  in  a  higher  degree  than 
sir  Walter  Scott.     In  its  exercice  in  the  former 
sense  consists  much  of  the  charm  of  his  delight" 
ful  romances,  and  in  the  latter,  much  of  the  vice 
of  this  pretended  history.     The  extent  of  his 
injustice  in  the  present  case  may  readily  he  con- 
ceived by  an  English  reader,  if  he  will  reflect  that 
an  army  may  obtain  wealth  without  dishonour; 
that  the  soldier  is  as  fairly  entitled  to  the  spoils  of 
honourable  war  as  the  sailor.     We  hear  a  great 
deal  of  the  Deccan  prize  money,  in  which  Eng- 
lish noblemen  and  generals  participated.     The 
amount  of  prize  money  distributed   among  the 
British  seamen  of  all  ranks  during  the  last  war, 
it  might  be  difficult  to  calculate  ;  yet  who  would 
be  so  unjust  as  to  impute  to  the  brave  tars  who 
gained  it,  the  ignoble  desire  of  plunder  ?  Was 
that  the  motive  of  Nelson  when  at  a  sublime  mo- 
ment  he    uttered   the    sublimer   expression  — 
^'England  expects  e^^eiy  man  to  do  his  dutj.^^ 

Page  227. 

}  (i6)  Hitherto  the  errors  of  sir  Walter  Scott, 
have  consisted  principally  of  matters  of  asser- 
tion^ insinuation,  or  inference.  On  the  present 
occasion,  he  formally  suspends  his  narrative  for 


CHAPTER    VI.  5^7 

the  sake  of  introducing  a    historical  reflection 
on  the  art  of  war,  which  in    point    of  military 
nonsense  may  well  vie  with  his  confident  refe- 
rence to  the  ^'victory  of  Albenga."      The   so- 
lemn bustle,  with  which  it  is  ushered  into  view, 
was  intended  no  doubt  to  command  the  reader's 
attentive   consideration    (v.  iii,  p.  go).       "For 
victory,  he  relied  chiefly  upon  a  system  of  tactics 
hitherto  unpractised  in   war,    or  at  least  upon 
any  considerable  or  uniform  scale.     It  may  not 
be  unnecessary  to  pause,  to  take  a  general  view 
of  the  principles  which  he  now  called  into  action. 
Nations  in  the  savage  state  being  constantly  en- 
gaged in  war,   always  form  for  themselves  some 
peculiar  mode  of  fighting,  suited  to  the  country 
they  inhabit  and  the   mode   in  which  they  are 
armed.     The  North  American  Indian  becomes 
formidable   as  a  rifleman  or   sharpshooter,  lays 
ambuscades  in  his  pathless  forests,  and  practices 
all  the  arts  of  irregular  war.     The  Arab  or  Scy- 
thian manoeuvres  his  clouds  of  cavalry,  so  as  to 
envelop    and  destroy  his  enemy  in  his  deserts, 
by  sudden  onsets,  rapid  retreats,  and  unexpect- 
ed rallies,  desolating  the  country  around,  cutting 
off"  his  antagonist's  supplies,  and  practising  in 
short  the  species  of  war  proper  to  a  people  supe- 
rior in  light  cavalry."     In  this  passage,  notwith- 
standing the  admirable  freshness  and  animation 
of  the  style,  the  reader  will   at  once   discover 
that  there  is  not  a  single  fact  truly  affirmed, 
which  is  not  erroneously  proposed.      The    ge- 


528  APPENDIX. 

neral  assertion  that  "nations  in  a  savage  state 
are  constantly  engaged  in  war,"  admits  or  rather 
requires  this  obvious  qualification,  or  the  chase, 
which  last  occupation  not  only  engrosses  the 
greater  part  of  the  lives  of  savages,  but  creates 
interests  which  constitute  the  principal  cause  of 
their  wars.  For  the  rest,  the  facts  alleged  as  pe- 
culiar to  savage  nations,  are  common  to  them 
Avith  civilized  nations,  who  make  war  according 
to  the  mode  in  which  they  are  armed  and  the 
country  they  inhabit.  —  Hannibal  was  famous 
for  laying  ambuscades.  In  1765,  the  French 
adapting  their  warfare  to  the  country  they  were 
in,  defeateid  and  killed  general  Braddock,  by 
means  of  an  ambuscade.  In  1796,  at  the  battle 
of  Arcole,  Napoleon  placed  the  brave  thirty- 
second  in  ambuscade,  and  by  a  sudden  attack 
destroyed  a  column  of  three  thousand  Croats. 
The  Virginia.  Kentucky,  andTennesseeriflemen, 
are  better  sharpshooters  than  the  North  Ame 
rican  Indians,  better  horsemen,  and  more  expert 
in  the  arts  of  irregular  war.  The  Russian  ge- 
nerals in  1812,  manoeuvred  their  clouds  of  Cos- 
sacks, and  desolated  the  country  far  and  wide. 
The  Enulish  commanders  when  they  make  war 
on  the  banks  of  the  Ganges,  employ,  like  the 
natives,  the  huge  elephant  to  transport  the  bag- 
gage of  armies,  and  to  break  lines  of  hostile 
infantry.  Napoleon  himself  formed  a  corps  ol 
dromedaries  for  pursuing  his  wild  foe,  through 
the  deserts  of  Egypt.     So  that  admitting  there 


CHAPTi  R  Yi.  '  Sag 

could  be  the  least  possible  relation  between  this 
reflection  on  savage  warfare,  and  the  principles 
on  which  Bonaparte  conducted  his  invasion  of 
Italy,  its  folly  would  make  it  abortive ;  as  sir 
Walter  Scott  seems  himself  to  discover  in  the 
closing  paragraph  wherein  he  describes  his  sa- 
vages, whether  Arab,  or  Scythian,  as  prac- 
tising, '*  in  short  the  species  of  war  proper  to 
a  people  superior  in  light  cavalry."  Now  what 
more  could  a  civilized  commander,  Turenne  or 
Marlborough,  Frederic  or  Wellington  have  done, 
"  who  was  superior  in  light  cavalry  ^^ 

He  proceeds.  ' '  The  first  stage  of  civilization 
is  less  favourable  to  success  in  war.  As  nations 
advance  in  the  peaceful  arts  and  the  character  of 
the  soldiers  begins  to  be  less  familiarly  united 
with  that  of  the  citizen,  this  system  of  natural 
tactics  falls  out  of  practice;  and  when  foreign 
invasion  or  civil  broils  call  the  inhabitants  to 
arms,  they  have  no  idea  save  that  of  finding  out 
the  enemy,  rushing  upon  him  and  committing  the 
event  to  superior  strength,  bravery,  or  numbers. 
An  example  may  be  seen  in  the  great  civil  war  of 
England,  v.here  men  fought  on  both  sides,  in 
almost  every  county  of  the  kingdom,  without 
any  combination  or  exact  idea  of  uniting  in  mu- 
tual support,  or  manoeuvring  so  as  to  form  their 
insulated  bands  into  an  army  of  preponderating 
force.  At  least  what  was  attempted  for  that 
purpose  must  have  been  on  the  rudest  plan  pos- 
sible, where  even  in  actual  fight,  that  j^art  of  the 

34 


550  APPENDIX. 

army  which  obtained  any  advantage  pursued 
it  as  far  as  they  could,  instead  of  using  their 
success  for  the  support  of  their  companions;  so 
that  the  main  body  was  often  defeated  when  a 
victorious  wing  was  in  pursuit  of  those  whom 
their  first  onset  had  broken." 

Here  the  imputed  accidents  of  a  civil  war  in 
England,  at  a  time  when  the  population  of  that 
country  was  di\ided  by  political  and  religious 
feuds,    and   had  been    estranged   from  martial 
duties  by  a  long  peace,  are   taken  for  military 
characteristics  of  the  age  in  which  that  war  oc- 
curred.      Gustavus  Adolphus  flourished  a  little 
before,  and  Turenne  a  little  after  the  great  civil 
war  of  England,  and  if  the  French  were  rriore 
advanced  in  civilization  than  the  English  in  the 
middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  Swedes 
were  probably  less  so.     Yet  who  will  say  that 
these  great  commanders  had  *'  no  idea  save  that 
of  finding  out  the    enemy,  rushing  upon  him, 
and  committing  the  event  to  superior  strength, 
bravery,  or  numbers" — had  "no  exact  idea  of 
manoeuvring  so  as  to  form  their  insulated  bands 
into  an  army  of  preponderating  force" — or  that 
they  suflfered  their  "main  body  to  be  often  de- 
feated" by  having  "a  victorious  wing  in  pursuit 
of  those  whom  their  first  onset    had  broken." 
This  bold  and  feeble  attempt  at  philosophising 
on  the  military  history  of  society,  of  inducing 
general  principles  from  an  analysis  and  arrange- 
ment of  particular  facts,  is  carried  to  the  length 


CHAPTER  VI.  DDI 

of  making  the  single  instance  and  peculiar  cha- 
racter of  prince   Rupert,  >vhom  in  Rokeby  sir 
Walter  calls  "  hot  Rupert,"  a  fair  sample  of  the 
Avarlike    kaow  ledge    and   skill    likely   to    exist 
among  nations  in  that  state  of  civilization  which 
the  English  had  reached  at  the  time  of  the  great 
civil  war.  Prince  Rupert  made  himself  remark- 
able for  pursuing  the  left  wing  of  the  parlia- 
mentary forces,  in  the  battle  of  Naseby,  so  far, 
that  before  his  return^  Cromwell  and  Fairfax 
had  irretrievably  defeated  the  king's  right  and 
centre.     Yet,  on  this   single  act,  which  might 
have    occurred    in  any   age  of  the  world,   of  a 
single   officer,  whose  character   was  peculiarly 
prompt  and   impetuous,  is   founded  a   general 
principle   in  the  history    of  tactics  w^hich  the 
reader  is  gravely  requested  to  pause  and  reflect 
upon.     With  respect  to  the  imputed Rccidenis  of 
of  the  great  civil  war;  of  the  parties  being  "with- 
out combination"   and  divided  into  ** insulated 
bands,"  the  assertion  shows  that  sir  Walter  was 
indifierent  to  facts  whether   of   English   or  of 
French  history.   At  the  battle  of  Marston  Moor, 
as  Hume  relates,  "  fifty  thousand  British  troops 
were  led   to   mutual  slaughter."     These  were 
probably  the  largest  armies  which   were    en- 
gaged in  a   conflict  purely  civil   at   any    time 
during  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries. 
At  the  battle  of  CuUoden,  in  174^,  the  pretender 
had  four  thousand  men,  and  the  duke  of  Cum- 
berland a  much  larger  force  (see  Smollet's  His- 


553  APPENDIX. 

tory  of  England,  ch.  g).  In  the  war  of  the  Ame- 
rican revohition,  the  forces  engaged  in  hattle  in 
no  instance  amounted  to  forty  thousand  men. 

Sir  Walter  continues — "But  as  war  becomes 
a  profession,  and  a  subject  of  deep  study,  it  is 
gradually  discovered  that  the  principles  of  tac- 
tics depend  upon  mathematical  and  arithmetical 
science;  and  that  the  commander  will  be  vic- 
torious who  can  assemble  the  greatest  number 
of  forces  upon  the  same  point  at  the  same  moment, 
nothwithstanding  an  inferiority  of  numbers  to 
the  enemy  when  the  general  force  is  computed 
on  both  sides."  Were  Alexander,  Hannibal, 
Scipio,  Caesar,  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Turenne, 
prince  Eugene,  or  Marlborough,  oris  Welling- 
ton, famous  for  discoveries  in  mathematical  and 
arithmetical  science ;  or  w  ere  Newton  and  La- 
place esteemed  able  tacticians,  or  well  qualified 
to  command  armies  ?  It  is  wonderful  to  see  how 
boldly  he  connects  propositions  together  which 
have  no  relation.  Mathematical  and  arithme- 
tical science,  is  put  forward  as  leading  to  the 
discovery,  that  "the  commander  will  be  victo- 
rious who  can  assemble  the  greatest  number  of 
forces  upon  a  given  point."  Now  this  idea, 
as  it  might  be  properly  stated,  would  occur  and 
has  occurred  to  great  commanders  whether  they 
understood  mathematics  or  not.  But  it  is  not 
accurately  expressed  by  sir  Walter,  for  the  com- 
mander must  not  only  be  able  to  assemble  the 
greatest  number  of  forces  upon  the  same  point. 


CHAPTER    YI.  555 

and  at  the  same  moment;  but  he  must  be  able  to 
select  a  vital  point  and  a  proper  time  for  the 
operation^  matters  which  have  no  more  relation 
to  mathematical   or  arithmetical  science,  than 
they  have  to   dancing  a  minuet.     It  would  he 
as  rational  to  talk  of  new  principles  of  poetry  as 
of  war.     Napoleon,  upon  whose  character  and 
military  conduct,  sir  Walter  is  here  speculating, 
was  of  opinion    that  his  principles  of  war  were 
the  same  that  were  practised  by  the  great  com- 
manders   before    hini: — Alexander,    Hannibal, 
Caesar,    Gustavus  Adolphus,    Turenne,    prince 
Eugene,    and  Frederick  the  great,  men  whose 
eras  fill  a  space  of  more  than  two  thousand  years, 
and  comprehend  all  degrees  of  civilization  (Mon- 
tholon,  t.  ii;.  notes  vii  et  xvi).     Respecting  Na- 
poleon's secret^  as  sir  Walter  says  it  was  called, 
he   himself,  in  speaking  of  these  great  captains, 
thus  eloquently  reveals  it — (Montholon  t.  ii,  p. 
ig5) :   "Make  offensive  war  like  Alexander,  Han- 
nibal,   Ceesar,    Gustavus    Adolphus,     Turenne, 
prince  Eugene,  the  great  Frederick;  read  and 
reread  the   history  of  their   eighty-eight  cam- 
paigns,  model  yourself  on   them;  it  is  the  only 
means  of  becoming  a  great  captain,  and  oi  sur- 
prisin  g  the  secrets  of  the  art'''     Here  is  nothing 
like  mathematical  or  arithmetical    science;   but 
advice  to  study  the  conduct  and  exploits  of  great 
generals,  to  imitate,  to  imbibe    their  heroism, 
enterprise,  activity,  and  prudence;  to  hold  your 
force  collected^  to  choose  strong  ground  or  to 


554  APPENDIX, 

make  il  so  j  to  march  rapidly  on  imporlant  points^ 
to  cherish  the  spirit  of  your  troops,  and  the  re- 
putation of  your  arms  j  to  penetrate  the  charac- 
ter of  your  enemy;  to  inspire  him  with  fear  and 
act  on  that  fear;  to  keep  your  troops  well  supplied  j 
your  communications  free;  and  by  political  ad- 
dress and  ascendancy  to  manage  your  allies.  Thus 
you  may  become  a  great  captain,  but  not  by 
studying  mathematics. 

It  would  convey  a  reflection  on  the  reader's 
understanding  to  expose  these  absurdities  far- 
ther. But  as  the  course  of  sir  Walter's  disquisi- 
tion runs  into  less  harmless  misrepresentations, 
its  examination  in  this  direction  must  be  pur- 
sued. After  repeating  a  number  of  truisms  about 
Napoleon's  celerity,  exact  combinationsy  choice 
of  agents,  etc.  (in  which  few  men  by  the  way, 
seem  to  have  been  more  unlucky),  he  adds, 
''Great  sacrifices  were  necessary  to  enable  the 
French  troops  to  move  with  that  degree  of  cele- 
rity, which  Bonaparte's  combinations  required. 
He  made  no  allowance  for  impediments  or  unex- 
pected obstacles  ;  the  time  which  he  had  calcu- 
lated for  execution  of  manoeuvres  prescribed, 
was  on  no  account  to  be  exceeded;  every  sacrifice 
was  to  be  made  of  baggage,  stragglers,  even  ar- 
tillery, rather  than  that  the  column  should  ar- 
rive too  late  at  the  point  of  its  destination. 
Hence,  ail  that  had  hitherto  been  considered 
essential  not  only  to  the  health  but  to  the  very 
existence  of  an  army,  was  in  a  great  measure  dis- 
pensed with  in  the  French  service;  and  for  the 


CHAPTER    VI.  555 

first  time  troops  were  seen  to  take  the  field 
without  tents,  without  camp-equipage,  without 
magazines  of  provisions,  without  military  hospi- 
tals, the  soldiers  eating  as  they  could,  sleeping 
as  the  could,  and  dying  as  they  could  ;  but  still 
advancing,  still  combating,  and  still  victorious." 
The  declaration  that  (he  "dying  soldiers,  still 
advanced  still  combated  and  were  still  victo- 
rious," is  not  the  least  unfounded  assertion  in 
thispassagej  for  of  all  the  commanders  of  his  age 
Napoleon  was  the  most  careful  about  his  commu- 
nications, magazines,  and  hospitals.  His  attention 
to  these  subjects  of  military  adminstration  may 
almost  be  called  excessive,  as  maybe  seen  by  his 
orders  and  letters  in  all  his  campaigns.  In  this 
particular  campaign  of  Italy,  so  far  from  causing 
the  destitution  and  marauding  of  the  troops,  he 
put  an  end  to  those  evils  as  every  body  who  has 
attended  to  the  subject,  except  the  author  of 
Waverley,  and  it  appears  Lockhart  (v.  i,  p.  57) 
must  have  discovered.  In  his  first  letter  to  the 
directory  from  Nice,  dated  the  day  after  he  as- 
sumed the  command  he  says,  *'  The  administra- 
tive situation  of  this  army  is  deplorable,  but  it  is 
not  desperate.  Henceforward  the  troops  will  eat 
good  bread  and  will  have  meat."  Accordingly 
two  days  after  appears  this  order  (Correspon- 
dance  inedite,  t.  i,  p.  7).  "Fresh  meat  is  to  be 
served  out  to  the  troops  every  other  day.  The 
battalions  who  receive  salt  meat  to  day  will  have 
fresh  to-morrow  j  and  those  receiving  fresh  meat 


556  APPENDIX. 

will  have  salt."  The  fact  i?,  that  this  regard  for 
the  comfort  of  his  men,  was  one  of  the  causes  of 
their  attachment  to  him.  Can  it  be  supposd  that 
through  good  and  through  ill  fortune,  armies 
would  have  devoted  themselves  to  a  general 
who  was  regardless  of  their  health  and  exis- 
tence, and  left  them  to  eat^  sleep,  and  die  as 
they  could  ?  As  to  his  making  no  allowance  for 
difficulties,  and  insisting  that  the  time  pres- 
cribed for  movements,  must  on  no  account  to  be 
exceeded,  nothing  is  more  contrary  to  truth. 
It  is  well  known  that  at  Marengo,  he  waited 
anxiously  but  in  confidence  for  the  return  of  De- 
saix's  division  from  Novi — that  in  this  very  cam- 
paign of  Montenotte,  JMassena  delayed  his  attack 
on  Dego,  many  hours  after  it  had  been  ordered, 
in  consequence  of  the  troops  not  joining  him  in 
time;  and  in  the  military  correspondence  of  the 
same  campaign  occur  the  following  expressions 
in  two  letters  from  Augereau,  the  first  dated 
the  i6th  of  April,  and  the  second  the  25d.  In 
the  first,  written  on  the  heights  above  Ceva,  Au- 
gereau says,  *'I  have  this  moment  received  your 
different  orders,  but  I  cannot  put  them  in  exe- 
cution"^—  ''Neverthless,  if  you  persist  in  the 
changes  you  prescribe  I  pray  you  to  let  me  know." 
In  the  second,  written  from  Castellino,  below 
the  confluence  of  the  Tanaro  and  the  Corsagiio^ 
he  says,  '^l  received  this  morning,  at  7  o'clock 
precisely,  your  order  to  march  the  same  hour; 
which  it  is  imposj^le  for  me  to  do.     I  will  exert 


CTTAPTCR    VI.  537 

myseif  however,  to  put  my  columns  in  motion 
without  delay" — The  truth  is  sir  Walter  wrote 
at  random,  and  Napoleon  fought  with  wisdom, 
with  a  knowledge  of  the  capacity  of  men  and  a 
powerful  control  over  their  impulses;  and 
though  he  performed  great  exploits,  did  not 
exact  miracles  from  his  troops,  nor  move  them 
by  mathematics.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  in- 
form the  reader  that  Lockhart  epitomizes  the 
folly  and  injustice  of  this  part  of  sir  Walter's 
book.  Jomini,  himself  a  soldier,  holds  the  fol- 
lowing language  (t.  viii,  p.  61),  "The  first  mo- 
ments of  the  French  general  were  consecrated  to 
providing  for  the  wants  which  might  obstruct 
his  operations,  and  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  the 
state  of  his  troops.  " — "  Carrying  a  severe  scru- 
tiny i III o  the  administrations,  he  very  soon  im- 
pressed them  with  his  own  activity,  assured  the 
different  services,  and  seconded  by  the  zeal  and 
credit  of  a  banker  who  was  a  contractor,  he  con- 
trived to  pay  a  part  of  their  back  pay  to  the 
troops,  which  restored  their  confidence,  and 
attached  them  irrevocably  to  a  chief  who  knew 
how  to  meliorate  their  condition.  "'  Napoleon 
himself  says V  in  his  first  letter  to  the  directory 
(Correspondance  inedite,  t.  i,  p.  2  "The  troops 
will  henceforward  eat  good  bread,  and  will  have 
meat,  arid  already  they  have  received  a  part  of 
their  back  pay"  Yet  with  this  evidence  of  the 
fact  before  him,  and  with  the  order  for  furnish- 
ing fresh  and  salt  meat  alternately,  Norvins(t.i, 


538  APPENDIX. 

p.  88)  ventures  on  the  following  statement: 
"Besides,  the  government  not  having  paid  into 
the  military  chest  but  two  thousand  louis,  and 
one  million  in  bills  which  were  almost  all  protes- 
ted, it  was  impossible  to  nitdiorate  the  condition 
of  the  army,'"  This  was  not  slander,  but  sheer 
folly ;  and  as  it  w  as  written  after  sir  Walter 
Scott's  book  was  published,  furnished  no  autho- 
rity for  his  misrepresentation* 

Page  228. 

(17)  In  describing  the  plan  by  which  Napo- 
leon proposed  (o  enter  Italy,  sir  Walter  Scott 
says  (v.  iii,  pp.  loi,  ?),  "he  resolved  to  pass 
through  the  Genoese  territory  by  the  narrow 
pass  called  the  Bochetta  leading  round  the  ex- 
tremity of  the  mountains,  and  betwixt  these 
and  the  sea.  Thus  he  proposed  to  penetrate 
into  Italy  by  the  lowest  level  which  the  surface 
of  the  country  presented,  which  must  be,  of 
course,  where  the  range  of  the  Alps  unites  v/ith 
that  of  the  Appennines."  Every  reader  knows 
that  "thepassof  the  Bochetta,"  instead  of  lead- 
incr  araund  the  extremity  of  the  mountains,  and 
betwixt  these  and  the  sea,  is  a  pass  across  the 
Appennines  leading  directly  from  the  sea  at  Ge- 
noa, to  Voltaggio,  jNovi,  Alexandria,  and  Tu- 
rin. Why  it  should  be  a  matter  "of  course'' 
that  the  lowest  level  v.hich  the  surface  of  the 
coun  ry  presented  must  be  where  the  range  of 
the  Alps  united  with  that  of  the  Appennines, 
would  seem  to  be  a  geological  discovery  made 


CHAPTER    VI.  ,  5^9 

Ly  ''the  great  unknown."  The  pass  of  Cadi- 
bone  whence  the  Alps  and  Appennines  unite,  and 
through  which  Napoleon  proposed  entering 
Piedmont,  is  at  least  thirty  miles  north-west  of 
the  Bochetta.  There  are  numerous  other  errors 
equally  flagrant  in  this  part  of  sir  Walter's  work 
—  thus  he  talks  (p.  g5)  of  "  these  Alpine  cam- 
paigns being  victoriously  closed  by  the  armis- 
tice of  Cherasco.  "  Sixteen  clays  would  seem  a 
time  sufficiently  short  for  one  campaign.  Again, 
in  afFectinQ'  to  recaDitulate  the  motives  of  the 
government  for  entertaining  the  project  of  in- 
vading Italy,  he  mentions  the  murder  of  the 
Frenchenvoy  Bassevilleby  the  populace  of  Rome, 
whicii  the  republic  naturally  resented,  because 
no  attempt  was  made  to  prevent,  punish,  or 
atone  for  it,  by  the  papal  authorities.  The  au- 
thor of  Waverley,  who  would  have  stigmatized 
the  French  as  brutes,  had  they  shown  no  resent- 
ment at  this  outrage  on  humanity  and  the 
rights  of  ambassadors,  and  had  a  similar  murder 
occurred  at  Paris,  would  have  held  it  up  to  de- 
testation as  the  consequence  of  republican  li- 
berty, thus  notices  the  indignation  of  the  French 
government  (v.  iii,  p.  99).  ''The  French 
government  considered  this  very  naturally  as  a 
gross  insult,  and  were  the  more  desirous  of  aven- 
ging it,  that  by  doing  so  they  should  approach 
nearer  to  the  dignified  conduct  of  the  Roman  re- 
public, which,  in  good  or  evil,  seems  always  to 
have  been  their  model.      The  affair  happened  in 


54o  *  APPENDIX  . 

1795,  but  was  not  forgotten  in  1796."     At  first 
siglit  it  would  seem  to  be  a  strange  imitation  of 
the  conduct  of  the  Pioman  republic  to  take  ven- 
gence  on  the  citizens  of  Rome  themselves,  and 
capture  their  city,  which  were  at  one  time  the 
objects  of  the  French  republic  in  reference  to  the 
murder  of  Basseville.     But  it  is  difficult  to  con- 
ceive that  a  motive  so  slight  as  the  imitation  of 
this  or  that  model,  could  have  entered  into  the 
plans  of  a  government  desirous  to  avenge  so  cruel 
a  wrong.     It  would  be  as  fair  and  as  rational  to 
say  that  a  husband  and   friend   resenting   the 
wrongs  ol  a  modern  Lucretia,  are  actuated.by  a 
desire  to  "imitate  the  conduct"  ofCollatinus  and 
Brutus.     This  light  and  sneering  tone,  on  such  a 
subject,  is  as  revolting  to  common  sense  as  to  com- 
mon   feeling.      The  following   is   a    short   and 
unexaggerated  account  of  the  murder  of  Basse- 
ville,   which  sir  Walter  calls  "  an  affair,"  and 
seems  to  think  ought  to  have  been  speedily  for- 
gotten.    "  The  third  of  January,  i  795,  the  mob 
attacked  the  carriage  of  Basseviile,   as  he  was 
driving  out,  with  stones.    His  coachman  turned 
back  and  drove  to  his  hotel.      The  doors  were 
broken    open,    and   Basseviile   stabbed    with   a 
bayonet  in  the  belly.     In  his  shirt,  holding  his 
intestines  in  his  hands,  he  was  dragged  into  the 
street,  and  at  last  laid  down  in  a  guard  house  on 
a  camp  bed,  where  he  expired  the   next  day" 
(Montholon,  t.  iii^  p.  81). 

Sir  Walter  next  proceeds  to  assign  the  pur- 


CHAPTER  VI.  ,  'J^l 

pose  of  avciiging  this  outrage  as  one  of  the  oh- 
jects  proposed  hy  the  French  government  in 
authorising  Napoleon  to  invade  Italy.  In  the 
elaborate  instructions  of  the  6th  of  March  the 
subject  is  not  alluded  to,  nor  is  the  name  of 
Basseville  or  of  Rome  mentioned. 

At  a  later  period  and  a  different  stage  of  the 
campaign,  after  the  armistice  of  Cherasco,  when 
the  directory  saw  that  one  of  their  two  princi- 
pal enemies  in  Italy  was  humbled  and  disarmed, 
they  thought  of  Rome,  as  may  be  seen  by  their 
despatch  of  the  7th  of  May,  (Correspondance 
inedite  t.  i,  p.  i4^)»  ^^^^  then  with  sentiments  of 
moderated  hostility.  Yet  sir  Walter  a\ers  (v.iii, 
p.  97)  that   the   objeet  of  the  directory  at  the 
opening  of  the  campaign  was  'to  annihilate  and 
dethrone  the  Pope."     And,  as  if  to  accumulate 
misstatements  upon  the  commencement  of  this 
campaign,  he  adverts  to,  as  connected  with  it,  the 
proposed  coup  de  main  against  Rome  in  March, 
1795,  reference  to  which  is  made  in  the  fourth 
chapter  of  this  work,  and  in  the  twenty-first  note 
of  the  appendix  to  that  chapter.      It  was  bad 
enough  to  omit  all  notice  of  this  project  and 
Napoleon's  agency  in  counteracting  it,  in  their 
proper  place,  but  it  is  w  orse  to  introduce  them 
out  of  season,  and  encumbered  with  misrepre- 
sentation about  as  silly  and  positive  as  that  piece 
of  solid  ifjoimatiojiy    ''the  victory  of  Albenga.  " 
After  mentioning  this  project,  but  assigning  to 
it  no  date,  he  says  (v.  iii,  p.  99):  "Bonaparte 


54^  APPExM)iX. 

Tvho  was  consulted,  recommended  that  the  north 
of  Italy  should  he  first  conquered,  in  order  tliat 
Rome  might  be  with  safety  approached  and 
chastised.  "  The  absurdity  of  this  proposition 
is  a  proof  that  it  never  could  have  entered  the 
head  of  Napoleon.  It  is  like  advising  that  Great 
Britain  should  be  first  conquered  in  order  that 
the  isle  of  Anglesey  might  be  got  at  and  its  inha- 
bitants chastised — the  power  of  Rome  hearing 
that  proportion  to  the  strength  of  the  coalition 
in  the  north  of  Italy.  Napoleon,  as  has  been 
already  stated,  advised  nothing  about  the  north 
of  Italy,  but  insisted  that  unless  the  French  fleet 
first  obtained  a  mastery  in  the  Mediterranean, 
the  expedition  to  the  mouth  of  the  Tiber  would 
be  attended  with  disappointment  and  disaster. 
What  seems  to  have  misled  tfie  author  of  Waver- 
ley,  or  rather  to  have  given  occasion  to  his  ro- 
mance, is  the  following  remark  of  Napoleon, 
when  opposing  the  expedition  in  the  council  of 
war  (IMonthalon  t.  iii,  p.  8i):  "  Napoleon  v.as 
of  opinion  that  this  expedition  would  expose  the 
army  of  Italy,"  (that  is  by  depriving  it  often 
thousand  troops)  "and  would  itself  end  in 
disaster  •  that  if  notwithstanding  it  was  to  be 
undertaken,  it  would  be  necessary,  at  the  same 
time,  to  surprise  Mount  Argentare,  Orbitello, 
and  Civita  Vecchia,  and  then  to  disembark  the 
army.  But  ten  thousand  men  appeared  lo  him 
too  small  a  force  for  such  a  coup  de  mainy  etc. 
These  three  places  on  the  Roman  and  Tus:>:i 


CHAPTER  vr.  543 

icoast,  sir  Walter  conceived  T^eie  in  the  Alps 
and  the  north  of  Italy,  with  the  same  geogra- 
phical knowledge  which  persuaded  him  to  call 
the  Bochetta,  a  pass  betwixt  the  Alps  and 
the  sea. 

The  next  errors  with  which  sir  Walter's  en- 
trance upon  this  campaign  is  carpeted,  are  the 
reproduction  of  an  old,  and  the  commission  of 
a  new  fabrication.  Speaking  of  the  plan  of  in- 
vading Italy,  he  says  (v.  iii,  p.  loo)  :  it  "suited 
in  every  respect  the  ambitious  and  self  confident 
character  of  the  general,  to  whom  it  was  now 
intrusted.  It  gave  him  a  separate  and  indepen- 
dent authority,  and  the  power  ef  acting  on  his 
own  judgment  and  responsibility;  for  his  coun- 
tryman Salicetti,  the  deputy  who  accompanied 
him  as  commissioner  of  the  government,  was  not 
probably  much  disposed  to  obtrude  his  opinions. 
He  had  been  Bonaparte's  patron,  and  was  still 
his  friend.  "  From  this  we  are  to  believe  that  a 
desire  to  obtain  a  chief  command  and  indepen- 
dent authority,  was  peculiar  to  Napoleon  as  a 
general,  and  we  are  to  feel  persuaded,  that  am- 
bition and  self  confidence  are  the  principal  qua- 
lities displayed  by  a  commander  who  attacks  and 
defeats  an  army  double  in  number  and  strength 
to  his  own.  But  w  as  it  for  the  Avant  of  ambition 
on  the  part  of  Scherer,  or  self  confidence  on  that 
of  Kellerman,  that  this  command  of  the  army 
of  Italy  was  misplacedin  their  hands — Kellerman 
who    thought    himself  "the    firstv^ general  in 


544  APx^ENDlX. 

Europe. "  Were  ambilion  and  self  confidence  the 
leading  qualiiies  displayed  by  Miltiades  at 
Marathon,  Henry  V  at  Agincourt,  Henry  IV 
of  France  at  I>rv,  Marlborough  at  Ramilies, 
Prince  Eugene  at  Turin,  Frederic  the  great  at 
Lissa,  Prince  Ferdinand  at  Minden,  and  Jackson 
at  New  Orleans.  Is  there  no  such  thing  as  heroic 
enterprise,  contempt  of  death,  collectedness  in 
danger,  or  devotion  to  the  cause  of  ones  country? 
The  jriendsliip  and  patronai^e  of  Salicetti  the 
reader  v^ill  remember  were  proved  by  concur- 
ring with  Albite  and  Laporte  in  arresting  Napo- 
leon and  denouncing  jiim  to  the  convention  as 
a  mercenary  traitor  and  an  accomplice  of  Robes- 
pierre !  Further,  sir  Walter  Scott  ought  to  have 
known  that  Salicetti  was  not  the  only  commis- 
sioner in  attendance  upon  the  army  ofllaly,  that 
Gareau  was  his  colleague,  that  the  expression 
of  his  opinion  would  not  have  been  an  obtrusion 
of  it;  and  that  if  it  was  not  expressed  it  was  in 
consecpence  of  the  continued  triumphs  of  the 
general,  not  from  deference  to  his  ambilion  or 
self  confidence.  It  is  very  true  that  Napoleon 
was  on  principle  opposed  to  the  interference  of 
civil  agents  with  the  commanders  of  armies,  and 
as  will  be  remembered  had  protested  against  it 
on  the  1 2th  Vendemiaire.  This  was  not  the 
effect  of  ambition;  but  the  decision  of  common 
sense,  sanctioned  by  common  practice.  The 
British  government  did  not  send  members  of 
parliament  to  regulate  the  moveri:ents  of  lord 


CHAPTER    VI.  545 

Wellington.  The  Scotch  writers  and  critics 
have  never  forgiven  M.  Frere  to  this  day,  for 
his  interference  with  sir  John  Moore. 

But  sir  Walter  adds,  "the  young  general's 
mind  was  made  up  to  the  alternative  of  conquest 
or  ruin,  as  may  be  judged  from  his  words — "In 
three  months  I  v»  ill  be  either  at  Milan  or  Paris." 
Does  this  look  like  self  confidence  ?  Its  introduc- 
tion by  sir  Walter*  only  shews  the  inherent  in- 
consistency of  predetermined  error.     As  there 
appears  to  be  nothing  like  common  sense  in  the 
exclusion  of  greater    qualities  than   self-confi- 
dence and  ambition  from  this  part  of  Napoleon's 
career,  so  there  seems  no  reason  for  supposing 
that  the  circumstances  of  disorder,  disobedience, 
and  destitution,  in  which  he  found  the  army  of 
Italy,  were  likely  to  be  peculiarly  attractive  to  a 
person  under  the  influence  of  a  desire  to  gratify 
these  last  mentioned  qualities.  The  command  on 
the  Rhine,   or  that  on  the  Moselle,    offered  the 
prospect  of  more  speedy,  and  less  costly  success. 
It  V*  ould  disgust  the  reader  were  an  enumera- 
tion of  the  pert  fallacies  of  Lockhart  to  be  added 
to  this  notice  of  sir  Walter's  important  blunders. 
As  a  general  observation  it  may  be  affirmed,  that 
his  epitome  shows  a  total  ignorance  of  this  part 
of  the  subject,  and  as  much  injustice  of  imputa- 
tion and  confidence  in  error,    as  are  to  be  f  mnd 
in  the  work  of  the  author  of  Waverley  himself. 
Speaking  of  the  resentment  of  the  French  go- 
vernment at  the  shocking  and  unatoned  murder 

55 


5.^6  APPENDIX. 

of  Basseville,  he  also  represents  it  was  one  of  the 
motives  for  invading  Italy,  alleging  (v.  i,  p.  58) 
that  "the  haughty  repuhlic  considered  this  as 
an  insult  which  could  only  he  washed  out  by  seas 
of  blood."  How  much  Roman  blood  did  the 
French  army  shed?  Again,  after  describing  the 
positions  taken  by  Beaulieu  for  protecting  Genoa 
and  preventing  the  entrance  of  the  French  into 
Italy,  stating  that  he  placed  one  of  his  columns  at 
Yoltri,  another  at  Montenotte,  and  kept  the 
third  at  Ceva,  this  modern  Polybius  proceeds 
(p.  59)  "  The  French  could  not  advance  towards 
Genoa  but  by  confronting  some  one  of  the  three 
armies  thus  strangely  posted."  The  main  body 
of  the  French  were  in  and  around  Savona  and 
Loano ;  how  they  were  to  advance  towards  Ge- 
noa, by  confronting  the  allies  at  Montenotte  and 
Ceva,  it  is  not  easy  to  discover.  We  may  expect 
next  to  hear  that  an  army  stationed  at  St.  Cloud 
cannot  advance  upon  Paris  without  confronting 
a  force  posted  at  Versailles  !  —  or  that  a  force 
landed  at  Dover  could  not  march  upon  London 
without  encountering  an  army  encamped  near 
Edinburgh. 

Page  230. 

(18)  Scott  and  Lockhart  (v.  iii,  ch.  5,  and 
V.  i,  ch.  4)  seem  to  have  supposed  thatCervoni's 
movement  upon  Voltri,  was  directed  by  Napo- 
leon ;  whereas  his  correspondence  shows,  it 
was  made  before  his  taking  the  command,  and  in 
direct  opposition  to  his  plans  and  wishes.     But 


CHAPTEfl    VI.  547 

Norvins  ^Yanders  farther  from  the  fact,  and 
(t.  i,  p.  92)  expressly  asserts  that  it  was  one  of 
Napoleon's  first  operations.  In  his  despatch  of 
the  6th  of  April,  Napoleon  tells  the  directory: 
''The  movement  which  I  found  commenced 
against  Genoa,  has  drawn  the  enemy  from  their 
w  inter  quarters.  I  have  been  very  sorry  and  ex- 
tremely dissatisfied  with  this  movement  upon 
Genoa,  so  much  the  more  inopportune,  that  is 
has  obliged  that  republic  to  assume  a  hostile  atti- 
tude, and  has  awakened  the  enemy  whom  I 
wished  to  take  by  surprise.  It  will  cost  us  a  sa- 
crifice of  men." 

Page  Si.'O. 

(ig)  Among  the  innumerable  arts  and  strata- 
gems of  detraction  employed  by  the  author  of 
Waverley  to  diminish  the  fame  of  his  hero, 
some  are  so  low  and  palpable  as  to  be  among 
those  pratices  of  deception  called  tricks.  Of 
these,  one  is  attempted  at  the  expense  of  general 
Beaulieu;  an  officer  of  experience,  courage,  and 
activity,  who  had  been  selected  for  the  com- 
mand of  the  allied  forces  in  consequence  of  his 
services  in  this  very  war,  and  against  French 
troops  and  commanders-  In  describing  the  cha- 
racter of  Beaulieu,  Thiers  says  (t.  viii,  p.  227)  ''He 
had  distingnished  himself  in  the  Low  Countries. 
He  was  a  veteran  with  the  ardour  of  a  young 
man."  Scott  however  describes  him  (v.  iii, 
p.  loi)   "of  great  experience  and  some  talent 


548  APPENDIX . 

but  no  less  than  seventy- five  years  old,  accus- 
tomed all  bis  life  to  tbe  ancient  rule  of  tactics, 
and  unlikely  to  suspect,  anticipate  or  frustrate 
those  plans  formed  by  a  genius  so  fertile  as  that 
of  Napoleon."  The  reader  will  detect  in  this  a  sly 
and  awkward  attempt  to  make  Napoleon's  success 
as  much  the  consequence  of  the  age  and  imbeci- 
lity of  his  antagonist  as  of  his  own  wonderful 
genius.     Yet  the  archduke    Charles,   when    in 
the  flower  of  youth  and  spring  time  of  glory, 
after  being  instructed  by  the  failures  of  Beaulieu, 
Wurmser,  and  Alvinzi,  and  after  having  worsted 
Jourdan  and  Moreau,  when   opposed  to  Napo- 
leon,   made  no  better  resistance  than  Beaulieu 
did 

Page  251. 

(20)  We  are  told  by  sir  Walter  Scott  (v.  iii, 
p.  io4)»  whose  descriptions  of  battles  iii  poetry 
and  prose  have  been  universally  admired,  that 
"  Argenteau  descended  w^ow  Montenotte  ;"  the 
famous  village  of  that  name,  being  situated  on 
a  mountain  of  the  Appeninne  range.      It  might 
as  well  be  said  that  a  traveller  in  Switzerland 
descended  on   Mont -Blanc.      The  truth  is,  that 
Argenteau  occupied  Dego  and  Sassello,   and  as- 
cended by  the  route  of  Lower  to  Upper  Monte- 
notte.     Even  this  ludicrous  oversight  does  not 
arrest  the  prone  imitation  of  Lockhart,  who  (v.  i, 
p.  3g)  says — "  On  the  loth  of  April  d' Argenteau 
cajne  down  upon  Montenotte.^'     He  must  have 
dropped  from  the  clouds.    Jomini,  in  describing 


CHAPTER    VI.  549 

the  descent  oi  Xr^entesiU  (t.  viii,p.  67)  thus  ex- 
presses himself.  ''  He  moved  in  three  cohimns 
with  the  main  body  of  his  troops,  to  force  the  in- 
trenched positions  which  a  detachment  of  La- 
harpe's  division  occupied  on  the  summits  of  Mon- 
tenotte  and  Montehgino.'^  And  he  adds : — ''In 
order  to  give  a  just  idea  of  the  event  we  are 
going  to  describe,  it  is  indispensable,  that  the 
reader  should  be  convinced  of  the  importance  of 
the  position  of  Monlenotte.  It  is  composed  of 
a  small  chain  of  heights  situated  on  the  summit 
of  the  Appennines,    etc." 

Page  238. 

(21)  Las  Cases  (t.  ii,  p.  295)  justly  observes 
that  differences  will  be  found  between  the  offi- 
cial reports  of  Napoleon  and  his  account  dic- 
tated at  St.  Helena.  Among  them  he  says  is 
one  resulting  from  the  statement  in  the  former, 
that  xAirgenleau  had  but  fifteen  thousand  men 
when  he  attacked  Rampon  ;  while  he  had  left  a 
division  of  ten  thousand  in  the  rear  to  main- 
tain his  communications  with  Colli  at  Ceva. 
And  he  adds  that  it  was  against  this  division  of 
ten  th^isand  men  that  Massena  fired  the  first 
shot  on  the  morning  of  the  battle.  It  is  obvious 
that  in  many  respects  Napoleon's  reports  were 
necessarily  founded  on  what  he  supposed  to  be, 
at  the  time,  the  situation  and  intentions  of  his 

adversary. 

Page  258. 

(22)  Jomini  says  (t.  viii,  p.  72)  : — "  The  ge- 


55o  APPEM)lX. 

neral  in  chief  placed  himself  on  a  ridge  in  the 
centre  of  his  divisions,  the  better  of  judge  of  the 
turn  of  affairs,  and  to  prescribe  the  manoeuvres 
which  might  become  necessary." 

Page  240. 

(25)  Sir  Walter  Scott's  account  of  the  combats 
of  Voltri  and  Monteligino,  is  fair  enough.  His 
battle  of  Montenotte  however  is  a  curiosity  (v.  iii, 
p.  104).  "Cervoni,  who  retreated  before  Beau- 
lieu,  had  united  himself  with  Laharpe,  and 
both  advancing  northward  during  the  night  of 
the  nth,  established  themselves  in  the  rear  of 
the  redoubts  of  Monteligino,  which  Rampon 
had  so  gallantly  defended.  This  was  not  all. 
The  divisions  of  Augereau  and  Mass^na  had 
marched  by  different  routes  on  the  flank  and  on 
the  rear  of  Argenteau's  column  ;  so  that  the  next 
morning  instead  of  renewing  his  attack  on  the 
redoubts,  the  Austrian  general  was  obliged  to 
extricate  himself  by  a  disastrous  retreat,  leaving 
behind  him  colours  and  cannon,  a  thousand 
slain  and  two  thousand  prisoners.  Such  was  the 
battle  of  Montenotte,  the  first  of  Bonaparte's  vic- 
tories ;  eminently  displaying  that  truth  «nd  ma- 
thematical certainty  of  combination,"  etc.  From 
this  it  would  seem  that  if  two  corps  of  an  army 
unite,  and  advance  northward  during  the  night, 
while  two  other  corps  had  marched  by  different 
routes  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy,  that 
enemy  is  of  necessity  defeated  with  the  loss  of 
colours,  cannon,  slain,  and  prisoners,  by  virtue 


CHAPTER    VI.  55  i 

of  the  truth  and  certainty  of  mathematical  com- 
binations; and  without  any  thing  like  courage  or 
generalship  on  the  part  of  the  victors.  The 
commander  who  is  attacked  may  not  cut  his 
way  through  the  forces  in  his  front,  or  turn 
successfully  on  those  in  his  rear.  The  attacking 
troops  may  not  behave  badly,  nor  their  general 
act  timidly.  Jomini,  who  really  describes  this 
battle,  though  partial  to  the  allies  (t.  viii,  pp.  7 1 , 
7:2,  75),  attributes  the  success  of  the  French  to 
the  vigour  and  rapidity  of  their  attacks,  the  skill 
with  which  they  were  directed,  as  well  as  to 
their  superiority  of  force  collected  suddenly  on  a 
single  and  vital  point. 

Lockhart's  account  ''v.  i,  p.  SQ;  is  a  meagre  and 
close  imitation  of  sir  Walter's — both  intimating 
that  Augereau's  division  was  in  the  action,  though 
they  both  assert  the  contrary  immediately  after- 
wards (v.  iii,  p.  106,  andv.  i,  p.  40).  It  is  but 
fair  to  acknowledge  that  on  this  subject  Thiers 
is  not  behind  the  British  historians^  in  solid  in- 
formation or  vapid  romance  (t.  viii,  p.  23 1 ).  He 
says — "Bonaparte  that  very  night  withdrew  his 
right  formed  by  the  division  Laharpe,  at  this 
moment  engaged  with  Beaulieu  along  the  coast, 
and  advanced  it  by  the  route  of  Montenotte,  in 
front  of  Argenteau.  He  directed  on  the  same 
point  the  division  Augereau^  in  order  to  support 
that  of  Laharpe.  Finally  he  caused  the  division 
Massena  to  march  by  a  circuitous  route  across  the 
Appennines,  so  as  to  gain  a  position  in  the  rear 


552  APPENDIX. 

even  of  Argenteau's  corps.  The  12th  of  April 
in  the  morning,  all  his  columns  were  in  motion: 
placed  on  a  lofty  hill  himself,  he  saw  Laharpe 
and  Augereau  marching  on  Argenteau,"  Now 
so  far  was  Augereau  from  being  with  Laharpe 
and  in  the  battle  of  Montenotte,  that  a  physical 
impossibility  existed  to  prevent  it.  For  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  nth,  as  all  authorities  agree  in 
stating,  his  division  was  at  Loano,  from  which 
place  it  would  have  required  a  march  of  thirty- 
six  miles  through  the  Alps  and  Appennines,  be- 
tween evening  and  day  break  in  the  month  of 
April,  to  place  him  in  front  of  the  Austrians 
with  Laharpe,  while  this  general  had  but  about 
eight  miles  and  Massena  fourteen  to  reach  their 
respective  positions.  This  wanton  error  of 
Thiers  is  the  more  exceptionable,  as  it  assigns 
to  Napoleon  an  overwhelming  superiority  of 
force  in  the  battle,  and  effaces  from  Augereau's 
conduct  at  Milessimo  that  colour  of  fierceness, 
which  courage,  exasperated  by  emulation,  would 
be  likely  to  take,  in  a  character  so  ambitious, 
selfish,  and  vain. 

Page  244, 

(24)  Sir  Walter  Scott's  narrative  of  these 
Alpine  ''campaigns"  as  he  calls  them,  is  so 
sketchy  and  imperfect,  that  it  is  difficult  to 
mark  individual  errors.  He  asserts  however 
(v.  iii,  p.  107)  that  Bonaparte  "ordered  three 
successive  attacks,"  on  Provera.     Jomini,  who 


CHAPTER    VI.  553 

describes  all  these  operations  very  minutely,  says 
(t.  viii,  p.  qq)  that  Bonaparte  after  (Ordering  an 
attack  on  Provera,  ^vas  called  away  while  prepa- 
rations were  making  for  it  by  a  brisk  firing  at 
Cencio,  and  that  then  three  columns  were 
formed  which  advanced  against  Provera  simul- 
taneously, on  the  three  faces  of  the  hill.  These 
statements  correspond  with  Napoleon's  report  to 
the  directory  (see  Moniteur  of  the  27th  April 
1796),  and  with  his  concise  narrative  dictated  at 
St.  Helena,  v*hich  furnish  no  authority  for  the 
**  three  successive  attacks."  In  his  report  of 
the  action  he  speaks  of  but  one  attack  made  by 
three  columns  with  a  fourth  in  reserve,  and  ex- 
j3ressly  mentions  that  before  it  took  place  he 
was  called  away  by  a  firing  which  was  heard 
on  his  right.  In  his  dictation  to  Las  Cases  (Me- 
morial, t.  ii,  p.  274)5  he  says  simply  that  the 
attack  on  Provera  failed;  and  to  Montholon 
(t.  iii,  p.  184)  that  "  several  attacks  failed,''  and 
adds  that  during  the  battle  of  (he  i^th,  the 
general  in  chief  was  present  at  all  the  important 
points  of  the  line.  Taking  the  accounts  to- 
gether, it  appears  that  Napoleon  was  not  present, 
that  several  attacks  must  have  reference  to  the 
three  distinct  columns,  that  the  three  successive 
attacks  of  sir  Walter  did  not  take  place,  and 
that  admitting  their  reality,  ihey  were  ordered 
by  Augereau  and  not  by  Napoleon  in  person. 
In  a  letter  of  the  14th  of  Aj  ril,  the  day  of  the 
battle  of  Milessimo,  Augereau, in  reportingtoBo- 


554  APPENDIX. 

naparte   the  surrender  of  Provera,  says  (Corres- 
pondance   inc^dite,  t    i,  p.  58):  It  \vere  to   be 
wished  that  this   capitulation  had  taken   place 
yesterday  before  the  attack,  we  should  not  then 
have   to  regret    the  brave    generals  Banel  and 
Qu^nin, "  etc.       The   tactics    of  Lockhart    are 
equally  romantic  and  much  more  confused.     He 
affirms  (v.  i,  p.  40)  that  in  consequence   of  the 
battle  of  Montenotte,  while  Beaulieu  retreated 
from  Voltri  to  Dego,  in  order  to  reestablish  his 
communication    with   Colli,    Colli,    "with    the 
same  purpose  in  \ie\y  Jell  back   also,    and  took 
post  at  Milessimo."     Colli  all  this  time,  as  Lock- 
hart's  own  and  other  narratives  shew  (p.  Sg)  was 
at  Ceva,  at  least  four  leagues  in  the  rear  of    Mi- 
lessimo.  So  that  as  Argenteau  had  "  descended'^ 
upwards  ui^ on  Montenotte,  Colli  retreated /or- 
wards  to  Milessimo.      This  admirable  historian 
goes  on — '*Next  morning  (the   14th)  Bonaparte 
himself  arrived  at  that  scene  of  the  operations. 
He  forced  Colli  to  accept  battle,  utterly  broke 
and   scattered  him;    and  Provera,    thus    aban- 
doned, was  obliged  to  yield  at  discretion."    This 
is  as  like  the  truth  as  black  is  like  white.     Bo- 
naparte left  that   scene   of  operations    on   the 
morning  of  the  14th,   and   during  that  day  was 
employed  with  the  divisions  Massena    and   La- 
harpe  in    carrying   the   intrenched   heights   of 
Dego ;  where  he  received    Augereau's  written 
report  of  the  surrender  of  Provera  (Jomini,  t.  viii, 
p.  80).    And  so  far  was  Colli  from  being  ''forced 


CHAPTER    VI.  555 

to  accept  battle,"  that  he  himself  attacked  Au- 
gereau  repeatedly  with  a  view  of  rescuing  Pro- 
vera.  Napoleon  says  (Las  Cases,  t.  ii,  p.  274) 
"  all  the  attacks  of  Colli  to  disengage  Provera 
were  vain."  Thiers  (t.  viii,  p.  254),  and  Jomini 
(t,  viii,  p.  79)  confirm  this  account. 

Page  24o. 

(25)  This  active  and  intrepid  officer  appears  to 
have  been  but  momentarily  disabled  on  this  oc- 
casion, for  Napoleon  in  his  report  says  : — "  His 
soldiers  believed  him  to  be  dead,  but  his  wound 
is  not  dangerous,"  and  the  next  day  we  find  him 
engaged  at  the  head  of  bis  brigade.  Although 
he  was  under  Massena's  command  in  the  battle 
of  Montenotte,  he  seems  to  have  been  generally 
attached  to  the  division  of  Augereau.  However 
from  the  prompt  dispositions  and  rapid  move- 
ments of  the  French  commander  and  columns, 
the  brigades  belonging  to  the  several  divisions 
in  these  Alpine  operations,  were  occasionally 
interchans^ed.  Thus  in  the  battle  of  Montenotte 
the  bri^rade  Dommartin  was  with  Massena,  at 
Mondovi,  with  Serrurier. 

Page  268. 

(26)  It  appearing  useless  to  indicate  minutely 
the  imperfections  of  cir  Walter  Scott's  narra- 
tive of  these  battles,  which  is  altogether  erro- 
neous and  defective,!  have  determined  to  notice 
only    such   prominent    and   positive   errors,   as 


556  APPENDIX. 

shov/  not  only  how  indifferent  he  was  about  fur- 
nishing his  reader  with  facts,  but  how  ready  he 
was  to  supply  him  Avilh  ficJion.  \n  sketching 
the  battle  of  Mondovi(v.  iii,  p.  5) he  says:  "The 
dispirited  army  of  Colli  was  attacked  atMon- 
dovi  during  his  retreat,  by  two  corps  of  Bona- 
parte's army,  from  two  different  points,  com- 
manded by  Massena  and  Serrurier.  The  last 
general  the  Sardinian  repulsed  with  loss-  but 
when  he  found  Massena  in  the  meantime  was 
turning  the  left  of  his  line,  and  that  he  was  thus 
pressed  on  both  flanks,  his  situation  became 
almost  desperate.  The  cavalry  of  the  Pied- 
montese  made  an  efi'ort  to  renew^  the  combat. 
For  a  time  they  overpowered  and  drove  back 
those  of  the  French  ;  and  general  Stengel,  who 
commanded  the  cavalry,  was  slain  in  attempting 
to  get  them  into  order.  But  the  desperate 
valour  of  Murat,  unrivalled  perhaps  in  the  heady 
charge  of  cavalry  combat,  renewed  the  fortune 
of  the  field."  It  would  be  difficult  to  convey  a 
greater  quantity  of  misrepresentation  in  the 
same  number  of  words,  The  object  of  Colli 
wasnot  to  retreat  beyond  Mondovi,  but  at  that 
place  to  make  a  stand  where  he  had  strong- 
ground,  important  works,  and  magazines,  and 
was  actually  fortifying  himself  when  he  w  as  at- 
tacked. He  did  not  repulse  Serrurier  v.ith  loss, 
and  yield  to  the  movement  of  Massena.  The 
victory  was  gained  by  Serrurier,  with  the  bri- 
gade Guyeux  on  the  left  and   those  of  Dommar- 


CHAPTER    VI.  557 

tin  and  Fiorella  in  the  centre.     Napoleon  in  his 
concise  account  says  (Montholon,  t.  iii,  p.   189) 
"  SeiTurier  carried  the  redoubt  of  Bicoque  and 
decided  the  battle."      Jomini,  who  having  de- 
serted the  French    colours,    and  entered    the 
service  of  the  allies,  as  aide  de  camp  to  the  em- 
peror Alexander,  may  hv   deemed  the  organ  of 
the  Sardinians  in  this  campaign,  says   (t.  viii,  p. 
95)   after  mentioning   that    Serrurier    attacked 
the    centre  with  the  brigades  Dommartin  aud 
Fiorella,  '*  forced  thus  in  the  centre,  and  sur- 
rounded on  both  flanks  by  Meynier  and  Guyeux, 
Colli  determined  to  repass  the  Ellero.  " — Norvins 
(t.  i,  p.  98)  gives  a  similar  account — ''Serrurier 
carried  the  redoubt  of  Bicoque,  and  decided  the 
success  of  the  battle."     And  Thiers   (t.  viii,  p, 
239)  mentions — "  Serrurier  decided  the  victory 
by  taking   the  principal  redoubt."     This  injus- 
tice to  Serrurier  seems  to  have  been  occasioned 
by  sir  Walter's  confounding  the  check  that  ge- 
neral received  at  the  bridge  of  St.  Michel  on  the 
19th,  with  his  victorious  attack  at  Mondovi  on 
the  22d.     But  even  his  conduct    at   St.   Michel 
was  highly  praiseworthy;   and  his   misfortune, 
which  was  not  a  simple  repulse,  but  the  loss  of 
an  advantage  which  he   had  gained,  was  owing 
to  the  insubordination  of  his  troops.     Napoleon 
says    (Montholon,    t.    iii,    p      188)    "Serrurier 
would  however  have  maintained  himself  at  St. 
Michel,   had    not  a  regiment   of  light   infantry 
given  itself  up  to  pillage."     General  Despinois, 


558  APPE^D1X. 

in  a  letter  of  the  igth,  confirms  Napoleon's 
statement  (Correspondance  inedite,  t.  i,  p.  80)  : 
"We  Avere  masters  of  St.  Michel,  of  the  castles 
and  the  heights — in  short  we  were  on  the  point 
of  gaining  a  complete  victory.  A  part  of  the  di- 
vision of  general  Serrurier  unfortunately  gave 
themselves  up  to  pillage,  in  spite  of  the  efforts 
of  that  officer  to  prevent  it.  The  enemy  pro- 
fited of  this  folly  to  return  to  the  charge,  and 
the  conquerors  lost  their  advantage  in  an  instant  " 
Carnot  in  a  despatch  of  the  28th  of  April  to  the 
general  in  chief  says — "  Congratulate  on  the 
part  of  the  directory,  the  general  of  division 
Serrurier,  on  the  conduct  he  displayed  in  the 
attack  on  St  Michel  and  on  the  passage  of  the 
Corsaglio." 

The  next  assertion,  that  the  Piedmontese 
cavalry  made  an  effort  to  renew  the  combat  and 
overpowered  the  French  horse,  is  perfectly  un- 
founded. The  cavalry,  with  the  exception  of 
a  charge  by  Murat  with  a  single  regiment,  was 
not  engaged  in  the  battle  of  Mondovi,  nor  could 
be,  in  consequence  of  the  rough  and  precipitous 
ground.  This  is  clear  from  the  uniform  silence 
of  other  authors  respecting  the  cavalry;  from 
the  topography  of  the  place,  and  from  the  fol- 
lowing extract  from  a  letter  (probably  the  last 
he  ever  wrote)  of  the  brave  general  Stengel 
dated  the  21  st,  the  day  before  the  battle,  and 
written  on  the  heights  of  Vico,  in  the  immediate 
front  of  Colli's  right  wing  TCorrespondance  in^ 


CHAPTER    VI.  559 

dite,  t.  i,  p.  69).  "  I  regret  that  the  ground  does 
wot  permit  me  to  think  of  charging  the  enemy ^ 
nor  even  to  draw  out  mj  cavalry  from  the  place 
in  which  they  are  posted^  in  order  to  approach 
the  mountain  5  the  reverse  of  which  the  enemy 
might  occupy." 

It  follows  that  the  List  assertions  declaring  that 
Stengel  was   killed   in   the  battle  of  Mondovi, 
which  w  as  completely  decided  before  he  com- 
menced his  pursuit;  and   that  Murat   renewed 
the  fortune  of  the  field 3  are  attributable  solely 
to   the   ready   and   abundant    invention   of    sir 
Walter.      Stengel   was   killed,    as    the    reader 
knows,  after  the  battle  was  over,  and  beyond  the 
river  EUero,  in  charging  the  rear   guard  of  the 
flying  Sardinians  ;  and  for  any  thing  which  took 
place  in  the  battle  of  IMondovi,  might  have  been 
alive   now.     Lockhart's  epitome  becomes  more 
and  more  defective.     He    omits  all   mention  of 
the  combat  of  Dego  on  ihe  i5th,  where  Lanusse 
so  greatly  distinguished  himself,  and  where  the 
prudence  of  Napoleon,  which  was  so  conspicuous 
among   his  military  virtues,    received  an  early 
and  instructive  lesson  ;  as  we  see  him  immedi^ 
ately  afterwards  leaving  theentire  division  of  La- 
harpe  and  the  brigade  of  Victor,  to  protect  his 
rear,  and  sending  back  general  Cenoni  to   re- 
connoitre Voltri. 

Page  269. 
(27)  At  page   112   of   his    third   volume,    sir 


560  APPENDIX. 

Walter  Scolt  gives  a  summary  of  this  campaign. 
Although  he   admits  that  the  invasion  of  Pied- 
mont had  been   accomplished  ''with    so   much 
military  skill,"  he    overshadows  this  attempt  at 
justice  by  previously  ascribing  it  altogether   to 
fortune.   "  Thus  fortune,  in  the  course  of  a  cam- 
paign of  scarce  a  month,  placed  her  favourite  in 
full   possesion  of  the  desired  road  to   Italy  by 
command  of  the  mountain   passes,  which   had 
been  invaded  and  conquered  with  so  much  mi- 
litary skill."     The  reader  will  have  ascertained 
that  the  only  stroke   of  fortvme  which  occurred 
in  the  campaign,  was  the  wandering  arrival  of 
Wuckassowich  before  day  break  on  the  i5th,  in 
the  rear  of  Dego  ;  which  gave  the  Austrians  an 
unexpected  advantage,  that,  for  the  time  neutra- 
lized the  hard-earned  victory  of  the  14th;  and 
which  was  retrieved,  after  Massena's  effort  had 
failed,  by  the  promptness   and  energy  of  Napo- 
leon   in  person.      Indeed    sir   Walter   himself 
fairly  acknowledges  that  fortune  bore  no  part  in 
these  victories,  for  (at  page  1 1 5  and  1 16)  he  thus 
expresses  himself.      "  The  talents  as  a  general 
which  he  bad  exhibited,  were  of  the  very  first 
order.      There  was  no  disconnection  in  his  ob- 
jects, they  were  all  attained  by  the  very  means 
he  proposed,  and  the  success  was  improved  to 
the  utmost.     A  different  conduct  usually  charac- 
terises those  Avho   stumble  unexpectedly  on  vic- 
tory, either  by  good  fortune   or   the  valour  of 
their  troops.      When  the  favourable  opportunity 


CHAPTER  VI.  56 r 

» 

occurs  to  such  leaders,  they  are  nearly  as  much 
embarrassed  hy  it  as  by  a  defeat.  But  Bona- 
parte who  had  foreseen  the  result  of  each  ope- 
ration by  his  sagacity,  stood  also  prepared  to 
make  the  most  of  the  advantasfes  which  mia^hfc 
he  derived  from  it  " 

Notwithstanding  the  discriminating  and  manly 
temper  of  these  observations,  it  is  difficult  to  sup- 
press a  smile  at  finding  them  appended  to  sir 
Walter's  confused,  erroneous,  and  imperfect  nar- 
rative, in  which  are  found,  "  the  victory  of  Al- 
benga,"  the  "pass  of  the  Bochetta  betwixt  the 
Alps  and  the  sea,"  "the  descent  upon  Monte- 
notte,"  and  Serrurier's  defeat  in  the  battle  of 
Mondovi,  mistakes  which  independently  of  the 
more  important  and  calumnious  misrepresen- 
tations respecting  the  motives  and  character  of 
the  French  general  and  his  army,  render  sir 
Walter's  history  of  these  ''Alpine  campaigns,*' 
to  which  he  subjoins  this  formal  retrospect,  per- 
fectly unintelligible  and  ridiculous. 

Page  272. 
(28)  This  correspondence  consists  of  the  fol- 
lowing   letters   (Correspondance   inedite ,    t,  i, 

PP-  97-9^-99-^00)- 

^^  To  the  general  commanding  in  chief  the  French 

army  in  Italy. 

*'*"  From  the  head  quarters  of  the  Piedmontese 

army. 

"  23d  of  April,  1796. 

^*  Having  learned  that  his  majesty  the  king  of 

56 


562  APPENDIX. 

Sardinia  has  sent  plenipotentiaries  to  Genoa, 
thereto  treat  for  peace,  under  the  mediation  of 
the  court  of  Spain,  I  beheve,  general,  that  the 
interest  of  humanity  would  require  that  hostilities 
should  be  suspended  on  both  sides  during  the 
pendency  of  these  negotiations.  I  therefore 
propose  to  you  an  armistice,  either  unlimited  or 
for  a  definite  time  as  you  may  prefer,  with  a 
view  of  sparing  the  useless  effusion  of  human 
blood,  etc.,  etc.'' 

*' Colli." 

'^^  The  general  in  chief  of  the  army  of  Italy  to 
general  Colli^  commanding  in  chief  the  armj 
of  the  king  of  Sardinia. 

"  Head  quarters,  Caru,  24th  of  April,  1796. 

^'  The  executive  directory  has  reserved  to  it- 
self, sir,  the  right  to  treat  of  peace.  It  is  there- 
fore necessary  that  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the 
king,  your  master,  should  proceed  to  Paris  or 
wait  at  Genoa  for  the  plenipotentiaries  whom 
the  French  government  may  send  there. 

"The  military  and  moral  situation  of  the  two 
armies,  renders  a  pure  and  simple  suspension  of 
arms  impossible.  Although  I  am  individually 
persuaded  that  my  government  will  grant  peace 
on  honourable  conditions  to  your  king,  I  cannot, 
on  this  vague  presumption  stop  my  march. 
There  is  however  a  mode  of  accomplishing  your 
object,   conformably  with  the  true  interests   of 


CHL\PTER    VI.  563 

your  court,  and^vhich^vill  spare  an  effusion  of 
bloodj  useless,  and  therefore  contrary  to  reason 
and  the  laws  of  war.  This  is  to  put  in  my  pos- 
session two  of  the  three  fortresses,  Coni, 
Alexandria,  and  Tortona,  as  you  may  choose. 
Then  we  can  wait  without  hostilities  the  issue  of 
the  negotiations  which  may  be  entered  upon. 
This  proposition  is  very  moderate.  The  reci- 
procal interests  which  ought  to  exist  betw een 
Piedmont  and  the  French  republic,  inspire  me 
with  a  lively  desire  to  see  averted  from  your 
country  the  various  calamities  which  threaten 
it,  etc.,  etc. 

^'  Bonaparte.*' 

^'^  Tg  the  general  in  chief  of  the  French  array 

in  Italy. 

■"  Head  quarters  of  the  Piednionfese  army, 
26tli  of  April,  I  -g6. 

"I  have  communicated,  general,  to  the  (ourt 
of  Sardinia  the  letter  you  have  written  in  reply 
to  that  I  addressed  to  you,  to  notify  you  of  a  ple- 
nipotentiary of  the  king  having  been  sent  to 
Genoa,  charged  to  make  overtures  of  peace  at 
that  place,  and  to  invite  you,  while  waiting  tlieir 
result,  to  spare  the  eft'usion  of  human  blood  by 
a  suspension  of  arms. 

"  I  am  authorised  by  his  majesty  to  inform  you 
in  the  mean  time,  that  the  French  minister  at 
G^noa,    to    whom    the    plenipotentiary  of  the 


APPENDIX. 


664 

king  addressed  himself  on  the  subject  of  these 
overtures,  has  declared  to  him  that  neither  he 
himself  nor  any  other  person  at  Genoa  has  autho- 
rity to  enter  upon  such  negotiations,  but  that  it 
is  necessary  to  address  them  to  the  executive  di- 
rectory at  Paris^  which  alone  has  the  right  of 
entertaining  them.  Upon  which  the  plenipo- 
tentiary stated  his  intention  of  directing  his  fur- 
ther proceedings  on  the  subject  to  the  proper 
quarter.  While  by  these  means  (which  cannot 
fail  to  involve  some  delay)  we  may  accomplish 
the  desired  and  salutary  work  of  a  peace  between 
the  two  states,  the  king  desirous  of  sparing  to 
both  nations  the  calamities  of  all  sorts,  which 
hostilities  inflict,  has  not  hesitated  to  give  his 
consent  that  the  proposed  suspension  of  arms, 
which  you  seem  disposed  to  accept  upon  certain 
conditions,  may  take  place  and  be  determined 
upon  without  delay. 

In  consequence  H.  M.  orders  me  to  declare  to 
you  that  he  will  consent  to  put  into  your  power 
two  of  his  fortresses ;  that  is  Coni,  and  Tortona, 
as  you  have  demanded,  during  the  negotiations 
about  to  be  entered  upon,  and  in  the  manner 
which  shall  be  agreed  to.  In  virtue  of  which 
all  hostilities  shall  cease  from  this  time  to  the 
termination  of  the  said  negotiations.  And  in 
case  of  difficulties  which  may  arise  from  the  ac- 
tual situation  of  the  allied  army,  it  may  notbe  in 
his  majesty's  power  to  surrender  as  above  stated, 
the  place  of  Tortona,  H.   M.  is  determined   to 


CHAPTER    VI.  565 

offer  in  lieu  of  it,  the  fortress  of  Demont,  With 
exception  of  the  surrender  of  these  two  places, 
every  thing  shall  remain  in  statu  quo  with  re- 
gard to  the  countries  occupied  by  the  two  ar- 
mies, w  ithout  its  being  allowed  to  either  to  pass 
the  line  of  their  respective  limits;  and  conform- 
ably to  the  manner  in  which  the  whole  subject 
shall  be  settled  specifically  between  us. 

"Colli." 

The  reader  will  discover  from  this  correspon- 
dence that  the  concessions  demanded  by  Napo- 
leon were  as  moderate  as  the  ascendancy  of  his 
arms,   the  rights  of  his  government,  and  the 
safety  of  his  army,  could  possibly  admit  of;  that 
he  proposed  the  surrender  of  two  out  of  three 
fortresses,  and  accepted  the  offer  of  two  out  of 
four.     It  may  be  also  perceived  that  in  requiring 
this  security  against  the  proverbial  faithlessness 
of  the  court  of  Turin,  he  avoided  all  allusion  to 
it.     It  may  be  observed  too,  that  as  his  demands 
were  not   exorbitant,    so  his  declarations  were 
true.    It  was  true  that  the  directory  had  reserved 
to  itself  the  right  of  treating  for  peace.      It  was 
true  that  he  was  persuaded  they  would  grant 
honourable  terms  to  the  king;   since  their  in- 
structions  expressed    the    greatest    anxiety  not 
only  for  a  peace,   but  an  alliance  wdth  the  king 
of  Sardinia, 

This  last  observation  brings  into  view  a  state- 
ment of  Thiers  in  relation  to  the  conduct  of  Na 


566  APPENDIX. 

poleon  in    the   conference    at  Cherasco,  wTiicI* 
r.opears    to  be  bolli   unfounded  and  injurious. 
This  author  says  (t.  viii,  p.  ^45  et  244) ''  Bona- 
parte  could  not  suppose  the   directory  would 
consent  to  give  any  part  of  Lombardy  to  Pied- 
mont ;   for  it  was   not  yet  conquered,  and  its 
conquest  was  desired   only  for  the  purpose   of 
making  it  an  equivalent  for  the  Low  Countries, 
But  a  vague  hope  of  aggrandizement  might  dis- 
pose Piedmont  to  ally  herself  to  France,  which 
would    have    been   worth   a  reenforcement   of 
twenty  thousand  excellent  troops.     He  promised 
nothing,  but  he  contrived  by  letting  fall  a  few 
words  to  excite   the  cupidity  and  hopes  of  the 
cabinet  of  Turin." 

These  statements  are  not  only  inconsistent 
with  the  character  of  Napoleon,  which  they 
degrade  into  a  resemblance  with  Metternich 
or  Talleyrand,  but  totally  at  variance  with  the 
truth.  If  he  did,  by  a  few  words,  intimate  the 
probability  that  the  French  government  would 
enter  into  an  alliance  wilh  the  king  of  Sardinia, 
by  which  they  would  agree,  upon  his  furnishing 
a  contingent  of  ten  thousand  troops,  to  conquer 
and  cede  to  him  districts  of  Lombardy,  he  was 
authorized  by  the  letter  and  spirit  of  his  instruc- 
tions to  do  so,  and  was  expressing  himself  in 
strict  conformity  with  the  written  intentions  of 
the  directory.  That  this  is  the  fact  will  be  ad- 
mitted by  Thiers  himself  upon  reading  the  in- 
structions  of  the  6th  of  March;  and  more  par-- 


CHAPTER    VI.  567 

ticularly  the  following  clause,  explaining  and 
confirming  them,  in  the  next  letter  of  instruc- 
tion dated  the  7th  of  May.  In  this  letter  Carnot 
says  (Correspondance  inedite,  t.  i,p.  147)"  "In 
the  first  place,  make  the  conquest  of  the  Mi- 
lanese, whether  it  should  be  restored  to  the 
house  of  Austria  as  a  cession  necessary  to  assure 
peace  with  that  power,  or  whether  it  may  suit  us 
to  give  it  eventually  to  the  Piedmontese,  either 
as  a  recompense  for  the  efforts  we  may  engage 
them  to  make  to  aid  in  its  conquest,  or  as  in- 
demnity for  the  departments  of  Mont  Blanc  and 
the  maritime  Alps"  (that  is  Savoy  and  the  county 
of  Nice),  "  constitutionally  united  to  the  re- 
public." It  is  impossible  to  read  this  passage 
without  perceiving  that  Napoleon  when  con- 
ferring with  the  Sardinian  agents  upon  the 
prospects  of  peace^  could  not  fairly  deny  his 
impression  that  the  directory  would  grant  them 
honourable  terms,  and  be  disposed  in  conside- 
ration of  an  alliance  offensive  and  defensive,  to 
cede  to  Sardinia  out  of  conquests  that  might  be 
made  in  Lombardy,  an  equivalent  for  the  king's 
relinquishment  of  all  claim  to  Savoy  and  Nice. 
It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  this  misrepresen- 
tation of  Thiers  is  as  dow  nright  as  it  is  gratuitous, 
and  that  for  the  colour  of  subtile  and  faithle-js 
adroitness,  which  it  reflects  upon  the  character 
of  Napoleon,  inconsistent  with  the  tenor  of  his 
life  and  repugnant  to  his  disposition,  the  world 
is  indebled  to  the  fancy  of  the  French  historian. 


568  APPENDIX. 


Page  274. 


(•j.g)  On  the  subject  of  this  annistice,  sir  Walter 
Scott  is  thrown  into  convulsions  of  legitimate  in- 
dignation, which,  howeverhxdicrous  in  a  '^British 
historian,"  may  probably  appear  perfectly  consis- 
tent with  the  rank  and  dignity  of  a  new  Scotch 
baronet.     The  eflfusion  of  this  noble  sentiment 
takes   the  following  sonorous    and  magnificent 
form(v.iii,  p.  1 15)  :  '^  The  sovereign  of  Sardinia, 
Savoy,  and  Piedmont,  had  no  means  of  preserv- 
ing his  capital^  i^^J?  ^^^  existence,  on  the  conti- 
nent, excepting  by  an  almost  total  submission  to 
the  will  of  the  victor.     Let  it  be  remembered, 
that  Victor  Amadeus  III  was  the  descendant  of  a 
race  of  heroes,  who,  from  the  peculiar  situation 
of   their   territories,    as  constituting  a   neutral 
ground  of  great  strength  betwixt  France  and  the 
Italian  possessions  of  the  house  of  Austria,  had 
often  been  called  to  play  a  part  in  the  general 
affciirs  of  Europe,  of  importance  far  superior   to 
that   which   their   condition    as  a  second   rate 
power,  could  otherwise  have  demanded.  In  ge- 
neral, they  had  compensated  their  inferiority  of 
force  by  an  ability  and  gallantry  w^hich  did  them 
the  highest  credit,  both  as  generals  and  politi- 
cians ;  and  now  Piedmont  was  at  the  feet,  in  her 
turn,  of  an  enemy  weaker  in  numbers  than  her 
own''  (^her  owny/\i3Ll7).  *^  Besides  the  reflections 
on  the  past  fame  of  his  country,  the  present  hu- 
miliating situation  of  the  king  was  rendered  more 


CHAPTER  vj.  S6g 

mortifying  by  the  state  of  his  family  connections. 
Victor  Amadeiis  was  father-in-law  of  Monsieur 
(by  right  Louis  XVIIl),  and  of  the  comte  d'Ar- 
tois  (the  reigning  king  of  France).  He  had  re- 
ceived his  sons-in-law  at  his  court  at  Turin,  and 
afforded  them  an  opportunity  of  assembling 
around  them  their  forces,  consisting  of  the  emi- 
grant noblesse,  and  had  strained  all  the  power 
he  possessed,  and  in  many  instances  successfully, 
to  withstand  the  artifices  and  the  arms  of  the 
French  republicans  ;  and  now,  so  born,  so  con- 
nected, and  with  such  principles,  he  was  con- 
demned to  sue  for  peace  on  any  terms  which 
might  be  dictated,  from  a  general  of  France, 
aged  twenty-six  years,  who  a  few  months  before, 
was  desirous  of  an  appointment  in  the  artillery 
service  of  the  Grand  Signior."  The  probable 
inaccuracy  of  the  closing  assertion  having  been 
shewn  in  the  4th  chapter  of  this  volume,  and  in 
the  28th  note  of  the  appendix  to  that  chapter, 
it  is  worthy  of  attention  here  solely  in  conse- 
quence of  its  being  a  voluntary  aggravation  on 
the  part  of  sir  Walter,  of  the  royal  misfortunes 
which  he  so  ruefully  deplores.  But  if  the  ser- 
vice of  the  Grand  Signior,  a  monarch  whose 
power  was  much  more  ancient  and  extensive 
than  that  of  Victor  Amadeus  HI,  o^-  any  other 
Victor  Amadeus,  was  really  derogatory  to  the 
character  of  a  European  officer,  it  might  be 
demanded  in  what  consisted  the  dignity  of  this 
house   of  Savoy,  which  it  Avould  appear  to  be 


570  APPEISDIX. 

sacrilege  to  approach  either  hy  conquest  or  pa- 
cification. We  are  told  by  sir  Walter,  that  one 
source  of  his  dignity  was  in  the  king's  birth,  in 
his  being  "descended  from  a  race  of  heroes," 
and  being  father-in-law  to  Louis  XVIII  and  the 
comte  d'Artois  ,  being  ''so  born  and  so  con- 
nected" With  respect  to  the  circumstance  of 
"  being  so  born,"  the  reader  will  remember 
(2d  note  of  appendix  to  the  ist  chapter)  that 
sir  Walter  himself  pronounced  it  to  be  "  trivial 
and  unworthy  of  notice."  As  to  this  "  race  of 
heroes,"  ihe  only  one  of  the  king  of  Sardinia's  royal 
predecessors  who  was  famous  in  the  history  of  Eu- 
rope, was  Victor  Amadeus  I ;  and  his  fame  is  thus 
described  by  a  countryman  of  sir  Walter's,  on 
the  authority  of  a  kincr  whose  word  has  been  held 
to  be  law,  not  only  by  Louis  XVIII  and  the  comte 
d'Artois,  but  by  all  who,  like  sir  Walter  acknow- 
ledge the  fashionable  and  flourishing  doctrine  of 
the  divine  right  of  kings.  Smollett,  in  his  history 
of  England  (b.  i,  ch.  8),  mentioning  the  low  state 
of  fortune  to  which  the  prospects  of  the  emperor 
were  reduced  in  Italy  by  the  united  arms  of 
France  and  Savoy,  observes, — '^  The  emperor's 
prospect,  however,  was  soon  mended  by  two  in- 
cidents of  very  great  consequence  to  his  interest. 
The  duke  of  Savoy"  (then  in  strict  alliance  with 
France),  "  foreseeing  how  much  he  should  be 
exposed  to  the  mercy  of  the  French  king,  should 
that  monarch  become  master  of  the  Milanese, 
engaged  in  a  secret  negotiation  with  the  empe- 


CHAPTER  Vr.  671 

ror^'  Vvitli  whom,  as  the  ally  of  France,  he  was 
then  at  war),  "  which,  notwithstanding  all  his 
caution,  was  discoveredby  the  court  of  Versailles. 
Louis  immediately  ordered  the  duke  of  \  endome 
to  disarm  the  troops  of  Savoy  that  were  in  his  ar- 
my, to  the  number  of  two  and  twenty  thousand 
men  (Voltaire,  Siecle  de  Louis  XIV,  reduces 
this  number  to  five  thousand)  ;  to  insist  upon  the 
duke's  putting  him  in  possession  of  four  consi- 
derable fortresses,  and  to  demand  that  the  num- 
ber of  his  troops  should  be  reduced  to  the  esta- 
blishment stipulated  in  the  treaty  of  i6g6.  The 
duke,  exasperated  at  these  insults,  ordered  the 
French  ambassador,  and  several  officers  of  the 
same  nation,  to  be  arrested.  Louis  endeavoured 
to  intimidate  him  by  a  menacing  letter,  in  which 
he  gave  him  to  understand,  that  since  neither 
religion,  honour,  interest,  nor  allianceshad  been 
able  to  influence  his  conduct,  the  duke  of  Yen- 
dome  should  make  known  the  intentions  of  the 
French  monarch,  and  allow  him  four  and 
twenty  hours  to  deliberate."  This  is  one  of  the 
many  acts  of  unblushing  perfidy  performed  by 
that  father  of  ''a  race  of  heroes,"  Twho  was  a 
strane^er  to  the  sentiments  of  hojiow  and  reli- 
gioJi),  which  in  the  opinion  of  our  *' British  his- 
torian," ''did  him  the  highest  credit  both  as  a 
general  and  as  a  politician."  It  may  be  ob- 
served that  Louis  XIV,  the  revered  ancestor  of 
those  rightful  kings,  "  Mor.sieur  and  the  comte 
d'Artois,"  would  not  be  satisfied,  with  his  over- 


572  APPENDIX. 

whelming  army  under  the  duke  of  Yendome, 
Avithoutthe  surrender  *' of  four  considerable  fort- 
resses," while  Napoleon,   "a  general  of  France 
aged  twenty-six  years,"  with  his  small  army,  and 
with  the  Austrian  forces  before  him,  was  satisfied 
with  two.     Yet  Yictor  Amadeus  1,  had  not  en- 
couraged the  treason  of  Louis'  subjects,   nor  by 
means  of  it,  taken  possession  of  Toulon,   and  a 
large  French  fleet.     Passing  from  this   heroic 
progenitor  of  heroes  to  his  immediate  successor 
in  the  illustrious  line,  Smollet  (b.  ii,  ch.  4  and 
5),   says    that   Yictor  Amadeus  1   resigned   his 
throne  to  his  son  Charles  Emanuel;  and  that 
three  years  afterwards,  *' Victor  Amadeus^  the 
abdicated  king  of  Sardinia,  having,  at  the  insti- 
gation of  his  wife,  engaged  in  some  intrigues  in 
order  to  reascend  the  throne,  his  son  the  reign- 
ing king,   ordered  his  person  to  be   seized  at 
Montcalier,   and  conveyed    to  Rivoli,   under  a 
strong  guard.      His    wife,    the    marchioness   of 
Spigno,     was   conducted    to   Serva.      The    old 
king's  confessor,   his  physician,  and  eight  and 
forty  persons  of  distinction,  were  imprisoned." 
This  will  serve  to  convince  the  reader  of  the 
pious  respect  with  which  the  ''descendants  of 
this  race  of  heroes"  were  in  the  habit  of  look- 
ing back  upon  the  character   of  their  ances- 
tors,  and  "on  the  past  fame  of  their  country." 
In  respect  to  the  warm  affection  for  his  sons-in- 
law  by  which  it  is  alleged  Yictor  Amadeus  the 
third  was  engaged  in  war  against  "the  artifices 


CHAPTER    VI.  573 

and  arms  of  the  French  republicans;"  it  may  be 
observed  that,  inasmuch  as,  in  the  estimation  of 
all  loyal  and  true  baronets,  the  affections,  vir- 
tues, and  rights,  of  legitimate  monarchs,  are 
exalted,  sacred,  and  inviolable,  in  proportion 
to  the  extent  of  their  dominions  and  the  an- 
tiquity of  their  royal  descent,  it  may  be  safely 
asserted  that  the  king  of  Sardinia  could  not 
pretend  to  love  his  son-in-law  more  than  the 
emperor  of  Austria  loved  his.  Now  in  181 5  his 
apostolic  majesty,  provoked  not  by  the  ill  faith, 
but  by  the  misfortunes  of  his  son-in-law,  joined 
his  most  inveterate  enemies  in  a  war  against 
him,  and  prosecuted  it  with  unaffected  cruelty 
and  sincere  ingratitude,  until  he  had  taken  from 
him  his  crown,  and  separated  from  him  his  wife 
and  child;  and  made  that  wife  accept  as  her 
partner  in  a  dance  of  triumph  at  his  ruin,  the 
man  who  not  only  enjoyed  the  reputation  of  be- 
ing greatly  instrumental  in  her  husband's  down- 
fal,  but  in  having  him  murderously  relegated  to 
a  rock  in  the  African  sea.  Taking  this  conduct 
of  the  emperor  of  Austria  as  the  standard  of  mo- 
narchical feeling,  it  cannot  with  a  proper  res- 
pect for  his  imperial  rank,  be  admitted  that  the 
fortitude  of  the  king  of  Sardinia,  was  severely 
tried  by  being  placed  under  the  necessity  of  dis- 
continuing inconvenient  assistance  to  his  sons-in- 
law.  Yet  sir  Walter  Scott  seems  to  be  of  a  dif- 
ferent opinion,  avers  that  Victor  Amadeus  III 
(p.  ii5)  signed  the  treaty  with  France  with 
the  greatest  reluctance,   *'and  did  not  long  sur- 


574  APPENDIX. 

vive  it,"  language  which  the  imitation  of  Lock- 
hart  interprets  (v.  i,  p.  42)  "  died  of  a  hroken 
heart  a  few  days  after  the  treaty  of  Clierasco.'' 
But  even  if  Napoleon  could  be  held  accountable 
for  the  tenderness  of  Victor  Amadeus's  heart,  or 
for  the  treaty  of  Paris,  with  which  he  had  as 
little  concern,  it  would  be  difficult  to  prove  that 
the  death  of  the  king  was  the  effect  of  his  con- 
duct, since  that  monarch  survived  the  treaty  of 
Paris  instead  of  "  a  few  days,"  five  months,  and 
then  died,  in  his  seventy-first  year,  not  by  "  a 
fall  from  a  cherry  ti^ee,"  but  of  a  fit  of  apo- 
plexy. All  the  cruelty  with  which  Napoleon 
can  be  reproached,  consisted,  as  we  have  seen, 
in  requiring  and  obtaining  the  cautionary  sur- 
render of  Coni  and  Tortona,  when  as  sir  Wal- 
ter himself  confesses,  "\ictor  Amadeus's  capi- 
tal, nay  his  existence  on  the  continent,"  were 
at  the  mercy  of  Napoleon. 

Coni  and  Tortona,  both  these  authors  deno- 
minate "  keys  of  the  Alps,"'  Lockhart,  with  an 
abundance  of  solid  information,  describing  them 
as  the  only  kejs  of  the  Alps  (v.  i,  p.  40*"  And 
lastly,  wrested  from  his  hands,  Coni  and  Tor- 
tona, the  two  great  fortresses  called  ^'  the  keys 
of  the  Alps."  Every  body,  but  these  "British 
historians,"  who  ever  looked  at  a  map  of  Italy, 
knows  that  Tortona  is  at  least  fifty  miles  from 
the  Alps,  at  the  opposite  edge  of  the  plain  of 
Piedmont  5  and  that  an  army  invading  Piedmont 
by  the  passes  of  the  Alps,  might  take  all  the  keys 


CHAPTER    VI.  676 

of  those  mountains,  and  Turin  itself,  ^vithout 
being  within  a  day's  march  of  Tortona.  Yet  such 
trash  as  this,  mixed  up  with  calumny  and  contra- 
dictions, is  sold  and  circulated  in  England,  for 
the  instruction,  in  political  sentiment  and  histo- 
rical knowledge,  of  families,  whose  parents  stu- 
died the  thoughtful  and  luminous  pages  of  Hume, 
Robertson,  and  Gibbon! 

In  regard  to  the  rhapsody  about  the  kings  of 
Sardinia  playing  "  an  important  part,  superior 
to  that  demanded  bv  their  condition  as  a  second 
rate  power, ''  this  circumstance  instead  of  being 
a  matter  to  boast  of,  was  the  effect  of  shameful 
imprudence  on  their  part.  Nations,  like  indivi- 
duals, when  they  are  made  to  attempt  enterprises 
above  their  strength,  and  to  assume- characters 
out  of  the  range  of  their  position  and  qualities, 
are  sure  to  be  exposed  sooner  or  later  to  calamity 
and  disgrace. 

Page  276. 

(5o)  In  closing  his  reflections  on  the  military 
operations,  which  eventuated  in  what  Lockhart 
calls  the  "treaty  of  Cherasco,"  confounding  in 
one  pregnant  blunder  the  armistice  of  Cherasco, 
signed  28th  of  April,  and  the  treaty  of  Paris  con- 
cluded the  1 5th  May,  observations  escape  the 
author  of  Waverley  which ,  notwithstanding  their 
folly,  deserve  consideration.  He  thus  ediheshis 
readers  (v.  iii,  p.  116).  "  Bonaparte's  style  in 
addressing  the  directory,  was  at  this  period 
more  modest  and   simple,  and  therefore  more 


076  APPENDIX. 

impressive,  than  the  figurative  and  bombastic 
style  which  he  afterwards  used  in  his  bulletins. 
His  self  opinion,  perhaps,  was  not  risen  so  high 
as  to  permit  him  to  use  the  sesquipedalian  words 
and  violent  metaphors,  to  which  he  afterwards 
seems  to  have  given  a  preference.  We  may 
remark  also,  that  the  young  victor  was  honour- 
ably anxious  to  secure  for  such  officers  as  distin- 
guished themselves,  the  preferment  which  their 
services  entitled  them  to.  He  urges  the  promo- 
tion of  his  brethren  in  arms  in  almost  every  one 
of  his  despatches,  a  conduct  not  only  just  and 
generons  but  also  highly  politic.  Were  his  recom- 
mendations successful,  their  general  had  the 
gratitude  due  for  the  benefit;  were  they  over- 
looked, thanks  equally  belonged  to  him  for  his 
good  wishes,  and  the  resentment  for  ihe  slight 
attached  itself  to  the  government,  who  did  not 
ffive  effect  to  them.  " 

In  the  first  note  of  the  Appendix  to  the  first 
chapter  of  this  volume,  the  reader  will  have 
observed  an  index  pointing  out  the  biographical 
intention,  the  quo  animo^  with  which  the  author 
of  Waverley  undertook  to  descend  from  the  re- 
gions of  romance  to  the  high  road  of  history, 
and  to  furnish  the  public  with  a  life  of  Napoleon. 
The  passage  of  his  work  now  under  considera- 
tion, reveals  most  clearly  the  accordant  spirit  in 
which  that  intention  w  as  executed.  If  Napoleon 
recommended  for  promotion  such  of  his  officers 
in  tlds  active  and  sanguinary  campaign,  as  emi- 


CHAPTER  YI.  577 

Sienlly  deserved  it,  such  as  Rampon,  Lanusse, 
and  Lannes,  it  is  first  admitted  that  he  was  ac- 
tuated by  an  honourable  desire  to  reward  pa- 
triotism and  valour  -,  but,  lest  the  merit  of  this 
just  and  liberal,  though  common,  sentiment, 
should  attach  itself  to  the  character  of  his  hero, 
sir  Walter  hastens  to  balance  it  by  the  impu- 
tation of  a  mean  and  interested  policy — the  more 
mean  as  it  implies  a  design  upon  the  reputation 
of  the  government,  whose  confidence  he  enjoyed 
and  whose  army  he  commanded.  Regardless 
of  metaphysical  as  of  moral  propriety,  sir  Wal- 
ter thus  crowds  together  upon  a  single  and  very 
natural  act,  the  redundant  and  incongruous  mo- 
tives of  justice,  generosity,  policy,  and  fraud. 
This  compound  of  compliment  and  calumny, 
this  equipoise  of  admitted  honour  and  imputed 
baseness,  while  they  disclose  the  jusfe  milieu 
condition  of  the  author's  moral  sentim'^nt,  de- 
monstrate the  distinct  separation  which  the 
scheme  of  his  work  required  him  to  maintain 
between  the  course  of  his  narrative  and  the 
principles  of  justice,  in  regard  to  that  important 
branch  of  his  subject,  consisting  of  the  impulses 
of  his  hero's  heart,  and  the  motives  of  his  con- 
duct. 

With  respect  to  the  less  essential  qualities  of 
Napoleon,  we  shall  find  in  this  passage  evidence 
of  the  same  industrious  artifice  and  anxious  de- 
famation. Although,  in  1796,  Napoleon's  mili- 
tary reports   and   despatches  are  expressed  in 

37 


578  APPENDIX. 

language  modest  and  simple,  the  reader  is  as- 
sured, upon  the  word  of  a  baronet,  that  at  a  later 
stage  of  his  career,  they  will  be  found  to  assume 
a  style  bombastic,  inflated,  and  pompous.  When, 
however,  we  come  to  this  later  stage  in  his  ca- 
reer; when  we  find  him  on  the  banks  of  the 
Moscowa,  in  the  zenith  of  power,  conquest,  and 
glory,  and  admire  the  heroic  simplicity  of  these 
words: — ''  Soldiers!  behold  the  battle  which 
you  have  so  long  desired, "  etc.  j  sir  Walter 
protests  on  the  honour  of  "  the  great  unknown," 
that,  if  we  turn  back  to  an  earlier  stage  of  his 
career^  we  shall  find,  notwithstanding  the  sim- 
ple and  impressive  style  of  this  address,  that  his 
orders  and  reports  were  (v.  vii,  p.  272)  expressed 
in  that  "  tinsel  of  oratory  which  he  generally 
used  on  such  occasions." 

By  this  ingenious  process  it  will  be  perceived, 
that  the  author  of  Waverley  contrives  to  acknow- 
ledge the  merit  of  Napoleon,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  defame  him.  If  he  performs  an  act  of 
incontestable  honour  and  generosity,  the  natu- 
ral motive  is  artfully  withdrawn,  to  make  room 
for  the  farfetched  imputation  of  selfish  and  treach- 
erous policy.  If  he  discovers  a  becoming  mo- 
desty to-day,  it  is  instantly  asserted  that  he  will 
become  conceited  and  arrogant  to-morrow,  and 
therefore  that  there  is  no  occasion  for  praising 
him;  and  if  to-morrow  he  maintains  a  style  of 
severe  simplicity,  it  is  boldly  aveiTcd  that  his 
manner   of  expression   yesterday   was  remark- 


CHAPTkr.  VI.  5*70 

^hly  tinselled  and  tawdry  ,  and  of  course  that 
this  single  exception  can  entitle  him  to  no  credit. 
As  this  literary  legerdemain  when  exposed, 
must  disgust  all  persons  of  sense  and  dignity;  so 
the  attempt  to  contaminate  with  corrupt  mo- 
tives the  ordinary  solicitude  of  a  commander  for 
his  deserving  officers,  cannot  fail  to  offend  mi- 
litary men,  of  whatsoever  nation.  They  will 
•say  : — If^sir  Walter  ScotVs  rule  of  construction 
become  general^  our  utmost  gallantry  may  fall 
to  extort  recommendations  for  promotion  from  our 
commander  in  chiefs  who  must  either  neglect  usj 
or  expose  his  own  honour  and  delicacy.  It  is 
clear  that  by  this  forked  and  poisonous  process 
of  defamation— the  invention  and  practice  of  the 
greatest  writer  of  his  age — the  courage  of  Leo- 
nidas,  the  integrity  of  Fabricius,  the  patriot- 
ism of  Wallace,  and  the  virtue  of  Washington, 
might  be  plausibly  calumniated. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  had  Napoleon 
omitted  to  recommend  the  promotion  of  his  me- 
ritorious officers,  the  author  of  Waverley  would 
have  imputed  his  neglect  to  a  jealous  policy,  to  a 
desire  of  engrossing  the  whole  credit  of  the  cam- 
paign to  himself.  So  that  in  the  plan  of  his  work 
there  was  a  positive  certainty  that  the  memory 
of  his  hero  would  incur  censure  on  any  given 
occasion  ;  no  matter  what  might  be  the  nature 
of  his  motives  or  the  tenor  of  his  conduct. 

In  connection  with  the  predetermined  defa- 
mation,   sir  Walter  on  the  next  page  misrepre- 


58o  APPEISBIX. 

sents  and  ridicules  a  passage  of  the  speech  of 
M.  Daubermesnil,  a  member  of  the  council  of 
five  hundred,  in  celebration  of  the  exploits  of 
Bonaparte  and  his  army.  It  is  possible  that  even 
a  fair  version  of  the  passage  in  question,  might 
expose  the  French  orator  to  the  charge  of  extra- 
vagance.  But  had  the  author  of  Waverley  com- 
pared this  French  oration,  with  his  own  effu- 
sion on  the  death  of  George  III,  he  might  have 
found  M.  Daubermesnirs  flourish  about  Orpheus, 
Tyrtaeus,  and  Ossian,  tame  even  to  frigidity.  In 
a  memoir  which  was  published  in  the  Edinburgh 
Journal  of  the  8th  of  February,  1820,  sir  Walter 
Scott  poured  forth  the  following  strain  of  idol- 
atry, which  besides  shewing  his  incapacity  to 
discriminate  between  rank  and  merit,  and  being 
repugnant  to  every  sentiment  of  moral  dignity 
and  religious  feeling,  is  beyond  comparison  the 
most  successful  example  of  the  anticlimax,  to  be 
found  in  the  whole  compass  of  English  literature. 
ti  Were  a  voice  from  heaven  to  proclaim  aloud 
to  us,  that  there  is  another  and  a  better  world, 
in  which  virtue  may  expect  its  assured  reward^, 
the  testimony  of  a  miracle  could  not  impress  the 
awful  truth  more  deeply  upon  the  mind,  than 
the  life  and  death  of  George  the  Third." 

*^  Next  comes  Dalhoussey  the  great  god  of  war, 
'•'■  Lieutenaut-colonel  to  the  earl  of  Mar," 


CHAPTER    VI.  58 I 

Page  281. 

(5i)  No  kingdom  was  ever  before  conquered 
by  troops  in  the  state  Bonaparte's  were  in,  dur- 
ing this  victorious  campaign  against  the  king  of 
Sardinia  and  his  aiUes,  in  the  close  of  which,  as 
sir  Walter  Scott  observes  (v.  iii,  p.  ii5),  that 
monarch  "had  no  means  of  preserving  his  ca- 
pital, nay,  his  existence  on  the  continent,  ex- 
cepting by  an  almost  total  submission  to  the  will 
of  the  victor."  Their  distress  for  subsistence 
and  clothing  is  thus  noticed  by  the  Annual  Regis- 
ter of  the  period.  *'No  class  of  men  had  sig- 
nalized their  attachment  to  republican  principles 
with  such  fervour  and  constancy  as  the  French 
soldiery*"^**.  Hunger  and  nakedness  had  fre- 
quently been  their  portion  in  the  midst  of  their 
most  splendid  successes.****  The  army  of  Italy, 
in  particular,  had  exhibited  astonishing  exam- 
ples of  fortitude  in  the  most  trying  situations, 
that  their  enemies  had  concluded,  from  the  re- 
ports of  the  difficulties  to  which  they  were  re- 
duced, in  procuring  the  means  of  existence,  that 
nothing  else  would  be  needed  to  compel  them  to 
abandon  their  positions  and  withdraw  to  France. 
*  *  *  *  The  coarse  and  digusting  food  on  which 
they  subsisted,  was  compared  to  theLacedemo- 
nian  broth  of  old,  and  none  it  was  said,  but 
Frenchmen,  Greenlanders,  or  Scotch  highland- 
ers,  could  have  fed  on  such  messes." 

The  legions  ofCaisarin  the  civil  war,    were 


58: 


APPENDIX, 


reduced  to  great  extremity  while  investing  the 
camp  of  Pompey  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Dyr- 
rachium,  and  lived  for  the  most  part  on  bread 
made  of  the  root  of  a  plant  called  chara  or  wild 
cabbage.     Loaves  of  this  bread,  the  reader  will 
remember,  they  were  in  the  habit  of  throwing 
to  the  outposts  of  Pompey,    in  order  to  convince 
their  adversaries  that  they  were  not  likely  to  re- 
lax in  their  exertions,  for  want  of  food.     But  at 
this  time  Caesar  made    no  conquests.      On  the 
contrary    Pompey   made   a    sally   in   which    he 
gained  a  victory,  destroyed  a  number  of  Caesar's 
best  troops,  and  forced  him  to  break  up  his  camp, 
change  the  plan   of  the  war,  and  march  into 
Thessaly  (Caesar,  Bello  Civili,  1.  iii).     In  the  Par- 
thian war,  Anthony  and  his  troops  exhibited, 
under  privations  of  this  kind,  great  courage,  forti- 
tude and  patience;  but  it  was  in  a  retreat,  in  which 
their  efforts  were  confined  to  self-preservation, 
in  which  they  suffered  great  loss,   and  the  Ro- 
man  soldiers   pillaged  their  commander's   tent 
(Plutarch,  Life  of  Anthony).    In  sir  JohnMoore's 
retreat  to  Corunna,    although  his  troops  came 
to  their  colours  whenever  the  enemy  appeared, 
and  constantly  repulsed,   and   finally    defeated 
marshal  Soult,    the  British  commander  had  re- 
nounced all  hopes  of  conquest  and  fought  only 
for  safety  (Napier's  Peninsular  War,  v.  i,  ch.  5). 
Bonaparte's  short  campaign  of  Montenotte  and 
Cherasco,  in  which  with  an  army  half  as  nume- 
rous as. the  one  opposed  to  him,  he  subdued  a 


CHAPTER    VI.  585 

strong  kingdom,  in  a  fortnight,  and,  notwith- 
standing his  exertions  to  procure  regular  sup- 
plies, comparatively  speaking,  without  rations, 
cannon,  or  cavalry,  stands  alone  in  the  annals  of 
warfare. 

Page  281. 

(52;  In  a  letter  of  the  istofMay,  general  Ver- 
dier,  the  adjutant  general  of  Augereau's  division, 
reported  that  a  corporal  and  a  private  of  the  sixth 
regiment  of  carabiniers,  had  been  shot  under  the 
sentence  of  a  court  martial,  for  the  commission 
of  thefts  with  violence  (Correspondence  inedite, 
t.  i,  p.  119).  This  fact  would  alone  disprove  all 
sir  Walter  Scott's  assertions  about  Napoleon's 
system  of  marauding — (See  also  on  this  subject 
V^ictoires  et  Conquetes,    t.  v,    p.  2i/{). 

Page  282. 

(55)  Montholon,  t.  iii,  pp.  192,  195, — ^'  The 
minds  of  the  people  in  Piedmont  were  greatly 
agitated  •  the  court  did  not  enjoy  public  confi- 
dence; it  placed  itself  at  the  discretion  of  Napo- 
leon, and  solicited  an  armistice.  Many  persons 
would  have  wished  that  the  army  should  march 
on  Turin.  Officers  and  even  generals  did  not 
conceive  it  prudent  to  undertake  the  conquest 
of  Italy,  with  so  small  a  force  of  artillery,  ca- 
valry so  badly  mounted,  and  an  army  so  feeble, 
and  likely  to  be  reduced  every  day  by  sickness 
and  remoteness  from  France."  At  page  197  of  the 
same  volume,  Napoleon  recites  in  substance  the 


584  APPENDIX. 

arguments  of  the  officers  ^vlio  were  opposed  to 
invading  Lombardy,  and  who  suggested  '*  that 
it  would  be  more  advantageous  to  profit  by  the 
success  already  gained,  and  to  revolutionize 
Piedmont  and  Genoa,  before  going  farther." 

In  the  instructions  of  the  directory  of  the  6th 
of  March,  the  reader  will  find  the  following 
sentence,  "The  generalin  chief  will  endeavour 
by  all  means  in  his  power  to  excite  the  malcon- 
tents of  Piedmont,  and  to  make  them  breakout 
in  a  general  or  partial  insurrection,  against  the 
court  of  Turin."  Having  gone  beyond  the  hopes 
of  the  directory,  in  conquering  Piedmont,  Napo- 
leon could  aflford  to  disregard  this  odious  instruc- 
tion which  was  intended  as  a  means  of  gaining 
advantages,  which  his  campaign  had  without 
those  means  transcended. 

Page  284. 

(34)  It  appears  from  the  despatch  of  Car- 
not  of  the  7th  of  May  approving  the  armistice, 
that  Napoleon  had  obtained  the  assent  of  Sali- 
cetti  on  the  occasion,  a  form  which  although  he 
makes  no  allusion  to  it  in  communicating  to  the 
government  the  terms  of  the  truce,  was  no  doubt 
pleasing  to  the  directors,  as  it  seemed  to  make 
the  general's  departure  from  the  letter  of  their 
orders,  less  direct. 

Page  28S, 

(55)  In  a  letter  to  Napoleon  of  the  25th  of 
April  Carnot   says — "All  France,    all  Europe 


CHAPTF.R    Vf,  585 

have  their  eyes  fixed  upon  you.  Your  triumphs 
are  those  of  Hberty."  And  Lockhart,  the  editor 
of  the  Quartex'ly  Review,  in  1829,  speaking  of 
this  period  of  his  Hfe  observes  (v.  i,  p.  43)  :  '^  The 
name  of  Bonaparte  was  spotless,  and  the  eyes  of 
all  Europe  were  fixed  in  admiration  on  his  ca- 
reer.— The  contradictions  between  these  ex- 
pressions and  the  narrative  and  insinuations  of 
the  same  author,  and  more  particularly  of  sir 
Walter  Scott,  now  that  their  misrepresentations 
have  been  exposed,  render^  this  admission  of  no 
further  value  than  as  it  affords  for  the  progress 
of  this  work,  a  point  of  departure,  up  to  which, 
according  to  the  solemn  decision  of  a  "  British 
historian,"  and  the  obiter  dictum  of  an  exalted 
literary  judge,  the  spotless  name,  and  unqualified 
merit  of  Napoleon,  cannot  be  legally  disputed 
or  justly  denied. 

Page  28o. 

(56).  The  armies  of  Moreau  and  Jourdan  on 
the  Rhine,  although  it  was  understood  they 
were  to  operate  in  concert  vvith  tbe  army  of 
Italy,  remained  inactive  in  their  cantonments 
until  the  month  of  June  (Jomini,  t.  viii,  p.  i65). 

Page  28o. 

(57)  Maria  Louisa  confessed  to  the  emperor 
that  when  their  marriage  was  first  talked  of,  she 
experienced  a  certain  insuppressible  fright,  in 
consequence  of  the  bad  terms  in  which  she  had 


586  APPENDIX. 

been  accustomed  to  hear  the  members  of  her 
family  speak  of  Napoleon,  and  that  when  she 
reminded  them  of  it,  her  uncles,  the  archdukes, 
who  urged  her  very  much  to  consent  to  the  mar- 
riage, replied,  ^'  all  that  was  true  only  while  he 
was  our  enemy,  but  he  is  no  longer  our  enemy 
now.^'  '^  Indeed,  to  give  an  idea,"  said  the  em- 
peror, 'of  the  benevolent  feelings  toward  me 
in  which  that  family  was  educated,  there  was 
one  of  the  young  archdukes  who  often  burned 
his  puppets,  saying  that  he  was  roasting  Napo- 
leon (Las  Cases,  t.  i,  pp.  418-19)." 


i       Iff    t-i     *\    5  i      ■.* 


THE    END. 


ERRATA. 

Pabfacb,  in  the  last  page,  line  i,  after  and  erase  the  comma. 
Page  12  line  23,  for  ephemeroe  read  ephemern. 

32  line    '],{ov  drowed  read  drotvned. 

86    —    7,  for  with  t/ie  read  with  /lis. 
112     —     2,  after  coun  add  /rj. 
129     —     8,  after  </«cujj/o/j  insert  C6). 

142    —    'jyior  advance  read  advanced. 

1 54    — 23,  for  dreacAed  read proacheJ- 

191    —    9,  for  quai  read  qaay, 

197    —  19,  for  were  read  waj. 

262    —  16,  for  his  read  this. 

267    —    7,  for  troops  read  troopers. 

281    — 2'j,  for  in  read  his. 

Sir    —    8,  for  examples  read  example. 

3 1 3  —  1 5,  for  Butlofaco  read  Buitafoco. 

3 14  —    5,  for  prococit/  read precocitf. 
3 16    -^  10,  for  Amoult  read  Arnault. 

319  — 2  3,  for  fugitive  read  future. 

320  —  27,  for  poscit  read ponit. 

329  —  23,  for  fft/Aread  fo. 

330  —    I,  for  fen  read  ecen. 

467    —   8,  the  words/>ro/)Ojerf  an<i  to  be  erased. 
485    —  10,  after  viciout  insert  and. 
496    —    2,  for  had  read  Aaj. 
5 1 6    —  6,  full  stop  after  gold. 

5 1  8   —  i4>  for  bold  read  boldest. 

52  1    —  10,  for  letter's  read  letters. 

525  —  23,  erase  an. 

526  —     7,  for  exercice  raad  exercise. 
529  —  16,  for  soldiers  read  soldier. 
539  —    2,  for  (f Acncc  read  (v/ierc. 

546  — I  i,  for  strangeljr  read  stronglj: 
55o  —  2,  for  0/ judge,  read /o  judge. 
559    —  27,  for  Cenoni  read  Cerconi. 


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